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[E.N.A.

Prince von Bülow in 1908.

[*Frontispiece*

LETTERS OF PRINCE VON BÜLOW

A selection from Prince von Bülow's official correspondence as Imperial Chancellor during the years 1903-1909, including, in particular, many confidential letters exchanged between him and the Emperor

TRANSLATED AND WITH A PREFACE BY

FREDERIC WHYTE

EIGHT ILLUSTRATIONS

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
	PREFACE - - - - -	vii
I.	THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1903 - - -	13
II.	THE YEAR 1904 - - - - -	27
III.	THE YEAR 1905 : JANUARY-APRIL - -	91
IV.	THE YEAR 1905 : JUNE-NOVEMBER - -	127
V.	THE YEAR 1906 - - - - -	191
VI.	THE YEAR 1907 - - - - -	202
VII.	THE YEAR 1908 - - - - -	229
VIII.	THE YEAR 1909 - - - - -	289
	INDEX - - - - - -	343

198479

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Prince von Bülow in 1908 - - - *Frontispiece*

PAGE

The Imperial Chancellor's Palace, Berlin - - 32

The Emperor William II. - - - - 48

Herr Richard von Kühlmann - - - 112

M. Delcassé - - - - - - 128

M. Isvolsky - - - - - - 198

Count von Metternich - - - - 266

Prince and Princess von Bülow with a friend - - 320

PREFACE

THE letters and memoranda here translated are taken from a considerably larger selection issued in two volumes in Germany, with an Introduction of no fewer than 96 pages from the pen of an "anonymous" editor,[1] whom the publishers describe as "a very prominent personage."

This Introduction, written with a strong bias against Prince von Bülow, will have been read with much interest by the German circles to which it is addressed, and with particular relish by opponents and censors of the ex-Chancellor, but it contains only a few points or passages that seem to call for reproduction in this English edition.

The most important point to be noted is that the volumes were avowedly compiled without the consent and against the wishes of Prince von Bülow, who for some years before his death in November 1929 had been engaged in writing his autobiography. The Prince had been anxious, very naturally, to prevent the publication of these documents in popular form until he had been able to give in full his own version of the story which they partly tell. His standpoint, of course, will have been that they do not record the whole truth—that they call continually for elucidation and commentary; that the written words were often modified and corrected or explained by spoken words, etc., etc. Prince von Bülow's autobiography had been completed before he died, and it will soon be available.

If the Prince, as one may perhaps assume, knew something of the attitude likely to be taken towards him by the "prominent personage" in question, it is all the more explicable that he should have been disposed to veto the compilation,

[1] "Herausgegeben von einem Ungenannten" is the wording on the title-page. The title given to the German volumes is *Deutschland und die Mächte vor dem Krieg*, "Germany and the Powers Before the War." The documents come from the archives of the German Foreign Office through the medium of the *Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*.

for, as I have said, the tone of the introductory pages is distinctly hostile to him. The writer gives him credit for wit and charm and grace and resourcefulness as a diplomatist, but for very little else. Here is a typical passage :

> . . . It is impossible to think of a greater contrast to Bismarck than Bülow. Bismarck, the overwhelming heavy-weight, whom we think of to-day almost as a living monument ; Bülow, the light and smiling and elegant, the winning and cultured and courteous—Bülow, whose very dimples have taken their place in the small-talk of history. In one of his memoranda Bülow remarks that " one may cut arrows out of any kind of wood," a phrase which has in it something in the nature of a confession.
>
> Our era, in truth, could scarcely point to a statesman who has possessed a more brilliant array of talents, a more dazzling adaptability and a more polished courtesy than this master of the art of secretiveness. How wonderful, for instance, was the cleverness with which Bülow passed off on an admiring world as a success so transparent a failure as the Algeciras Conference ! But here we see his limitations ; whereas such a piece of juggling may have ministered at the moment to the Prince's fame, the actual events damaged it : they were, in truth, but the outcome of his incapacity as a statesman.

Many people have maintained that Prince von Bülow, had he been at the helm in 1914, would have prevented the War. In the December of that fateful year, when he arrived in Rome as German Ambassador, King Victor Emmanuel's first words to him were : " If you had been in Berlin all these stupidities would not have happened ! " When, in 1909, he gave up the Chancellorship, Holstein, for so many years the redoubtable head of the German Foreign Office, remarked to him : " If you go, war will be unavoidable." The writer of the Introduction is candid enough to record these testimonies, but he prefaces them with some characteristic observations of his own :

> . . . It must be declared with all possible emphasis : *Bülow beyond the possibility of doubt would have prevented the war.* This is a verdict which neither friend nor foe can avoid. For Bülow's strength consisted in saving quite lost positions, and one comes to feel that he almost wished for such perilous positions in order that they should enable him to display his mastery, just as the matador's supreme moment is that of his greatest peril. . . .

The writer of the Introduction seeks throughout to exhibit Bülow at his worst : as a pusillanimous and obsequious

flatterer of the Kaiser; as an ungrateful and false friend; and in his outlook generally—but, above all, in regard to Anglo-German relations—as a short-sighted and misguided politician.

The selection opens, he explains, with the Russo-Japanese War, because at this point "the network" round Germany "begins to be drawn closer." He proceeds:

> In the second letter we see the proud assertion that Germany is living in deep tranquillity and that her situation is fully safeguarded. Then in the first communication from the Emperor we hear his cry of distress to Bülow: "England is working at high pressure to isolate us"—a discerning judgment which Bülow, the ever-smiling, makes light of. Nor had the words any effect upon his policy.

The selection finishes with the end of Bülow's Chancellorship, not long after the episode of the famous *Daily Telegraph* interview with the Kaiser, upon which some interesting light is thrown.

Some thirty or forty pages of this German Introduction are devoted to an exposure of Bülow's blunders and follies during the intervening six years, illustrated by copious citations from his letters, and emphasized by hostile and scornful criticisms from the pens of other writers.

Among these he, of course, includes an extract from the vivid description of Bülow's attitude towards the Kaiser in 1903 given by Count Robert Zedlitz in his widely-read book.[1] Here is the passage in full. It will often recur to our minds as we read Bülow's communications to the Emperor, but, as we shall see in a moment, there was another side to the picture.

> Since I have been at Court I have had many opportunities of observing Count Bülow, the Imperial Chancellor, at the closest quarters, especially in the New Palace. He is certainly an exceptional and striking personality. He combines great amiability, strength of character, and adroitness with the charm of one of the most graceful *causeurs* that I have ever met. But I found, curiously enough, how often, in spite of these fascinating and often quite irresistible gifts, which give one the feeling that here at last we have a man "above the pressure of weight of the surrounding atmosphere," there came moments in which all faith in his strength of character was destroyed.

---

[1] "Twelve Years at the Imperial Court," by Count Robert Zedlitz-Trützschler, Controller of the Household; translated by Alfred Kalisch. (Nisbet & Co.)

No one could fail to admire—though it shook one's confidence—the inconceivable skill with which he would almost imperceptibly shift his ground whenever he had inadvertently expressed an opinion which did not quite find favour with the Emperor, and veer to his side.

At such times the Emperor would fix him with a penetrating glance, and would suddenly break in, and—at once or after a few moments—brusquely state his own opinion, which admitted neither of doubt nor contradiction. As soon as he saw that look, and heard that tone, this adroitest of courtiers would relapse into devout silence till he found a chance of once more insinuating himself unobtrusively into the conversation. At such moments the extraordinary gifts and the exceptional will-power of the Emperor impressed me more strongly than ever.

Most people would jump to the conclusion, after reading these lines, that Bülow was a weakling as well as a sycophant, unless they happened to have followed his career with some attention and to recall some of the numerous occasions on which, *when really important things were at stake*, he took his stand against the Emperor resolutely and effectively. We shall see instances of this in his correspondence, notably in his protest against the use of the words "*en Europe*" in the abortive secret Treaty of Björkö and in his attitude regarding the Kaiser's visit to Tangier.[1] The real truth of the matter surely is that, being intent on fulfilling his arduous and important duties, and realizing that he could succeed in this only by remaining upon good terms with his sometimes almost maniacal master, Bülow acted accordingly, treating the Emperor as a "mental case." This view of Bülow's conduct seems supported by some remarks which were made by Zedlitz's father in 1908. Count Robert Zedlitz had been criticizing the Chancellor again on the same score—it was a frequent theme of his. Here is his father's comment. I have put its last sentence in italics.

From Count Zedlitz-Trützschler, Senior.

Breslau, Dec. 29, 1908.

Dear Rob,

Your very interesting letter of the 22nd reminded me of a conversation I had with the Ambassador Schweinitz a few months before his death. The bright star you mentioned (*i.e.*, von Bülow) was just appearing on the horizon, and this experienced diplomat, with his shrewd knowledge of men, described him almost exactly as you have done, on the

[1] The Emperor's reply about the Björkö Treaty (see p. 171) is the most sensational document in the whole book.

strength of your observations over so many years. Full of gifts and skill until it comes to a fight, he is weak when the conflict is upon him. But on one point, in my opinion, you are both deceived. It is certain that men who had not said, " Yes, of course," " As Your Majesty has rightly remarked," would have been done for in a very short time, and would have made themselves so impossible that nothing could have been achieved in this way. *It is at any rate something for which we should be thankful that the coach has so long been saved from falling over the precipice and has been steered clear of the edge.*

FATHER.

It is the reader who is most keenly interested in the psychology of the ex-Kaiser and of Prince von Bülow [1] who will derive most entertainment from the pages which follow, but they contain something for almost everybody in any way concerned with international affairs. They include all the letters exchanged between the Emperor and the Chancellor that are given in the German volumes, but only a small fraction of the rest of the correspondence: a fraction made up of the documents that seemed to bear most nearly upon the main topics under discussion, such as the relations between the two principal letter-writers themselves, the relations between the Kaiser and the Tsar Nicholas and King Edward, the naval rivalry between England and Germany, the Franco-German tussle over Morocco, and last, but not least, the "Yellow Peril." Printed thus, without their context,[2] the letters tell a rather disjointed story, of course, but it is a story full of revelations and surprises.

FREDERIC WHYTE.

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[1] Any such reader, by the way, should not miss the enlightening and very amusing pages on the ex-Kaiser and Bülow in Dame Ethel Smyth's " Streaks of Life."

[2] They are, of course, thus printed in the German edition also, and without many footnotes. The task of supplying footnotes to elucidate all the minor obscurities and references to unfamiliar names would, indeed, have been endless, and the effect very tiresome.

For permission to use the passages from various books cited in the prefatory matter which introduces each section I must thank most cordially the authors and publishers named.—F.W.

I

THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1903

I

THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1903

NOTE.

As there are many allusions in the correspondence for 1903-1904 to the situation in the Far East, it may be useful to recall how matters stood out there at the time.

Towards the close of 1903 there was increasing tension between Russia and Japan, the prelude to the war of 1904. At the end of the war with China, 1894-95, Japan was in the possession of the Liao-tung Peninsula with the fortress and dockyard of Port Arthur. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895) these were ceded to Japan by China. Russia protested against the cession, arguing that the permanent occupation of Port Arthur by a foreign Power would be a standing menace to the Peking Government and the independence of China. Germany and France joined in the protest, and the three Powers began to move their warships eastward.

Japan, having as yet only a fleet of cruisers and lighter craft, gave way, and Port Arthur was restored to China.

A few months later it was reported that Cassini, the Russian Ambassador at Peking, had arranged a secret convention with China, giving Russia the right to construct a branch of the Siberian Railway across Manchuria, to Port Arthur, and empowering the Russian Eastern Fleet to use its dockyard and harbour as its naval base. The existence of the convention was denied by Russia, and she would have probably continued to deny it until the new railway was nearer Port Arthur, but, in the winter of 1897, Germany, to exact compensation for the murder of German missionaries in Shantung, sent a squadron to Kiao-chau Bay, and secured from China the lease of the place and part of the Shantung province for ninety-nine years.

On this, the Russian Fleet occupied Port Arthur, and by a treaty with China (March 27, 1898) secured a lease of it and of the Liao-tung Peninsula for twenty-five years, to be prolonged by mutual agreement. Japan protested, and at first hoped for support from other Powers, but England was satisfied with the "lease" of Wei-ha-wei, and France with a lease of Kwang-chan-wa Bay in Southern China. England also received a vague assurance that the Yang-tse Valley would be recognized as her "sphere of influence."

Japan then began preparations to assert herself against Russian domination in the Far East. The Army was reorganised and increased,

and battleships and destroyers were built in European and American shipyards. Russia also increased her fleet and began to concentrate it in Far Eastern waters, while her armies in the East were steadily reinforced. In 1903 the Viceroy Alexeiev, anxious for war before Japan's preparations were complete, assumed a provocative attitude. War was now imminent sooner or later.

Germany was friendly to Russia. The Emperor William had spoken rather wildly of the " yellow peril to European civilization in the East," and the friends discussed the question of safeguarding the " Russian rear " in Europe, in case of other Powers coming to the aid of Japan. Hence the suggestion of the neutralization of the Sound and the Belts, making the Baltic a closed sea against the navies of the Powers outside it.

F. W.

I

THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1903

To Count von Arco,
Ambassador in Tokyo.

"Berlin, Oct. 25, 1903.

"*Secret.*

"According to a Reuter telegram from London of the 23rd instant, Lloyds have doubled the insurance premium for ships sailing to the Far East on account of war risks. In other ways the London news is disturbing, particularly on account of the large coal contracts said to have been concluded in the last week principally for the Japanese, but also for the Russians, and for the British China station. This expectation of war would relate to an earlier stage, now closed. Yesterday news reached here from high quarters in Russia that Admiral Alexeiev [1] had aroused suspicion in the Tsar that he is working for war, and has been warned to keep quiet by a laconic telegram from the Tsar, 'I do not want war.'

"Immediately afterwards the Emperor Nicholas nominated a Commission to serve as a Board of Control to the Viceroy. Whence it follows that attack from the Russian side is not to be expected.

"I leave it to you to tell this to M. Aoki,[2] naturally in strict confidence, with the addition that the incident has probably resulted in strengthening Count Lamsdorff's [3] position. We shall, indeed, only have proof of the correctness of this news if Admiral Alexeiev be then really recalled to St. Petersburg to report himself."

---

[1] Russian Viceroy in the Far East.

[2] Viscount Aoki. He had been Japanese Foreign Minister, 1898-1900.

[3] Count Lamsdorff, Russian Foreign Minister.

To Baron von Schoen,
Minister in Copenhagen.

"Berlin, Nov. 13, 1903.

"*Very Secret.*

"Herewith you will find a note on the conversation of our Most Gracious Master with His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas. Against the passage where it is stated that Prince Hans of Glücksburg [1] has raised the question of the neutralization of Denmark and of Danish waters, His Majesty inserted in the draft: 'Permanent, on every occasion.' There is not the slightest doubt that a direct and abrupt refusal to consider the idea of neutralization would have exposed His Majesty the Kaiser and, indeed, German policy generally to all sorts of suspicions from the Danish and perhaps also from the Russian side. The acceptance of the idea in principle, *i.e.*, under reservation of later settlement of the details, was therefore a diplomatic necessity.

"About these details I should like to say one thing: First, it is questionable whether it would be of advantage to Denmark if the two Great Powers, acting on the well-founded view that Denmark is not strong enough for this task, themselves took in hand the defence of the entrances to the Baltic. This would mean the occupation of the strategic points on the Danish coast by Germany, by Russia, or by both Powers. Occupations of that kind are not welcomed by the occupied areas nowadays, because of the different instances in which a temporary occupation has gradually taken on a permanent character. Common action on the part of two Great Powers would perhaps recall in Denmark and elsewhere the German-Austrian common action of 1864. Yet common action could hardly be avoided, since presumably neither Germany nor Russia would be willing to renounce common occupation of the entrances to the Baltic.

"In addition to this special question, other far-reaching aspects of a general nature also come into consideration. Germany enjoys to-day profound peace, and our position is all the more secure in that we are not directly interested in the

[1] Hans, Prince von Schleswig-Holstein-Glücksburg, a Major-General in the Danish Army.

great questions in dispute either in the Near or in the Far East. Russia, on the other hand, may be suddenly involved in a war by land and sea. The Baltic, with the Pacific Ocean and the Black Sea, forms one of three maritime fronts of the Russian Empire open to attack ; it is, indeed, of special importance, because the capital lies in its area. If Germany closes the entrance to the Baltic to the attacking Power, she in fact makes the enemies of Russia her own. The consequences may develop in one of two directions. Either Germany will be drawn into the war, or the enemies of Russia will be induced to abandon the war by the movement of Germany to the Russian side. In the latter case the acutest hatred would be diverted from Russia towards Germany, as was the case after the Berlin Congress, and we should have to reckon in the future with the combined hostility of England, America and Japan to our colonial and commercial interests throughout the globe. I have propounded these ideas in detail in a telegram which I addressed to His Majesty from Sorrento before the Danish journey, and received His Majesty's approval of them. I particularly brought out the point that actual entry by Germany into the Franco-Russian group would be to invite a corresponding association of America and England.

"If we were to take upon ourselves the hostility of Russia's enemies the German Government would be justified —indeed, it would be under obligation to the German people— in demanding in principle complete reciprocity from Russia. But it is not clear how full reciprocity could be accomplished to-day. Even in a mutual guarantee of the existing territory there would be no equality, since Russia would hardly have to co-operate in a German war within any foreseeable time, while the present world situation shows that Germany might at any moment have to help Russia in the defence of her eastern frontier. Moreover, the Tsar's remark that he 'must keep the French on a string' leads to the conclusion that there can now be no question of a territorial guarantee which would make Russia a co-guarantor of the Peace of Frankfurt.

"His Majesty the Emperor has therefore given express orders that the passage in His Majesty's note dealing with Denmark is intended 'of course for your purely private guidance.' His Majesty added (I quote his actual words): 'Nothing must be done.'"

To Count von Metternich,
Ambassador in London.

"Berlin, Dec. 21, 1903.

"*Very Secret.*

"For some months, *i.e.*, since a great naval war has been brought into the region of possibility by the gradual aggravation of the East Asiatic question, the idea of a neutralization of Denmark and of the entrances to the Baltic in Danish waters crops up here and there in the Press.

"The well-known authority on international law and confidant of the Russian Government, Professor von Martens, has advocated this neutralization several times, most recently in the *Revue des deux Mondes* of November 15. High political circles in Denmark and the Danish papers are also discussing that question, either of their own motion or at the instigation of Russia.

"A real neutralization of the Baltic would obviously only be attainable if the great Powers interested in the defence themselves took over the defence of the entrances—the Sound and the Great Belt.

"There are many indications that this question will force itself on us sooner or later. Germany, which would only protect in any case a part of her commercial and maritime interests by the neutralization of the Baltic, should therefore consider in advance its advantages and disadvantages. In this matter the primary consideration is what would be the effect of the participation of Germany in the neutralization of the Baltic—a measure of a purely defensive character—on the political attitudes of England and the United States.

"Neither State has, so to speak, anything to gain in the Baltic, and they could only be interested in the freedom of the entrances into this sea from the point of view that under certain circumstances they might find themselves in a position of aggressive intention against one of the Baltic Powers, Russia or Germany. The prospects of a conflict with England or America are indeed not the same for Russia and Germany. Germany is only indirectly interested in the great disputed questions of the day in the Far and the Near East, while Russia plays a premier rôle in both. Both Russia and her

opponents must reckon with the possibility of an early and sudden collision. Germany's co-operation in the neutralization of the Baltic might therefore be regarded and handled by the Anglo-Saxon Powers as assistance in the defence of the Russian coast rather than as an assurance of the security of the German coast. Without a certain degree of clearness as to the possible repercussion of Germany's co-operation in the closing of the Baltic, it is not possible to judge the opportuneness of measures in many other respects desirable. I therefore beg you to make a reasoned statement on the question: Whether Germany's participation in the neutralization of the Baltic and the defence of the entrances to it from the side of (1) England and (2) America would be predominantly regarded as a practical means for German coastal defence, or as taking sides for Russia in the current questions in dispute, and what would be its eventual results. Wire reply."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Sunday evening, Dec. 27, 1903.

"*Secret.*

"I tender my humble thanks to Your Imperial and Royal Majesty for graciously forwarding the letter of His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas. . . . I beg respectfully to attach a draft answer to the political part of the letter, together with the original. With the help of the exhaustive explanations which Your Majesty was gracious enough to give me recently, I have given mature consideration to the question during the Christmas holiday.

"I think the surest way to avoid either being pushed up against England's naval artillery—needlessly, and to serve Russian ends—or giving any reasonable ground to the Tsar for dissatisfaction or mistrust, is to put upon the worthy King of Denmark the responsibility for the 'Project of the Scheme,'[1] demanded from us. This would also minimize the danger of the Russians making use of positive proposals

[1] The English words are used within quotation marks in the original.

from our side to bring the Chinese to unconditional withdrawal by the spectre of a German-Russian understanding in case of a Russian naval war. I ask allowance for my not quite perfect English.

"I have read with great interest Hinzpeter's letter, which I respectfully return. What a strange conjuncture that the Countess Korff-Schmising should pray to her ancestress, Saint Elizabeth of Thuringia, for the good Lutheran and Protestant Emperor! But this is an indication of the statesman like wisdom with which Your Majesty, by patience and justice, has gradually been able to lead back the Catholic aristocracy, embittered by the *Kulturkampf* [the religious conflict] to the path of loyalty and patriotism.

"Lascelles[1] will on the first opportunity speak to Your Majesty with regard to his Royal Master's proposed visit. His Majesty King Edward will assuredly understand that Your Majesty, on account of the importance of your cure, cannot be in Berlin before May. In the present state of affairs I should regard a visit from King Edward in Berlin as useful. The state of feeling at home towards England has long been calmer, but the state of feeling in England is still agitated. If His Majesty wishes to make the visit—he must know his own people and be informed of public opinion, and he is not in the habit of affronting either needlessly—then this visit must be possible also from the English standpoint. In my humble opinion we have no political reason for evading this visit. The saying of the oldest, and in many respects the profoundest, of all philosophers, Heraclitus, that 'things are in a state of constant flux' (*πάνα ξεὶ*) is also valid for the relations between States and nations. The moment may very well come for the English to recognize that their interest lies with us rather than with others.

"The charming postcard with the stout drummer of my regiment has given me great pleasure. It is being nicely framed and will stand on my table. I thank Your Majesty for the kind remembrance.

"I hope with all my heart that Your Majesty and Her Majesty the Empress have had a good Christmas. The old year now coming to an end has brought Your Majesty hard work, heavy anxieties and many conflicts, but also uninterrupted

[1] Sir Frank Lascelles, British Ambassador in Berlin.

and reasonably rapid advance, with unfailing energy in the right direction. For some weeks in the year I suffered painful anxiety on account of my Emperor and Master, but our prayers were fully answered. I shall never forget our anxiety and distress before October 10, and the joy and gratitude after it. May God bless, protect and guide Your Majesty in the coming year and for many, many years to come!"

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR COUNT VON BÜLOW.

"Dec. 27, 1903.

"'Reflections' as a basis for the letter to be written by the Tsar to the King of Denmark.

"The Tsar writes that Your Excellency might set down some notes; in your draft that fact will be ignored! It would not do, and would annoy him and inspire him with mistrust. The answer must therefore be conceived as if I were submitting to him extracts on the basis of *proposals* o the '*Danish*' *papers* which he might use as a foundation for a letter to the King which the *King expects* from him. To the latter I would write that the Tsar will get into communication with him himself and write to him about the matter.

"This question of Danish neutrality must be energetically pursued *as being mainly in the interest of Russia*, whom we are helping, out of kindness, as an 'honest broker.' But in reality it is from the military standpoint a *vital question for us.* It means doubling our strength in war if we can rely upon Denmark. For it is undeniable that England—secretly—is working at high pressure to isolate us. The essentially ridiculous Treaties of Arbitration always have the advantage of concealing or developing budding friendships, and giving forth a halo-like semblance of success which deceives the mob; as many countries happen not to be our friends, the intention is clear that we should be gradually isolated so that we can then be destroyed by them with a few hard blows! *And without Denmark that is easy.*

"The draft reply, which begins about Nihilism and anarchists

instead of about the Danish question, is not practical. These people—all the more because they are in evidence in Russia at the moment—should in no case be paraded before His Majesty. And as for co-operation against them, this phrase is so horribly hackneyed by its regular use in letters, notes, and your speeches, that it has lost all meaning. All the more that you, since your energetic attempt to secure a stronger attitude of the governments in this question—on the occasion of the murder of King Humbert—are obliged to see year after year go by without the slightest result in this matter. On the contrary, we have to put up with an officially recognized colony of anarchists in Berlin for the sake of the Russians, in order to lighten for the 'Little Father's' police agents their task of watching them! Therefore we may still spare our fine phrase. When you have laid before me the first order for a mass execution of these rascals, then I shall admit some ground for the above-mentioned phrase, but not till then.

"We must indeed accept the situation as it is. From Alvensleben's[1] really excellent report of yesterday it is quite clear that there is not to be war for the present. For England has clearly and formally refused the Japs the necessary money, and has bought under their very noses the Chilean ships that they wanted to have, so that they should not become arrogant through naval superiority and pick a quarrel.[2] Therefore the Japs[3] cannot now attack without the sure prospect of disaster. Delay can only help the Russians; they continually acquire more troops and ships by land and sea, and will *in time* gain so much the advantage that, although it might now be doubtful or difficult, war will be undertaken by them in the future with a steadily increasing prospect of easy success. Therefore there are general military-political reasons, partly of a local nature, which will prevent war.

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[1] Count von Alvensleben, German Ambassador in St. Petersburg.

[2] Here the Emperor shows he was badly informed. The purchase of the Chilean ships by England was regarded by the Japanese as a friendly act, preventing Russia from obtaining them. King Edward VII had acted as arbitrator in a dispute between Chile and Argentina as to the line of the Andes frontier. The two Republics were preparing for war, and two powerful battleships had just been built in England for Chile. Under King Edward's award, the Republics were to cease all armaments and dispose of their new ships. Japan secured by purchase two Italian-built ships and renamed them the *Nishin* and *Kasuga*. Russia was trying to purchase the English-built ships, but the British Government exercised its right of purchase and they were taken into our Navy as the *Belleisle* and the *Superb*. F. W.

[3] Thus abbreviated in the original.

"If enough docks are built to accommodate damaged Russian ships in an emergency, then in time sufficient troops would be concentrated in the Far East to make impossible any reverse at present foreseeable. Then the Russians will take Korea, perhaps Peking also, whether others like it or not. It is also to the interest of England that this latent possibility of war should continue and no great war arise out of it; that also keeps the Japs back. And since America has no spare dollars for them they can do nothing unless they risk a *coup de tête*, which is always possible, but this need not be considered in connection with the present political situation.

"The foregoing provides evidence that Russia can never use *us* in order to make *us*, as being in union with her, the means of bringing the Japs to 'withdraw.' They are 'withdrawing' just 'so' and for the reasons given above, or they will 'attack' as also above stated. Negotiation on the treatment of the neutrality of Denmark which allows us to seem equally interested with Russia does not change the Japanese tactics.

"*How we stand with the Russians* can be estimated exactly by every half-baked politician in the world ever since Wiesbaden. Anyone who has read our own and the Russian Press attentively—and it is possible to read between the lines—will not for one moment doubt that we shall not be hostile to the Russians in their Eastern Asiatic conflict.

"I recollect England's attempts from 1900 to 1902 to play us off against Russia in Manchuria, and the very clear refusal which that attempt met, and the check administered to them by your masterly reflections in the Reichstag. The facts are quite sufficient for an experienced politician. Never since '97—Kiao-chau—have we left Russia in doubt that we will protect her rear in Europe should she intend an essay in high politics in Eastern Asia which might lead to warlike developments (with the intention of relieving our eastern frontier from the frightful pressure and threat of the Russian armed masses!) Thereupon Russia took Port Arthur, and, relying upon *us*, removed her Fleet *from the Baltic*, thus *exposing* herself to us *by sea*. At Danzig in '01 and at Reval in '02 the same assurance was repeated, with the result that whole Russian divisions are being and were removed from Russian Poland and from European Russia to Asia. That would not have happened if the Governments had not come to an agreement!

That is understood by the stupidest Japanese or British Capman.[1] Therefore the '*well-informed*' *know exactly how we stand with the Russians*; for that, no threats are necessary! We already *know where we are*, the Japs included, and Copenhagen makes no difference. The miserable little squadron which we maintain in the Gulf of Pechili tells the same tale; it is eloquent enough to any military politician. *Too weak to be intended for help or feared as an enemy.*

"Since His Majesty *the Emperor himself* lays the greatest stress on the secrecy of the eventful arrangements concerning the guarantee of Danish neutrality, there is no reason to suppose that *he* will injure them or will allow them to be divulged by his Government. With regard to England, there is no reason for any anxiety about her hearing of the matter. And even if she did hear of it, it would not be a bad thing, since she has often in the past made ready for this emergency, and His Majesty would indeed be grateful to us if we took care that his dear old papa-in-law [*Schwiegerpapa*] was protected from all unpleasantness!"

[1] A slang word equivalent to "duffer."

II

THE YEAR 1904

II

THE YEAR 1904

NOTE.

The following extract from *The Annual Register* (Longmans) for 1904 will help us to understand better some of the allusions in the correspondence for this year:

The desire of the German Emperor to cultivate friendly relations with England, notwithstanding the proceedings of his Government, was manifested by the accession of Germany in June to the arrangements made under the Anglo-French Agreement as to Egypt; by the hearty reception which he gave shortly after to King Edward during his visit to Kiel, and by the visit of the German Fleet to Plymouth. In July an arbitration agreement, similar to that which had been concluded with France, was signed between Great Britain and Germany; and the demand of the German Colonial Society and the Pan-German Congress for the vindication of Germany's "commercial and political rights in Morocco" in view of the agreement concluded with regard to that country between England and France, and for securing "a German naval base" on the Moroccan coast, met with no response from the German Government.

But as regards the Far East the German Emperor openly favoured a policy of Russian and German aggrandisement at whatever cost to British trade and industry. When the *Petropavlovsk* was sunk he sent a telegram of condolence, proclaiming that "Russian mourning was German mourning"; and when the Viborg regiment of infantry, of which he was the honorary colonel, was despatched to the war he telegraphed to its commander congratulating it on its prospect of meeting the enemy and having the "honour of fighting for the Fatherland," and expressing his wishes for its success. When the Russian Fleet put to sea from Port Arthur on June 23, its object was manifestly to make for the German harbour of Kiao-chau, where it could be dismantled and be again at the disposal of Russia after the war, that being the only means of saving it from destruction by the Japanese.

In the province of Shantung, too, Germany's scheme of assuming a position similar to that of Russia in Manchuria had been partly carried out, though the Russian reverses had prevented her from completing it. She had secured railway and mining monopolies there and an extensive postal system of her own, and there were upwards of 500 German officials, professors, and traders in the province. Even in Chifu, its treaty port, the harbour-master and the Imperial Chinese postmaster were both Germans.

II

THE YEAR 1904

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Monday morning, Jan. 4, 1904.

"I have considered again and again Your Imperial and Royal Majesty's letter to the Emperor. At this moment the world situation is so tense that every word from Your Majesty doubtless falls with immense weight into the scales when war and peace are in the balance After once again reading Your Majesty's letter, I am firmly convinced that it will awaken suspicion in the Tsar and the impression that we want to encourage him to war at a moment when he appears to be hesitating before the decision.

"With all his friendship for Your Majesty, the Emperor Nicholas is timid and distrustful at the moment. Moreover, he will often have heard how his grandfather, the Emperor Alexander II, was in his time urged on to war with Turkey by Berlin, a war from which Russia in the end reaped nothing but heavy losses and the strengthening of Nihilism in the interior. I fear that the passage relating to Eastern Asia in Your Majesty's letter will startle the Tsar. This danger will be avoided if Your Majesty, in place of the passage put in red brackets in the draft, which I again return, were to write somewhat as follows . . .[1]

* * *

"We can this evening send a second messenger to Saint Petersburg and simultaneously telegraph to Alvensleben not to give to the Tsar Your Majesty's letter sent off by the first messenger this morning, but to substitute the letter which the second messenger brings."

[1] Bülow's emendation is not given.

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Jan. 8, 1904.

"I have the honour to lay before Your Imperial and Royal Majesty the enclosed document which the Russian Ambassador Count Osten-Sacken handed to me this evening.

"In this document complaints are made of false rumours which are being spread in the Far East with respect to the aims of Russian policy. Referring to earlier Russian communiqués, it was pointed out that it was a mistake to suppose that Russia intended to cut across the commercial and economic policy of the Powers in China and to deprive them of the advantages acquired by virtue of existing treaties with China in those areas occupied by Russian troops.

"Russia's chief preoccupation was naturally the protection of her fundamental political interests arising out of her territorial contiguity with China, and especially her great railway. She had not yet succeeded in assuring this protection by agreement with China on account of the ill-will of the Chinese Government. But Russia declared that at the present time, and without anticipating definite regulation in the future, she had no intention whatever of hindering the Powers in the enjoyment of their proper rights and privileges.

"Count Osten-Sacken expressed his hope for the maintenance of peace. According to his information from St. Petersburg, those in authority desired, if it were possible, to avoid war. Among other evidence, he stated that the Russian Secretary of Embassy in London, Poklevsky, who passed through here yesterday on the way to his post, had been commissioned in St. Petersburg to say in London, where he had many social connections, that Russia had none but peaceful intentions. In the view of those in authority in St. Petersburg, a war in Eastern Asia was not in the interest of Russia, since it would paralyse Russian participation in European affairs.

"Incidentally Count Osten-Sacken remarked that the English Press was agitated in tone but that the English Government was pacific and trying to do everything possible for the maintenance of peace. Considering the peaceful disposition of His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas, and of

E.N.A.

The Imperial Chancellor's Palace, Berlin.

the Russian Government, the only danger really lay in public opinion in Japan, which was being artificially worked up by the Japanese Press. It is to be hoped that the Japanese Government, which has more sense than the Japanese population, will succeed in calming the agitation. The Russian Government on their side will exercise all prudence and discretion in order to facilitate the task of the Japanese Government.

" The document submitted by Count Osten-Sacken, which he states is being sent to all the great Powers, reports a retreat of the Russian Government on the Manchurian question, Russia conceding to all the Powers an important part of what the Japanese had hitherto vainly demanded in respect of Manchuria. Probably this decision of the Russian Government is due in part on the one side to the steadily accentuated attitude of England, and on the other to the announcement of the American Government stating that American Consulates would be set up in Manchuria."

MARGINAL NOTES OF THE EMPEROR TO THIS REPORT.

" *Donnerwetter!* This is really too strong tobacco! ! So the poor Chinaman is responsible for all the trouble! . . . . From the above exposition one really cannot see how these men, overflowing as they are with love of peace, can really have brought things to such a pitch as to be on the brink of war! And no one—not even the ' Little Father '—has approached the Hague Tribunal! . . .

" This is what is called ' *réculer pour mieux sauter* '! If the Japanese view—as expressed by Hayashi—keeps the upper hand, then all the twaddle does not help Russia. Then the Japs will come forward and make war for the sufficiently clear reason that, as he says, now is ' *the last favourable opportunity.*' If the Japanese Government succeed in pacifying the war temper, and do not even send troops across to Korea, *then Japan has in effect lost Korea*, for she has missed her ' *last favourable opportunity.*' Russia then *appears* indeed to be the one ' *yielding* ' or ' *drawing back*,' but by further postponement she will become steadily stronger and her superiority less in doubt and Japan's prospects steadily less

favourable. After the threats and fuss and preparation for war, I should see in a renunciation by the Japanese of an expedition to Korea and in demobilisation without fighting, at the moment when Russia is *apparently drawing back*, a serious Japanese reverse, and a great moral success for the Russians. For, one might say, if the Japanese in the *present favourable* moment do not do anything to the Russians, when Russia, as can be clearly seen, is not prepared, then they will certainly not risk anything when after months or years Russia has been able to restore her superiority. That is to say, the *Japanese* are before everything else *Asiatics*—the Yellow Race, whose leaders they aim at being against the Whites—morally dead. Therefore—provided that the Japs do nothing and disarm—the momentary 'withdrawal' of the Russians is perhaps *a great moral success*! Especially in the eyes of the Asiatics, who are very important for Russia! The consequence is that wherever Russia may direct her attention—Afghanistan, Persia, Tibet—as soon as she expresses her wishes, the rulers in those countries will reflect: 'Japan, although *supported by England*, does not dare to affront the Muscovites, therefore England alone will not!'

"The note should be answered in this sense.

"WILLIAM I.R.

"P.S.—My admiration of 'the prudence and discretion,' of the Russians is to be particularly stressed; and it should be indicated that the points cited are particularly suitable for the Hague Tribunal."

To BARON VON HOLSTEIN,
REPORTS COUNCILLOR[1] OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

"BERLIN, Jan. 15, 1904.

"The 'previous question' to be raised before answering your enquiry is whether you think war or peace in the Far East

[1] The actual heading to the letter is *An den vortragenden Rat im Auswärtigen Amt von Holstein. Vortragenden Rat* means literally "Reporting Councillor." In point of fact, Baron von Holstein was at this time, and until his death in 1911, the "presiding genius" of the Foreign Office.

more advantageous to us. The *démarche* inspired by you in Tokyo would, so far as I can judge, rather diminish the chances of a conflict. Moreover, we cannot very well, as regards Japan, refer to the very secret and purely personal telegram of His Majesty to the Tsar. His Majesty has no intention of putting himself forward as the champion of the white race against the yellow race, but His Majesty rightly desires that, however the dice may fall in the East, his good relationship with the Tsar and our diplomatic relations with Russia shall emerge uninjured from the conflict."

MEMORANDUM.

"BERLIN, Jan. 16, 1904.

"*Very Secret.*

"His Majesty is in complete agreement with me that for the moment we should maintain reserve with regard to the Russo-Japanese conflict, and, above all, avoid anything that might particularly awaken a suspicion in Russia that we are urging war. Russia and the Russian Tsar must, whatever may be the course of the present East Asiatic crisis, be convinced that they have in the German Emperor and in the German Government a loyal and safe neighbour.

"His Majesty stated to-day that it seemed to him not impossible that Russia might seek our support in one form or another if circumstances became more critical. Since in politics one must be prepared for all eventualities, he asked me to set down my views on the question of what counter-demands we could make in such a case.

"The earlier I am able to submit to His Majesty an *aide-mémoire* on these lines the better. It should not be too long and should not be concerned with special stipulations. It must be drawn up in short clear propositions. It should not give the impression that we primarily or in principle fear an understanding or transaction with Russia. But it may well be asked why we cannot engage ourselves on the side of Russia without binding and adequate undertakings from the Russian side. It is important eventually to find a formula for this which will not arouse distrust in the Tsar, or give the Russian Government occasion

to contemplate an understanding *à tout prix* with Japan, England, and America, or further concessions to France. The main point is the formulation of those guarantees which we should eventually ask from Russia."

MEMORANDUM.

" BERLIN, Feb. 14, 1904.

" *Secret.*

" His Majesty the Emperor told me yesterday he was deeply disappointed by the Tsar's answer to his letter. He had hoped that the warmth of his letter would induce the Tsar to turn the whole of his power against Japan. Instead of that the attitude of the Emperor Nicholas still remains as pusillanimous as before; he seems not to want to fight, and it is not impossible that he might leave Manchuria to the Japs in the end without a blow or with slight resistance. Such a turn of affairs must under all circumstances be prevented. I replied that the surest means of securing the conclusion by the Russians of a hasty and contemptible [*faulen*] peace with Japan would be imprudent German encouragement addressed to the Tsar. If the Tsar realizes His Majesty's anxiety that he should set his teeth in Japan, that will induce him to let go immediately.

" His Majesty replied that I might be right from the statesman's point of view. He, however, had the sentiments of a sovereign, and as such the ridicule to which the Emperor Nicholas exposed himself by his flabby procedure wounded him. By it the Tsar was compromising all great sovereigns. In the interest of the prestige of monarchy something must be done to make the Emperor Nicholas act with more decision. I replied that His Majesty's duty was only to maintain his own honour and the interest of the Russian and German nation. For other rulers and nations the German Emperor was not responsible. The Emperor Wilhelm I and Frederick the Great would not have bothered their heads about the others. It was a matter of perfect indifference to the Great King what Louis XV and Peter III might do if he was only certain of his own advantage. His Majesty expressed the opinion that times were different

now. In those days there were no Socialists and Nihilists to reap advantage from the folly of princes. By his weak-kneed behaviour, the Tsar was injuring the monarchical principle. He should go to Moscow, summon Holy Russia to battle, mobilize the whole army, etc. I said His Majesty should leave it to the Tsar to decide whether he would do that. Princes like advice even less than other men. Too much advice would not turn the Emperor Nicholas in the direction desired, but would annoy him and make him distrustful.

"His Majesty agreed that my arguments might be applicable from the political standpoint. But I overlooked an enormous danger which he, as a sovereign, was better able to appreciate than diplomats, who ordinarily reckoned with the present, namely the Yellow Peril. This was the greatest danger threatening the white race, Christendom, and European civilization. If the Russians retreated further before the Japanese, the yellow race would be in Moscow or Posen in twenty years' time. When I interposed that I did not believe in this danger, and that in any case it affected all the other World-Powers, Russia, England, America, and France, more seriously than ourselves, His Majesty insisted on his view, which I should put down in black-and-white and place in the archives. It was shameful for England to leave her Russian ally in the lurch, and for England and the United States to sympathize with Japan. We must draw the Tsar's attention to the magnitude of the Yellow Peril, which he had not yet grasped. I replied that this would only result in the Tsar's asking us to give him armed assistance against a peril which seemed to us so serious. That would entail war with England.

His Majesty the Emperor asked what issue I imagined for the dangerous situation created by the weakness of the Tsar, the perfidy of the English, and the self-seeking of the French. I told His Majesty that we were concerned only with avoiding two things: first, injury to our relations with Russia through the war. To this end we must avoid everything that might make us appear in Russia as untrustworthy or malicious or treacherous neighbours. His Majesty also should do nothing that might estrange the Tsar personally. Secondly, we must carefully avoid allowing ourselves to be pushed by the Russians into an attitude

of hostility towards Japan, or, indeed, towards England. We should avoid both risks best by cultivating a calm attitude."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Feb. 18, 1904.

"I have the honour humbly to inform Your Imperial and Royal Majesty that the movement secretly inspired by us in the United States of America for the neutralization of China—with the exception of Manchuria—during the present war has so far succeeded, and that our co-operation has made a good impression. For the time being an end has been put, we hope, to the reports repeatedly cropping up that Germany wishes to use the present conflict for selfish purposes.

"Moreover, Your Majesty's Ambassador in Peking, whom I specially charged to inform the Chinese Government of our successful *démarche* on her behalf, and to impress upon them the importance of a reciprocal attitude, reports as follows: 'The Ministers of the Waiwupu ask me to express to the Imperial Government their profound thanks for the steps taken for the benefit of China, and to give assurance that China will make every effort to maintain a strictly neutral attitude in accordance with the Imperial edict issued yesterday.'

"Your Majesty's Ambassador in Washington, under date of the 13th inst., was able to report on the matter as follows: 'The Secretary of State informs me that in addition to Italy, Austria-Hungary, and England, France also has to-day agreed to the American communication in principle. Mr. Hay admits that Delcassé made this pronouncement through the French Ambassador here only after enquiry in Petersburg, and that Russia, as Japan has already done, will accept the American proposal'—the final agreement of Russia is, in the opinion of Your Majesty's Ambassador in St. Petersburg, shortly to be expected. Under date of the 15th inst., evening, Count Alvensleben reports as follows: 'The effect of the explanation which I have just given Count Lamsdorff

with regard to our attitude to the American proposal was evidently favourable. I think that I succeeded in completely removing the remnants of distrust. Count Lamsdorff thanked me and expressed his satisfaction that Germany had kept the political aspect of the question quite separate. Admiral Alexeiev had, as Count Lamsdorff confidentially informed me, expressed himself without hesitation against the neutralization of China on the supposition that Manchuria, the area of the eventual war zone, and the railways would be excluded, so long as this neutrality was conscientiously and correctly observed by China and Japan. The American Government will agree to the foregoing as soon as His Majesty the Emperor has notified his approval, presumably to-morrow.' "

To the Emperor William II.

" Berlin, Feb. 26, 1904.

" I should like first of all to say to Your Imperial and Royal Majesty how deeply the death of the little Prince in Kiel has distressed me. May God console and strengthen the Royal parents, who love their children so devotedly and will be broken-hearted.

" I tender respectful and hearty thanks for Your Majesty's gracious note. I am also very grateful for Leuthold's[1] visit. I shall be obliged to take care for a few days as I have caught a bad cold and am very hoarse. If Szögyenyi comes again I shall tell him that it is the fault of his friends of the B.T.[2]

" The news which Your Majesty was kind enough to give me interested me extremely. I fully share the view that the English will leave no opportunity unused. That this opinion is also shared in French circles appears from the enclosed illustration from yesterday's *Charivari*. *Charivari* thinks that France's participation in the Russo-Japanese War will induce the English to raise their terms higher.

" After the outbreak of war, the most immediate danger was that England would instigate unrest in China and then establish herself as the protector of world-commerce on

[1] The Emperor's physician.

[2] The *Berliner Tageblatt*.

the Yang-Tse. This danger, indeed, is not quite removed, but was pushed into the background after the Americans succeeded in securing the acceptance of the idea of a neutralization of China under the protection of all the Powers. The English have tried in vain to thwart an understanding on neutralization by proposing that not the whole of Manchuria, but only its eastern portion, should be regarded as a war zone. This limitation, which Russia would never have been able to accept, found, however, no support. It is to be hoped that the Chinese will not give the English and French an excuse for intervention by attacks on foreigners. Apart from this eventuality, the Russo-Japanese War, so long as it remains localized, will help the English only to take possession of Tibet, an eventuality in which nobody is directly interested except Russia.

"It is quite a different matter if there is a conflagration in the Balkans. The English hope that in that case as many of the Continental Powers as possible will be drawn in. Reports from different quarters state that the English actually, through their official organs, are inciting the Bulgars to war. Nevertheless, it seems that the latter have no such intention, because they fear that Russia will make them pay for it at the first opportunity if they go to war at a moment so unfavourable for Russia as the present is. If the direct negotiations now pending between the Sultan and the Bulgarian Government really lead to agreement, there is a possibility that we shall not see a Balkan war this summer.

"Meanwhile nervousness has certainly increased among all the Mediterranean peoples, because all of them have to reckon with the eventuality of war. When the newspapers announced a week ago that Spain meant to strengthen the garrisons and fortifications on the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, at Ceuta, Ferrol, etc., I enquired by telegraph of Radovitz, Monts, and Wedel who had put this flea in the ear of the Spanish Government. None of the three Ambassadors could find anything out, and Radovitz announced that the Spanish Government officially declared that no foreign Government had even raised the question how Spanish neutrality should be maintained. A few days later Radovitz announced that the neutrality and defence question had been exaggerated and made the most of for the benefit of the Stock Exchange. Although I have not yet

secured the necessary evidence, I am inclined to think that the Spanish Ministers had other than Stock Exchange reasons for the rather insufficient measures they have taken. However, all questions of occupation and defence of islands and strategical points on the coast will become acute only if the Balkan War breaks out. The two factors on which the maintenance of peace depends are the Sultan and Prince Ferdinand. The Sultan can be influenced by fear, Prince Ferdinand by vanity. He has gradually succeeded in obtaining the appointment of Bulgarian diplomatic agents in St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome, Paris, and London. He now ardently desires that Your Majesty should permit him to accredit an agent in Berlin also. I think that if Your Majesty's Consul-General in Sofia were commissioned to tell the Prince that if an understanding with the Porte was now reached Your Majesty would, in acknowledgment of this proof of pacific intentions, be glad to receive a Bulgarian agent in Berlin, then this prospect would have a decisive effect on the Prince's attitude. The negotiations between Constantinople and Sofia are reported by Marschall[1] to have now entered the decisive stage, and the conclusion of a protocol or the breaking-off of negotiations may be expected in the next few days. May I telegraph to Consul-General von Below in the above sense?"

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, March 23, 1904.

"*Secret.*

"Monts unobtrusively touched on the idea in conversation with Tittoni of a meeting between Your Majesty and Loubet. Tittoni had at first taken up this suggestion with enthusiasm, and told Monts that Lanza[2] would be commissioned to

[1] Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, German Ambassador at Constantinople.

[2] Count Monts, German Ambassador in Rome; Count di Lanza, Italian Ambassador in Berlin.

submit a proposal of this kind here. But since then several days have gone by without anything being heard of Lanza. This evening Lanza was with me, but remained as dumb as a fish on the question of the visit. This silence on the part of the Italians plainly indicates that soundings are being taken from the Italian side first of all with Barrère, and that he has rejected the idea. Under these circumstances I would offer as my respectful opinion that Your Majesty should leave the question of the meeting in Naples alone and also maintain the fullest reserve if any allusion should be made to the matter from the other side. This obviates the possibility that the idea of a meeting of Your Majesty with the President of the French Republic might be publicly represented as of German origin. It would be different if His Majesty King Victor Emmanuel were to mention the question of a meeting of three to Your Majesty as a joint Italian-French proposal.

"I hope the sun is shining brighter over Naples than it seemed to do eight years ago when I had the good fortune to accompany Your Majesty in a snowstorm to Camalvoli."

To Count Monts,
"Ambassador in Rome.

"Berlin, March 26, 1904.

"I have once more had a serious conversation with Count Lanza. The quintessence of my detailed explanation was that upon the attitude of the Italian Ministers, and still more of His Majesty King Victor Emmanuel, during Loubet's visit depended the continuance, after this visit, of the alliance between Italy and Germany. This is the point of view from which the whole affair must be considered.

"I shall deal with the matter by word of mouth and in writing very seriously, and showing my concern for the future, without hard words or bitterness, as often as opportunity offers. Your Excellency will probably also be in the position to work in the same sense."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, March 19, 1904.

"His Majesty the King of Italy has asked me through Count Lanza whether he should bring Signor Tittoni, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with him to Naples. I would venture to urge Your Majesty to answer in the affirmative, as in view of the forthcoming French visit, which is to be given as dramatic a setting as possible, it seems to me desirable that the importance of Your Majesty's visit from an Italian standpoint should be emphasized in the eyes of those people who judge things by their outward appearance.

"His Majesty the King has asked also whether toasts are being delivered in Naples. To this question, also, I think an affirmative answer should be given, as the King in this case will not be able to avoid expressing himself amicably with reference to the Triple Alliance. . . ."

To von Below-Rutzau,
Consul-General in Sofia.

"Berlin, March 27, 1904.

"Prince Ferdinand, who, as I note once more from your latest communication, approaches me with confidence, may depend upon it that his frankness will entail on him no annoyance or injury. In order to avoid the latter, I must, of course, use great prudence. My Most Gracious Master, who has followed the course of his regency with attention, had received the impression—I do not know whether it originated with himself or from outside sources—that His Royal Highness desired a European war as a means of attaining his ends. I only succeeded gradually and not without difficulty in repelling this suspicion, which might again arise if the idea occurred to the Emperor that it is desired to establish in advance his policy as regards the Straits. For Germany's topographically unfavourable and in many ways dangerous situation has the one advantage

that we have no *pignon sur la Méditerranée*, and can therefore pursue a more elastic policy on Mediterranean and allied questions than States lying nearer to that sea. Therefore the Russo-French Dual Alliance has never caused any anxiety to the German Government. We knew, indeed, that this alliance was based on the French side on an idea of aggression, but on the Russian side on considerations of defence only, for a strengthening of France would worsen Russia's own prospects of obtaining the Straits. France has an interest of many centuries' standing in the Straits and the Mediterranean coasts of Asia Minor and Syria, the old crusading area. Russia is aware of that, and, in deference to her relations with France, has for a quarter of a century taken no steps with regard to the Straits. Russia also knows—and this is inherent in the nature of the affair—that it would be easier to disinterest Germany than France in the matter of the Straits. Yet I note in this connection that neither on this nor on any other political question, great or small, is there any arrangement between ourselves and Russia. We desire to keep our hands free, and, moreover, we are conscious that a German attempt to secure *political* interest in the Bagdad railway zone would be the surest means of bridging the deep chasm which has hitherto separated Russian and French Eastern policy. That this chasm persisted until our own time is evidenced by a statement made by the Minister Hanotaux to a foreign ambassador at the time of the Armenian disturbances: '*J'espère que la Russie ne va pas soulever la question des détroits, parce que cela sera trop gros pour nous.*' M. Delcassé is no more Russophile than his predecessor—rather the contrary. Since M. Delcassé has been at the helm the contours of the old Crimea group (France, England, Italy) have begun to disclose themselves with increasing clearness against the mists of the future. But M. Delcassé is in addition a constant and convinced enemy of Germany.

"The Prince has described a German-French grouping as the ideal. For my part, I believe in Thiers's phrase: "*Il ne faut jamais dire: Jamais!*" But I also think that it will not be long before the French nation—without taking account of single outstanding individuals—ceases to say '*Jamais!*' The Prince will be able to judge whether the psychological moment for a German-French *rapprochement* has come,

when signs appear that French statesmen judge it to be possible and conceivable that Germany and France should mutually guarantee their territorial position. This guarantee is, as you know, the basic idea and the principal article of every defensive alliance. But I doubt whether His Royal Highness, though he has every physical reason to look forward to a long life, will ever see that psychological moment.

" Under these circumstances it is disinterested advice if I tell the Prince that he will do well to cultivate carefully his relations with France, though retaining his freedom of action; for there are conjunctures in the not distant future in which Bulgaria may be a valuable trump in the French game. This would be the case to a greater extent to-day if there was a conviction that the Bulgarian nation would follow their Prince against every enemy. But it is still too soon for that. Naturally the Prince's personal position will be more strongly established both at home and abroad with every crisis which is surmounted and with every increase of strength of Bulgaria.

" But that leads me back to the idea that the Prince should not hurry the great decision. Those very factors, indeed, which might influence him *to-day* to adopt the idea of hurrying forward constitute the most dangerous hostile elements to his personal interests. Among these factors the most important is England, who is the most ruthless in urging him on, and is generally not ready to give her support later to the one she has so urged on. Perhaps Japan will be the next to experience this truth, should Russia prove the more steadfast fighter of the two. Then comes Italy, who is bored, and hankers after experience with the levity of youth. Finally France, whose light-hearted Balkan policy is explicable less by the interests of the Dual Alliance than by the desire to divert attention from Morocco, perhaps also by the idea that she will gain more in the Mediterranean area by the Crimean grouping than with Russia.

" These three Powers, representatives of an active policy, naturally wish to draw Bulgaria into their direction. But would any of them stand by Bulgaria if Russia, in order ' to secure herself against attack from the South,' occupied Varna and Burgas ? The Prince is more competent to answer this question than I am. But we both know that on the

Russian side such an occupation has repeatedly been considered. I believe, too, that Russian political thinking is more concerned with this than with a descent on Turkish territory in the Adrianople vilayet. For as the opponents of a Russian seizure of Constantinople make a firmer stand and make closer contacts with one another, Russian policy—at all events, official Russian policy—is driven to maintain a convenient janitor in the Sultan, who is not to be unnecessarily annoyed. Moreover, the occupation of Varna and Burgas would be an emphatic warning, a *reductio ad absurdum* of the Bulgarian activist policy, while on the other hand a Russian landing on *Turkish* territory would make the Bulgarian activist party even more unmanageable than was the case with the naval demonstration of last year. From the Russian standpoint, therefore, everything is in favour of the occupation of strategic points on the Bulgarian, not on Turkish, territory. Therefore, from the Prince's standpoint, it appears that, in so far as no support is to be expected from the activist Powers, the right course is not to annoy Russia and Austria at present. Neither of them are pleased as it is by the direct agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey. The Prince had obtained an important success in regard to concessions secured from the Sultan in Constantinople up till now. The whole agreement is endangered by the Petrow amendment, the basic motive of which was, I suspect, the General's wish to put Natschewitsch's achievements in the shade. The Sultan is being energetically influenced against it by powerful elements, and I am not acting on baseless supposition when I say that the Sultan may perhaps one fine day declare that he will no longer be bound to what he has hithero accepted. It is, for example, conceivable that in this case he would be granted more favourable conditions for the gendarmerie or some other reform question.

"The question of the gendarmerie brings me back to Austria, who is the most exacting on this matter. If I sought to set the Prince's mind at rest with regard to Austrian intentions, I was far from making a thorough examination of the real mind of the Dual Monarchy. I only examined the matter of possibilities, and I cannot discover how, without the support of Hungary or against her wishes, Vienna can be induced to take steps leading eventually to an increase of the Slav dominions of Austria. The voice

of Hungary is to-day stronger than ever in the counsels of the Dual Monarchy; that has been proved recently in the matter of the Army language question. Plans may perhaps be made without Hungary, but their execution without Hungarian assent is inconceivable.

"To sum up, I believe that the Prince has nothing to fear from Austria. If the Austrian Heir Apparent should eventually place the satisfaction of Slav instincts more in the foreground, he would forthwith encounter the opposition of Hungary. And without Hungary, Austria will never be able to do much.

"With Russia the question is less simple. Official Russia menaces the Prince if he goes forward, revolutionary Russia if he does nothing; both, the official and the revolutionary elements, would gladly see Varna and Burgas in Russian hands. But, so long as the Japanese War lasts, Russia desires quiescence in the Balkans. Of this interval of quiescence the Prince should take full advantage to consolidate the position of Bulgaria as a power to be reckoned with in the Balkans by concluding a convention with the Sultan on the basis of what is attainable. When she has won this firm position she can await the issue, which will, in my opinion, be in favour of Bulgaria."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, March 30, 1904.

"On the 7th ult. the Pasha of Fez had the native agent (Mochalat) of a German firm put in prison, without first informing in writing our Consular representative, as in treaty and custom bound, of the impending arrest and of the reasons for it. The efforts of the Vice-Consul in Fez to secure from the Moroccan Foreign Minister, Abdelkrim ben Sliman, the release of the Mochalat were not only fruitless, but resulted in compulsion being put on the prisoner to renounce in writing his status as a Mochalat and therewith his right to protection. On the receipt of this news Baron von Mentzingen demanded from Abdelkrim ben Sliman in a note handed in on the 15th ult. the immediate release of the

Mochalat and assurance against further proceedings. The Minister did not fulfil the demand, and, moreover, in spite of repeated pressure on the part of the Vice-Consul, evaded, with empty excuses, the further demand of Baron von Mentzingen that he should send an answer with the least possible delay to Tangier by the messenger bearing our remonstrances. The imprisoned Mochalat was made to suffer for the intervention of Your Majesty's Minister by being put for a time in chains and being removed from his former comparatively endurable prison to an infected cell.

"Baron von Mentzingen only received Abdelkrim ben Sliman's reply by word of mouth from one of the representatives of the Sultan at Tangier on the 14th inst. The explanation was unsatisfactory in every respect. Without assigning any reason for the man's imprisonment, the Minister sought to justify himself by the untrue statement, easily controverted by Baron von Mentzingen, that the incident was explicable by an error in the lists of German Mochalats communicated to the Moroccan Government by us. The refutation of this untruth by Your Majesty's Minister was so complete that the Sultan's representatives themselves admitted the justice of the plea that Abdelkrim ben Sliman made for the release of the prisoner. Whether their admission is effective and hastens success should not, however, be important at the present stage of the proceedings. The mere release of the Mochalat would no longer be sufficient under the given circumstances.

"For a long time now the Shereefian Government has been trying to avoid all its obligations to us. In regard to this Baron von Mentzingen reports:

"'Abdelkrim ben Sliman has hardly answered our written suggestions for months past, and he has met the verbal representations of the Vice-Consul either with promises or with references to German friendship and the difficult situation.'

"This system of passive resistance and wilful obstruction is being pursued by the Sultan's Government recently in every case, whether in relation to material questions, such as money payments, or on questions of giving satisfaction for outbreaks of fanaticism and hatred of the foreigner. Nevertheless, we have until now shown patience and consideration to the Moroccan Government because of its

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The Emperor William II.
A photograph taken about 1905.

p. 48

internal and external difficulties. That this cannot go on is made evident by the stubborn resistance of Abdelkrim ben Sliman in the question now at issue, in which he could satisfy our just demand without any material sacrifice. The non-fulfilment of our requests and the exacerbation of the conflict through pressure of the worst sort on the imprisoned Mochalat are characteristic of the present frame of mind of influential persons at the Sultan's Court. The frankly hostile attitude of Abdelkrim ben Sliman to Germany suggests that the Minister, whose French sympathies are well known, is being strengthened in his insolent resistance to us from outside. Our political and economic position in Morocco, especially in relation to the other Powers concerned there, though I do not presume to dictate, make it indispensable, I think, to break this resistance, and to insist on full satisfaction for the bad behaviour of Abdelkrim ben Sliman, contravening our treaty rights, and openly scorning our just claims.

"Your Majesty's Minister in Tangier has also indicated it as imperative to secure quick and sufficient expiation for the flagrant breach of treaty in Fez. Demands for satisfaction should include, beside the immediate release of the imprisoned Mochalat, the grant of reasonable compensation to himself and to other persons affected by his imprisonment, and the severe punishment of the Shereefian officials implicated in the affair. By such limitation of our demands, and by excluding all economic demands from the legal case at issue, we should best avoid any attempts at intervention by the Three Powers. Perhaps, however, it might seem feasible to secure the final liquidation of our demands against Morocco, which have long been pending, within the framework of our procedure in the Fez incident. The course of the negotiations so far seems to show that it is nearly certain that the Shereefian Government will not take kindly to a rapid satisfaction of our demands. On the other hand, it is urgent to maintain respect towards us. To obtain a quick solution, we should now have to back up further negotiations with a show of military force. I venture, therefore, with the profoundest respect, to draw attention to the fact that in an earlier case at the beginning of 1899, the despatch, graciously commanded by Your Majesty, of Your Majesty's training-ships *Stosch* and *Charlotte*, together with the small

cruiser *Bussard*, brought the Shereefian Government to make rapid amends, and helped the complete success of our demands, up to that time unattainable.

"I venture most humbly to beg Your Imperial and Royal Majesty to deign to grant the favour of sending to Tangier one of Your Majesty's ships in support of our demands and remonstrances against the Shereefian Government. In the case of your agreement with this proposal, I shall not fail to ask Your Majesty's authorization to get into touch with the head of the Admiral Staff of the Navy with this end in view."

MEMORANDUM.

"BERLIN, April 6, 1904.

"I told the English Ambassador I had invited him in order to assure him that the health of His Majesty the Kaiser was excellent. The announcements to the contrary appearing in French journals and reproduced in the English Press were completely without foundation. Sir Frank seemed to have no idea that the English reports were French fabrications. He repeated his regret at the attitude of *The Times* in the matter, and promised to use his influence to prevent the English papers from publishing false reports of His Majesty's health. He will try to find out if this news can have travelled by way of Malta.

"In the course of further conversation with the English Ambassador I laid great stress on my conviction that the Eastern Asiatic War would remain localized. We should not think of overstepping our strict and loyal neutrality. So long as we stood in readiness—as we certainly shall do—all rumours of a renewal of the Eastern Asiatic Triple Alliance were empty chatter; not only was His Majesty's will decisive in this question, but also the desire and public opinion of the whole of Germany. France would not move under any circumstances. Lascelles listened to this part of my explanation with great attention and sympathy.

"Sir Frank told me that the Anglo-French Agreement will soon be concluded. Lord Lansdowne had written to

him that he relied on his making it understood here that it was not directed against Germany. I replied that we had not thought so. It was desirable for us that England and France should come to an understanding over a series of existing differences, since that made for world peace.

"Lascelles thinks that feeling in England is less bitter against us than it was a few months ago. The moment would come when people in England would once more be convinced that Germany and England had no ground for mistrust and snarling. The next Premier would probably be the Duke of Devonshire, or perhaps Lord Spencer. Lord Rosebery, or possibly Grey, would be Foreign Minister. Recent articles in English papers about the aggressive intentions of Germany against England, Lascelles described as foolish."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, April 9, 1904.

"The Turco-Bulgar Agreement was signed yesterday evening, and therewith a notable step was taken towards the pacification for the time being of the Balkan Peninsula. The Sultan, like Prince Ferdinand, received from outside sources during the course of the negotiations advice calculated to thwart the understanding between the two. In particular the Sultan asked for a military convention with its point directed against Austria, while the Prince claimed the immediate extension of the Macedonian reform scheme to the vilayet of Adrianople. Yesterday the Sultan told Your Majesty's Ambassador that he had decided, in accordance with our advice, to allow the clause about the military convention to be struck out. On the other hand, Prince Ferdinand had a severe struggle, not only possibly with himself, but with his Prime Minister, General Petrow, who threatened resignation, to limit his demands as we had recommended.

"He says frankly that his desire not to be at variance with

Your Majesty's intentions was decisive in his case. The Prince had been informed, in accordance with Your Majesty's decision, that Your Majesty would be disposed to receive a diplomatic agent of Bulgaria as soon as the Prince, by the conclusion of the Turkish convention, showed unequivocally his pacific temper. In opposition to the German and to official Russian policy, there are other Powers who regard the Japanese War as a suitable moment for solving, by means of a sharp conflict, the Balkan question in a sense adverse to Russia while she is engaged elsewhere, and for blocking Russia's road to the Mediterranean permanently. Until quite recently diplomatic and military agents were working, both with the Sultan and with Prince Ferdinand, to keep open, even to aggravate, the sore between Turkey and Bulgaria.

"Your Majesty has always orientated German policy from the point of view that the flow of Russian power towards the Mediterranean was desirable for Germany and that, under some circumstances, a damming-up of the tide might be serious for us. In accordance with Your Majesty's direction, I have therefore tried to hinder the acute Eastern conflict, which, indeed, cannot be indefinitely deferred, from being settled at this moment to the one-sided advantage of the Western Powers. The most effective means of deferring it seems to be the Turco-Bulgarian Convention, which really removes the abnormal element in Turco-Bulgarian relations and therefore cuts away the ground from the intervention of a third party as well as is possible.

"The terms of the Convention, so far as they are published at present, are as follows:

"Bulgaria undertakes to prevent the formation of revolutionary *komitadjis* and armed bands against the Turkish Empire, and to punish, in accordance with the laws, those of her subjects who have undertaken revolutionary operations in the neighbouring provinces. Bulgaria will also hinder the import of explosives, etc., into the three Macedonian provinces. With reference to the execution of the reforms in the three provinces agreed on with the Entente Powers, the Sultan will amnesty those who are under arrest, in prison, or in banishment on account of revolutionary activities, will release them, and will allow them to return home, with the exception of those condemned for dynamite outrages. The Macedonian fugitives will be assisted by the

Porte on their return in rebuilding their homes. The emergency taxes and measures against free circulation by railway will be put an end to. Turkish subjects of Bulgar origin are eligible for public positions in Turkey. A mixed commission will settle the other pending differences. There are stipulations for an extradition treaty for common criminals and for agreement on frontier protection.

"Your Majesty's gracious greetings from Palermo and the charming picture postcards have given me and my wife much pleasure. We were glad to hear of your good impressions at the foot of Monte Pellegrino, and we hope with all our hearts that you will also have a pleasant time in Malta."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, April 17, 1904.

"I received, with my humblest thanks, Your Majesty's very gracious telegram from Malta. How much I should have liked to accompany Your Majesty on the tour through the old town of the Order of St. John and to have received so many inspiring historical political impressions.

"Your Majesty's statements about the English temper towards Russia there are highly interesting, especially at a time when so many elements in England—perhaps including King Edward?—seem to be striving for a Russo-English understanding. Plainly such an understanding is eagerly desired from the French side. Therefore I am glad that Your Majesty, according to newspaper reports, appears to be staying on the east coast of Sicily and Italy, and that all possibility is ruled out of a chance encounter which would at the present moment be represented as a pursuit. French papers have the effrontery to state that Your Majesty would do everything possible to meet the French Fleet. It is added that France has no interest in such a meeting."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR COUNT VON BÜLOW.

"SYRACUSE, April 19, 1904.

"The recent Anglo-French Agreement gives me food for thought in many directions. I think the French have used the advantage of their momentary political situation with the utmost skill. They have succeeded in making England pay dearly for their friendship without loosening their bond with Russia. The preponderant position which they have now succeeded in obtaining in Morocco is undoubtedly a great gain for them, which they have bought cheaply in exchange for the surrender of their more theoretical than real rights in Egypt. As our commercial interests in Morocco are considerable, I hope that on our side we are taking care to secure the necessary guarantees that our trade there will not suffer. On the other hand, England has received a perfectly free hand in Egypt.

"Possible points of friction with France are substantially reduced by the Agreement and England has also won much in the way of freedom of movement in various parts of the world. It is only natural that the increasing friendship with France and the consequent assurance that *there is nothing to fear from that quarter will have the result that English consideration for us will pass more and more into the background.* The language of the English Press also shows that irritation against us is not in any case diminishing. Under these circumstances, it must be regarded as a blessing that a naval demonstration on our part in Morocco did not take place.

"WILLIAM I.R."

TO THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

"BERLIN, April 20, 1904.

"Your Majesty's gracious telegrams from Malta and Catania were received with humblest thanks. The messenger

leaving to-day brings a detailed and interesting report from Bernstorff on the Anglo-French Agreement. It seems to me to afford a mutual guarantee against the participation by either of the two countries in the war in Eastern Asia. But without doubt both Powers, by this Agreement and by their mutual *rapprochement*, gain in international importance and in freedom of movement. And the attraction of the Anglo-French Entente for Italy will be stronger; the attraction of each of the Western Powers separately for her was strong already. Probably a certain degree of coolness will ensue when the peace negotiations between Russia and Japan begin. Presumably England will then seek to limit the position of Russia in Eastern Asia as far as possible by supporting the Japanese programme, while France will hesitate to burden Russia with demands which are hard for the deeply wounded Russian temper to accept. Our trade relations in Morocco are the object of particular attention. How pleasant Your Majesty's reception in Catania must have been!"

To Count von Metternich,
Ambassador in London.

"Berlin, June 4, 1904.

"The Belgian Minister, who was received yesterday at the Foreign Office, stated that he had reason to suspect that the Anglo-French Agreement contained a secret clause dealing with the Rhine frontier. Baron Greindl is a cautious diplomat of long standing, and it is unlikely that he made a statement of such import on mere supposition or without direct instructions from his Government. We must therefore take his communication seriously.

"When all conceivable explanations are exhausted, we come to the question whether the French Government may have set this report in circulation secretly in order to make Germany mistrustful of England and thus permanently hinder an improvement of German-English relations. The Belgian Government, for whom the Rhine question is a vital one, may for that very reason have been chosen as the agent for spreading the report.

"But this hypothesis does not liquidate the matter. We must rather reckon, until further information, with the possibility that the Cabinets of London and Paris have really negotiated and come to an understanding on the Rhine boundary. That France, if she had her way, would like to bring the Rhine boundary into the treaty is a matter of course. But, on the other hand, we see from the whole character of the Anglo-French Agreement how weak a stand England made to French wishes.

"The Russo-French Dual Alliance had a purely defensive character. It has never been suggested at any time or from any quarter that it dealt with the Rhine frontier. A Rhine frontier clause in the Anglo-French Agreement could only have one meaning, that English protection in the rear, if not active support, would be available under certain conditions for French plans of conquest. We should then no longer be faced, as was the case with the Russo-French Dual Alliance, with a purely defensive and therefore, for us, since we harbour no schemes of conquest, an unobjectionable agreement.

"Confronted with the possibilities now revealed, the German Government would be, in duty bound, as I need not tell you, not to wait until stormclouds appeared on the horizon—they often rise very suddenly—but to take steps to find cover for their own rear forthwith. In the present world situation this would not be difficult. The only question is, as I remark for your personal information, whether we should alter the orientation of our policy on mere suspicion, that is, abstain from further efforts towards an improvement of our relations with England, or whether we should first take steps to ascertain with certainty the existence or non-existence of a Rhine clause. This might possibly be done by Your Excellency's asking Lord Lansdowne direct, stating completely your reasons, omitting anything which might give your statement a comminatory character, as indeed Your Excellency's personal relations require. The English Minister cannot possibly doubt that the enquiry on our part is inspired by disinclination to orientate our policy in a way which would involve a breach with the long-standing German-English traditions. Your Excellency could also make use of the idea that perhaps the French Government created this distraction.

"Your Excellency is empowered to take or not to take

this step with Lord Lansdowne, in case you see anything against it. In the latter case I beg you to wire by return. Naturally, Belgium must not be indicated as the source of information."

To the Emperor William II.

"Norderney, June 15, 1904.

"*Very Secret.*

"I have humbly informed Your Imperial and Royal Majesty that Witte has arrived here according to programme. I have spent a good deal of time with him outside our conferences on commercial matters. He takes most of his meals with us. An intelligent man with a wide outlook, he has gradually become very frank through this informal intercourse in the free and easy life at the seaside. Speaking of the situation in the theatre of war, he told me that Kuropatkin had said at a council of war before his departure that he would defeat the Japanese if they gave him a year and a half to do it, placed an army of 400,000 good troops at his disposal, and if he might sacrifice 40,000 of these in dead and wounded.

"Referring to his declaration at that time, Kuropatkin had now written to him (Witte) that so far he had only 3,000 Russians out of the fighting line and therefore still had a margin of 27,000 (*sic*). Kuropatkin is convinced that if Russia holds out he will beat the Japanese in the end. Witte shares this conviction.

"If Witte considers the cessation of the war, except after important Russian successes, as impossible, at least for the moment, he maintains, on the other hand, that this war is in the highest degree unpopular among all classes of the Russian people. He leaves no doubt that an early peace after Russian military successes, even without territorial expansion, would be most welcome to him. Witte went so far as to tell me in complete confidence that as a patriot he must rejoice over Russian successes; as a statesman he feared that quick and brilliant Russian successes would turn the heads of the governing circles in St. Petersburg. '*On demanderait alors chez nous des choses impossibles au Japon.*' Russia would still have

to suffer some military reverses, to induce her, when the fortunes of war inclined to her side after heavy trials, to conclude a peace on reasonable terms. Russia only required to secure a guarantee from Japan that she would not again attack Russia within a reasonable space of time.

"Witte did not say whether this was to be accompanied by the destruction of the Japanese military and naval power or by an alliance to be concluded with Japan after the war. But he expressed the opinion that it would be *une folie* for Russia to insist on the possession of Manchuria or of Korea. He also thought that it might be advantageous for Russia at a given moment to make use of King Edward as a mediator, since this Royal personage was in contact with the Japanese and enjoyed their confidence.

"It is comprehensible that Witte, at a moment when he is negotiating with me a commercial treaty which is of profound importance to both countries, and on the terms of which the material weal and woe of millions depends, should take the attitude that the prestige of Russia cannot be seriously shattered even by greater disasters in the Far East. But he makes no attempt to conceal the fact that the consequences of this war may be very serious for the Russian internal situation.

"At present a mistaken and stupid domestic policy is being pursued in Russia. The policy adopted towards Jews and Finns, Catholics and Armenians, students and the Press, cannot be permanently carried out. The Government of Russia was more reactionary than under the Emperor Alexander III, and nearly as reactionary as under the Emperor Nicholas I. But the Russia of to-day was not the Russia of seventy years ago, even apart from the fact that the régime of Nicholas had been finally shattered in the Crimean War.

"Discontent in Russia was now very great. Of a revolution in the Western sense there could be no question; such a happening in Russia would be for a long time out of the question. But there might be outrages as at the end of the 'seventies of the preceding century, when every week shots were fired at a Minister or a Governor-General, and finally at the Tsar. Such outrages would have a demoralizing effect. There was a weak sort of character who went from one extreme to the other: for example, from a quite retrograde and absolute administration to excessive liberal concessions.

"The backbone of discontent in Russia could be broken now if more tolerance were shown to the non-Russian nationalities and communities, if the educated young people were less brutalized, some freedom granted to the Press, and if a modest degree of self-government were substituted in internal administration for extreme bureaucratic tutelage. If, under the terrorizing influence of outrage, the highest circles should think of giving Russia a Constitution, it would be the end of Russia. Russia could endure no Constitution in the European sense. A Constitution with Constitutional guarantees, parliament, and universal suffrage would lead to anarchy and split Russia asunder.

"Witte praises Lamsdorff, who is his personal friend. Lamsdorff's misfortune is the possession of too sensitive a nature. He finds difficulty in freely expressing his ideas except *tête-à-tête*. That is why he likes to avoid all Cabinet and Council meetings. But Lamsdorff is reliable, as he showed in his youth—among other ways by his unconditional devotion for Giers, who was hated by the Old Russians because he was Germanophile. He was sensible, understood his job as a diplomat, and was, in spite of his timid aspect and *malgré ses apparences féminines*, very firm at critical moments and in difficult times. The Tsar, in consequence of the intrigues of Alexeiev and Besobrasov, had deprived him of the conduct of Eastern Asiatic questions until just before the outbreak of war, and this was a misfortune for Russia.

"In all European affairs, especially in connection with relations to other Powers, and especially the Oriental question, the Emperor Nicholas left Count Lamsdorff a completely free hand. For two years Lamsdorff had advocated good relations with Germany and urged them on the Tsar at every opportunity. Lamsdorff had recently laid before the Tsar an excellent memorandum written by himself in order to get rid of the old and harmful legend that Germany had deprived Russia of the fruits of victory after the last Turkish war. On the margin of this memorandum, in which Lamsdorff indicated that the Peace of Berlin was more favourable for Russia than Ignatiev's Treaty of San Stefano with its Greater Bulgaria, the Emperor Nicholas wrote: 'Very interesting and quite to the point.' Lamsdorff repeatedly told the Tsar that our attitude towards Russia in all European and extra-European questions was a loyal one and that no credence was to be given to the calumnies

and gossip of the opponents of good relations between Russia and Germany. Witte thinks that Lamsdorff will remain Minister so long as his health, which is not of the best, holds out. His successor would eventually be Isvolsky (Copenhagen.) Isvolsky was more brilliant.

" What Witte told me of His Majesty the Emperor was particularly confidential, with a request for the utmost discretion. Russian monarchs, continued Witte, had either '*une ambition d'Empereur*' or '*une ambition personelle.*' The Emperor Alexander III had possessed the first kind of ambition. With the Emperor Nicholas the personal element was the primary element. He wanted personally to cut a good figure, to direct everything himself. He feared nothing more than that it should appear that he allowed himself to be influenced by his Ministers. To avoid this suspicion he tried to get information and advice behind their backs. This tendency explained the influence of Besobrasov, of Alexeiev, and the Grand Duke Alexander Michailovich, who were responsible for the surprise effected by the Japanese. The Emperor Nicholas was honest through and through, and a noble character in the best sense of the word. As a private person of blameless *probité* he detested dishonesty and untruthfulness, such as was unfortunately to be met with among Russian officials. But since he had no real knowledge of the world or of men, he did not see through the little artfulnesses by which he was often deceived. Under the influence of the unlimited power of a Russian autocrat there gradually grew up in him, though he was by nature modest, a strong tendency to absolute autocracy and the belief that he was omnipotent. He really imagined that, if he did not want war, there would be none. On the Tsar's relation to Your Majesty, Witte said: 'For some years the relation on the Tsar's side was not good. The superiority of your Emperor impressed the Tsar and made him jealous. He was also urged to dislike of your Emperor from various quarters. He was distrustful of your Emperor and did not wish to see him. That, *sans phrase*, was the real attitude of mind of the Emperor Nicholas from his accession to the time of the Danzig meeting.

" ' Since that time a great revulsion of feeling, which has been more and more accentuated, has taken place. The meeting at Danzig went well, at Reval better, at Wolfsgarten excellently well. Since the outbreak of war the Emperor

Nicholas knows where he is with your Emperor. He is now full of confidence in your Emperor, and, more than that, he really likes him. The Tsar's nature is such that his personal feelings are decisive.'

"Of Her Majesty the reigning Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, Witte said she was '*une âme bien élevée*,' but obstinate and narrow-minded. She had embraced a specifically orthodox mysticism. Entry into another Confession had been very difficult for her, just because she had a lofty and a proud disposition.

"For years she had suffered from the idea that her conversion might be attributed to reasons of policy. From inner conflicts of this kind arose the idea of justifying herself to her conscience by self-abnegation in the mystic side of the Orthodox Church, and of winning peace of soul in this way. The seed thus sown resulted in the cult of St. Seraphin, of whose existence most educated Russians had hardly heard and with whom Court circles had never bothered themselves until the Empress brought him into fashion.

"The spiritualist Philippe had made use of the Empress's deep desire for a male heir to entice her into his net with his impostures. The Empress's influence on her Consort was very great, for the simple reason that the Tsar was always with her and was still in love with her. No one had any influence over the Empress except her Hessian relatives, and especially her brother, the Grand Duke. Whoever wanted to make sure of the Emperor must bring the Grand Duke into this game. This point was very important, for the Tsar was fickle; one must keep one's eye on him and never let go of him.

"The Empress Mother's influence over the Tsar had for a long time not been so great as that of the reigning Empress; nevertheless, it was not negligible. In contrast to the reigning Empress, the Empress Maria Feodorovna was very popular, not only in St. Petersburg society, but with the whole nation.

"With regard to Your Majesty, a complete change had taken place in the Empress Mother's attitude. At one time Germanophobe, the Empress Mother now respected and admired Your Majesty. Your Majesty's friendly relations with the King of Denmark had contributed substantially to this. Under his mother's influence the Emperor had also become Germanophile.

"Witte seemed to be favourably regarded by the Empress Mother and the Heir Apparent, originally because he had enjoyed the confidence of Alexander III. Of his own relations with the Tsar, Witte said that the Tsar had been annoyed with him for his sharp opposition to the Japanese policy of Alexeiev and the Yalu speculations of Besobrasov. The entourage of the Emperor Nicholas had said that Witte was a friend of the Japanese, Jews, and Finns. He had been overthrown by such methods as those often practised at the Russian Court. But the Tsar was not so ill-disposed to him as was supposed in foreign countries. On his retirement from the Finance Ministry the Tsar had 'given him a fortune,' and had shown him other great kindnesses. Since the spring he had had many conversations with the Tsar. He knew very well that his rather brusque ways and his habit of calling things by their names was not agreeable to the Tsar. But the Tsar was very far from consigning him to the rubbish-heap.

"Incidentally, Witte said the Tsar had expressed his pleasure at Your Majesty's having sent Your Majesty's Aide-de-camp, Count Lamsdorff, to St. Petersburg. The Tsar meditated sending one of his aides-de-camp on a similar errand to Berlin. The execution of this even must be left to mature in the Tsar's mind. He was, indeed, slow in decision. The Empress's piety had to a certain extent also attacked the Tsar. It was, continued Witte, more convenient to ascribe to Providence, rather than to one's own mistakes, the lack of military preparedness in the Far East and the diplomatic and military failures as against Japan.

"With regard to the Near East, Witte said that it was not to Russia's interest to allow the nationalities there to become as strong as the Western Powers would like to see them. Turkey must for the moment be kept on her legs. However, this was only possible on condition that the Sultan provided some sort of order in Macedonia, for no Russian Tsar could look placidly on at atrocities there, whoever might be really morally responsible for these butcheries of Christians.

"Witte again repeated that the only right policy for both countries was an intimate relationship between Germany and Russia, and especially between the two greatest monarchs of the world. If both parties followed the course at present pursued we should soon attain the relations which obtained

from the beginning of the nineteenth century up to the end of the 'seventies, to the advantage of both dynasties and of both nations. '*Il faut revenir aux temps de Nicholas I et d'Alexandre II et oublier les malentendus de la fin du siècle dernier.*'

" I avoided expressing to Witte concrete wishes in this direction or making proposals, partly because he, in spite of his close relations with Lamsdorff, is not authorized to undertake political negotiations, and partly, and more especially, because the psychological moment for it has not yet arrived. Incidentally, Witte made the observation : ' Our relation to France has already changed, and will gradually change still more.'

" In describing the Japanese attack on Port Arthur and the excitement over it in St. Petersburg, Witte related that some of the Grand Dukes had then proposed to the Tsar an advance against India. Witte described this proposal as *une folie furieuse*, as he had always laid especial stress on the necessity for Russia to avoid offending England or America. He is peacefully inclined, not only because of the present peaceful trend of public opinion in Russia, to which he attaches more importance than do the Grand Dukes, the Generals, and Plehve, and that not only because he wants to maintain his chief achievement, the foreign exchange, at its present level, but also because he is frankly convinced that Russia must avoid foreign adventures, such as expansion of territory, and devote herself for many years to internal reforms and the economic development of her internal resources.

" As the main reason for his desire for better relations with Germany, he pointed out that it could then be possible to break with the method of perpetual armaments, which arose from the mistrust arising out of the friction of the 'eighties.

" The commercial treaty negotiations are very troublesome. The Russians have conceded to us the minimum rates for the four chief grains (wheat, rye, oats, and barley), together with freedom in veterinary regulations, the two main demands which they have hitherto resisted with might and main. Witte mentioned in this connection that he made these great concessions only *sur l'ordre formel de son Auguste Maître*. Now we are fighting over the other Customs duties on agricultural produce (geese, pigs, horses, fodder, barley, rape, eggs, potatoes, beans, timber, the Upper Silesian pig contingent, lubricating oil, etc.) and the Russian duties on

manufactured goods (iron, machines, chemicals, leather and woollen goods, etc.).

"The outcome of the negotiations is to be kept secret, and the treaty, if it is drafted, must also be kept secret, on account of other countries with whom we have to come to an agreement, who should not know what concessions we have made to the Russians and they to us. Witte is a hard bargainer and has great expert knowledge. But I have tried not to let our bread go unbuttered, even if I have in the end to grant him an abatement of a duty of 20 marks per hundred kilogrammes of *beurre frais, salé ou fondu* (Art. 134).

"I received from Metternich a private letter, which I beg humbly to annex; the letter is not intended for Your Majesty, nevertheless I venture to present it, because this completely unadorned and frank outpouring contains much that is worthy of attention. I agree with what Metternich says of the influence of the English monthly reviews, the poisonous matter of which infects small circles in the first instance, then wider strata of the population, and finally the whole public opinion of a generation. I am also convinced that Soveral has become a very important factor in German-English relations, but that he is not an irreconcilable opponent, and might be made useful to us if we got hold of him through his Southern vanity. In this, Metternich and Eckardstein, Bernstorff and Seckendorff are agreed. I also think that Mensdorff, though he may howl with the wolves (*sit venia verbo*) now and again in the Royal Family, is too good a black-and-yellow Austrian not to desire good relations between Germany and England, which are so much in the interest of the Habsburg monarchy. I have seen reports from Mensdorff which he could not know I should read, and in these he gave expression to this conviction and to his anxiety with regard to the too great tension in German-English relations.

"On the other hand, I think it not impossible that Benckendorff is working for the worsening of German-English relations. For if these good relations are advantageous to Austria, there remains the fact that bad German-English relations or a German-English conflict would leave Russia as the *tertia gaudens*. Even Witte could not help pointing out to me that improvement in our relations with Russia would mean a corresponding increase in the amount we could spend on building ships. Metternich was also right when he said that

we should not let Benckendorff (and his Hatzfeld relations) have the slightest inkling, but we must continue to watch him carefully, until we can catch him *avec la main dans le sac* and nail him fast. . . .

"The improvement of relations with England must be the object of continuous effort, because that is the only quarter in the present world situation from which we could be seriously threatened. It requires much patience, prudence, and self-control in face of English presumption and injustice. For just as we have to do in England, at Court, in society and in the Press, with so many occult proceedings, and as fresh disturbing incidents continually occur, it becomes doubly necessary to convince the main strata of the English nation that we nourish no hostile or aggressive intentions towards England. I am of the opinion that the reception prepared for His Majesty King Edward in Hamburg especially has had a favourable effect in this direction.

"I hope with all my heart that Your Majesty's tour in the North is going well, and that it will aid Your Majesty's recovery after so much work, trouble, and embarrassment. Here we have a cloudless sky and the sea is as calm and quiet as one of the lakes of the Havel. I would like to take Witte for a trip to Heligoland on the *Forelle*, which would have been a pleasant interlude in the tariff negotiations which last from morning till night. But in spite of his size and bodily strength —he has grown to a colossal bulk during the seven years since I saw him last—he has, like most of his countrymen, not got *le pied marin* and does not like to leave *terra firma*."

To the Emperor William II.

"Kiel, June 24, 1904.

"I have the honour most humbly to lay before Your Majesty herewith the four documents from London which contain the understanding reached between us and the English Government on Egypt. They are: two confidential Notes from Lord Lansdowne, dated the 15th instant, to Your Majesty's Ambassador in London, of which one states the propositions agreed on both sides, while the other is concerned with the interpretation of these propositions, and

Count Metternich's answers, which state the agreement of Your Majesty's Government with the contents of the two Notes.

"I beg respectfully to make the following statement on the import of the agreements:

"The English Government had originally asked us, like other Powers, simply to communicate our concurrence with the draft of a Khedivial decree agreed upon by them with the French Government. This decree is intended to give the English administration greater freedom in the field of Egyptian finance, and to impose corresponding limitations on the functions hitherto exercised by the International Commission of the Debt.

"That English demand we declined, and on our side insisted that assurance must be given of the continuance of the 'most-favoured-nation' treatment hitherto enjoyed by us, in Egypt, especially in relation to the French. To this the English eventually gave effect. They guarantee the most-favoured-nation treatment for German trade in Egypt for thirty years, that is to say for the same period for which most-favoured-nation treatment is assured to the French by the declaration of April 8 of this year.

"They further promise to observe the rights at present enjoyed in Egypt on the ground either of treaties and agreements or of customary right. Finally they promise protection for the German schools in Egypt in their present liberties, and that Germans in the Egyptian service shall not be subjected to less favourable conditions than Englishmen in the Egyptian service. In return we agree:

"To concur in the Khedivial decree;

"Further to promise not to ask for a time-limit to the English occupation of Egypt, nor otherwise to put obstacles in the way of English policy in Egypt;

"That after England has recognized the international character of the Suez Canal, we concur in the non-execution of certain conditions for the international supervision of the Canal contained in the Suez Canal Act of 1888.

"All these concessions on our part are the less serious for us since France had made exactly the same concessions to England in the Anglo-French Declaration of April 8 of this year.

"Moreover, we are further safeguarded by the express declaration of Count Metternich in his second Note to Lord

Lansdowne in support of English policy in Egypt that we are only bound, especially in respect of a certain revision of the Capitulations, in so far as France is also bound.

"On the other hand, we have the same assured legal position, henceforth, in Egypt as that secured to France in the Declaration of April 8 of this year. In particular, the door is bolted against any differentiation against German trade in Egypt for the next thirty years.

"The Agreement will now be confidentially communicated in its main outlines to the Governments of Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia, but it will otherwise remain secret for the time being."

MEMORANDUM.

"KIEL, June 26, 1904.

"*Very Secret.*

"His Majesty King Edward drew me into a rather long political conversation to-day after breakfast on the *Iduna*. His Majesty then began to speak of Eastern Asia. The Russians had themselves to blame for their failure. Their diplomacy was as unskilful as their war strategy on sea and land.

"The Japanese were doing excellently in every way. Moreover, they were morally in the right. Russia had neither warrant nor provocation to go to Port Arthur, had nothing to do with Korea, and had seized Manchuria from China in a brutal fashion. The King further told me that Russia would never have got so far as war if she had taken his advice. He had communicated to the Emperor Nicholas, who was then staying at Spala, at the end of November, the basic conditions under which Japan would then have been ready to come to an understanding with Russia. The Emperor Nicholas had deferred answering these proposals until too late, a delay with which in any case the death of the little Princess Elizabeth of Hesse, which had made a great impression on him, had something to do. The Japanese had steadily reiterated that they could not any longer restrain public opinion in Japan in favour of war if Russia did not speedily reply. When the Tsar

at length decided to accept the Japanese proposals it was too late; the leading men in Japan had meanwhile decided for war.

"King Edward did not conceal his wish for an early end to the Eastern Asiatic war, and he would be willing to step in as a mediator with that in view. The Japanese would be now very accommodating. When I interjected that Russia could hardly make peace after defeat without a severe blow to her prestige, King Edward said he did not see how Russia's position was going to improve. One could not reckon on a Russian victory either by sea or land, and the wisest thing the Russians could do would be, as soon as possible, to conclude as acceptable terms of peace as were attainable.

"The King also happened to speak of the 'Yellow Peril,' and said he could not recognize such a thing. The Japanese were an intelligent, brave, and chivalrous people, just as civilized as Europeans, and were distinguished from them only by the colour of their skin. It would be regrettable if the 'Yellow Peril,' in his opinion non-existent, were to influence our policy in a sense hostile to Japan. I replied to the King that we should continue to observe a neutral and loyal position in the East Asiatic war. We should not think of intervening in this conflict.

"When I expressed my thanks to the King for his toast of yesterday, His Majesty remarked that he had genuinely at heart the maintenance of peaceful and friendly relations with Germany. The Press on both sides had much to answer for. With patience and tact, it was to be hoped that both nations would gradually attain a better mutual understanding. He was completely in accord with the 'Small Egyptian Agreement.' In general, no special agreements were necessary between Germany and England, because no opposed political interests stood in our way. With France the situation had been otherwise. A settlement over long-standing and difficult points of difference had become absolutely necessary. The understanding between England and France was not directed against Germany. He had no idea of isolating Germany. On the contrary, he desired to minimize the points of friction between all the Great Powers, and to assure universal peace in Europe for the longest possible period. Peace was a necessity for the nations groaning under the weight

of their military obligations and the taxation required to meet them. The King added, with great frankness, that he ardently desired to reach a similar understanding with Russia to that so happily attained with France. It would be a good opening for world peace if England and Russia could agree satisfactorily on certain Asiatic questions. The task was difficult, but he did not doubt it would be solved.

"Incidentally the King remarked that he regretted to see disturbances come to a head in the Near East. He was for peace everywhere. He admitted that not much could be done with the Sultan and the Turks; the former was unteachable and the latter had outlived their day. The future in the Balkan Peninsula lay with the Rumanians, the Greeks, and the Bulgarians. The King indicated M. Isvolsky as the most capable of Russian diplomats; during his recent stay in Copenhagen he had gladly entered into the King's desire for a settlement with Russia, which he had communicated to St. Petersburg, where it had apparently not been taken into closer consideration.

"Lamsdorff was an honest man, but too nervous and too bureaucratic. King Edward was pessimistic about the internal Russian situation; he compared General Bobrikov to the bailiff Gessler.[1] Of his relative Emperor Nicholas he spoke affectionately.

"King Edward's attitude here has been most friendly. His intercourse with His Majesty the Emperor is friendly and unconstrained."

MEMORANDUM.

"KIEL, June 29, 1904.

"*Secret.*

"His Majesty King Edward is highly satisfied with the whole of his stay in Kiel, and particularly with his excursion to Hamburg. The King told me he had telegraphed to Lord Lansdowne that he could not have been better received in an English town than he was in Hamburg.

"The King had a political conversation with His Majesty

[1] The bailiff in "William Tell."

the Emperor to-day for the first time; this conversation, covering the ground of the earlier conversation with me, went off well. The King also repeatedly engaged me in political conversations during the last few days, in which, on the one hand, he again took sides enthusiastically for Japan and the Japanese claims, and, on the other, there emerged his desire for the ending of the Eastern Asiatic war and the smoothing out of Anglo-Russian differences. The King thought the Japanese would in no case pursue a vengeful policy towards the Russians, if the latter would only evacuate Manchuria. Japan, rightly, could not allow any uncertainty about the return of Manchuria to China and the recognition of Japanese preponderance in Korea. Neither the King nor the other English gentlemen believed in the possibility of a turn of affairs in the war in Russia's favour. They thought revolutionary movements in Russia not unlikely. Lord Selborne incidentally said it was not desirable that Russia should retire completely in Eastern Asia, as she might then exert her whole strength in Eastern Europe."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR COUNT VON BÜLOW.

"NEUES PALAIS, Aug. 28, 1904.

"Henry[1] is just back. Very full of impressions. Unusually warmly received; I personally in high favour *for the moment*. Journey of Frederick Leopold put off at the direct request of H.M., since Chinese revolts have broken out and bands of Chun Chus so often attack the railway that H.M. cannot guarantee the safe arrival of the Prince in the theatre of war. H.M. designated the increasing activity of the Chinese as treacherous and so dangerous that he is meditating 'declaring war on China' (!!!)—these are the Emperor's own words for my benefit! That would be nice and pleasant for the rest of us Europeans! The Grand Dukes quite apathetic and unenthusiastic; they don't go into the field but spend their time in amusement

[1]Prince Henry of Prussia represented the Emperor William II at the christening of the Russian Heir to the Throne.

as usual. Spirits generally depressed, however. The Emperor has thoughtfully sent me a message: 'Willy need not be anxious at all, he may go fast asleep at night, for I vouch for it that everything will come perfectly right!' Prince Henry himself very much struck with the Emperor's inexplicable optimism. The Russian people so friendly to me personally that on the news of the birth of the Heir to the Throne in Moscow there was an immediate demand for the German Emperor to be invited to stand godfather; this state of mind is widespread throughout the country! . . ."

To the Emperor William II.

"Norderney, Aug. 28, 1904.

"Your Majesty's telegram just received, with my most humble thanks. The St. Petersburg impressions of his Royal Highness Prince Henry very interesting! The most pleasing news of all is that Your Majesty has personally won so much ground among the masses in Russia. Just reward for a chivalrous and wise attitude. The Tsar's optimism with regard to eventual success not disadvantageous, since it excludes a premature conclusion of peace, which, without striking Russian successes, would not be without danger for the Russian dynasty. To drag China into the war would certainly be serious, since it might be a signal for the partition of China, which is not in our interests at present. I may reserve the intention of recurring, with great humility, to this point. That His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas does not desire the appearance of His Royal Highness Prince Frederick Leopold in the Eastern Asiatic theatre of war shows that the conditions there are bad. If, in this way, without any action on our part, and at expressed Russian desire, a Prussian Prince can only be present in the Japanese camp, that only helps us with the Japanese. Deeply disturbed that the Mirbach affair is still not settled in spite of Your Majesty's recent decision. With the heartiest wishes that so many cares may not be injurious to Your Majesty's health."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Aug. 31, 1904.

"*Very Secret.*

"From Your Imperial and Royal Majesty's Ambassador in Washington there has arrived the following secret communication:

"'President Roosevelt told me that, in case the Japanese annihilate General Kuropatkin's army, Port Arthur falls, and there is question of the conclusion of peace, he would seek for the following settlement: Korea remains under the Japanese protectorate, which should be equivalent to control. The Powers guarantee the neutralization of Manchuria, which is placed under the control of a Chinese Viceroy, nominated by Germany, *not* by England. Should he be re-elected President, he desires to go hand in hand with Germany in Eastern Asia. But he would like first to come to a clear understanding, and for that purpose is ready to take the initiative in carrying it out. He gave me to understand that he regarded it as desirable, as soon as the moment arrives, to discuss verbally with His Majesty the Kaiser the details of the policy which he thinks the best in the Far East.'

"I asked the Foreign Office for an opinion on President Roosevelt's proposals as a whole and in detail, and I beg humbly to submit to Your Majesty this opinion in the attached Memorandum with the further remark that I concur substantially in the explanations and proposals of the Foreign Office, and have only to offer the following remarks:

"In considering the Roosevelt suggestions, it ought not, I respectfully submit, to be left out of account that the President is a great admirer of Your Majesty and would like to rule the world hand in hand with Your Majesty, as he certainly conceives himself to be the American pendant to Your Majesty. Therefore I should wish to agree all the more with the opinion set out in the Memorandum that Mr. Roosevelt is sincere and that no hostile intention to us underlies his proposal. In our concurrence in a Japanese protectorate over Korea, I should advise, if possible, no move regarding Russia until the latter shows inclination

to accept such an arrangement. Then, should America succeed in securing a guarantee from the Powers for the neutralization of Manchuria, we can accept the decision. Naturally, it would be more convenient for us if the Viceroy of Manchuria was nominated, not by us, but by America or England. Yet I should also concur in this matter with the Foreign Office Memorandum, that we could confidently leave the refusal of this point to other Powers.

"We should, in my most humble opinion, defer as long as possible the statement that we are not disposed to involve ourselves in any fresh military undertakings in Eastern Asia—not, at least, until Mr. Roosevelt has committed himself as deeply as possible for the 'Open Door,' especially in the Yang-Tse Valley.

"I respectfully beg for Your Majesty's most gracious opinion:

"Whether, with the foregoing reservations, the suggestions of President Roosevelt should be answered and further negotiated upon by Baron Speck von Sternburg in accordance with the proposals of the Memorandum."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Oct. 28, 1904.

"I have the honour most humbly to submit to Your Imperial and Royal Majesty the annexed telegram from your Ambassador in Washington, in which President Roosevelt lays great personal stress on concluding an arbitration treaty with Your Majesty.

"I beg Your Majesty's most gracious decision whether I should have a reply sent to the President to the effect that Your Majesty would willingly examine his suggestions more closely.

"I would take care that no decisions were accepted in the arbitration treaty which would bind us more closely than do those of the German-English Arbitration Treaty of the summer."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Oct. 30, 1904.

"In an annex I submit with the deepest respect to your Imperial and Royal Majesty the draft of a letter to His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas. I think it is better to draw up Your Majesty's reply in this question of world-historical importance in the form of a letter: first, because the answer, corresponding to the importance of the matter, must touch all sides of the question; secondly, because, in the present state of affairs in Russia, it is not certain that a long cipher telegram from Your Majesty to the Tsar might not fall into the wrong hands. I should like most humbly to propose to transmit this letter of Your Majesty to the Emperor Nicholas by messenger, since sending one of Your Majesty's aides-de-camp would draw attention prematurely to the negotiations. It is all-important to keep the secret from the Anglo-French party at the Russian Court at present. In despatching this letter, Your Majesty might perhaps telegraph (in cipher) to His Majesty the Tsar Nicholas: 'Received your telegram. Agree with your views. I send answer by messenger.'

"May God bless this effort."

"(*Enclosure* I)

"To the Emperor Nicholas II of Russia.[1]

"My dear Nicky!

"Your kind telegram has given me the pleasure to feel that I was able in a serious moment to be of some use to you. I have at once communicated with the Chancellor, and we both have drawn up the three articles of the treaty you wished. Be it as you say. Let us stand together. Of course the alliance must be purely defensive and exclusively directed against the European aggressor or aggressors in the form of a mutual fire insurance company against incendiarism. It is very essential that America should not feel threatened by our agreement. Roosevelt, as I know, owing to the innate American antipathy against

[1] Thus given in the original in Bülow's own English.

all coloured races, has no special partiality for Japan, although the English do their utmost to work upon American opinion in favour of the Japanese. Besides, the Americans have a clear conception of the indisputable fact that a powerful Japanese Empire is a lasting danger for the American Philippines.

"As for France, we both know that the Radical or anti-Christian party, which for the moment appears to be the stronger one, inclines towards England, Crimean tradition, but is opposed to war, because a victorious general would mean certain destruction to this Republic of miserable civilians. The Nationalist or Clerical party dislikes England and has sympathies for Russia, but does not dream of throwing in its lot with Russia in the present war. Between the two parties the Republic would remain neutral and do nothing. The English count upon this neutrality and upon the consequent isolation of Russia. I positively know that as far back as last December the French Finance Minister Rouvier told the Finance Minister of another Power that France would on no account join in a Russo-Japanese war, even though England sided with Japan. To make doubly sure, the English have handed Morocco over to France. The certainty that France intends to remain neutral, and even to lend her diplomatic support to England, is the motive which gives English policy its present unwonted brutal assurance.

"This unheard-of state of things will change as soon as France finds herself face to face with the necessity of eventually choosing sides. As I said, the Radical party, which gravitates towards England, abhors wars and militarism, while the Nationalist party, while not objecting to war in itself, hates fighting for England and against Russia. Thus it will be in the interests of both parties to bring pressure to bear on and warn England to keep the peace. The main result will be, if you and I stand shoulder to shoulder, that France must formally and openly join us, thereby fulfilling her treaty obligations towards Russia. That, I expect, will put an end to made-up grievances about so-called breaches of neutrality. This consummation once reached, I expect to maintain peace, and you will be left an undisturbed and free hand to deal with Japan.

"Let me finally add that I sincerely admire your masterful political instinct which caused you to refer the North Sea

incident to your Hague Tribunal. For this systematically distorted incident has been used by the French Radicals, Clemenceau, and all the rest of the rag-tag and bobtail, as a further argument against France fulfilling her treaty obligations towards Russia.

"I enclose the draft of an agreement that you desired."

"(*Enclosure* II)

"*Leurs Majestés l'Empereur d'Allemagne et l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, afin de localiser, autant que faire se peut, la guerre Russo-Japonaise, ont arrêté les articles suivants d'un traité d'alliance défensive.*

"ARTICLE I

"*Au cas où l'un des deux Empires serait attaqué par une puissance Européenne, son allié l'aidera de toutes ses forces de terre et de mer. Les deux alliés, le cas échéant, feront également cause commune afin de rappeler à la France les obligations qu'elle a assumées aux termes du traité d'alliance franco-russe.*

"ARTICLE II

"*Les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à ne conclure de paix séparée avec aucun adversaire commun.*

"ARTICLE III

"*L'engagement de s'entr'aider est valable également pour le cas où des actes accomplis par l'une des deux hautes parties contractantes pendant la guerre tels que la livraison de charbon à un belligérant donneraient lieu après la guerre à des réclamations d'une tierce puissance, comme prétendues violations du droit des neutres.*"

TO THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

"BERLIN, Oct. 31, 1904.

"Your Imperial and Royal Majesty was so gracious as to give me the last communication from Lamsdorff. I read it on the return journey. From Lamsdorff's communication it is quite clear that His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas

does not regard the Hull-Vigo incident as closed, and for its settlement would like to play us off against England. That must not happen in any case, for in the matter of this incident and the behaviour of the "Roschestwensky" the French will under no circumstances act against England. On that matter, the language of all the French papers and information from Paris leave no doubt. Not only would it not have the effect intended by Your Majesty, to detach France from England and push her in the direction of ourselves and Russia, but it might perhaps have the contrary result. In my most humble estimation, Your Majesty should, in order to circumvent this danger, add to the letter (which now, as before, meets the case) the following postscript, the following propositions between the two last paragraphs of the draft (between 'towards Russia' and 'I enclose'): 'Naturally the damnable Hull incident must first be closed before we can undertake anything and approach France. My information leaves no doubt that in this matter Delcassé and Cambon have already settled the policy of the French Government in an Anglophile sense. We should only drive France on to the English side if we compelled France to declare herself in this matter.'"

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Nov. 16, 1904.

"I transmit to Your Imperial and Royal Majesty in the annex to this letter a draft reply to His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas. The reply this time must unfortunately be incomplete. Your Majesty has to do with a partner who is not so practised as Your Majesty in the political game, and for whom an exact statement of all the evidence was necessary to avoid the danger of mistaken interpretation. If the Tsar at the outset, instead of '*Afin de localiser autant que faire se peut la guerre Russo-Japonaise,*' said, '*Afin d'assurer le mainte* (sic) *de la paix en Europe,*' the alliance will be more powerful and safer and will last longer. Naturally we must not let our interest in this alteration appear.

"Now Your Majesty is faced with the horrid task of

translating this long letter into good English. I am so sorry that Your Majesty should have this trouble. My justification for this presumption is that this is a matter of a really great and delicate situation quite unexpected by an attentive world. If they had the least suspicion in Paris and London of the contents of this document they would strain every nerve to prevent at the last moment the German-Russian alliance, by which the possibility of a Russo-French-English alliance is destroyed."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR COUNT VON BÜLOW.

"GR. STRELITZ, NOV. 23, 1904.

"Dear Bülow,

"Herewith I send you a cipher just received from the Tsar which I have decoded with Cuno [1] and Hohenau.[2]

"His Majesty is beginning to have 'cold feet' with regard to the Gauls, and is so flabby that he will not make this treaty with us without their permission—that means also not against them. It is in my opinion impossible that Paris should know anything about it before we have secured the 'Little Father's' signature. For its communication to Delcassé means a telegram to Cambon and that very evening its appearance in *The Times* and *The Figaro*, and with that the affair is done for; for the row that would then break out in London would perhaps induce 'Little Father' to make such modifications as would make the treaty worthless or frighten him off concluding it. I am very much worried by this turn of affairs but not surprised; he is too weak-kneed towards the French—on account of the loan—and I should not be surprised if your friend Witte with the flabby Lamsdorff had not both of them had a finger in our pie. He—or the Tsar—will have perhaps made enquiries, secretly because of Paris, and Witte, in anxiety about some outstanding loan from there, has given his advice on this disastrous proposal. If they go on in this way the whole story will come out, and the net result is 'tata.'

[1] Count Cuno Moltke.

[2] Count Wilhelm von Hohenau.

"I have to-day received from Coerper[1] fresh news of the increasing bad feeling, of articles directly advocating aggressive action, and of conversations of the same tenor with ladies in naval circles, who told him frankly that war must soon be declared against us since our Fleet was still small enough for England to 'annihilate' it without danger to herself, that in two years' time it would be already too late, and that they would then risk losing too many ships. He also announces further preparations in the shape of the putting in readiness of more reserve cruisers for peace service in the North Sea to join up with the 'Home Fleet.' Preparations for mobilization are being pushed forward at high pressure, and the possibility of a surprise attack with overwhelming force is brought nearer.

"A *casus belli* for us in this situation would be the withdrawal of the Mediterranean Fleet from the Mediterranean into English waters. It would constitute a direct threat of war against us. This is the view also of the Naval Chief of Staff.

"We have had abominable rainy weather here at home and have stayed in the house playing cards. With regard to your early draft of a reply to the flabby Tsar, I beg you to send it through Adjutant-General von Scholl, so that he can put it into cipher straight away.

"With kindest regards,

"Yours most sincerely,

"WILLIAM I.R.

"P.S.—The situation begins more and more to resemble that before the Seven Years' War."

TO THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

"BERLIN, Nov. 24, 1904.

"I beg humbly to hand to Your Imperial and Royal Majesty in the annex the draft of a reply to the Tsar. In this critical moment it is important:

"(1) To keep the pourparlers secret. Hence the indirect appeal to the Tsar's loyalty.

[1] Naval Attaché in London.

"(2) To show no agitation, so as not to drive the Tsar into the arms of England. Therefore we will not mention at all that the idea of an alliance arose in Russia.

"(3) To keep an eye on England, but to show no nervousness.

"(4) To keep open to the Tsar the possibility of a German-Russian understanding, even though he now jibs at it.

"I have kept the draft telegram as short and clear as possible, but what we say in this draft seems to me necessary. I would willingly have spared Your Majesty the trouble of translation into English, but Your Majesty knows English so much better than I do.

"(*Enclosure*)

"DRAFT OF A TELEGRAM FROM THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II OF RUSSIA.

"Best thanks for your telegram. That you will say nothing to France without my agreement is for me a fresh proof of your perfect loyalty. I should think it absolutely dangerous for France to be informed before a treaty is concluded between you and me. I am convinced that premature communication to France would result in the opposite of what we want. If France knows for certain that Russia and Germany are bound by a treaty to support one another it will warn the English to keep the peace in order not to place themselves in an unpleasant situation. But if France knows that a German-Russian treaty has been projected, but not yet concluded, the French Government might arrive at a decision to give the English a hint while there is still time. The possibility is not excluded that the English may then, in association with Japan, attack me all along the line in Asia and Europe as a preventive measure. Germany would then be temporarily crippled by the maritime superiority of the two others. Thereby the balance of power in the world would be destroyed for a time to my and your disadvantage, and in your conclusion of peace later on Japan with her friends would have completely the upper hand.

"My desire was, and is, to maintain this balance of power by a union between Germany, Russia, and France in the interest of peace. But I think that is only possible if first of all we are both agreed in some form and a treaty an accomplished fact. By informing France beforehand, you might precipitate a catastrophe. But if you find that you cannot conclude a treaty without the prior consent of France, then the less dangerous alternative for us both is not to conclude a treaty at all. Naturally, on my side I am keeping the secret of a pourparler as conscientiously as you. As you have only admitted Lamsdorff into the secret, so I have only spoken of it with Bülow and have taken pains to secure absolute secrecy. Our regard for one another remains in any case as before. I shall seek now as ever to be of use to you so far as I can do so within the limits of my own security. Your neutrality agreement with Austria has been communicated to me by the Emperor Francis Joseph. I am in complete agreement with it."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Dec. 6, 1904.

"*Very Secret.*

"Your Imperial and Royal Majesty is informed of the most recent newspaper reports from England, according to which the English Government has now begun to forbid German ships which were arranging to take coal from English ports for the Russian ships to leave the ports and is compelling them to unload their coal cargoes. The English Government justifies this proceeding on the English legal doctrine that a merchant ship which loads coal more than once for a foreign ship of war or other purpose must thereby be regarded as an auxiliary vessel of that fleet, and consequently commits an offence against English obligations as a neutral. As Director-General Ballin has reported to the Foreign Office, he has a number of German vessels intended to carry coal to the Russian Fleet more than once. Cases of English intervention against our merchant ships may therefore recur.

"According to the report of Wolff's Bureau herewith most respectfully annexed, the Japanese allow threats to be made through its Press in Tokyo that they will use armed force against any breach of neutrality, and will no longer respect the neutrality of the State in question. This gives the impression that we are faced with Anglo-Japanese action.

"To the question of what security Russia offers us against the eventual evil results of the coal deliveries and the other services rendered to her there is as yet no satisfactory reply. The letter already announced of His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas on Your Majesty's observations on the treaty project suggested by the Tsar himself is still awaited. The Russian Government shows coolness towards us, as Your Majesty will see from the enclosed report of Baron von Romberg of the 1st instant. On the other hand, as the attached report of Prince Radolin of the 2nd instant shows, emphasis is recently laid with surprising diligence, not only in the French Press, but by the French Government, on the fact that the Dual Alliance remains unchanged and that Germany's advances to Russia would fail. The suspicion is not excluded that something about the Russo-German pourparlers has trickled through from the Neva to the Seine.

"In my most humble opinion it is indicated under these circumstances that we should compel Russia to avow her principles, while we make certain how far we can count on Russian help if we are drawn into a conflict over the coal deliveries.

"If we defer acquiring this certainty it may happen that the German coaling operations will be carried out in the interval, and that Russia would therefore have no further interest in our support. Ballin, for instance, as the annexed statement shows, only delivers the coal part of the way, not in the theatre of war itself.

"In accordance with all this I would most respectfully ask Your Majesty's agreement to the draft request to St. Petersburg enclosed herewith.

"At the same time, it might be advantageous if Your Majesty would address a letter to the Emperor Nicholas in the sense of the German draft, humbly submitted herewith.

"The despatch of the request, together with the letter, is subject to the condition that in case we receive no satisfactory

answer from St. Petersburg I will request Herr Ballin, in Your Majesty's name, not to deliver any more coal to the Russians."

MEMORANDUM.

"BERLIN, Dec. 16, 1904.

"(1) Our intentions towards England are absolutely peaceful. We shall act as prudently as possible towards England. We shall in every way strive to avoid incidents with England. The increase in our Fleet goes forward more slowly than in many other countries. The provision to be expected for the Fleet next winter will be kept within relatively modest bounds, without Navy scares, and will be quietly planned and carried out. In spite of this, is there any danger that we may be attacked by England within a measurable time?

"(2) Would the danger of an English attack on Germany be increased or diminished by the conclusion of an agreement of any kind between Germany and Russia?

"(3) In case of a German-Russian agreement, would England be more disposed than she is now to attack Russia and to draw us in on sympathetic grounds?

"(4) As against England, would a defensive alliance between Germany and Russia (both Powers bind themselves respectively to full support if one of them should be attacked) be more useful, or a neutrality agreement (by which Russia would cover our rear exclusively with regard to certain neutrality questions, such as coal deliveries, questions of ports, etc.)?

"(5) Would the one or the other form of agreement be more irritating to England? Which kind of agreement would offer us more security against England?

"(6) Will the danger of an English attack on us be increased by our benevolent attitude towards Russia in neutrality questions, and particularly in the matter of coaling? Can serious incidents with England arise out of the coal deliveries? Is it therefore advisable to conclude no agreement of any sort with Russia, but, on the other hand, to stop the coal deliveries?

"(7) Does the danger exist that England, if she hears of negotiations for an alliance between us and Russia, may suddenly make a surprise attack on us?"

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Dec. 24, 1904.

"Your Majesty's Ambassador in Washington, Baron Speck von Sternburg, has arrived here, charged with special messages from President Roosevelt and commissioned to act as his mouthpiece. The state of his health is given as the ostensible object of his journey.

"Baron Sternburg has briefly set out, in the accompanying *aide-mémoire*, the views of the American Press regarding the political situation, especially the situation in Eastern Asia. From this it appears that President Roosevelt, in conformity both with his personal feelings and with the prevailing views amongst both the Republicans and Democrats in the United States, does not wish in any circumstances to act in opposition to Japan, whose expansion and increasing strength he does not fear, and whose friendship he wishes to win. On the other hand, he cherishes a deep-seated mistrust of Russia, and of her aggressive and reactionary tendencies. The President does not wish to hand over either China or Manchuria or Korea to the Russian system of isolation.

"This outline Your Majesty's Ambassador amplified in verbal communications to myself. From these, it transpires that the dislike of Russia which President Roosevelt shares with almost the whole American people is too deep-rooted for any change to be expected. Naturally we cannot put ourselves into opposition to Russia in order to fall in with the Asiatic policy of America. Nevertheless, we must manage to give a reply to Roosevelt which will not endanger the gradual development of the friendly relations between Germany and America. As the main features of our reply, I might suggest the following points:

"'Germany finds herself in a more difficult position than that of America. The latter need have no anxiety as to an attack from any direction, while H.M. the German

Emperor has not the same desirable security with regard to the intentions which England and France may cherish towards Germany. England has paid for her *Entente Cordiale* with France by heavy sacrifices. The renunciation of Morocco, in particular, is both surprising and suspicious. One could almost ask whether England thereby sought to assure herself of French support against Germany, either on behalf of an acquisitive policy in China or with a view to the creation, through French assistance, of an Anglo-Russo-Japanese alliance.

"'With such an outlook, the Kaiser cannot afford to make an enemy of Russia. The aims of German policy are clear and simple, namely, purely defensive.

"'Germany seeks for no expansion of her sphere of influence. The question of an extension of her sphere in China was specially considered in 1900, the year of the Boxing rising, and after mature deliberation, with special reference to the expense and dangers likely to be incurred, was finally rejected. In conformity with this non-aggressive character of German policy, H.M. the Kaiser's Government would willingly enter into defensive alliances for the preservation of the recognized *status quo*. Such a defensive alliance with America would perhaps be profitable for both parties, but His Majesty is well aware that the Constitution of the United States has expressed itself against entanglements to be feared from treaties of alliance. How far an alliance which ostensibly does nothing but guarantee the maintenance of the *status quo*, as now internationally recognized, would fit in with the interests and aims of Russian policy, only Russia herself can judge. At any rate, there exists no alliance between Germany and Russia. That Germany, who herself seeks no territorial advantages, should bind herself by treaty to support the aggressive policy of another Power, would be unnatural, save only in the case of Germany seeing herself threatened by some all-powerful enemy and being compelled to pay a high price for an ally who would protect her rear. H.M. the Kaiser hopes, none the less, despite somewhat threatening appearances—such as the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale and the powerful strengthening of the English Channel Squadron—that the German Empire may be spared the pressure of such a serious situation.

As has already been said, the German Empire seeks no advantage for herself—her aim is directed only towards self-preservation. If French policy succeeds in bringing Russia into the Anglo-Japanese group, then England, France, Japan, and Russia combined will probably be strong enough to dictate to the whole world—at any rate, strong enough to divide up Asia, and especially China, amongst them.' "

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Dec. 26, 1904.

"I thank Your Imperial Majesty for sending me the reply of His Majesty the Tsar Nicholas. The manner in which he deals with Your Majesty's last letter confirms the suspicion that Russia attaches either no value to an alliance with us or not so high a value as she would if she held more correct views on the political situation and the relations of the Powers.

"In the enclosure I present a most interesting secret dispatch from von Arco. Japan seeks peace. The impending Aoki mission seems, if we collate our reports from all sources, to be the third attempt to initiate negotiations for peace. Some weeks ago Viscount Hayashi suggested in London that England and Japan should discuss peace terms between themselves, and England suggested to Japan that it would be advisable to adopt the most conciliatory attitude possible. On the other hand, we know from Baron Sternburg that the Japanese made known their desire for peace to the American Ambassador in Tokyo, Mr. Griscom. Probably in connection with this, Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, brought forward the question of peace with Count Cassini, but he replied to the Ambassador that the war must go on to the bitter end.

"Since the Japanese feelers have not hitherto produced any tangible results from England or America, the Japanese think they will try to avail themselves of the friendly relations between Russia and Germany, which, from outside, they believe to be more intimate than they are in reality. A refusal to receive the Aoki mission would, in my respectful opinion,

not suit German interests, since by so doing we would present ourselves quite unnecessarily before the world as the partisan of Russia, though for some time she has not allowed us to have any influence upon her. It would be equally detrimental to our prestige, however, if our refusal were couched in such terms as to convey the impression that we were, above all, afraid to express an opinion. On the other hand, the reception of the Aoki mission commits us to nothing. It would be perfectly natural were the long-established envoy of Japan in Berlin to be chosen as representative of Japan at the wedding of His Imperial Highness the Grand Prince. The combination of circumstances would be so natural that no political inferences could justly be drawn.

"From the standpoint of Court etiquette, the objection might be made that a Prince of the Imperial House of Japan ought to attend the wedding of His Imperial Highness. But this formal objection should be disregarded in view of the useful purpose which the Aoki mission would certainly fulfil. For even if the mission itself has no other results, it would enable us to obtain a fairly clear insight into Japanese policy and also into the Asiatic policy of the other Powers. The present situation is that America and Japan unite with us in the solution of the Far Eastern question, while Russia, France, and England, on the other hand, would like to keep us in ignorance of the fluctuations of the negotiations. It follows from this that we must not fall out with America and Japan, but, as far as possible, must remain in touch with them. The more we learn what is going on, the more does the danger of the situation diminish. In the next place, it would suffice were Your Majesty to let Aoki know that you would be prepared to receive him in a special audience on the occasion of the betrothal celebrations. As to the attitude to be adopted with regard to Aoki's communications, there is still ample time for consideration.

"In the interval before Aoki arrives the war situation may change considerably; so may many other factors dependent upon it. If we replied to Tokyo that, in the circumstances, it would be more suitable to send an Imperial Prince to represent Japan at the betrothal celebrations instead of the undoubtedly useful and sympathetic Aoki, that would be interpreted as meaning that we wish to avoid any political

pronouncement. This would be a blunter way of bringing the matter to a conclusion than if, after hearing the grievances of the Japanese, we then explained in a friendly manner: 'We regret we are unable to help you; our own situation forbids us to embark on new enterprises where we should only make new enemies.' This latter course would give less offence to the Japanese than if we definitely refused to give them a hearing. I think, therefore, it would be advisable if Your Majesty would authorize me to telegraph to von Arco that Aoki would be agreeable to Your Majesty as Japan's representative. Further, we might consider whether we should receive Aoki as an Ambassador. In view of the sensitive national pride of the Japanese, that would be a great *coup*, and would also cause immense annoyance to the English.

"As regards America, I should advise that at present we dwell more on the danger of a Quadruple Alliance (England, France, Russia, and Japan) than on that of a Yellow Peril. The Americans will be more ready to believe in the former danger, as it is nearer to them. The latter is too remote, and the peculiar characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon peoples is to grasp, for the most part, only that which lies nearest to their view. Further, Japan, as the fourth member of an alliance with three European Powers, is more dangerous than if she stands alone with China. The latter contingency is that which Roosevelt foreshadows when he says it would not be difficult to deal with Japan. For us, too, the Quadruple Alliance is a more urgent danger than the Chino-Japanese Alliance. The chief thing appears to me to be that we should get Aoki here. Whether we afterwards really embark on serious negotiations is of secondary importance. The advantage to us is that, through America and Japan, we should be rescued from the obscure corner to which not only England, but Russia, wishes to relegate us. . . .

"On Christmas Day I had a long conversation with Lascelles. On this occasion he has made excellent use of his leave, and has discussed German relations not only with King Edward, but also with numerous English politicians and publicists. His impressions are roughly the same as those of Metternich; the English distrust of Germany is just as great as that of Germany for England.

If we believe in the possibility of an English attack, so, on the other hand, many Englishmen are convinced that we are only building our Fleet in order to attack England as soon as we are strong enough. If the fresh allocation of the English Fleet arouses our anxiety, so, on the other hand, is the English Admiralty convinced that we are concentrating all our energies on the construction of warships, and are assembling these in our home waters. If the English Press is hostile at present, it has for some years been the case that the German Press has adopted an unfriendly tone towards England.

"My reply to Lascelles was a variation of the Latin tag, '*Si duo faciunt idem, non est idem.*' What the German Press may say with regard to foreign policy has little importance for practical purposes, for the German people have unfortunately little political education and the German Press is merely doctrinaire. With us, only the official policy counts at all, and ours, especially during the Boer War, was not only correct and loyal, but even outspokenly friendly. In England it is otherwise. The attitude of the great English newspapers has in fact a profound influence on the course of English policy, for English public opinion determines, in the last event, the direction of her policy. It is further a fact that the great English Press, just because, in contrast to the German Press, it possesses political traditions, is not in the habit of opposing the views of the English Government in decisive international questions. If the English Press adopts so hostile a tone against a foreign country as it is now doing against Germany, it must be a cause of serious anxiety. On the other hand, England is so superior to us at sea, that the possibility of a German attack on England is not worth discussing amongst sensible people.

"The opposite is, however, quite conceivable. Lascelles denied most emphatically that either the English Government, or the Navy, or the City, or the great majority of the English people want war with us. Mistrust and irritation with us are at this time certainly great in England, but England seeks no conflict with us; she wants peace. His Majesty King Edward has given Lascelles friendly messages for Your Majesty, which the latter hopes to convey to you on the occasion of his New Year audience.

"His Majesty also said to him, 'I place full confidence in

Count Bülow.' As Your Majesty has repeatedly and rightly said, the all-important thing with England is to get through the next few years with patience and smoothness, to give no cause for friction and no visible ground for suspicions. The situation resembles that of the Athenians, when they had to build the long walls on the Piræus without interference from the more powerful Spartans before the work was complete."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR COUNT VON BÜLOW.

"Dec. 28, 1904.

"DEAR BÜLOW,

"As regards the Tsar's letter of reply, it is clearly a refusal even to consider an agreement without France's knowledge. An entirely negative result after two months' solid work and negotiations. The first failure which I, personally, have experienced. I hope it is not the first of a series of similar happenings. America and Japan must now be all the more carefully cultivated. The latter is, undoubtedly, much annoyed with England, and is in a depressed frame of mind because everything is not going exactly as she wishes. Paris must be pulled up sharply!

"The French have certainly got wind of our negotiations and have thwarted them. Delcassé is infernally clever and very powerful. I am now heart and soul with the Bulgar—he is coming to my birthday festivities! He has already promised to support the Bagdad Railway, and will try to bring the French round too. He is very much annoyed with Austria. He has joined a secret alliance with Hungary, whose revolt he considers absolutely certain on the death of the present Emperor. Franz Ferdinand is Czech pure and simple. He wants to make his wife Empress! . . .

"WILLIAM."[1]

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[1] In this instance the Emperor omitted, apparently, the usual "I.R." after his name.

III

THE YEAR 1905.: JANUARY-APRIL

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THE YEAR 1905 : JANUARY-APRIL

NOTE.

A page from Mr. R. H. Gretton's " Modern History of the English People," Volume II, will serve as a very interesting and useful preface to this section :

The quality of our agreement with France had been expressed in a phrase new to the British public. It hardly savours too much of cynicism to say that this fact greatly assisted the establishment of friendly feelings. The " Entente Cordiale " became a street catchword ; and so an idea that might have taken years to bear fruit found its way at once to the populace. If it had remained entirely, or even almost entirely, on the diplomatic plane, it would have been seriously shaken this year. For, as far as the principal bargain was concerned, France appeared to have made a miscalculation. She had bargained a certainty in Egypt against a speculation in Morocco. The situation in Egypt had lasted long enough to make our position assured. But it soon appeared that there were others besides ourselves with a word to say about Morocco. The German Emperor visited Tangier in the spring of 1905, and in a speech there remarked that he could not allow any Power to step between him and the free sovereign of a free country. Incidentally, this event gave a new text for the Free Traders. A nation that set up tariffs and protected markets, like the French, could not move a step towards new expansion without alarming a great trading nation like Germany. Expansion to France meant a new closed market ; expansion to us meant a new open market for everybody. But this was a minor aspect of the affair. The more important aspect was that friction arose between France and Germany, and arose from an agreement of which we seemed to be getting the only profit. As it turned out, the storm fell solely upon M. Delcassé. King Edward went yachting in the Mediterranean in the spring, and, both on his way south and on his return, he stopped at Paris to visit President Loubet. M. Delcassé could not be saved. A logical people, like the French, could see the mistake he had made, and in June he resigned the Foreign Ministry. It was thought, perhaps with some truth, that Russia's grievous preoccupation in the Far East, paralyzing her for the moment in Europe, had deprived M. Delcassé of power upon which he had relied. A meeting between the Tsar of Russia and the German Emperor on their yachts in the Baltic added to French uneasiness. But the friendliness with England stood the strain. The French Fleet visited Spithead in July and was fêted ; the Municipal Council of Paris visited the London County Council in September, and were received by the King.

III

THE YEAR 1905: JANUARY-APRIL

To Herr von Kühlmann,[1]
Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier.

"Berlin, Jan. 2, 1905.

"The suggestion put forward in your Report No. A298, that it should be made clear in the appropriate quarter in Morocco that Germany takes a *political* interest in Moroccan affairs, is worthy of consideration. Naturally we cannot go so far as to say that we will give open support to the Moroccans. In this connection you must unhesitatingly deny the report emanating partly direct from Paris, partly in a roundabout way through Madrid, 'that the Sultan is alarmed at the unanimous action taken by the European Powers,' and you might also let slip the observation that Germany, together with other of the Great Powers, has not yet occupied herself with the new phase of the Moroccan question.

"Your Excellency must use your own judgment as to the time and place when it might be advisable to add that the Nationalist opposition in France through their Press opposes in the most violent manner the idea of any military operations in Morocco, since France would then no longer have a free hand for many years to avail herself of any desirable opportunity for revenge against Germany."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Jan. 15, 1905.

"Your Majesty's Ambassador in Washington cabled yesterday:

[1] Herr Richard von Kühlmann, who was later First Secretary at the Embassy in London.

"'The Russian Ambassador informs me that yesterday he presented to the Secretary of State, Mr. Hay, and to the other Powers a formal statement with regard to the breach of neutrality by China. Mr. Hay at first replied he had no cognizance of the facts alleged by Russia, and doubted whether Russia were not taking too gloomy a view of the situation. He added, however, that he would telegraph at once to Peking, expostulating with the Chinese Government. Mr. Hay was clearly taken aback by his arguments.'

"On the 12th the Press telegram from St. Petersburg had reported that the Russian Government had circularized the Powers with regard to the violation of Chinese neutrality. Russia finds herself under the necessity of acting in accordance with her own interests in the matter of Chinese neutrality.

"Also on the 12th there appeared in the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg* a complete reprint of articles which had appeared in the *United Services Magazine*, in which without any hesitation the *rapprochement* between England and Russia is advocated, and not Russia, but Germany, appears as the real enemy of Great Britain.

"In this connection I might point out that *Le Temps* on the 13th, under the heading 'L'Indo-Chine et le Japon,' has a remarkable article, which speaks out without restraint and lays down in detail exactly how and why French interests in Lower India are so dangerously threatened by Japan.

"Against this threat France must defend herself on sea. Other Powers may also be ranged in opposition to Japan by the side of France. Asia to-day is mainly under the domination of England, France, and Russia. The control of China is on the way. Japan stands as warlike protagonist of the yellow races against the white in opposing these measures. It would be most natural for the threatened Powers to draw closer together; for the present, however, England stands apart, by reason of her friendly relations with Japan.

"This same number of *Le Temps* reprints the report made by Doumer when, as Governor-General of Indo-China in March 1897, he foresaw the danger from Japan. Both articles I herewith enclose. From the circumstances that the organ of Delcassé has reproduced a report in which Doumer appears as a prophet, one can perhaps infer that Delcassé[1]

[1] M. Delcassé, then French Minister for Foreign Affairs. M. Combes was French Premier, and M. Doumer was Governor-General of Indo-China.

would like to see Doumer in the place of Combes. But this matter of internal politics is not of much importance compared with the apprehensions called forth by the utterances which have already been made public. The Russian Circular Note, as made public by the Russian Telegraph (up to the present it has not been officially issued), allows it to be understood that Russia is offended by China and on that account will take control of her. The *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*, by reproducing without criticism the ideas of the *United Services Magazine*, identifies itself with the policy that England should join with Russia and that England's real enemy is not Russia but Germany. The *Temps* finally says openly that Russia, France, and England, if they understand their own interests, should unite against the common enemy, Japan, for the accomplishment of their long-desired aims in Asia. Of course, it is rightly admitted that at present nothing can be reckoned on as far as England is concerned. None the less, the far-seeing M. Delcassé would hardly have let such an article appear, pointing directly at war with Japan, and quoting Doumer's report, as documentary evidence in this connection, unless he entertained hopes that by an extension of the quarrel in the Far East, England might be detached from the side of Japan. Further, it may be adduced that M. Delcassé views with much favour the prospect of a Franco-Anglo-Russian alliance for the control of China.

" All these plans will be greatly disturbed by the American Note of yesterday, the text of which I herewith enclose for Your Majesty. The main points of the Note are: The American Government has received intimations from various Powers that, in the event of a rupture between Russia and Japan, they will seize the opportunity to put forward their own views on the Chinese question. The President regards these intimations with apprehension, for such discussions will confuse and embitter the whole situation. The United States, for their part, will stand, as hitherto, for the integrity of China and the ' Open Door.' Finally, the Ambassador is commissioned to ascertain the opinions of the various Powers, including Germany, on each point. This conclusion leaves nothing to be desired from the point of view of firmness.

" The position which Your Majesty has adopted over the Eastern Asiatic question is absolutely clear. I beg Your Majesty's consent that in reply to the American questions

I should state that Your Majesty's Government adheres to your earlier declarations, that in particular your standpoint may be ascertained by reference to the Anglo-German Agreement of October 16, 1900, in which your full intentions were imparted to all interested parties. Your Majesty's Government desires the maintenance of the 'Open Door' and wishes for no extension of influence."

To Herr von Kühlmann,
Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier.

"Berlin, Jan. 16, 1905.

"We can rest assured that the French demands are not detrimental to German interests. We must not, however, bind ourselves in advance to undertake any responsibility for giving the Sultan advice on particular points, if the Sultan tries to ascertain our intentions.

"Should the Sultan ask to see Dr. Vassel he must, of course, comply. He can take the opportunity of remarking that the Nationalist party in France dreads war with Morocco, since in that event the frontier between France and Germany would be partially denuded of troops.

"Anything in the Press of an anti-French character, especially anything of English or American origin, may be turned to account, as long as Dr. Vassel is not used as the sole channel of communication. Will the change on the Moroccan outlook have any effect on American commercial interests? Is the American representative taking the matter up? Please report."

To Herr von Kühlmann,
Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier.

"Berlin, Jan. 30, 1905.

"When Dr. Vassel employed the expression, 'unfortunate idea,' he could not have been instructed in conformity with

my telegram No. 1. It therefore seems advisable to put forward once more the German point of view:

"(1.) German and French interests are not identical.

"(2.) The German Government has not received any formal notification on the part of France of any intended change of policy in Morocco, and has also had no occasion up to now to take any notice of any such change of policy.

"Dr. Vassel should speak to the Sultan in this sense in the course of their next conversation. Should the Sultan enquire whether Germany will support him, Dr. Vassel must reply that Germany cannot go to war with France over Morocco. There are, however, other problems which are capable of stirring up the distrust of each other felt by France and Germany. Actually the party in France which is most hostile to Germany, and most warlike, is opposed to a Moroccan war, for this would involve the dispatch of a large army and to a certain extent would involve the depletion of the garrisons along the German frontier.

"I leave to your own judgment:

"Whether you will allow Dr. Vassel to fix a date for his conversation with the Sultan or will yourself appoint one;

"Further, whether you think it advisable to speak to the Sultan's representative yourself in the foregoing sense. This latter course should only be taken into consideration if the Moroccan in question is not entirely under the influence of the French group."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Feb. 14, 1905.

"I hasten to inform Your Imperial Majesty that on returning from my daily constitutional I found the telegram from the Tsar which Scholl had placed carefully sealed on my writing-table. From this telegram it appears, as a dispatch received at the same time from Tschirschky [1] confirms, that the Hamburg-America Line would like to put on us the responsibility and odium of the awkward matter of the coal

[1] Herr von Tschirschky, then Prussian Minister in Hamburg.

problem. Of this there can be no question. Your Majesty's personal relations with His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas are too important and the moment is too critical, with Delcassé and Lansdowne eagerly working for the formation of a Russo-Franco-English group, for either Your Majesty, or Y.M.'s Imperial Chancellor, not to stand completely aside from the whole matter.

"I attach a report received to-day from Alvensleben, from which it appears that in St. Petersburg the desire for peace grows stronger. Russia should not be given the opportunity to say, 'Russia has been obliged to seek peace because Your Majesty or Your Majesty's Government has prevented the Hamburg-America Line from supplying the Russian Fleet with any more coal.' The sole responsibility for dispatching or not dispatching the colliers must be accepted by the Hamburg-America Line. I beg to enclose the draft of a telegram in this sense for Your Majesty to dispatch to the Tsar. At the same time, I am informing Ballin, through Tschirschky, that he cannot appeal against Russia either to Your Majesty or to me, and that above all things he must not allow political considerations to weigh with him, but must think solely of what is conducive to the economic interests of the Hamburg-America Line."

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To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Feb. 15, 1905.

"Your Majesty's comment that it would be perfectly simple for the Russians to proceed with Ballin's colliers if they would only buy these up and man them themselves allows me to think that the Tsar has not yet been informed of the tentative proposal of the Hamburg-America Line. It would, in my opinion, be most useful if Your Majesty would telegraph to-day to the Tsar in the sense of the draft. The telegram is written in such a way that it will appear Your Majesty has made enquiries in Hamburg and is now letting the Tsar know the result of the enquiries. I should not be surprised if the Russian Fleet were led to seek peace

through their handling of the coal question—at our expense. Skrydlow has recently said openly: 'Peace at once!' The accompanying telegram, which is perfectly neutral and harmless, will act as a check on any such plots and designs.

"At this juncture I have received the enclosed telegram from Tschirschky, which I beg to lay before you. I will inform Ballin that he should, if it is at all possible, raise the proposal to sell to the Russians once again, and even insist on this."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Feb. 18, 1905.

"I beg to bring to Your Majesty's notice a telegram despatched yesterday by Count von Arco. The correspondence to which he refers was occasioned by the report of the Ambassador that the Japanese Press had recently again announced, despite all denials, that a Russo-Franco-German Alliance had been formed. My Telegram No. 20, enclosed, combats these untrue reports.

"The latest telegram from von Arco reports official Japanese demonstrations of confidence in the policy of Germany. Viscount Aoki claims to see in this change for the better a result of his activities. Without wishing to depreciate the services of this true friend of Germany, I think, none the less, that two other factors have aided the Japanese conversion.

"First of all the American Government, as soon as it was itself convinced of the disinterested character of German policy, laid stress upon this in its communications with Tokyo. In addition the violence of the French official Press has been such as might well cause a revulsion of feeling on the part of the Japanese. I took the liberty of calling Your Majesty's attention to these views a month ago. As a proof of the continuance of this campaign against Japan I venture to enclose copies of an article which appeared in the *Figaro* on the 14th of this month, entitled '*Le Partage Nécessaire.*' In this the partition of China is advocated. It should, according to the views of the *Figaro*, be undertaken while Japan is

demobilized. Russia should be given the North, as far as Peking, England the Yang-Tse, France the Southern provinces, both Yunnan and Kwangsu. Germany and Italy should be given territorial gains, while America should receive commercial advantages.

"This plan of partition, if it really exits, has been relegated to the background by the declaration of disinterestedness obtained from America, but it need certainly not be entirely abandoned. It may well be understood that the Japanese fight shy of it to a certain extent. Therefore the categorical denial by Your Majesty's Ambassador of any agreement between the German Government and France or Russia will fall on good ground. For the present I will go no further. The Japanese are very reserved as to their policy and may hope to exploit a further advance on the part of Germany in such a way as will enable them to manœuvre us into a position of opposition, not only to France—which would not matter so much—but also to Russia. Following up those ideas, I have emphasized to Tokyo that we cannot take any fresh steps towards the reception of the Aoki mission, but must await official action on the part of the Japanese Government.

"If the Japanese think that a *rapprochement* with Germany suits their interest, they will come of their own accord, since they now have been given full proof of Your Majesty's friendly political intentions."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, March 5, 1905.

"I must not fail to lay before Your Majesty the letter of the two Italian Ministers to Count Lanza, and the accompanying French translation. The Italian Government in this explanation, in which a certain amount of frankness is shown and in which even some regret for the behaviour of their predecessors in office may be perceived, prove quite clearly how very important it is for Italy to have no breach with Germany. Italy feels that by herself she is no match for her north-eastern neighbour; on the other hand, she knows French help has to be paid for—witness Savoy and Nice. For

that reason Rome does not wish to lose the support of Germany. It has been a good thing to have startled Italy, both in order to test her mood and also as a warning. But, now that Italy has calmed down and undertaken 'not to do it again,' it is contrary to German interests to repulse her, or to drive her to join the opposition by wounding her highly-developed national pride.

"It is strongly in our own interests, both for the sake of peace and all international alliances, that the structure of the Triple Alliance should be maintained intact, and especially because, so long as Italy is part of the Triple Alliance, she would be met with distrust on the part of our enemies. In the event of serious complications we should have no illusions as to active co-operation on the part of Italy. But at the same time it is not a negligible matter to ensure that Italy will remain neutral instead of joining with France."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, March 10, 1905.

"I beg to lay before Your Majesty the letter received from His Majesty the King of Italy, which I enclose, together with a draft reply to this letter. I have considered the draft most carefully. If Your Majesty wishes to visit Italy, then of course the reply to H.M. King Victor Emmanuel must be couched in friendly terms. It so happens that the new Prime Minister, Crispi, formerly Under-Secretary of State, has hitherto been a warm supporter of the Entente with Germany, and it is advisable to help to smooth the way for him. The important thing is that Your Majesty can speak with affectionate appreciation to the King of Italy of Her Majesty Queen Elena.

"It is clear from the despatch how much Their Majesties wish to make the personal acquaintance of Your Majesty and the Empress. Here is the vulnerable spot of King Victor Emmanuel, who in this resembles King Philip of old in Schiller's 'Don Carlos.' The whole international situation is so tense that we must not leave a stone unturned. We must not drive Italy into the French camp, for it will make all

the difference if eventually Italy decides to range her army alongside that of France or if she merely remains neutral."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR COUNT VON BÜLOW.

"BREMERHAVEN, March 11, 1905.

"The news, just received through Wolff, of the negotiations for peace, set on foot through the Franco-English group on behalf of the Tsar, proves that Rothschild is not willing to provide funds for the war any longer. These negotiations should provide the main reason for the sudden abandonment of King Edward VII's journeys! He will now make a Franco-Russo-British Alliance, so that he may put Tibet and Afghanistan in his pocket. Aoki may be commissioned by us to say that we raise no objection to Port Arthur being in the hands of Japan.

"It is astounding in these circumstances that we who have stood loyally by the Tsar are now not even consulted in any way. The surrender of Mukden seems practically to involve the annihilation of the Russian Army. Ought we to send the Emperor of Japan some sort of congratulations? My departure for Lisbon seems very, very doubtful to me. The weather here is awful. Kodama, the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army, who is a great friend of Waldersee, might be given the order 'for merit.'

"WILLIAM I.R."

TO THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

"BERLIN, March 11, 1905.

"The report of the *Daily Graphic* transmitted to Your Majesty by Wolff has been contradicted already. Any congratulations to the Emperor of Japan on the siege of Mukden, or one-sided conferring of a decoration on a Japanese general during the continuance of the war, would

give the deepest offence not only to His Majesty the Tsar Nicholas, but also to the whole Russian nation.

"It is more desirable to be on more cordial terms with Japan, but, in view of the Japanese character and all that has gone before, this can only be achieved by gradual degrees. Too great haste on our part will only arouse Japanese distrust. And if we want to win over Japan it will be desirable to develop most carefully our entente with Russia, which, together with France, still forms a strong group in Europe."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, March 20, 1905.

"I must not fail to lay before Your Imperial Majesty the accompanying article which the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* has published to-day on my authority, dealing with Your Majesty's call at Tangier.[1]

"Your Majesty's visit to Tangier will embarrass M. Delcassé, will run counter to his plans, and will be most helpful to our commercial interests in Morocco."

To the Emperor William II.

"March 20, 1905.

"Your Majesty will be pleased to see from my urgent report, received in the meantime, that I have corrected in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* the rumours circulated by the English Press, taking as a basis Your Majesty's explanations given some years ago to King Alfonso. Through the hint that Your Majesty seeks no territorial advantages in Morocco, but only claims equal economic rights for Germany with other nations, the bottom has been knocked out of the sensational stories told by the Press. In these circumstances I would recommend that no alteration should be made in the

[1] The article contained the following announcement:
"The *Cologne Gazette* reports from Tangier on the 19th a well-authenticated rumour that H.M. William II will arrive at Tangier on the 31st of March."

arrangements for Your Majesty's journey to Tangier. The ground for my objection to any change is the experience which we have had the opportunity of obtaining in the course of the year of the secretive habits of M. Delcassé.

"If we now telegraph that Your Majesty would perhaps not visit Tangier at all, or at any rate only incognito and as a tourist, and that all audiences and receptions would be cancelled, Delcassé will spread abroad that there are grounds for assuming the French Government has made representations in Berlin which, as proved by the curtailment of Your Majesty's programme of travel, have been crowned with success.

"I venture to think I am in agreement with Your Majesty in the opinion that there is no need for us to prepare such a triumph for M. Delcassé, which he, with his customary virtuosity, will well know how to make the most of."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR COUNT VON BÜLOW.

[About March 21, 1905].

"You will see from Wolff and Wedekind that the German Colony and the Moroccans are preparing a great outburst over my visit and Britain is making use of it against the French.

"You should telegraph at once to Tangier that it is extremely doubtful whether I shall land, and that I am only travelling incognito as a tourist and therefore there will be no audiences and no receptions.

"WILLIAM I.R."

MEMORANDUM.

"BERLIN, March 21, 1905.

"His Majesty is in agreement with our handling of the Moroccan situation. With regard to the character of His Majesty's visit to Tangier, he awaits proposals which will be telegraphed to him at Lisbon. In the first place the question

arises whether His Majesty can land without endangering his safety. If so, His Majesty will, under von Kühlmann's guidance, visit the beauty-spots and sights of Tangier and breakfast with him. Further, a decision must be made as to whom His Majesty should receive on board as envoy of the Sultan of Morocco. All this must be carefully weighed and decided in order that His Majesty on arriving at Lisbon may find awaiting him a precise programme for Tangier, including a statement of what is to take place there, of the situation of affairs there, and of the speeches he is to make."

To Herr von Kühlmann,
Chargé d'Affaires in Tangier.

"Berlin, March 24, 1905.

"During the past two days an international Press campaign has been set on foot, having as its theme the theory that the utterances of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* have no anti-French tendency, and that the German Emperor and the German Government have no intention of doing anything which could offend France. The plan underlying this campaign can be seen most clearly in the *Daily Chronicle*, which publishes an alleged interview with a member of the German Embassy in London, and in the next issue gives an interview with the French Ambassador, M. Cambon. The German diplomat is reported to have said that hitherto the Franco-Russian Alliance has prevented any *rapprochement* between France and Germany, but that, now Russia has been defeated, England can offer to France no equivalent for the advantages which an understanding with Germany would assure to her. M. Cambon, acting on this, deduces that Germany wishes to approach France, and indicates as a necessary preliminary that Germany must first give tangible proof of her good intentions. France could only consider a reconciliation after, for example, the question of Metz had been settled.

"Such pronouncements aim at discouraging the Sultan of Morocco through the suggestion that Germany is utilizing the Moroccan affair to reconcile herself with France, and that France is laying down conditions for such a reconciliation

"I beg Your Majesty to take steps either through Dr. Vassel or by some other suitable means, or in an unostentatious way, to contradict these baseless rumours. For instance, you might call attention to the inherent absurdity of the idea that a German diplomat in England would be allowed to say to the representative of an English paper that France ought to abandon England and turn to Germany.

"In both the leading articles of the *Norddeutsche* two points are clearly brought out, and the exposition is important to us, namely, that Germany desires no special territorial advantages, and that she is only directing her attention to the maintenance of the 'Open Door.' For the rest, we have no interests to serve in telling our opponents beforehand what we intend to do or how far we will go, and in particular we will not take the initiative in issuing any declaration."

MEMORANDUM.

"BERLIN, March 24, 1905.

"If any questions are put to diplomats on the subject of Tangier and Morocco, I beg that they will make no reply, and merely present impassive countenances. Our deportment in these matters should resemble that of the Sphinx, which, when surrounded by inquisitive tourists, betrays nothing."

TO THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

"BERLIN, March 26, 1905.

"Concerning Your Majesty's visit to Tangier.

"The Sultan of Morocco, being greatly pleased at Your Majesty's visit to Tangier, is despatching his great-uncle, Malai Abd-el Malek, as the bearer of a Shereef's manuscript, accompanied by three high dignitaries.

"The programme drawn up by Your Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier is based on the assumption that Your Majesty will spend about five hours there.

"Main points:

"Reception of Malai Abd-el Malek on board (salute to be given in honour of the great-uncle of His Shereefian Majesty).

"On the landing-stage the Moroccan authorities will be drawn up, together with the Diplomatic Corps and the German colony.

"Drive through the town to the Kasba—the old palace of the Sultans—and from thence to the market-place, where Your Majesty will watch a display of riding from a decorated pavilion.

"Arrival at the Legation. Here a garden party will shortly afterwards be given to which the ladies of the Diplomatic Corps and people of importance will be invited.

"With regard to these points, I beg Your Majesty to inform the Chargé d'Affaires immediately of your decision. He will discuss the minor details verbally with Your Majesty and take Your Majesty's commands."

"Most respectfully,

"BÜLOW."

TO THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

"March 26, 1905.

"*Strictly Confidential.*

"Directly Your Majesty's visit to Tangier became known about I arranged for the *Norddeutsche* to recall the fact that last year Your Majesty when at Vigo had announced that we aimed at no territorial advantages in Morocco, but confined our attention solely to the preservation of the freedom of trade. As a result of this announcement it appears that the English colony in Tangier has decided to erect a triumphal arch in Your Majesty's honour. This proceeding affords justification of the attitude we have adopted. As the champion of equal economic rights for all nations we shall be automatically accepted as protector of the English business world in Morocco, whose interests have been sacrificed by the English Government. The English business man is too sharp not to

know what it would mean for him and for anyone else who is not a French subject if Morocco gradually is converted into the same sort of protectorate as Tunis.

"The French Press, which at first spoke with some anxiety of Your Majesty's visit to Tangier, and regarded it as making the Franco-Moroccan negotiations more difficult, has subsequently become more daring. A member of the French Embassy in London has even given an interview to the *Daily Chronicle*, in which it is stated that while France will not refuse a reconciliation with Germany, nevertheless Germany must first of all prove her good intentions and, for example, give up Metz. I believe that utterances of this sort are intended to reach the Sultan at Fez, through Tangier, in order to make him believe that France is the stronger of the two Powers, and that she dictates the conditions which regulate the relations of the two Powers.

"Naturally it would not be to Germany's best interest were the Sultan to become discouraged just at the outset of the French negotiations and were to accept a French protectorate. It is advisable to my mind, in order to prevent this, for Your Majesty to receive the Sultan's envoy with marked distinction, and expressly as the Envoy of a Sovereign State, and to send your greetings to the Sultan with the hope that he will shortly succeed in suppressing the revolt of Bu-Amama, since all seafaring and mercantile nations have an interest in the restoration of peace in Morocco. Should Your Majesty enquire whence Bu-Amama obtains the means for his prolonged resistance, and should the envoy perhaps reply, 'From France in all probability,' Your Majesty should respond, 'I can hardly credit the French with such contemptible behaviour.'

"The Sultan and his advisers have hardly yet recovered from the shock of finding that England, so long regarded as the protector of Morocco, has now abandoned her. In order to exacerbate this feeling, the French representatives in Fez are now spreading the report that German friendliness towards the Sultan is also aimed merely at obtaining from France permission to share in the spoils of Morocco, and that, having obtained this, Germany would be promptly satisfied. It would not be in Germany's interests to assist in the gradual absorption of Morocco by France through any discouraging of the Sultan. Apart from the fact that the systematic exclusion from Morocco of non-French traders and contractors

on the model of Tunis would involve Germany in substantial economic loss, it is also a misconception of our position as a Power if M. Delcassé does not think it worth his while to communicate with Germany concerning his Moroccan policy. M. Delcassé has completely ignored us on this occasion.

"It seems indicated, therefore, that Your Majesty, without uttering any unfriendly words about France, should on your side ignore the French in Morocco, should make no reference to their proceedings in the country, and should not honour the French Chargé d'Affaires by speaking to him, but should greet him in silence.

"It is not likely that any diplomat will speak to Your Majesty on the subject of French policy in Morocco. But should anyone do so Your Majesty will be ready with the reply that you know nothing whatever about French Moroccan policy. It would be quite different were the Sultan's envoy to summon up courage and ask Your Majesty's advice. It would then depend on Your Majesty's answer whether the Sultan would continue to defend the independence of Morocco or subject himself to France. The question as to whether Your Majesty will risk war with France over Morocco cannot be considered as coming within the picture. But, on the other hand, it is more than questionable whether the present civilian French Government, to which a victorious French general would be almost more dangerous than a foreign enemy, will risk a war with Morocco so long as there is the slightest risk of Germany taking part in it. At present, therefore, we must leave our ultimate aims obscure.

"We cannot properly make an alliance with Morocco. If, on the other hand, we entirely deprive the Sultan of Germany's moral support and leave him without any hope, we sacrifice important German interests. On that account I suggest that Your Majesty's reply to the Sultan's envoy should be on the following lines:

"'It is known that I do not covet any sphere of influence in Morocco, but that I attach importance to the retention, along with other nations, of equality of rights in trade and commerce. Other mercantile nations have identical interests. Since this is known to be my view, the English colony have greeted me enthusiastically to-day. The interests of the Sultan are therefore identical with those of almost all seafaring and trading peoples, if he preserves his independence, and with it the

power to grant equal rights to all within his territory. The chief strength of every ruler lies in having his people at his back in a crisis. Then no one will attack him from without with impunity. The Sultan should therefore assure himself that the trusty persons whom he has summoned to Fez to advise him are of one mind with himself, and should then arrange his policy accordingly.'

"As it is known that the Moorish delegates now assembled in Fez are entirely opposed to the Sultan giving way to the French, the Sultan can here receive a clear indication of policy. Should the envoy enquire whether Your Majesty would support the Sultan in a war with France, I would respectfully suggest the reply:

"'If I gave you a definite promise to-day, would you attack the French to-morrow? I should like to maintain peace if possible, though I have a very strong Army, and I must therefore reserve my decision against the contingency of war actually breaking out between Morocco and France. I do not believe, however, that it will come to that. France will see what she can achieve by threats, but she knows her situation will be dangerous if she attacks Morocco without first assuring herself of German neutrality.'

"Next to the discussion with the Sultan's envoy, the most important matter is Your Majesty's reply to a brief English address which might possibly be given at the English triumphal arch. It would be necessary there to lay special stress on our common interests in maintaining equal rights for all nations. By expounding this principle at this juncture Your Majesty will make it practically impossible for the English Government to take the French side in the event of later discussions between France and Germany.

"Finally, I should like to consider the contingency of Your Majesty's being placed in the position of having to reply to a question, not emanating from a Moroccan quarter, as to the attitude Germany might be expected to adopt in the event of a French war against Morocco. To that the answer could be given: 'Germany has no obligations which would prevent her from acting solely according to her own interests in that event.' This reply sounds alarming to our opponents but does not commit us to anything.

"In conclusion, may I venture to add a few personal observations? The Spanish Ambassador, Cologan, is one of

[*E.N.A.*

Herr Richard von Kühlmann.

the diplomats who were besieged in Peking. In the ensuing diplomatic negotiations he used his influence as doyen of the Diplomatic Corps in favour of the German proposals. He is friendly to Germany and has worked secretly in Tangier and Fez for the *status quo* and against the policy of France. Spain is, of course, too weak and too dependent financially on Paris to pursue openly a policy of hostility to France.

"The Russian Ambassador, Herr von Bacheracht, was Secretary to the Embassy in Berlin for many years.

"As to the American Ambassador, Gummeré, it would certainly interest him greatly if he could report at home that Your Majesty sent greetings to the President, and had drawn a parallel between the preservation of the 'Open Door' in China and in Morocco.

"Information on other possible details will be best obtained from Your Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Herr von Kühlmann, who during this interval when he has been in charge has acquitted himself very well.

"Your Majesty's visit to Tangier constitutes the chief matter of world interest at the moment. Attempts will be made in Lisbon to ascertain from Your Majesty information about our ultimate aims in Morocco. The more Your Majesty plays the Sphinx until your arrival at Tangier, and the less that is known of your attitude till then, the more powerful will be the effect produced by your visit to Tangier."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, March 27, 1905.

"Everyone here is profoundly impressed by the powerful speech made by Your Majesty in Bremen. In my opinion Your Majesty has seldom spoken with more weight and conviction. I read the speech with profound admiration.

"The speech was an excellent preliminary to the visit to Tangier, on which the eyes of all, both at home and abroad, are riveted. This visit has put Delcassé for the first occasion for a long time in an awkward situation. If the Tangier visit goes off according to our expectations, Delcassé will be exposed

to the criticism of all Europe for his policy of hostility to Germany.

"I have taken on myself to despatch a confidential telegram to Your Majesty to-day, dealing with the main points which may be raised on your visit to Tangier."

To Herr von Kühlmann,
Chargé d'Affaires in Morocco.

"Berlin, March 27, 1905.

"Have you yet discussed with Mr. Harris the suggestion of the Moroccan Government, which you recently reported, about taking the view of the Powers represented in Morocco as to the nature of the French demands? How does Harris think the English Government would receive the idea of a request from Morocco for a diplomatic conference? Would England, even in the case of a purely economic programme, refuse to take part, on the ground that after the agreement with France the English Government is no longer in a position to uphold against France any English interests in Morocco, even interests of a purely economic character?

"If England will not take part, the idea of a conference must be abandoned. If England will participate, then such a conference would afford the simplest means of maintaining the *status quo* and improving upon it. Germany, and probably America, would uphold the *status quo* and the integrity of Morocco, and so it would be made possible for the English Government, without taking the initiative themselves, to rescue the English economic interests which have been sacrificed in Morocco. The decisions of other Powers would without any doubt whatever be influenced by the attitude of Germany, America, and England.

"That France would agree to the idea of such a conference is extremely improbable, unless the Sultan should announce that he would not be willing to make any concessions if the conference were not summoned. In view of the likelihood of French opposition, the question would have to be considered whether it would be practicable for the Sultan to ask the Powers represented in Morocco straight out if they

advised him to place himself under the protection of France. Certain questions must be brought before the public at the same time. Will the English nation remain apathetic? Will the English Government consider itself pledged by the French agreement to advise the Sultan to come to terms with France at any cost, or will they make reservations? As Harris has only just returned from England, his opinion is worth having.

"You are authorized to discuss the matter with him as if it were only your own purely academic idea, and you should proceed to say that a similar step regarding the Powers was in contemplation by Fez some time ago, and that the Sultan will first have to ask for help before any assistance can be given him."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR COUNT VON BÜLOW.

"LISBON, March 28, 1905.

"Now that Crete has declared itself entirely hostile to Greece, ought we to reconsider whether I can keep the appointment with the King in Corfu in the circumstances? At this very moment the devil has broken loose in Tangier; yesterday an Englishman was nearly murdered there. It seems to me the matter is very dubious, and as Tattenbach, who is an old hand, is also doubtful, I have given orders that he should accompany me and see how things are before I land. Here I am making the most fearful exertions in unspeakable heat in overcrowded and over-heated rooms.

"Everyone is most agreeable. But it is too much of a good thing to remain in full-dress from 1.30 p.m. to 2.30 the next morning—thirteen hours on end. I am absolutely worn out. The State entry went on for three-and-a-half hours at the most solemn pace and we were obliged to halt every few paces for a quarter of an hour! And in an old rococo glass coach. The behaviour and demeanour of the crowds were quite irreproachable and orderly. To-day we are off again, and not a moment's rest. Summerlike heat.

"WILLIAM I.R."

To Prince Henry of Prussia.

"Berlin, March 30, 1905.

"I telegraphed yesterday to Admiral Baron von Seckendorff at Kiel, asking whether he could possibly come here either to-day or to-morrow to discuss an important matter. I learnt from the telegraph bureau that the Admiral had accompanied His Majesty on the *Hamburg*. I had meant to give him a written statement, with verbal explanations, in order that he might inform Your Highness of the political and military situation in Russia. I beg permission to set forth as briefly as possible in this letter what I had intended to communicate to the Admiral at greater length.

"News from St. Petersburg is serious; the disturbances there continue alarmingly. The chief danger lies in the general feeling of insecurity. Count Osten-Sacken, almost in tears, summed it up to me yesterday in the words, '*Un peu d'énergie pourrait nous sauver, mais on ne la voit paraître nulle part?*

"I consider it disastrous that obvious hostility prevails between Their Majesties the Dowager Empress [of Russia] and the reigning Empress. The former appears to be completely entangled in the political meshes of Witte, whom all parties now mistrust and who is alleged to cherish vindictive feelings against H.M. the Emperor Nicholas. Witte desires peace at once at all costs. This desire is shared by all the Liberals and Revolutionaries, who in Russia cannot always be distinguished from each other. Osten-Sacken said to me in private conversation, that while it is true the conclusion of peace at this moment would be received with satisfaction by the Russian Press and by financial circles throughout the world, it would be regarded by the Russian nation as a fearful humiliation, and for this the Tsar would be made responsible, directly and personally. '*Ça pourrait être la fin.*' If, however, the Tsar could hold out, the situation would improve for him and become worse for Japan.

"I should not attach much weight to the views of a civilian diplomat regarding a situation the chief factors of which are of a military nature but for the fact that our

General Staff has formed the same opinion of the military situation. They regard it as impossible for Russia, as would be the case with almost any other country, to be forced to make peace by further Japanese victories, either by land or sea. Japan might capture Saghalien and Vladivostok, but she would be obliged to halt somewhere on the Siberian steppes, and there wait, gun in hand and at a colossal cost in money, until the Russian Army, after several months, was once more ready to give battle.

"General Kuropatkin made two great mistakes: at Lio Yang he retreated without any visible necessity, and at Mukden he did not take into account the effect of the Japanese Army released by the fall of Port Arthur. On both occasions, however, Kuropatkin showed extraordinary skill in his retreat. The Russian soldier also showed quite remarkable powers of endurance and stubbornness in misfortune. The chief danger in the immediate future, according to our General Staff, is lest the new Commander-in Chief, Linevitsch, acting either on orders from St. Petersburg or from his own thirst for action, should again advance to the attack before his army is sufficiently strengthened and reorganized. In the present crisis our General Staff sees the decisive factor to be endurance.

"My own assumption that time is on the side of Russia is strengthened when I see with what zeal both the friends of Japan and the internal and external enemies of the Tsar are pressing for peace. I received an indication of this recently when a man in a very high political position, in reply to the remark of a German ambassador that an unfavourable peace, concluded in present circumstances, might cost the Tsar his life, merely said, 'His danger is the lesser of two evils.' Naturally, a German royalist cannot adopt this point of view. The death of the Emperor Nicholas, at this moment, followed by the Regency, during the minority of an infant, of the Grand Duke Michael, who is totally inexperienced, even though protected by Witte, might easily bring about the end of the Tsar's dynasty and the rise of a Republic.

"We have for 180 years almost always been on friendly terms with the Tsarist régime, and during most of our great national crises it has either been our friend or at least a benevolent neighbour. The Tsar's dynasty has indeed hardly any Russian blood in its veins. But a very different

state of affairs would probably arise in the event of a Russian Republic. The natural inclination of the Slavs towards the French would then find much more expression in politics than it does at present.

"To me, the Tsar Nicholas is an object of respectful and genuine sympathy, but I must frankly declare that this sympathy alone would not have induced me to trouble Your Highness with this long disquisition. Only the prospect that the violent destruction of the Tsar and the collapse of his régime would create serious dangers for our own country have induced me to ask Your Highness whether you could yourself write a letter of warning to Your Imperial brother-in-law, if you see the sequence of events in the light that I do. In order to reinforce the warning, I would mention three main points :

"(1) That the reforms which the Tsar has approved and ordered to be undertaken, especially those with regard to the extension of the powers of the Duma, should not be shelved but should be carried through at once.

"(2) That the internal disorders, which are financed for the most part by disloyal factions and often even from abroad, should be vigorously suppressed, and those officials who do not show sufficient energy at the psychological moment should be dismissed.

"(3) That Russia should make full military use of her geographical situation, with its vast distances, in order to sap her opponent's strength by delays, instead of making peace in the present unfavourable circumstances—a peace whose humiliating conditions would give rise to general agitation against the Tsar and his dynasty.

"I would not have taken on myself the responsibility of touching on these matters had I not discovered in the last few days that the Prussian General Staff supports my view, that time favours Russia, equally considers endurance will prove to be the decisive factor, and condemns over-hasty action.

"The General Staff is concerned only with haste in military operations, while I, as a politician, object to premature overtures for peace, but the General Staff and I both agree in regarding endurance as the vital factor.

"This matter, which for me is mainly a political question, touches, as I know, the heart of Your Royal Highness.

The disappearance of His Majesty the Tsar Nicholas would mean for Your Royal Highness the loss of a dear friend and relation. This catastrophe, however, would, in addition, involve a most threatening prospect for Germany, and, knowing this, I have decided to give Your Royal Highness a brief description of the Russian situation as I envisage it, for I see no one but Your Royal Highness who can advise and warn the Tsar in this terribly difficult situation.

"The bearer of these lines is an official of the secret cipher bureau, and he has been directed to hold himself at Your Royal Highness's disposal, in case you feel inclined to write a letter of this description to the Tsar Nicholas, which letter would then be despatched from here to St. Petersburg by special courier."

To Herr von Kühlmann,
Chargé d'Affaires in Tangier.

"Berlin, March 30, 1905.

"*Decipher this yourself.*

"Since the Press has made so much of the attempt on Harris's life, the Kaiser's entourage is strongly opposed to his landing in Tangier; but Count Tattenbach and His Excellency Count Eulenburg are resolute that he ought to land, provided there are no real dangers or unpleasantnesses to be feared. Those who oppose the landing allege there are no proper means of getting about on shore; to go on foot, they hold, would be unsuitable, so would riding on a donkey, and to go in a litter or a carriage is regarded as an effeminate method of transport, and by reason of his weak left arm the Emperor should be warned against 'an unbroken restless Arab stallion which has not been tested by the riding-master.' Could not, I wonder, the horse be led by two of the prominent Moorish citizens as a sign of greater honour, or could not the pavilion be pitched nearer the shore, or could not His Majesty go part of the way

on foot—so as to see the town better—and part of the way in a litter or a carriage?

"It would be very helpful if the route to be followed could be shortened—for example, by abandoning the visit to the Kasba.

"Please be responsible yourself for going into all these details and then discuss them all with Count Tattenbach, who will be the first to go on shore. The best thing would be to secure a horse which is guaranteed to be quiet, and have it thoroughly exercised by some trustworthy groom for some hours in the very early morning, and this would obviate all the difficulties and any shortening of the programme. Perhaps you have already thought of this.

"To return to the landing. The question of security also arises. You must impress on Count Tattenbach, who will certainly not be disinclined to do so, that he must satisfy himself that, quite apart from the presence of German detectives, provision be made for the greatest possible security."

To Herr von Kühlmann,
Chargé d'Affaires in Tangier.

"Berlin, April 3, 1905.

"(1) His Majesty's Government considers the idea of a conference as eminently practical. Tangier would be the most suitable place for it, as now all the interested Powers are represented there, which was not the case at the time of the last conference, held in Madrid in 1880. We will support the proposal of Morocco to this effect.

"(2) President Roosevelt has recently declared that he will take care the American envoy is instructed to keep in close touch with you.

"(3) In the reports hitherto received of a diplomatic nature regarding the Emperor's visit to Tangier there has been no mention of the terms in which the Spanish Minister expressed himself to His Majesty. If you know anything about it, please telegraph briefly the main features."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, April 4, 1905.

"I very respectfully beg to inform Your Imperial and Royal Majesty of the further development of the present political situation since my last telegram, submitted to you on the 27th of last month.

"Through Your Majesty's visit to Tangier the Moroccan question has been brought into the foreground. Your Majesty's impressive intervention, and the highly important pronouncements made to the French Consul and to the German colony, have made an enduring mark on opinion, both within and without Europe. At this point I should like to mention at once that the American Ambassador, who has been instructed directly by President Roosevelt to remain in close touch with Your Majesty's representative, on hearing of Your Majesty's declaration regarding the 'Open Door,' exclaimed, 'That is just exactly what we also want.' One part of the English Press meanwhile is pleased to run amuck over it. Yet '*Mag sich der Most auch noch so wild gebärden, es gibt zuletzt noch 'nen Wein.*'[1] This section of the English Press will also become reasonable when it is clear that Germany is seeking no separate advantages, and that, despite German hostility and French machinations, the English instinct for the 'Open Door' will not find itself altogether suppressed (see, for example, the articles on this subject in the *Morning Post* and the *Manchester Guardian*). This will be so all the more if the English see that American diplomacy also ranges itself on the side of Germany's 'Open Door.'

"The fear of Roosevelt is visibly increasing in England; whether affection for him is increasing also I do not know. Delcassé, closely pressed in the French Senate, twists round the sharp corner of the Moroccan question. In the Chamber of Deputies yesterday he parried the interpellation upon it. In his Press he employs threats, while he alludes to a Franco-Anglo-Spanish group—a castle in the air. In order to disperse this it will suffice to explain still more clearly

[1] Roughly, "Though the must look unpromising, some wine will result."

than hitherto the indisputable justice of our policy. I suggest that in order to strengthen the opposition to Delcassé the following points should be stressed:

"(1) The abandonment of all territorial claims.

"(2) The demand for equal economic rights for all nations, by which should be understood not only freedom to trade, nor merely most-favoured-nation treatment, but the 'Open Door' in its widest sense.

"(3) The trump card in our hand is, however, the allusion to the assembled European Powers having repeatedly held conferences, jointly with the United States of America, over the Moroccan question and concluded secret agreements. The last conference of this kind was held in Madrid in the 'eighties. Now it is indisputable that Morocco, as a glance at the globe shows, is an object of interest to all the Powers.

Following from this, if to-morrow the French Government were generously to work itself up and offer to allow us to make a special agreement over economic concessions in Morocco, we can rightly only reply just what was said in 1897 over the Russo-Austrian Balkan negotiations by the Viennese Cabinet to St. Petersburg concerning the Hellespont: 'We do not consider ourselves entitled to come to an agreement over the Straits without the participation of the Allied Powers.' From Tangier, Your Majesty's Consul already telegraphs that the Sultan is mooting a plan to appeal from the formulated demands of the French to the Treaty Powers.

"If it should happen that a conference is called together, we are already assured of the diplomatic support of America as regards the 'Open Door.' England will, above all else, wish to avoid the risk of opposing America. Austria will not desire to embroil herself with us over Morocco, and I believe the same to be the case with Italy, especially as the Fortis Cabinet favours the Triple Alliance. I hold it unthinkable that a conference could have as result the enclosing of Morocco in the exclusive sphere of French influence and interests.

"If it should happen that the Sultan's plan of a conference fails through France refusing to participate, this would put her in the wrong with the other Treaty Powers. Right and wrong are, moreover, highly important in international affairs in cases where the law-breaker is not so powerful

as to be able to over-ride everyone else. France is not in such a position to-day, for she will become yet more isolated through the development of her policy. Russia is occupied with her own affairs. England will find it very difficult to give France any further assistance in face of the entry of President Roosevelt on the scene and in view of the support given by a large part of the English nation to the policy of the 'Open Door.'

"In these circumstances Your Majesty can, in your powerful and impregnable position, await the settlement of the Moroccan position with calm."

To Herr von Kühlmann,
Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier.

"Berlin, April 6, 1905.

"The position of Germany with regard to the Moroccan question is as follows: The fact that France has not discussed with us the conference to be held on April 8 does not hurt our dignity, and does not affect the legal contention, which applies not only to us, but to all the Treaty Powers, namely, that the situation in Morocco cannot be altered through agreements with individual Powers, but only by a joint conference of all the Treaty States. We have proceeded with caution at the outset, so as to run no risk of exposing ourselves to isolation. To-day, however, we have established confidential relations with America, and know that she will give diplomatic support to the policy of the 'Open Door.' Through this attitude of America, England will be obliged to change her tone. The Italian Prime Minister, Fortis, has assured the German Ambassador in a convincing manner that Italy does not want another Tunis. It is not to be expected that Austria will support France rather than us, and the smaller States will naturally favour the 'Open Door' as soon as they find themselves in good company in so doing.

"Russia did not take part in the last conference. If now that she has had a representative at Tangier, though only for a short time, she should wish to participate, we will

raise no objection. I do not think that Russia either will be very enthusiastic over the conclusion of an Anglo-French Agreement. It seems, therefore, out of the question that the conference could have the effect of handing over Morocco to France on a majority vote. If, on the other hand, France objects to a conference, she will put herself in the wrong. In international relations right and wrong are of particular importance when the wrong-doer is not strong enough to over-ride all her opponents. France will hardly find herself in that situation now.

"We can also now tell the Sultan that no one will help him if he does not show any desire to help himself. He ought to turn to the assembled Treaty Powers with the proposal to refer the French schemes to a conference. The conference must take place in Tangier and not in Madrid. Firstly, because now diplomatic representation is more complete in Tangier than it was twenty years ago. Secondly, because Spain, in view of the French Treaty, is in a peculiar position.

"Dr. Vassel should therefore be instructed to speak to the Sultan in vigorous terms, and to point out that the Sultan must hasten to act before Spain sends out invitations to a conference at Madrid. You will also, I hope, find an opportunity of persuading Abd-el Malek and Kaid Maclean in this sense, as I understand from the papers they are leaving for Fez on Saturday. I should think it would be very helpful if Count von Tattenbach—who I am glad to hear is still in Tangier—would employ his influence to the same effect in all moderate circles. His experience and knowledge of the position in Morocco will afford welcome support to your efforts and add weight to our arguments. I beg that on receipt of this communication you will at once get into touch with Count von Tattenbach."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, April 11, 1905.

"Count von Tattenbach wired three days ago, before Your Majesty had appointed him to be Chief of the Moroccan Embassy, that, according to his information, the French

Envoy in Fez was trying to put an end to the Sultan's opposition to the programme of Delcassé. The Envoy has either threatened or bribed the Sultan's advisers, and the Sultan finds it difficult to maintain the opposition by himself. The head of the German Consulate, Dr. Vassel, is quite a competent business man, but by reason of his rather insignificant position he cannot make any headway against the French. It is therefore extremely necessary that a diplomatic mission should be at once despatched to Fez.

"Without vouching for the accuracy of this report, I consider that an important and difficult mission of this character should possess not only a thorough knowledge of the local circumstances, but also considerable personal prestige. If only Dr. Rosen, that most industrious Envoy, were in Tangier, he would undertake to see how the land lies. As it is, Graf von Tattenbach is himself the only person who combines both qualifications. I have telegraphed to ask von Tattenbach whether he feels prepared to undertake this arduous task. If he agrees, I will propose him formally to Your Majesty for the mission. The Count has just wired that he is perfectly willing and can set off with the greatest despatch.

"I therefore respectfully beg Your Majesty to order Count von Tattenbach to proceed immediately to Fez, in order to thank the Sultan for the reception given you in Tangier and for the welcome he extended to you through the mouth of a near relative. Such a mission of thanks is in accordance with custom and is free from any political objection.

"Count von Tattenbach will understand that his aim should be to encourage the Sultan in the idea that the adoption of the French demands, or so-called reforms, depends on the assent of the majority of those States which took part in the earlier conferences over the Moroccan question. These are, with the exception of Russia, who has no sea-borne trade worth mentioning, all the great European Powers, the United States of America, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Holland, Sweden, and Norway.

"I therefore beg Your Majesty to wire your gracious approval of the mission of Count von Tattenbach."

IV

THE YEAR 1905: JUNE-NOVEMBER.

IV

THE YEAR 1905 : JUNE-NOVEMBER

NOTE.

The following passage from Prince von Bülow's book "Imperial Germany," the English version of which was published by Cassell and Co. in 1913 (2nd enlarged edition, 1916), gives us the Chancellor's own view, in retrospect, of the Moroccan question, which remained so prominent throughout this year :

On March 31, 1905, His Majesty the Emperor, in pursuance of my advice, landed at Tangier, where he defended the independence and sovereignty of Morocco in unequivocal language. The demands of Germany to be consulted about Moroccan affairs were thus announced to the world. It was made clear that Germany intended to adhere to the International Treaty of 1880, based on the acknowledgment of the sovereignty of Morocco, and that she was not inclined to recognize the new situation created without her consent by the Anglo-French Moroccan Treaty and the action of France in that country. Our object was to substitute an international settlement by the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Madrid for the one-sided arrangement between England and France. We also had to prevent an international conference from simply giving its consent to French policy in Morocco. Both ends were attained by the fact that the Conference of Algeciras actually took place, and by the decisions it made. France violently opposed the scheme of calling a conference. For a time it seemed as if M. Delcassé would make the question of peace or war depend on this point. When the German Government refused to yield, France consented to the conference. M. Delcassé resigned the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. He retired, and we got our way because we stood firm. In Algeciras our position was naturally a difficult one, seeing that we were opposed to the Powers of the *Entente*, and that the other Powers took little interest in the Moroccan question.

Nevertheless, we succeeded in preserving the sovereignty of the Sultan and in securing international control of the police organization and the Moroccan National Bank, thus ensuring the open door in Morocco for German economic interests as well as for those of all other countries. We did not attain all we wished, but at least all that was essential. We had foiled the attempt to set us aside in the settlement of an affair of great international importance. We should have a voice in the further development of Moroccan affairs, and we did not need to renounce our right to this without adequate compensation. The decisions of

the Algeciras Conference bolted the door against the attempts of France to compass the "Tunification" of Morocco. They also proved a bell we could ring at any time should France show any similar tendencies again. Very soon after the Algeciras Conference the new state of affairs made itself felt in a painful manner in France. The "nefarious Algeciras document" was characterized as "European tutelage forced upon France," or at best as an "honourable retreat." It has been said that after the resignation of Delcassé we ought to have tried to come to a direct understanding with France. It is a question whether France was at all inclined to pay us an acceptable price. Anyway, it was not open to us to pursue this course, if only on account of our position with regard to Turkey and Islam.

In November 1898, the Emperor William II had said in Damascus: "The three hundred million Mahommedans who live scattered over the globe may be assured of this, that the German Emperor will be their friend at all times." In Tangier the Emperor had declared emphatically in favour of the integrity of Morocco. We should have completely destroyed our credit in the Mahommedan world if so soon after these declarations we had sold Morocco to the French. Our Ambassador in Constantinople, Freiherr von Marschall, said to me at the time: "If we sacrifice Morocco in spite of Damascus and Tangier, we shall at one fell swoop lose our position in Turkey, and therefore all the advantages and prospects that we have painfully acquired by the labour of many years."



[E.N.A.

M. Delcassé.

p. 128

IV

THE YEAR 1905 : JUNE-NOVEMBER

To Count von Metternich,
Ambassador in London.

"Berlin, June 11, 1905.

"The British Ambassador, Sir Frank Lascelles, came to see me yesterday, before leaving for London, to discuss with me the subject of Anglo-German relations, which are a matter of anxiety and trouble to him also. The following is a résume of my remarks to him.

"The mutual mistrust now existing between Germany and England is due to a great misunderstanding. There are Englishmen who believe that we want to attack, invade, undermine, weaken England ; there are Germans who believe the same of England. Over-excited Pan-German professors occasionally make foolish speeches, and retired officers write extravagant articles or fantasies like 'The Battle of Dorking.' In England there are ex-Admirals, and even some members of the Government, who do the same. There is equal folly on either side. The only difference is that in Germany these stupidities belong more to the past, in England more to the present. The immense majority of sensible people in Germany have as little fear of war as have the English, but they are convinced that it would be an advantage to neither party and would result merely in other countries acquiring the world-market without firing a shot.

"Remarks of an alarming kind, or of a kind unfriendly to England, made by His Majesty the Kaiser are occasionally repeated. The English, however, know His Majesty well enough to be aware that, if things came to the worst, he would not, as a Prussian officer and prince, be the man to hold back, but that never even in his dreams does he think of

any kind of offensive against England. Of course, His Majesty has been sometimes disturbed and angered by the persistent insinuations put forward by the English newspapers regarding our policy, and by their, at times, indescribably exacerbating remarks. In this connection, among many other examples, I pointed to the quite brazenly mendacious statement that we sought to mix ourselves up in the Tibet affair. Quite recently, too (I pointed out), it had been declared in a pamphlet issued by an English Conservative that we mobilized our Fleet after the Dogger Bank incident. This assertion is simply absurd in its untruthfulness.

"I informed the Ambassador confidentially, in emphatic words, that what happened on this occasion was precisely the opposite: that when we were sounded regarding the Dogger Bank incident by the Russians, not officially, but from a High Quarter, we answered that Russia could in no way count upon our support. Yet another suggestion by *The Times* was that we desired the prolongation of the Eastern Asiatic war, the outbreak of which we deplored at the time. The truth is that we exerted ourselves, and not without success, to bring about the conclusion of peace.

"Our Fleet, I said, was used only for purposes of defence. The idea that we had the intention of building a strong Fleet in order to subdue the British Navy was one, I declared, that could be met with a shrug of the shoulders by any German naval officer or statesman in possession of his five senses. We had to have ships, as we could not tell by whom, or when, or by how many foes we might be attacked, and it was our duty to protect our trade emporiums, our seaports, and our overseas commerce. All other countries, America, no less than Italy, France, and Russia, were building ships also.

"In regard to Morocco, we took our stand on treaties. The English would surely not maintain seriously that we must look on quietly if our rights were to be dealt with without reference to us. In the matter in question, we had waited a year, and had taken action only when the French, without asking us, had unwarrantably used our name in order to secure the sanction of the Sultan of Morocco for a programme which would make of Morocco a second Tunis. I pointed out to the Ambassador that we had commercial interests in Morocco which we could not

suddenly sacrifice in this way. Moreover, our dignity was involved.

"A Great Power like Germany could not allow herself to be treated as a *quantité négligeable*, as the French had tried to treat us, despite our friendly and courteous attitude. We would know how to maintain our dignity, and our treaty rights should not be dealt with without our agreement. I said I thought the best way out of the Morocco affair would be the conference proposed by the Sultan. This would also expedite the bringing about of reforms in Morocco.

"Unless such a conference were held, everything would go on in Morocco in the old way. Incidentally, I intimated that we had heard, not officially, but from very good and reliable sources, that Delcassé had proposed to the English an offensive and defensive alliance against Germany. The way in which a great portion of the English Press had excited the French against us imparted, I said, an aspect of probability to this communication. I concluded with the remark that we observed a blind hostility to us in almost all the organs of English public opinion, and that we heard from all sides that English policy was directly unfriendly to us. I suggest that in your conversation with Sir Frank Lascelles you take the same line."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, June 22, 1905.

"According to a telegraphic communication just received from Radolin, Rouvier has been trying since yesterday to force Delcassé's Morocco programme upon us as his own. He wants to make his acceptance of the invitation to the Conference dependent upon our previous acceptance of the main points of the Delcassé programme. Thus we should be placing ourselves in direct contradiction to the assurances which Your Majesty, when in Tangier, gave the Sultan of Morocco. And we should be preparing a triumph later for the worthy Delcassé! For this would constitute the proof that his programme, which involved the practical control by France of the army, police, and finance of Morocco,

was right and acceptable, and that, moreover, he was overthrown unfairly. Delcassé would at once become the Great Man again, and might, perhaps, hope to become Premier and Foreign Minister in Rouvier's place.

"Rouvier, of whom we know that he does not want to have any conflict with us, has evidently allowed himself to be talked over by the Delcassé clan and is now endeavouring, tradesman-wise, to see to what extent his excessive demands will be acceded to. His chief argument is that he is appealing to our magnanimity in asking us to make concessions to him, to save his face with the Chamber of Deputies.

"This is nonsense, for neither the Chamber of Deputies nor anyone else makes Rouvier responsible for the faults of Delcassé, and what the Chamber of Deputies is most anxious about is that there may be no war. Rouvier would be responsible for the Delcassé programme if he should eventually adopt it himself. Our confidence in Rouvier cannot, in my opinion, be extended so far that we should help him on, or, more properly, help Delcassé on, to a success at our own cost.

"If my memory be not at fault, the Prince of Monaco stands in good personal relations with Rouvier. Perhaps, therefore, he will on this account, and as a friend of France, plead in favour of the Rouvier proposals. In this case, it would have a good effect by ricochet if, apropos of the Prince, the remark were made that we heard with real regret that Rouvier intended to accept the invitation to the Morocco Conference only after we had given our adhesion to the main points of the Delcassé programme. If that were really Rouvier's intention, we should have good reason for complaint on several grounds: in the interests of Franco-German relations, for one thing, which we should like to see improved. We should not, indeed, make any attack on the Morocco Delcassé programme, but if Rouvier held by this programme we should be obliged to abandon the negotiations with France as hopeless, to conclude a defensive alliance with the Sultan of Morocco, and then to wait and see what France did. Thus would be created a situation out of which—especially in view of the Morocco rising and the support which it received from Algeria—serious complications might result. It might be added that we were the more hopeful that Rouvier would spare us this in that an acceptance of

the main point of M. Delcassé's programme would have the result of admitting that this Minister's policy was right.

"The political world in France and elsewhere would ask itself why Rouvier had thrown Delcassé over if he held his programme to be right in its essentials. Thus by accepting the Delcassé programme, now endorsed by Rouvier, we should be contributing to the otherwise impossible rehabilitation of Delcassé. These were the results which we should expect if France wanted to pursue the Delcassé policy without Delcassé.

"I would like to add that we should not, indeed, associate ourselves entirely, and certainly not for ever, with the Sultan of Morocco, but that, having regard to the maintenance of Your Majesty's status in the Islamite world, we could not hand over his sovereignty and the independence of Morocco so completely to France as Rouvier, following in Delcassé's footsteps, now desires."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, June 24, 1905.

"Your Majesty's telegram received with respectful thanks. Rouvier keeps circling round the heart of the question like a cat round a bowl of hot porridge.

"Until France has accepted the invitation to the Conference we cannot enter into preliminary negotiations over Morocco, ignoring the Sultan altogether. On the one hand, because such preliminary negotiations would drag on for ever; on the other hand, because it is the Sultan's task to draw up the programme of the Conference. Once the holding of the Conference has been ensured, we shall be able without difficulty to agree with France over details and as to how long the Conference shall last. Clearly we have now come to a turning-point in the Morocco question.

"If Rouvier goes on shilly-shallying and finessing the points of disagreement between Germany and France will grow acute, to the joy of the *tertii gaudentes*, who would like to see us at loggerheads. If Rouvier accepts the invitation to the Conference, as is feasible without injury either for him

or for France, the most difficult part of the Morocco question will have been got over."

To Prince von Radolin,
Ambassador in Paris.

"Berlin, June 24, 1905.

"His Majesty the Kaiser, to whom I had communicated news of the unsatisfactory turn which things have taken in Paris, has telegraphed me as follows. I may point out, apropos of this telegram, that the Prince of Monaco, who is attached to His Majesty and who is, moreover, a warm advocate of friendly relations between France and Germany, is at the moment staying at Kiel:

"'Prince of Monaco absolutely astonished and bewildered! He had been telling me a few hours earlier that Radolin when driving him to the station the day before had assured him that all was going excellently. Rouvier had dined with him the day before Delcassé's fall and had been won over by him and his friends and had been stimulated by them into throwing Delcassé over—as had happened. Since then, Rouvier had visited the Prince almost daily and had held forth more and more sharply and harshly on the extravagance of Delcassé's attitude and action.

"'President Loubet, it appears, had been so completely in the dark in regard to the communications over Delcassé's proceedings that he was quite at a loss what to say or do when he came to hear of them and of the prospects which resulted from them. Delcassé (Rouvier declared) was an unspeakable rogue, and, without the general public—or even he himself, Rouvier—realizing it or expecting it, had brought France to the brink of destruction. This, Rouvier said, was now recognized, and there was great indignation over it. He (Delcassé) had never succeeded in getting the country behind him. Rouvier's present attitude was utterly inexplicable and in flat contradiction to what he had said to the Prince. London must have had a hand in the game. The Prince proposes to write to Rouvier at once to the above effect.

'William I.R.'

"We are standing now on the brink of the turning-point of the Morocco question. Our hope that this turning-point had been reached with the fall of Delcassé has not been realized, as Rouvier, with his sudden *volte-face*, which was first made known to me in your despatch of the 11th inst., is now preparing to carry through the Delcassé programme.

"If France refuses to take part in the Conference, Germany has the choice either to sit still and watch how France overpowers the Sultan, or to declare to France that we hold ourselves bound to support the Sultan and the *status quo* until the moment when a conference of the Treaty States shall free us from this responsibility. Only the second alternative accords with what has been the German policy down to now. There remains the further question, whether it be better to keep quiet until events constrain us to take some step or to intimate now at once to M. Rouvier what France must be prepared for eventually. Rouvier until now seemed to favour an amicable settlement of the Morocco question. He recently opened out ways which brought under consideration such a settlement.

"The more we make clear to him the consequences of France's not joining the Conference and of the French proceeding to give their support to the Pretendant to the Throne, the more we shall lessen the danger of the situation. It seems therefore extremely desirable to inform Rouvier of this without loss of time. Any further delay might encourage and incite him to proceed on his present Delcassé line, whereby the cause of peace would not be served. Your Excellency will know best whether to communicate to the Premier direct the above intimation as to the consequences of France's not joining the Conference or whether to do so through one of your confidential intermediaries. In order not to alarm public opinion inopportunely, it is desirable that the Press should not be taken into our confidence."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, June 25, 1905.

"I beg respectfully to communicate to Your Imperial and Royal Majesty a telegram just received from Sternburg.

From it one learns that the wily Rouvier has made the same attempt in Washington that he made in the case of the Prince of Monaco, namely, to make people believe that France has practically accepted the Morocco Conference. It will not be difficult to make this clear to Roosevelt. I have confined myself to telegraphing *en clair* to Sternburg the passage from the French Note, which runs :

" ' *Dans l'état actuel des choses, une réponse définitive à la question qui nous a été posée serait encore de notre part insuffisamment éclairée. Le Gouvernement de la Republique est vivement frappé de cette double considération que la conférence pourrait être dangereuse si elle n'est pas précedée d'une entente et inutile si elle la suit.*'

" That is what Rouvier calls ' accepting ' the Conference. On top of this the Paris Press declares that it is not Rouvier who is responsible for the pettifogging *Exposé*, but a supporter of Delcassé's named Revoil. Delcassé had this man appointed Governor-General of Algeria, but Combes gave him short shrift, getting rid of him in April 1903, because he thought that Revoil was working for a Moroccan war. Rouvier, curious to note, sought out Revoil and had the Morocco *Exposé* drafted by him, and Revoil availed himself of the opportunity to rehabilitate his friend Delcassé, foisting the Delcassé programme like a cuckoo's egg upon Rouvier, who manifestly knows nothing about colonial affairs. So long as Rouvier allows himself to be guided by Revoil the situation continues to be the same as though Delcassé were still at the helm. But I imagine that Rouvier, who is clearheaded by nature, will listen to reason and get rid of Revoil again if he thinks that he is being ill advized.

" I assume that it would be in accordance with Your Majesty's views to convey our thanks to President Roosevelt through Sternburg. An explanation of the French mistake will, indeed, be scarcely necessary, but in my opinion it would none the less be useful if Your Majesty were once again to revert to the subject, perhaps in such terms as the following :

" ' Convey my cordial thanks to the President. France, indeed, has by no means given in her adhesion yet, but my gratitude for the unselfish efforts of the President remains just as great. The difficulty consists in this, as the President has already learnt from you, that the French are ignoring

the Sultan of Morocco completely, do not think it worth while even to answer his invitation to the Conference, but instead of that want to negotiate with me regarding the future of Morocco. I believe I might secure all sorts of advantages if I agreed to do so. I cannot do so, however, as I have told the Sultan that I regarded him as an independent Sovereign, and on hearing this from me, depending upon my word, he refused Delcassé's proposals. I cannot now let the Sultan down just because France turns a friendly countenance towards me. Would Theodore Roosevelt break his word when he had made a promise to a poor nigger? I believe that he and I think alike on this point and that we shall understand each other. Moreover, I do not doubt that the matter of the Conference will come right. The difficulties just at the moment come from this, that Rouvier, who is well posted in regard to French home politics, but who has had no experience of colonial affairs, has had in taking up foreign questions to place his trust in Delcassé's followers, and these, naturally, have sought to bring Delcassé's programme back into repute.

" ' A friend of Rouvier's, the Prince of Monaco, who is here with me, feels no doubt, nevertheless, that it will be practicable to come to an understanding with Rouvier as soon as he has taken his bearings in his new position; but, as I have said, I cannot come to an understanding with France over Morocco and leave the Sultan out of it, for this would be against my word. . . .' "

To the Emperor William II.

" Berlin June 28, 1905.

" Prince Radolin telegraphs regarding his conversation yesterday with Rouvier, which lasted two hours. Rouvier again expressed the fear that he would be overthrown if he had to admit that he had been obliged to fall in ' unconditionally ' with Germany's wishes. He made various proposals with a view to binding us to a definite programme before giving in his adhesion. These proposals might have

the effect of estranging the Sultan from us and thus rendering the Conference abortive. The following proposals in particular are in question:

"(1) Rouvier desires that, before entering upon the Conference, one German and one French representative should together discuss with the Sultan, and decide upon the different items of the programme. This proposal seems a doubtful one, because such negotiations might be very tedious and difficult. And it is, moreover, probable that until the Conference is definitely arranged the Sultan would continue to be subjected from the most different sides to influences inimical to peace.

"(2) Another of Rouvier's proposals is that Germany and France should come to an understanding alone in regard to the main points of the programme, but that this understanding should take effect only after France has formally given in her adhesion to the Conference. This proposal comes as a natural sequence to the recent French *Exposé* rejected by us. It seems unacceptable all the more in that, according to Rouvier's wish, the advantages to be secured for France would have to be fixed in advance, while those to be secured for the other Powers would remain in suspense.

"(3) Rouvier recommends the recall of the German, French, and English Ministers from Fez, on the ground that this would clear the situation and tend to the Sultan's peace of mind. A recall of our Minister at the present moment would look like a change of policy on the part of Germany, and would deprive us of all influence with the Sultan, whereas the influence of France is permanently secured by the presence of French troops on the frontier. Manifestly we could not agree to this before France gives in her adhesion to the Conference.

"Prince Radolin has been instructed, in reply to these proposals, to adhere to the position which we have already taken, 'first acceptance, then negotiations,' but at the same time to communicate the following to M. Rouvier.

"That we should be ready, as soon as the French Government shall have accepted the invitation to the Conference, to enter with her into an exhaustive and practical exchange of views over Morocco.

"The aim would be to agree as to the advice which our representatives at Fez should give the Sultan for the

drawing up of the programme of the Conference. Rouvier could set himself right towards the Chamber and public opinion by taking some such line as the following, when announcing the agreement to the Conference: 'The French Government has withdrawn its original objection to the Conference, having been convinced by oral declarations given by the German Ambassador that Germany will not follow any aims at the Conference which stand in opposition to the lawful interests of France.'

"Such a declaration ought also to satisfy the French Chamber, if the Premier were to add that further exposition of the German case would be harmful as it had to be remembered that France and Germany were not deliberating in private, but were surrounded by an inquisitive group of interested parties."

To Prince von Radolin,
Ambassador in Paris.

"Berlin, July 2, 1905.

"We are in general agreement with the proposed exchange of Notes between you and M. Rouvier as well as with the exchange of Understandings, and we hope sincerely that upon this basis the desired understanding may come about.

"We have some alterations in details to propose, both in the Notes and in the Interpretations, the effect of which will be to make the text read as follows:

"'Text of the Note.

"'Rouvier to Prince Radolin.

"'The Government of the Republic has reached the conviction, as the outcome of the exchange of views which has taken place between the representatives of both countries in Paris and Berlin, that at the Conference proposed by the Sultan of Morocco the Imperial Government will not pursue any aims which

would have the effect of questioning the legitimate interests of France in that country or which would conflict with the rights arising from the Sultan's agreements (or "*arrangements*") and to be brought into agreement with the following principles:

"'Sovereignty and Independence of the Sultan.

"'Integrity of the Kingdom.

"'Economic freedom without any inequality.

"'Desirability of police and financial reforms, the carrying out of which within a brief period is to be effected in accordance with international agreement.

"'Recognition of the situation in Morocco as it is, resulting from the long frontier between Algeria and the Shereefian kingdom; further from the special condition resulting for the two neighbouring countries therefrom.

"'In consequence France withdraws her original objections to the Conference and accepts the invitation to it.

"'TEXT OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

"'The Government of the Republic and the German Government are agreed:

"'(1) Simultaneously to withdraw to Tangier their Present Ministers at Fez as soon as the Conference shall have met.

"'(2) Acting together to give to the Sultan of Morocco through their representatives in Fez advice in regard to drawing up the programme which he will propose to the Conference at a date (to be fixed) on the basis of the Notes exchanged between the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and the German Ambassador in Paris.'

"I cherish the hope that Your Excellency will succeed in inducing the French Government, upon this basis, to agree to the proposed alteration, and I authorize you in this case to proceed with the exchange of Notes and Interpretations as soon as possible."

TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

"*For His Excellency Baron von Holstein; to be put before him at once.*

"NORDERNEY, July 20, 1905.

"*Strictly Secret.*

"His Majesty, in a message marked 'To be deciphered by yourself' and 'Strictly Secret,' informs me that he asked the Tsar Nicholas 'whether he had any wish to see him' ['*ob dieser irgend welche Wünsche für ihn habe*']. The Tsar Nicholas replied: 'Delighted with your proposal. Would it suit you meet at Björkö-Sund, near Viborg, a pleasant, quiet place; live on board our yachts? In this serious time I cannot go far from the capital. Of course our meeting will be quite singly and homely. Look forward with intense pleasure to see you.' [1]

"His Majesty requests me to telegraph him direct and at once a transcript of the defensive alliance proposed by us last November, 'before it was pulled about and botched' [*verballhornisiert*] by Count Lamsdorff. His Majesty particularly desires me to let nobody (not even the police) know about the projected *entrevue*. Nobody on the *Hohenzollern*, it appears, knows anything about the meeting, about which absolutely nothing is to be made public in advance.

"You are the only person to whom I am saying anything about the matter. As things stand at present, I regard the meeting as useful. (1) We shall at least learn something definite about further Russian intentions and plans at home and abroad; (2) His Majesty will avail himself of this occasion to communicate to the Tsar the contemplated replacement of Count Alvensleben by von Schoen; (3) Probably peace will be concluded. Possibly the Russian dynasty will survive the present crisis.

"In this case, as the General Staff recently pointed out, Russia in from six to eleven months from now will once again be in force along our frontier. Then King Edward will take up

[1] The Kaiser's own English.

again with renewed zest his efforts to bring about an Anglo-Russian understanding, of which he has never lost sight, and France will change her attitude towards us. In all these circumstances Russia remains as a massive lump of earth with which it remains useful to keep in contact until it has really fallen into pieces.

"Please telegraph to me at once the text of that proposed alliance. Telegraph me first of all what you advise me to suggest to His Majesty when I pass on the text to him. I believe your resourceful mind will know how to draw forth from the unfinished web the threads out of which something useful can eventuate for us. There can be no question of our intervening on behalf of Russia in the peace negotiations. It would be advantageous, however, if we could so far bind the Tsar that Witte and Count Lamsdorff, after the conclusion of peace, could not at once constitute a Russian-French-English *Entente* which the *Novosti* in St. Petersburg and Clemenceau in Paris are recommending, with the idea further in view that a solution would be reached of the Morocco question, which Delcassé in a misguided moment had allowed to become acute."

To the Foreign Office.

"*For His Excellency Baron von Holstein.*

"Norderney, July 22, 1905.

"Best thanks!

"Two important points:

"(1) Should I telegraph His Majesty that we cannot allow Russia to let France into the secret and seek her adhesion until Russia has bound herself to us?

"Please telegraph reply.

"(2) It seems to me important that we should send a telegram to Tokyo (perhaps also to Washington) to intimate that the forthcoming meeting of the Emperor and Tsar does not signify any intervention in the peace negotiations which are now imminent. That there must be no risk of a repetition of what happened in 1895. Rather that it is to be expected

that the meeting with the German Emperor, who has had more to do with the American effort to mediate than is known to the general public, may strengthen the Russian Tsar in his decision to do everything to bring to an end a war so disastrous for Russia.

"Wire me if you do not agree with me in regard to the Press instructions which are being sent by telegraph together with this."

To the Foreign Office.

"Norderney, July 22, 1905.

"*Quite Secret.*

(N.B.—The letter begins by citing again the text of the Tsar's telegram to the Kaiser already given).

". . . I have to-day addressed the following two telegrams to His Majesty:

"(1) *Quite Secret.*

"Our draft of the proposed treaty ran as follows:

"England wants an English-Russian grouping [*gruppierung*]. France also, in view of Delcassé's present position, would probably welcome something in the nature of a German-French-Russian *Entente*. Witte and Lamsdorff are in favour of the English-French combination. In these circumstances we ought not to take the initiative in respect to raising the question of the treaty as there is danger that Count Lamsdorff would use our approaches and the Russian rejection of them against us in Paris, London, and Washington. We must wait until the Tsar makes known his wish—even if it be only in general terms—for joint action with us [*den Wunsch nach einer gemeinsamen Haltung*]. The Tsar will overcome the opposition of Lamsdorff and Witte if he tells them both firmly that he could never come to an understanding with England in view of the rôle played by her before and during the war; any such understanding would make Russia remain a dupe, as France naturally would be more favourably disposed towards Liberal England than towards the Russian Empire.

"If the Tsar should take the view that the sea-power of

the Russian-German-French triple alliance would be less than that of the English-Japanese dual alliance, the answer to be made would be that England would never dare to take action if Russia, Germany, and France were allied because the English coast would then be threatened by France and Germany, while India and Persia would be threatened by Russia; and that the anxiety of the English in regard to an attack on India is greater than appears outwardly.

"If the Tsar should insist on the addition which was made by Count Lamsdorff and which is unacceptable to us (*leur entente cordiale subsisterait également en présence des difficultés qui pourraient surgir à l'époque des négociations de paix entre la Russie et la Japon*), it might be pointed out to him that the moral impression produced by the announcement of the new grouping of Russia, Germany, and France would be so great that the Japanese demands would be considerably lowered thereby. On the other hand, England could not help Russia if as an ally of Japan she did not approach her until after peace had been declared and during the peace negotiations.

"Should it come to the conclusion of the treaty of alliance, *i.e.*, to the adhesion of Germany to the Russo-French dual alliance, the new treaty of alliance must be made public by us in all its bearings. The real reason for this is that otherwise we should lose the trust of Roosevelt and the Americans. A better motive to give the Tsar, however, would be our regard for the Federal Council and the Reichstag. It is of no importance that Article IV (coal, etc.) should be made public also.

"(2) On our side absolute secrecy has been kept in regard to the forthcoming meeting. From St. Petersburg, on the other hand, telegrams have been sent to several Paris newspapers stating that the Tsar was about to go for a fortnight's trip on board the Imperial yacht *Polar Star*; officially it has been announced that only a trip along the coast is in question, but that it was believed that the Tsar would meet the Kaiser in Swedish waters.

"If, in your interview with the Tsar, Your Majesty should strike the warm and cordial note which Your Majesty's whole attitude during the Russo-Japanese War has inspired, it will do the Tsar[1] much good at this moment, for him so full of

[1] *Dem Hohen Herrn* in the German—"the exalted personage."

trouble. Your Majesty's *leitmotiv* throughout has been: our only desire is that the Russian dynasty should come out of this crisis unhurt and Russia's standing as a Power unweakened, for this is in the interest of the Russian monarchy as in the political interest of Germany, and the personal friendship of the German Kaiser and the King of Prussia for His Majesty the Tsar Nicholas is in full and complete accord with this interest.

"I hope that the Tsar will not bring Lamsdorff with him this time. Should this happen, however, Your Majesty will call to mind the proverb, '*A corsaire, corsaire et demi*,' and will show Lamsdorff outwardly the friendliest possible mien. In this way it will be the more possible to nullify his influence over the Tsar."

To the Ambassador in London.

"Norderney, July 22, 1905.

"*Quite Confidential.*

"Heartiest thanks for both of your exhaustive and very important private letters of the 5th and 12th instant.

"What interested me most, naturally, was what you tell me about the feeling of His Majesty the King in regard to us. Moreover, I attach much weight to the sober and well-informed judgment of Count Seckendorff. As you know, I have hitherto shared the opinion which both you and he express that King Edward really desires and works for better relations between Germany and England. I must, however, state that much has occurred recently to surprise me a little. You yourself tell me of what the Grand Duchess[1] of Mecklenburg-Strelitz has to say about the King's having lost confidence in the Kaiser as the result of our Morocco policy. A letter from Schölzer, of which you have received a copy, goes to bear this out. Sternburg also records, on the strength of a communication from President Roosevelt, that the King made an urgent appeal to Hay, the Secretary of State, now on his deathbed, to detach Roosevelt from Germany.

"It would have been useful if Seckendorff had given

[1] *Grossherzogin-Witwe* in the German. Witwe = widow.

currency *dort* to your quite excellent exposition of our grievances against England. You have maintained with perfect accuracy that our Morocco policy is not directed against the Franco-English alliance and, above all, not against England. Our intentions were, and still are to-day, so little hostile to England that when taking the course we did in Morocco, and for some time afterwards, we were actuated by the hope (based upon the explanation you gave Lord Lansdowne this summer) that England would be, if not on our side, at least neutral in this matter in which there was question only of the 'Open Door' and economic equality of rights.

"The news of a row between Prince Radolin and his English colleague is based upon a mis-statement in the account of the incident given to you. Sir Francis Bertie thought fit at a *soirée* at Prince Murat's in the presence of the Crown Prince of Greece to address remonstrances to Radolin, quite suddenly and in an excited tone of voice, regarding the 'senselessness' of our efforts to bring about a Morocco conference. Radolin carried himself with dignity in the face of this unusually tactless outburst, and a few days later he even put in an appearance at the official reception at the English Ambassador's, although he naturally maintained a somewhat cold demeanour. . . .

"Seckendorff has been staying here since yesterday. Although he has already communicated his travel impressions to you, I am giving you a quite brief summary of them, as follows:

"(1) Anxiety prevails in France in regard to us. No one there wants war with us. Even Delcassé pursued a policy of bluff, although in a very shortsighted and unskilful fashion. His retirement is regretted by no one in France.

"(2) The advances of the English, and especially of His Majesty King Edward, flattered the French and especially the vain Delcassé, a man risen from humble circumstances. Seckendorff contests the idea that the King has set the French against us. I must add to my regret that many Frenchmen assure us of the contrary. Seckendorff does not believe that the French would enter into a genuine alliance with England. Their mistrust of *la perfide Albion* is (he thinks) too deeply rooted, and it has been strengthened by the irritating utterances in the English Press, '*qui sont trop cousues de fil blanc.*'

"Moreover, not only the French politician, but perhaps even more the English, could not help the French at all on land, and for France what will happen on land is all-important. The French (Seckendorff says) have no confidence in their own Army—least of all in their Generals.

"(3) Bertie and his staff are very anti-German.

"(4) The *Haute Finance* of Paris is convinced that Russia will have very hard peace conditions imposed on her by Japan and will have to pay a very high indemnity. It is maintained that the assertions to the contrary made by Russian newspapers and diplomatists are mere talk. Paris financial circles calculate that the indemnity will come to from four to five milliards and they are ready to lend Russia the money. Russia, it is believed, cannot continue the war; the internal condition of the country would not permit, and the people and now the Tsar are war-weary. But Russia possesses such great internal resources that international finance would always be willing to go on supplying her with money.

"(5) Seckendorff does not believe that the people who count in the political world of England want to attack us. Nor does he believe that these are so foolish as to attribute seriously to us any intention of attacking England. In naval circles there would seem to be more support for the idea of a prophylactic war against Germany. Moreover, the English do not like us and are envious of us. With patience, calm, and 'good manners' the relations between us may be improved, but only slowly.

"(6) As already intimated, Seckendorff is of the opinion that His Majesty King Edward is not our enemy. His Majesty, he thinks, has merely had his feelings stirred up against us by the people round him who have been hostile to us almost all of them, and who keep telling him that his exalted nephew is 'incalculable' and that His Majesty must be prepared for all kinds of *coups de tête*.

"(7) Among those specially hostile to us (he says) are Princess Victoria (the King's daughter), the Duchess of Connaught, and Princess Louis of Battenberg. . . . It is the case that the indiscreet and tactless young Prince[1] excites the Kaiser, whom he amuses by his quips and jeers, against the Royal Family.

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[1] The Crown Prince, evidently.

"(8) Seckendorff has asked more than once whether *The Times* might not be won over to us. Chirol,[1] he thinks, cannot forgive Holstein the violent rupture of 1896. Walter, he adds, is aggrieved with Eckardstein. Do you think that you, with your tact, could do something in the right direction?

"(9) His Majesty intimated to Seckendorff that Gleichen would be recalled in the winter. It should not, however, be made to look as though His Majesty had been forced into this step. It seems that His Majesty has already someone in view to replace Gleichen.

"(10) Seckendorff kept insisting that the King's efforts continue to be directed towards bringing about an agreement with Russia also.

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II
TO PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"VISBY, July 25, 1905.

"My Dear Bülow,

"You will have learnt already from my telegram that the work of *rapprochement* [*Annäherung*] has borne fruit and the throw has succeeded! The treaty has been considerably simplified inasmuch as the old Clause 4 has been abolished. In Clause 1, 'European Power *in Europe*' has been inserted so that Asia and India have been got rid of for us. In the new Clause 4 the Kaiser undertakes to enter into co-operation with France after the conclusion of peace [*nach Abschluss des Friedens Frankreich zur Theilnahme einzuführen*]; just as the treaty comes into force only *after the conclusion of peace* so that the entire *present* situation, with the war in progress, is absolutely not binding for us.

"And now that this has come about people are wondering how such a thing can have become possible. The answer is very clear to me! God has so ordained. In spite of mortal muddlings, in scorn of mortal meddlings,[2] He has brought

[1] The late Sir Valentine Chirol, who in 1896 was *The Times* correspondent in Berlin. In 1905 he was Foreign Editor of the paper.

[2] A rather free rendering of the Kaiser's rhetorical phrase.

together what belonged together. Now His ways are different from our ways and His thoughts are loftier than ours. What Russia last winter rejected in her pride and endeavoured by means of intrigues to shape to our disadvantage has now been forced upon her by the terrible, hard, mortifying hand of the Lord and has been accepted gladly as a beautiful gift. My head became dizzy from the way I cudgelled my brains these days in my anxiety to make sure that I was setting about the matter in the right way, the interests of the country always before my eyes, but not less so the interests of the monarchical idea generally. Finally, I have raised my hands to the Lord over us all, and committed everything into His hands, and prayed. He will assuredly direct and lead me whither He wilt. I am but a simple tool in His hands and I will achieve what He entrusts me with, however difficult may be the task. And in conclusion I have uttered the wish of the Old Dessauer at Kesselsdorff, that if He be not willing to help me He should at least not help the other side. Having done so, I felt wonderfully strengthened, and my will and purpose are growing ever more firm and definite. 'You see it through, cost it what it may!' And so I looked forward to the interview with complete confidence. And what was I to meet with? A warm, affectionate, hearty greeting such as could be given only to a really beloved friend. The Tsar embraced me and held me close as though I were his very brother, and he kept gazing at me with eyes full of joy and gratitude. The people round the Tsar—save for that oyster-like foreigner P——[1]—showed me a cordiality I never before met with. Benckendorff even allowed his monocle to drop from his eye when I gave him my hand!! The Grand Duke Michael, Heir to the Throne, had expressly been made one of the party, and was ecstatic.

"Soon the Tsar took me aside and said he was burning to have a long talk with me. We lit our cigarettes and were soon *in medias res*. He was extremely pleased about our Morocco arrangement, feeling that it opened out the way to permanently good relations with France, and he subscribed warmly to my hope that an enduring understanding and perhaps

[1] According to the official documents, "the expression applied by the Kaiser to Count Lamsdorff does not bear reproduction."

even an 'agreement' with Gaul might result from it. When I proceeded to draw his attention to the fact that, in spite of the instigation from the side of England, France had flatly refused to enter the lists against us, and thus showed that she was no longer inclined to fight us over Alsace-Lorraine, he said emphatically: 'Yes, that I saw; it is quite clear the Alsace-Lorraine question is closed once for all, thank God.' The conversation then turned to England, and it very soon became clear that the Tsar cherishes a feeling of deep personal anger against England and the King. He described Edward VII as the greatest 'mischief-maker' and the most insincere and most dangerous intriguer in the world. I could but agree with him, remarking that I had suffered from his intrigues in a very special degree during the last few years, which, more particularly after his reception at Kiel, was absolutely beyond denial. I said he had a passion for contriving plots with every Power and making 'a little agreement.' Here the Tsar broke in with the words: 'Well, I can only say, he shall not get one from me, and never in my life against Germany or you, my word of honour on it.'

"We then talked about the introduction and carrying through of the peace measure, and the Tsar thanked me very warmly for the proposal made in conjunction with Roosevelt and Meyer. To begin with, I had, he said, written him such a clear and obliging letter. Meyer he found a charming conversationalist and a charming man, and he had very quickly come to an understanding with him. And the best of the whole thing was that the three things had come about so opportunely together! It is obvious, therefore, what a good thing it was that I wrote the Tsar that letter on the evening of June 4 after the bride had moved in, and sent it off at once. The Tsar has hopes that Roosevelt, in whom he places entire confidence, will manage to reduce some of the exorbitant demands which the Japanese will be making to reasonable proportions.

"He was very much troubled about Norway. On my telling him that King Oscar feels indifferent as to who may be his neighbour, and would not object even to a republic, he threw up his hands over his head and exclaimed: 'So it has come to that! As though we hadn't enough republics already in the world, to say nothing of monarchs of his type! What is coming to the monarchical principle!' He went on to

express the opinion that if no Swedish prince were forthcoming, and if Copenhagen were interested, Prince Waldemar might step in. He had some knowledge of life, a nice elegant wife, and fine strapping children. I agreed with him, but pointed out that, according to private information from Copenhagen, the King of England had already intimated his willingness to agree to the choice of his son-in-law if it should be made. The Tsar was very disagreeably surprised to hear this. He seemed to have known nothing about it and he said he thought his cousin Carl quite unfitted for the position, as he had been nowhere, had no knowledge whatever of life, was an insignificant figure and lazy; Waldemar would be much better. If Carl were chosen, England, 'by fair means or foul,' would stretch out her hand towards Norway, and acquire influence, and begin to intrigue, and eventually, by the occupation of Christians and, would lock up the Skagerrack and with it the whole lot of us in the Baltic; in the same way in the North his Murman harbours would be done for.

"This brought our first conversation to a close and I took leave of him, but he came back with me at once to the *Hohenzollern*, and as we were mounting the steps of his yacht he once again threw his arms round my neck, thanking me once more for my visit.

"My dinner-party on the *Hohenzollern*—which began only at 10.30 p.m.—was very lively, and the Tsar grew more and more animated. Hirsch, his excellent old doctor, remarked to me that it was long since he had seen the Tsar in such bright spirits. He was glad to see him enjoying this respite from domestic preoccupations, and he said *they all hoped* the talk with me would do him good and have beneficent effects for Russia, at home as well as abroad. It was already bright daylight when the Tsar left the yacht, after conversing at length with all the members of my suite. The latter told me that both Fredericks and Count Heyden, in the course of their after-dinner talk, had declared to them unreservedly that a German-Russian-French alliance would be the best solution of the situation; perhaps Japan might join in later.

"It was clear to me from all this that the ground for my action was well prepared and that there was a general feeling already that it would be actually realized. For if the people round the Tsar could venture to speak of it so openly, it was

obvious he himself could have no objection to it. And this proved to be the case.

"Next morning I opened my *Losungen*[1] and came upon the following text: '*Ein jeglicher wird seinen Lohn empfangen nach seiner Arbeit*'—'Each one of us shall receive his reward according to his work.' And having exchanged a brief handshake with my faithful Tschirschky, who had risen to the occasion splendidly from first to last, I stepped, full of radiant confidence, into the boat which was to take me to the Tsar's yacht, with the treaty in my pocket.

"The Tsar welcomed me down on the gangway with a cordial embrace, and then with Micha[2] we went below to enjoy, the three of us, an excellent breakfast. The conversation turned now upon more or less the same themes as those detailed above. I was able to see how extremely vexed the Tsar was over the attitude of France in the Dogger Bank affair, and, referring to the way in which, at England's bidding, France drove Roschestwensky out of Cochin China almost into the hands of the Japs, he exclaimed: 'The French behaved like scoundrels to me: by order of England my ally left me in the lurch! And now look at Brest! How they fraternize with the English! And they never told me anything about it before—did not even ask my permission!' In other respects, he said, the French Government and Press had behaved fairly well; and the people of Paris had remained cold.

"Was it possible, I asked, that any kind of understanding had been come to between them (the French and English)? I said I thought that some kind of small 'agreement'—Edward VII had a weakness for 'agreements'—might very well have been fixed up without co-operation on the part of France's ally. The Tsar's head sank gloomily. 'That is too bad!' he said. 'What shall I do in this disagreeable situation?'

"I felt that the moment had now arrived! As his ally had maintained the policy of the free hand and reinsurance without informing the Tsar or consulting with him, it was open to him, without doing anything incorrect, to retaliate in similar fashion, *suum cuique*. How would it be, then, if we also made such a 'little agreement'? We had already once

[1] A book of "watch-words," or aphorisms, of the Moravian Brotherhood—*Losungen der Brüdergemeinde für* 1905.

[2] The Grand Duke Nicholas.

deliberated as to doing this in the previous winter, but nothing had resulted because of Delcassé and the tension with France. Now that that was all over and done with, and that we were good friends with the French, there was no longer any obstacle in the way! 'Oh yes, to be sure, I remember well! But I forgot (*sic*) the contents of it; what a pity I haven't got it here.' [1] I possess a copy, which quite by chance I have here in my pocket. The Tsar took me by the arm and led me out of the room into his father's special cabin, and closed all the doors himself at once. 'Show it to me, please'; and his dreamy eyes sparkled in the bright light. I drew the envelope out of my pocket, spread out the sheet on the writing-table of Alexander III in front of the portrait of the Empress Dowager, and laid it before the Tsar. He read through once, twice, three times, the text, which had once before been submitted to him. I sent up a fervent prayer to God that he should take our side and direct the young ruler!

"There was a stillness as of the grave; one heard only the sound of the sea, and the sun was shining brightly and joyfully in the sombre cabin. Right in front of me I could see the *Hohenzollern*, dazzlingly white, the Imperial Standard waving in the wind high up aloft. On its black cross I could make out distinctly the words '*Gott mit Uns*' ['God with us'].

"Now I hear the Tsar's voice close to me: 'That is quite excellent. I quite agree!' My heart is beating so loud that I can hear it. I pull myself together, and answer, quite casually: 'Should you like to sign it? It would be a very nice souvenir of our *entrevue*.' He went over the sheet once again. Then he said: 'Yes, I will.' I raised the lid of the inkstand, handed him the pen, and he wrote with a firm hand, 'Nikolas,' and as I stood up he threw his arms round me with signs of emotion and said: 'I thank God and I thank you; it will be of most beneficial consequences for my country and for yours; you are Russia's only real friend in the whole world—I have felt that through the whole war and I know it.'

"Tears of joy stood in my eyes—indeed, perspiration was coursing down my forehead and my back—and I said to myself: 'Frederic William III, Queen Louise, Grosspapa [the

[1] The ex-Kaiser in this letter records the Tsar's remarks in English for the most part.

Emperor William I] and Nicholas I must at this moment be close at hand! At all events, they have been looking on, and all of them will have rejoiced!'

"On my pointing out to the Tsar that it would be desirable to have the signatures of two witnesses, as was customary with documents of the kind, he agreed, and gave orders at once for Tschirschky to join us, and for Admiral Birilew to come below. You should have seen the joy of the former, who had been obliged to put up with ten years of the hardest period of Russian pride, mistrust, and arrogant treatment in St. Petersburg. To him and Birilew we communicated the fact of the treaty, and the old sailor silently took my hand in both his and kissed it reverently.

"And so the morning of the 24th of July, 1905, became a turning-point in the history of Europe, thanks be to the grace of God; and a great lightening of the situation for my dear Fatherland, which at last will be freed from the horrible fangs of Gaul and Russia!

"The Tsar now inspected the *Berlin* and gave a great farewell lunch in honour of all the members of my suite, during which he was in the most expansive mood.

"I have to add that while we were waiting for the two gentlemen to come and add their signatures, I suggested to the Tsar—as he would have to have a copy of the treaty—that his brother might transcribe it, and he at once decided that this should be. It was thus made feasible for the possible Heir to the Throne or Regent to become acquainted with the treaty which otherwise would be kept quite secret.

"We also had much talk regarding Denmark, and the Tsar expressed the wish that we should consider whether some way might not be found by which we both might guarantee to King Christian his possessions so that we might be sure that in case of war we could undertake the defence of the Baltic *north of the Belt*. A declaration of neutrality in accordance with which the Danes, quite rightly from their own standpoint, would allow enemy ships to be piloted into the Baltic right up to our harbour. In case the foe did not respect Denmark's neutrality—a contingency to be assumed probable owing to the great weakness of the country—then he would take possession of it and the neutral kingdom would be forced to join the enemy and would furnish him with an excellent basis for his operations against our coasts. Denmark at

present was a Baltic State and not a North Sea State. I promised to go into the question with him. I shall question Schoen on the subject in Copenhagen, and shall hear from him what is thought there about neutrality.

"The weather is splendid, the voyage most beautiful.

"Your true friend,

"WILLIAM I.R.

"P.S.—In the course of our conversation regarding the internal situation of Russia I told him some home truths. I have advised him to do two things:

"First, to give the country a Habeas Corpus Act (like Magna Charta in England), couched in solemn language, bestowing on the citizens of his realm personal security and the right to justice, in place of the present bureaucratic procedure.

"When this charter should have been prepared by the Ministry I advised him not to promulgate it immediately, but first to call together the State Council—as constituted upon lines which I sketched out—and to submit it to them. Only when this State Council should be in session, presided over by himself, should he allow people to begin to talk and argue about Parliament and Constitution—for everyone would have some different proposal to bring forward. Then, when people had talked themselves out (with all the passion and faculty for talk which mark the Slavs), and when all the arguing was done with, he could come forward and, pointing out, by reference to the past, that it was no easy matter to frame a Constitution, make a definite start at once with something more directly useful to the people; here, he might say, is a guarantee for the personal security and just treatment of Russian citizens; a right of *Habeas Corpus* before any man be sentenced, and the right to be brought before a judge and tried within thirty-six hours of having been arrested.

"Second, his Army, I said, had fought bravely in the field but had been very inadequately led—the Tsar ended by admitting this—and, moreover, for six months past had been engaged in combating revolution, doing a kind of police duty which it found very unpleasant. The Guards had remained at home. The troops of the line ought therefore to receive adequate indemnity. They should be placed upon

the same basis as the Guards in respect to pay and advancement. At the same time the deeply humiliating status of the officers of the Second Class should cease. The Tsar promised me at once to issue an order to the Army as to this. This will result in the troops returning home cheered and contented when peace has been declared, even if they come home without a victory."

To the Foreign Office.

"Norderney, July 28, 1905.

"I have telegraphed to His Majesty:

"The words '*en Europe*' in the First Article of the Agreement cause me some hesitation. The one thing the English really fear is an attack on India. In Europe the Russians can do very little with their crippled Fleet, and not much with their Army, to help us against England. But if the English knew that, in the event of their attacking Germany, the Russians would be available for our support in Europe only, and Russia was thus under no engagement to make a push for India, they would be more inclined to let matters come to a conflict with us than if India would be thereby endangered. At first sight, therefore, it seems to me that it would be better if Article I ran: 'In the event of one of the Empires being attacked by a European Power, its ally will aid it with all its forces by land and sea.'[1]

"Such a wording, however, would not oblige us to send our troops or ships to Asia. For in case of war with England we should naturally have to keep all our forces together on our coasts. I may venture to keep this matter in my mind for a while, and come back again to the point with Your Majesty. The question seems to me exceedingly important, but there is no hurry about it, for the Agreement is to come into force only after peace is concluded. Very likely it can take such a form that one may be able to put forward the omission of the words '*en Europe*' as an extension of the alliance in favour of

[1] "En cas où l'un des deux empires serait attaqué par une puissance européenne, on allié l'aidera de toutes ses forces de terre et de mer."

Russia, an inclusion of the Asiatic possessions of the Tsar, and thus a friendly act of Your Majesty in his regard.

"Metternich telegraphs from London that in the last few weeks English opinion has become more excited against us, and that an English attack upon us now seems to him more likely than was the case a year ago. Until the Agreement with Russia comes into force we must be cautious as regards England, and keep our good looks for her. I am telegraphing this also, this evening, as there are many lines leading from Copenhagen [1] to London."

To the Foreign Office.

"Norderney, July 30, 1905.

"His Majesty telegraphed to me this afternoon from Danzig:

"*Strictly Confidential.*

"It was I who inserted the phrase '*en Europe*' after mature consideration and most deliberately. Without it we would have been pledged unconditionally to co-operation in Asia. Thus, for instance, in case of a conflict in Afghanistan, supposing England had picked a quarrel with Russia there, we might, from the military point of view, find a legitimate claim for the co-operation of our troops put to us by Russia. Now as regards the 'push for India,' which is a favourite catch-word of diplomatic talk and an item listed in the diplomatic drug store for bringing pressure to bear on England, the thing is altogether an illusion. In former years I, once for all, studied this question very thoroughly and from every point of view obtained the opinion of the General Staff upon it. It is practically impossible for a great army to set out on a march against India without years of preparation and expenditure on quite an enormous scale.

"The thing would take so long in its mere preliminaries that England would have plenty of time for fixing up her preparations and counter-measures. And then it is doubtful

[1] The Emperor William II made a visit to Copenhagen from July 31 to August 2.

if the invading army could reach the Indian frontier in condition for the conflict, so that this idea has to be excluded from the region of sober 'practical politics.' This is all the more so because Russia is now seriously weakened for a long time to come in troops and resources, and besides this will lose millions in war costs, and also have to spend as much again on reconstruction and reorganization when peace is made. She will therefore be quite incapable of a military enterprise such as we are discussing during the lifetime of men now living.

"On the other hand, there is quite a different situation if Russia, after concluding an alliance with Japan as one Asiatic Power with another, were to join her with the object of turning the 'Europeans' out of India. In union with the most powerful fleet in the East—that of Japan—and supported by China as a passive or active partner, the conquest of India from the other side might quite well be possible, all the more because the English naval forces would be reduced to a minimum, and no ships of the line would be abroad, all of these being stationed in European waters, and mostly in the Channel and the North Sea. If it comes to a war with England, Russian help for us will not be in Asia or in the chimerical 'push for India,' but will consist in the fact that Russia will guarantee for us absolute security for our rear in Europe. Thus the 'war on two fronts,' which we have been busily studying for the last twenty years, will be changed for a war on one front, as it was in 1870, with the whole united German Army against France only. This is, of course, on the supposition that France mobilizes against us to help England, which is not unlikely.

"The very strange and surprising report published by Reuter yesterday morning, that the English Channel Fleet is suddenly to be sent into the Baltic, and with this the voting of an extraordinary expenditure of 120 million marks by Parliament for English naval purposes, namely the new base for the Navy at Rosyth—already abandoned for a while—besides other matters, such as Count Metternich's serious information as to the renewed excitement in England—confirmed by Coerper in a private letter to Baron von Senden—do not allow us entirely to leave out of account the idea of unfriendly projects against us.

"I have therefore talked over eventualities with Julius

von Moltke,[1] who is to succeed Count von Schlieffen in the winter. The following is the result: It is very unlikely that England, supposing she had part of her Fleet in the Baltic, would attempt a *coup-de-main*. For in that case this detachment of her Fleet would be cut off by our immediately occupying Denmark and closing the Belts, while our Fleet would have the opportunity of going off to the North Sea coast of England and doing a lot of damage there. But this is not a course likely to be taken by a circumspect opponent with sound ideas of war operations. But however England may declare, or in any way begin war against us, Your Excellency's part will be at once to send off two despatches to Brussels and Paris calling upon them to declare, within six hours, whether they are for or against us. We must immediately march into Belgium, whatever may be her reply. As for France, it depends on whether she remains neutral—an eventuality that I think cannot be entirely left out of account, even though it is hardly probable; in that case there need be no question of Russian treaty obligations.

"But if France mobilizes, then it is a menace of war against us in favour of England, and in that case Russian regiments must march with us. It is my belief that the prospect of ravaging and plundering in the pleasant lands of France would afford the Russians enough delight to attract them to our side. We may eventually have to consider whether, as a bait for good conduct towards ourselves, we might offer France a rounding-off of her frontier at the expense of Belgium, as a compensation for her lost provinces.

"The appearance of the English Fleet in the Baltic has, of course, been called forth by the surprisingly warm reception of our squadron at Copenhagen, which has much astonished England. Admiral May will doubtless consider it his duty at Copenhagen to remember that England regards both Denmark and Portugal as alike its satrapies and outposts and cannot understand that they should have any love-looks for us. It is the same in Sweden since an English princess made her appearance there.

"We cannot count on active help from Russia in the near future, for war and revolution are keeping its armies occupied,

[1] Julius von Moltke was the nephew of the famous Helmuth von Moltke, the "organizer of victory" in 1864, 1866, and 1870. He succeeded von Schlieffen as Chief of the General Staff.

and there is no longer any fleet. But she can keep our rear safe. Passive help is very good ! "

" To this I have given the following reply :

" *Strictly Confidential.*

" I have just received with most respectful thanks Your Majesty's significant and most interesting telegram from Danzig. Your Majesty will not take it in bad part if I hold fast to my opinion that the Agreement will be much more valuable for us without the limitation ' *en Europe.*'

" The opinion that a Russian advance against India would have no chance of success is not shared by influential groups in England, as was lately shown by the Curzon-Kitchener dispute and is plainly evident from all the English writings about India. As the English—whether rightly or wrongly does not matter in this case—fear nothing more than a Russian push for India, so it is for me undoubtedly true that a treaty between Germany and Russia, in which the possibility of a Russian advance in Asia is expressly excluded, is less calculated to hinder an English attack on Germany than a treaty without such a limitation. An English advance against Russia in Asia is very much more unlikely than such action against us in Europe. The English are much more inclined to move in the latter than in the former direction. I would still, as before, consider it a very fortunate thing if the expression ' *en Europe* ' were dropped out, but I fully grant that not only the matter itself, but also the ways and means for ultimately making the alteration possible, deserve serious consideration.

" In my humble opinion, what Your Majesty says as to the value of security in the rear for us is most completely to the point. To have obtained this for us will be for Your Majesty a title to the highest renown. But if this advantage is to be a lasting one for us the Tsar will have to hold his own. I fear the position of His Highness will be a very precarious one if he alone takes the responsibility of accepting or refusing the Japanese peace conditions, and does not soon grant some kind of a Constitution. It would be of the highest interest to hear the views of King Christian on this point.

" What Your Majesty says about Belgium hits the nail on the head. Everything suggests that the Belgians have so far no suspicion that, in such an eventuality, we would put

this 'yes or no' to them. Otherwise they would have spent a lot of money on putting up fortifications against us and given the French a hint to arrange their plans for such an event.

"As regards England, the words of Goethe are always occurring to me:

'Heute heute lass dich nicht fangen,
So bist du tausendmal entgangen.' [1]

"We must now assume towards England neither an apologetic nor an offensive tone. I have sent instructions to the Press to this effect. I believe also that it is extremely advisable not to decide the neutrality question at Copenhagen before Your Majesty has had a talk with Schoen, who must be well informed as to the feelings of the Danes on this matter."

To the Foreign Office.

"Norderney, July 31, 1905.

"*Secret.*

"As to the Morocco question, there are now three points to be considered:

"(1) We must keep for ourselves the possibility of securing for France a free hand in Morocco at the moment when she has to decide as to her joining in the German-Russian understanding. The Morocco affair could not take a better turn for us than this, and it would be far and away the best ending for our Morocco campaign.

"(2) To secure this, we must not prematurely abandon our principal and general standpoint in the Morocco question. But, also, the French are not to be allowed to believe that our ultimate aims go so far as finally obtaining for ourselves a footing in Morocco.

"It seems to me more advisable to let the Morocco question stagnate for a while than to hurry it. Pushfulness or threatening over the Morocco question at this moment would only press France closer up to England, and at the

[1] "Don't let yourself be entangled to-day; it is thus you will go free a thousand times."

same time lead the Emperor Nicholas to imagine that immediately after Björkö he is to be compelled to choose between us and France. From this point of view, I ask you to examine once more the draft of the telegram to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris."

To the Foreign Office.

"Norderney, Aug. 2, 1905.

"*Secret.*

"In view of the situation created through the Agreement of Björkö, including the expression '*en Europe*,' we must now, as far as possible, avoid friction with France. To bring the Russians into the Morocco question seems to me for the present inadvisable, for Count Lamsdorff, faced with a choice between us and France, would be evasive, while the Tsar would think that we wanted immediately to take advantage of the engagements he has entered into to push him forward against France.

"I wrote this morning to His Majesty that I held the addition of the words '*en Europe*' to be pernicious and that I could not take any responsibility for them. As I could not obtain from His Majesty the Emperor and King a modification of the draft of the Agreement already drawn up and signed by His Highness, I begged him to appoint my successor."

To the Foreign Office.

"*For His Excellency Baron von Holstein.*

"Norderney, Aug. 5, 1905.

"*Strictly Secret.*

"Hearty thanks for your letter received yesterday. As for the further proceedings regarding my offer of my

resignation, there is only one possible course for me, namely, so to act as is useful for my country and the Crown, in order, so far as in me lies, to guard them both from the dangers of the present and the future. The question arises whether I must not declare to General-Lieutenant von Moltke that for me the situation has not been cleared up, even by his explanations, and that I must have a personal interview with His Majesty. My letter yesterday to His Majesty was to the point, practical and very definite.

"Obviously, however, we must now come to a clear understanding on the highly important question of the revision of Article I in its bearing on our future policy, whoever may have to direct it. My own personal opinion is that if we can obtain from the Tsar an explanation of it—that could be available for public use—to the effect that Russia, notwithstanding the addition '*en Europe*,' is, in case of an attack, to push forward on the whole front, these additional words will no longer be injurious to us. This will make it easier to defend the whole Agreement in the Reichstag and before public opinion in Germany. But I ask you to wire to me without being influenced by this my personal opinion.

"Meanwhile, as to what follows: As I have already written to you, from the very outset it seemed to me doubtful whether the deferring clause (until the peace) is not, after all, of no use to us. I would just now be ready to give it up if I were quite sure of getting rid of the '*en Europe*' in return for this. The change of Ambassadors at St. Petersburg has not been deferred by His Majesty, but by me. My whole desire is that a change at this moment should not disturb the Tsar and make Count Lamsdorff even more anxious and suspicious than he very probably is already. I would only abandon this idea if His Majesty had already spoken plainly to the Tsar, and explained the change of Ambassadors, and I do not know as yet about this. Otherwise my view would be that our first conversations with Count Lamsdorff should be through Count Alvensleben, who somehow or other inspires confidence at St. Petersburg, and that Schoen should not be sent to St. Petersburg until the autumn."

To the Foreign Office.

"Norderney, Aug. 5, 1905.

"*Strictly Confidential.*

"His Majesty the Emperor telegraphs to me that he is sending General-Lieutenant (Helmut) von Moltke to Norderney to give me explanations in an interview. His Majesty goes on to say: 'General-Lieutenant von Moltke is bringing you the draft of a letter from me to the Tsar, in which I explain to him that I assume as obvious, and anticipate, that "*toutes les forces de terre et de mer*" will obviously include all units of his Army, and even those on the Asiatic India border, and that in case these cannot be sent to Libau or Strassburg they will naturally come into action against India. Even without the words "*en Europe*" we are not in a position to force a plan of operations against India, if they do not wish for it, or plead that they cannot carry it out. But they will be more readily drawn to this if they have come to an understanding with Japan.

"'The English "strategists" and Anglo-Indian politicians use the "push for India"—that is, the possibility of a Russian invasion—only as a bogey for home consumption—in London—in order to get sufficient forces against their enemies in India itself, which since Japan's victories over the "white race" no longer believe in its invincibility and has begun to be restless. English soldiers of high rank, who had themselves served in India, have said to me that they had absolutely no fear of danger from Russia, for an invasion in any force by a column of efficiently organized troops was impracticable. Your Excellency was perfectly correct in saying that the frontier is well fortified and prepared for defence, but this has become one more reason for considering it unassailable.

"'It is self-evident that without the words "*en Europe*" the whole German Fleet might be obliged—at the desire of Russia—to go out with the special object of preventing the transport of English troops to India, and would thus be annihilated by the superior English Fleet, far from any home harbour as a base of operations. Your Excellency would find it extremely difficult to defend such a proceeding before the country, and people would begin referring to

"the bones of the Pomeranian Grenadier."[1] A refusal of a request for support "*en Europe*" for an enterprise against India would be regarded by Russia as a breach of the Agreement. An excuse that we must watch France would be met by the reply that she was Russia's ally and therefore no danger to us.'

"We have two possible courses as to the Agreement of Björkö, as regards Article I:

"(1) To strike out the words '*en Europe*.' This again may be brought about in two ways:

"(*a*) His Majesty may write to the Tsar that the Agreement of Björkö is, according to the German Constitution, valid only if it is countersigned by the Imperial Chancellor. I am opposed to the words '*en Europe*.' Therefore I send His Majesty the Tsar a new copy of the Agreement, signed by me, without these words, and request that he will have a similar Russian copy, countersigned by Count Lamsdorff, prepared. This is what is called 'taking the bull by the horns.' I doubt about its success.

"(*b*) Or His Majesty may write to the Tsar somewhat as follows: 'In the presence of the existing European situation, in both internal and external affairs, I more fully realize our solidarity as monarchical rulers. I would therefore like to establish our Agreement on the broadest possible foundation. In Asia your prestige has suffered through the war. All my thoughts are at present directed to strengthening this prestige along the whole line, and I therefore suggest to you the omission of the words "*en Europe*." I also desire that both our Ministers for Foreign Affairs should countersign the agreement. I send you a copy of it countersigned by my Imperial Chancellor. Send me a similar draft of the Agreement signed by Count Lamsdorff.'

"Such a letter would take less the line of bending or breaking, though its reasoning is somewhat far-fetched. But one sees the object in view.

"(2) We might retain the words '*en Europe*' but obtain from the Tsar an express declaration that Russia, in case of war, would go forward on the whole line. I have already had this idea for some time. The question is, how best

[1] The allusion is to Bismarck's refusal of a projected Eastern intervention with the words, "It is not worth the bones of even one Pomeranian Grenadier."

to formulate it? It might either be that His Majesty would write to the Tsar:

"'As in the event of either of us being attacked by a third European Power each of us has to move against this assailant, would it not be well for us even now to prepare the broad lines of an understanding as to simultaneous operations in Europe, Asia, and my colonies?'

"This wording has the drawback that the Tsar could give an evasive answer. But if he agrees, military conferences might just now attract unwelcome attention.

"Or His Majesty might write in another way to the Tsar:

"'I feel sure that you will agree with me if I assume that, if either of us is attacked by a third European Power, each of us is to make a general movement against the Power that thus assails us—that is, you in Asia also, and I in my Colonies.'

"Or, finally, His Majesty may formulate this idea in the terms already suggested to His Majesty, namely, the form supplied to him in my letter of yesterday:

"'I take it to be obvious that '*toutes les forces de terre et de mer*,' in Article I of the Agreement, includes all the forces of your Army, and thus also those in Asia.'

"Such are the ways that are open to us. I ask you to wire me your opinion on this matter fully and in precise terms."

To the Foreign Office.

"Norderney, Aug. 9, 1905.

"*Strictly Confidential.*

"His Majesty the Emperor has, by His Excellency General-Adjutant von Moltke, sent me a draft of a letter of His Highness to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, of which a copy is sent enclosed herewith. When he handed me this draft, General-Lieutenant von Moltke said to me that His Majesty the Emperor has not spoken to him or to anyone else of those with him, except von Tschirschky, about the Agreement before it was signed. Except His

Majesty and Herr von Tschirschky, no one on board the *Hohenzollern* had any idea of the possibility of an agreement with Russia or of its contents. General von Moltke admitted, without the least hesitation, that he regarded the addition '*en Europe*,' as essentially a source of weakness in the Agreement against which it seems that precautions must be taken, even without any regard to the obscure internal situation in Russia and her naval powerlessness. As to Herr von Tschirschky, General von Moltke asserted that he had made efforts to bar the addition of '*en Europe*,' but his remonstrances had not been successful.

"At the same time, General von Moltke disclosed to me, in the name of His Majesty the Emperor, that His Highness was deeply troubled by my offer of resignation. His Majesty did not understand why I wished to separate myself from him, seeing that he had the fullest confidence in me. His Majesty the Emperor could not believe that I would leave him in the lurch in his present difficult position. I replied that I had not asked His Majesty for my release from office out of any excessive idea of my own importance, or the mania for being in the right, or any wounded self-love, but because I am responsible to the German people for the conduct of our foreign policy.

"I could not bear this responsibility, if His Majesty, without asking my advice, introduces alterations of such far-reaching effect as the addition '*en Europe*' in a document so vitally important as this draft Agreement is. I remain in the service only so long as I can be helpful to the country. If this becomes impossible for me, I have to go. I must defer my final decision as to my offer of resignation until I have a personal interview with His Majesty the Emperor. This would also give me the opportunity of suggestions as to the opportuneness or otherwise of his letter to the Tsar.

"I ask you to examine as carefully as possible the annexed draft of a letter. The question is:

"(1) Whether the interpretation of Article I is now to be brought forward, or only dealt with later.

"(2) Whether the way suggested by His Majesty is the right one, or whether the suggestion would be better in the form adopted in the enclosed 'Proposal B.'

"I am inclining more and more to the opinion that the

Agreement should be allowed to become public only if it can be said in explanation of it that, in case of war, Russia is obviously pledged to an advance in Asia. For me it is doubtful if we shall get any positive result through Lamsdorff. The way of a letter from the Emperor seems to me in itself the better plan. Unless, indeed, it may be that Lamsdorff has throughout never believed that we would spontaneously and deliberately leave Asia out of the reckoning for Russia, and simply put forward an unaltered statement of the idea that in case of war Germany, as well as Russia, must take action on every front; but Germany, under the immediate menace of England against her coasts, and in presence of the unequal forces of the German and Russian Fleets, would not have to send any troops to Asia. It is a question—especially if the addition '*en Europe*' stands—if it would not be on many grounds advisable that the German-Russian Agreement should remain secret.

"I should like to hear as soon as possible your ideas on this matter.

"General von Moltke tells me also that at Björkö His Majesty spoke very earnestly to the Tsar, advising the early introduction of serious internal reforms (the *habeas corpus*, the transformation of Russia into a Constitutional State, etc.), and warned him against an inconsiderate prolongation of the war against the will of the country. Those about the Tsar were touchy on the subject of any extensive reforms, when such things were mentioned, optimistic and generally thick-skinned as to the internal situation in Russia, and thoroughly set on the continuation of the war. General von Moltke had, however, the impression that the Tsar now wants peace. The Tsar was in good humour, and looked well. He was evidently very pleased with His Majesty's visit, irritated against England, and disillusioned about France.

"PROPOSAL B.

"ALTERNATIVE DRAFT BY PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"According to German Constitutional Law, the agreement requires to be countersigned by the Chancellor of the Empire. I shall therefore have a copy of the Agreement

countersigned by von Bülow sent to you. I have informed the Chancellor, in this connection, that under the Agreement each of us has to act against a Power that attacks us anywhere in the world by land or sea where we can get at and inflict damage on the enemy, and I take it that I am in full agreement with yourself, as doubtless you will very kindly intimate to me.

"I regard it as obvious that the words '*toutes les forces de terre et de mer*,' in Article I of the Agreement, include all the forces of your Army."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"WILHELMSHÖHE, Aug. 11, 1905.

"My Dear Bülow,

"I have just received your letter, sent by messenger. After careful consideration, I am quite unable to see that the situation has become, through the words '*en Europe*,' so much more anxious and perilous for us than before that you have grounds for offering me your resignation. You have had from me the news of two events that even by themselves denote such an enormous advance on the past that they must be counted as of the highest value to us: (1) That His Majesty the Emperor has solemnly assured me that for Russia the Alsace-Lorraine question is *un incident clos*; (2) That he has given me his word for it that he will never enter into an agreement or an alliance with England against us. If Bismarck had succeeded in securing even one of these points from Alexander II or III he would have been beside himself with joy and would have had the congratulations of the entire people on having scored so great a success.

"These are two such weighty events that I believe they alone mean for our Fatherland a firmer safeguard than all agreements or other security for our rear.

"From my private letters to you, you will have seen what a serious, yes, even a sacred, thing for me is the welfare of my country, and how persuaded I was that I was in a position to bring you an important lightening of your heavy

task—and of this I am even now convinced—and that, above all else, I had it always in view to prepare the way for you and help you. Remember your parting words to me at Sassnitz: 'Oh, if it were only possible for you to meet the Tsar! It would rejoice me exceedingly; it would be the greatest blessing for both nations and for the world. You suggest it to him or ask him for it, then go in, and God be with you!' Now all this has happened; I thought I was working for you, and that I had accomplished something special. And then you send me a few cool lines and your resignation!!!

"Will you, my dear Bülow, please allow me to describe my state of mind to you? To be thus treated by the best and the most intimate friend I have—now that my poor Adolf is dead—without having given any sound reason whatever for it, this has been such a fearful shock to me that I am quite broken down and have to fear a serious nervous illness.

"You say that, thanks to the words '*en Europe*' in the Agreement, the situation has become so serious that you can take no responsibility for it. To whom? And in this same instant do you believe you justify yourself before God, in this anxious situation, now made more tense, for having left your Emperor and Master, to whom you swore fidelity, who has lavished upon you affection and honours, to face it alone, abandoning thus your Fatherland and, as I believed, your truest friend? No, dear Bülow, you will not inflict this upon us both. We are both called by God, and made for each other, to labour and work for our dear German Fatherland.

"Be it true—though I don't believe it—that through a mistake of mine the situation, as you hold, has become more serious, this has come about with the most entire good faith on my part! You must know me well enough to admit this. You personally are worth a hundred thousand times more to me and to our Fatherland than all the treaties in the world. I have at once taken steps with the Emperor so that these two words shall be modified or struck out! Do not forget that, *contrary to my own personal desires*, you sent me to Tangier in order to secure a success for your Morocco policy.

"Read over my telegrams before that visit to Tangier. You have yourself admitted to me that you were so anxious

about it that, when you got the news that I had started, you had some kind of nervous attack [*Weinkrampf*]. For your sake, as our Fatherland required it, I landed; despite the impediment to my horsemanship due to my crippled arm, I mounted a strange horse, and that horse might have brought me within a hair's breadth of *my life*—that was *your stake* in the game! I rode among a lot of Spanish anarchists, *because you wished all this*, and it was to help *your policy*. And now you want to let me go my way by myself, because you think my position looks serious—this after I have done all this for you, and, as I assuredly believe, much more!!

"But, Bülow, I have not deserved this of you! No, no, my friend, you are to remain in office and at my side, and you will go on still working with me, *ad majorem Germaniæ gloriam*. You are absolutely pledged to this by all I have accomplished this year; you cannot and dare not refuse me; if you did, all your own policy of this year would be disavowed by yourself. I would be for ever blamed for it! *I could not survive this*. Let me have a few days to rest and pull myself together before you come, for the nervous strain caused by your letter is great, and I am still in no condition for quietly discussing anything.

"Your true friend,

"WILLIAM I.R.

"P.S.—I appeal to your friendship for me to let me hear nothing more about your idea of resignation. Telegraph to me after this letter, 'All right,'[1] then I shall know you are staying on. For the morning after receiving your farewell visit of resignation *would not find the Emperor still living*! Think of my poor wife and children!—W."

MEMORANDUM.

"WILHELMSHÖHE, Aug. 18, 1905.

"*Strictly Secret.*

"His Majesty tells me that, as regards the Björkö Agreement, His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas has neither written

[1] The words "All right" are in English in the original.

nor telegraphed. His Majesty also quite agrees that as to the question of the interpretation or revision of Article I, nothing further can be done for the present. His Majesty also fully understands that, until a complete mutual Agreement as to this is secured, any publication of the Agreement is precluded by our political interests as well as by courtesy.

"On his own initiative His Majesty the Emperor gave me the following account of how the present Agreement was brought about: As soon as the two Sovereigns came together after their first meeting, the Tsar said to His Majesty the Emperor that he was deeply touched by His Majesty coming to visit him at the moment of his heaviest trials. His Majesty was the only one who understood his position and with whom he himself could speak freely. He wished always to go hand in hand with His Majesty; that was enjoined upon them both in the interest of monarchy. His Majesty the Emperor replied that he also was gladly prepared for such co-operation.

"Why had not the Tsar in the winter entered into an agreement that would have guaranteed this combined action? The Tsar answered that the difficulty had arisen from France. On many grounds Russia had need of France. Then, too, it was 'Dear Papa'[1] who had brought about the alliance between France and Russia. But Germany remained unfriendly towards France, as had been shown on various occasions. His Majesty replied that the relations between Germany and France had improved since the retirement of Delcassé; he himself desired a friendly attitude towards France. The Morocco question in particular had been for him a 'stepping-stone' towards preparing the way for better relations with France. He had no selfish views of any kind in Morocco. He would handle the Morocco question in a conciliatory and accommodating way and would certainly come to an understanding with France on the subject. The Tsar gave it as his opinion that, this being so, there was really nothing in the way of an Agreement between Russia and Germany. His Majesty the Emperor replied that he had the draft of such an Agreement with him. The Tsar was at once ready to sign it. When he signed the document, he kissed and embraced the Emperor with the words:

[1] "Dear Papa" in English in the original.

'I trust you; you are the only man in the world I entirely trust.'

"His Majesty also said to me that the Tsar was in a remarkably calm state of mind. He had no illusions as to the internal or the military situation of Russia, but showed great calmness and quite a dignified attitude. He said to His Majesty the Emperor that Russia was now in a situation very like that of Prussia after Jena and Tilsit; but, like Prussia, she would yet rejoice in 'a resurrection.' Everything now depended on showing patience and tenacity, and not losing confidence in the future.

"The Tsar was extremely embittered against England, and so were all those about him. From what the Tsar said, His Majesty had the impression that he wished for peace with Japan, and would like to establish intimate relations between Russia and Japan in the future. Amongst those about him also there was no sign whatever of hatred towards the Japanese, but rather of regret that Russia had been drawn into an armed conflict with these prickly Asiatics, instead of keeping friends with them.

"On the other hand, as to how the relations between the Tsar and Lamsdorff stand, His Majesty the Emperor could say nothing for certain when I asked him about this subject. All through the conversations the Tsar never named him."

To the Emperor William II.

"Norderney, Aug. 29, 1905.

"Most humble and hearty thanks for your gracious message. I think that this would be the moment to send a telegram (not in cipher) to the President, congratulating him on his success, and thanking him for the great service he has rendered to humanity by preparing the way for the peace.

"Your Majesty will be a better judge than myself as to whether it would not be advisable that Your Majesty should send a private, ciphered, telegram to His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas, expressing your conviction that this

conclusion of peace is an honourable one, for which we have equally to thank Russian valour and the firmness of the Tsar."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"ROMINTEN, Sept. 25, 1905.

"The Tsar informs me that he has no objection to my initiating Witte into a knowledge of the Agreement; I know nothing against this. It should be communicated only to Count Lamsdorff and the Ministers of War and of the Navy, as well as the Tsar's brother.

"I shall therefore personally make the communication to Witte; do not let him know anything of it from yourself directly or from the Foreign Office. Many good wishes; fine weather here, and five stags, but no big ones.

"WILLIAM I.R."

TO THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

"BERLIN, Sept. 25, 1905.

"I have received with most respectful thanks Your Majesty's most gracious telegram. I had this morning a two hours' conversation with Witte. It is clear that he has very strong anti-English feelings. He told me that at Paris he had succeeded in preventing, at the last moment, an Anglo-French Russian loan, patronized by Beckendorff and Nelidoff. He had convinced Rouvier that such a loan would mean a 'point' against Germany and thus would not be in accord with French interests. Loubet has told him that he knew nothing of this scheme, otherwise he would have blocked it. The President has also assured him on his word of honour that he is not in favour of any kind of secret arrangement between France and England. Witte considers the Anglo-Japanese Treaty damaging for Russia.

Besides, he is angry at England having linked the communication of this Treaty to St. Petersburg with the announcement that the English market was open for Russian bonds to the amount of ten millions sterling, a concession that England would soon have made worthless by turning the bonds over to France and Germany.

"Witte's view of the situation may be summed up as follows: If Continental Europe does not stand together against England she will eventually secure the mastery of the world. England lives on the conflicts and divisions of others. In the first place, therefore, Germany, Russia and France must stand together; as soon as these are united the rest of Europe and America also will be with them. I replied to Witte that Your Majesty's policy was directed to this same object. Your Majesty wished for co-operation with Russia, and this not merely out of common dynastic interests, but also because it was to the interest both of Germany and Russia that the whole world should not become English.

"England has long been seeking, with all manner of intrigues, to divide Germany from Russia, but in this she will not succeed. Your Majesty stands firmly by Russia. For France Your Majesty has always had a conciliatory feeling, and will show this all the more, the more France sets herself free from the English, and the less she allows England to push her forward against us.

"In accordance with Your Majesty's desire, I have said nothing to Witte about the Agreement of Björkö. So far his view is that the ground for alliances must be still further cleared. When Your Majesty communicates the Agreement to him Your Highness might perhaps say to him, in this connection, that with it the foundation has been laid on which the house may now be erected. It has now come to the point when we have gradually to win France to co-operation with Germany and Russia. For this purpose it is also especially important that the Russian Ambassadors in Paris and London should be instructed in future to promote and support co-operation between Germany, France, and Russia, and not between England and France.

"Witte asked that we should make further friendly advances towards France on the Morocco question, and this I promised him. I think that in the next few days we shall finally be at one with France on this.

"I believe that Witte would be very grateful if Your Majesty, after your interview with him, would telegraph to the Tsar that Witte can communicate to the Tsar whatever Your Majesty has told him. Witte fears that otherwise the Tsar may not give him any opportunity for a talk with him about the European situation and the alliance question.

"This will be useful, for there will also be attempts to influence the Tsar in an English sense. Possibly Your Majesty will also consider this the time to telegraph to the Emperor Nicholas that Count Alvensleben is ill and tired out, and that Your Majesty proposes to send Schoen from Copenhagen as his successor—a man whom Your Majesty knows to be loyal, level-headed and conciliatory, and who has Your Highness's confidence."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"ROMINTEN, Sept. 27, 1905.

"The interview has passed off with a success beyond all expectations. Witte was surprisingly open and candid. He gave me an account of America. There, at first, he found everyone, from the President downwards, pro-Japanese. But, nevertheless, by receiving and influencing hundreds of reporters, he soon succeeded in converting everyone, high and low, and making them pro-Russian. The President, as well as the people, has by this time recognized and taken account of the Japanese peril in the future. The Americans have more of the 'colour' and 'race' feeling than the English. These latter have made a stupid mistake with this Japanese Alliance.

"It amounts to a direct box on the ear and provocation to Russia, and at the same time a strengthening of English predominance in all Asia to the serious disadvantage of every other people.

"Nevertheless, in the very despatch of Lord Lansdowne giving information of the treaty, which is admittedly directed against Russia, England has added an offer as to the grant of ten million pounds sterling by means of an

Anglo-French loan! 'Adding insult to injury'! Then he told me of the affair of the loan, which you know. In this connection he turned to France and spoke more fully of the necessity and also the advantage of an 'Entente,' later to be a triple alliance, between Russia, Germany, and France. The Continent must act in close union, and the greater and lesser European States would, *ipso facto* of themselves, join up with this group, and America would come with them. Then England would soon find herself standing in isolation, and would finally realize that she could no longer, with her everlasting incitements, lies, and intrigues, play off one Power against another to her own advantage, no longer gain her ends, nor find servile nations to fight her quarrels.

"He became very angry about Nelidoff, who never troubled himself about Radolin, who, for his part, unfortunately, did not keep in touch with him, despite the fact that he had distinct orders to do so. Witte was still wilder about Beckendorff, whom he describes as '*le chambellan du Roi Edouard mais pas le gérant russe de sa politique de sa Majesté l'Empereur.*' He would like to break his neck!

"Morocco, he hoped, would finally be satisfactorily settled. He had got on well with both sides in Paris. Radolin and Rouvier were practically agreed already, only Rosen was insisting on some questions of mere form, that were really superfluous.

"Rouvier is willing to conform entirely to our proposals as to police questions, but wishes to have these dictated by *the Conference*, and not by *us*. His position in Parliament would be imperilled if now—before the Conference—he came to it with a solution insisted upon by us. On the other hand, if the Conference were already met, and resolved these matters according to our wishes, he could then tell the Deputies that it was settled according to the will of the united Conference of all the Powers, and then they would accept it. Personally, he is in complete agreement with our proposal. To carry it into effect, all he asks for is consideration for his Parliamentary position. I consider this quite intelligible, and desire that Radolin and Rosen should be directed accordingly. France must now be kindly addressed and friendship shown to her, to 'save her face,' so that no rancour may remain and the turning movement be completed that will bring her into our confederacy.

"After he had thus, speaking with warmth, completed his dissertation on the possibilities and hopes of the new triple alliance, I told him of my correspondence with His Majesty and Roosevelt about the peace. Then I described Björkö to him, with my impressions of His Majesty and those about him. Then, with His Majesty's consent, I informed him of the completion there of the league that would correspond to his ideas and wishes. The effect was striking; tears stood in his eyes, and he was hardly able to find words in his excitement and emotion. At last he exclaimed: '*Dieu soit loué! Dieu merci! A la fin cet infâme cauchemar qui pesait sur nous, nous est pris!*' And then he told me of unheard-of webs of intrigue that were spun against Germany at the Court; of the drive against me from Copenhagen; of the war party; above all, the part played by the Montenegrin princess, and especially by the Prince of Montenegro. He had in his possession a heap of letters from the old scoundrel and sharper, addressed to Alexander III and Nicholas II, all overflowing with slanders against Germany, and in which, in the most shameless way, he urged them on to war against us. I laughed aloud at the thought that the old robber-chief got the Order of the Black Eagle from me when in Berlin; he made out that Russia was dismissed by him in my favour; and asked me to take his son into my Army! The scoundrel!

"As concerns our agreement, I suggested to Witte that next, in order to win over France and gradually prepare the world for this tremendous event, the German and Russian Ambassadors should receive the like instructions, to the effect that inasmuch as the war had drawn the relations of the two Sovereigns closer together, and had brought into relief the common interests of both nations, it was the desire of both monarchs also to give an impression of this fact abroad. The Ambassadors were therefore to enter into regular intercourse with each other, and deal with all questions of general political interest in common from the same standpoint, special purely Russian or purely German questions being naturally excepted. This way of proceeding would soon make it plain to thoughtful men all the world over, and especially in France, that between us matters were on a different basis from before; then the consequences of the 'changed constellation of political affairs' would be deduced, and would be reckoned with. Thus France would gradually see that

it was more to her interest to join up with this strong group than to go hunting after an ephemeral *Entente Cordiale* with England, and then the moment would arrive when one might decide with confidence to propose their coming into the alliance. Till then it must under all circumstances remain a secret.

"I have got him to agree in every way with us, and he will inform Lamsdorff accordingly. Later, after dinner, Witte once more expressed to me his extreme pleasure about Björkö, and assured me that all day he had been thinking of nothing else. I never ventured to hope for such results. He is returning home set up, with his heart lightened of a ton weight burden, and will stake everything on using this splendid foundation for building a good edifice upon it. He takes with him a letter to His Majesty, in which I suggest these identical instructions for our Ambassadors."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"GLÜCKSBURG, Oct. 12, 1905.

"My Dear Bülow,

"Enclosed is a letter from the Tsar forwarded to me by Count Lamsdorff. It is a reply to the short letter which Witte took with him, in which I said flattering things about Witte and gave a summary of our conversation.

"It is clear that he is anxious about the connection with France. But there is no hurry about it, and all this can be smoothed over and settled down only by patience, equanimity, and courteous consideration. The Tsar wants alterations in view of some contingencies, especially with regard to France. He seems to feel himself hampered by some obligations of his father that might not be quite clear to him—at least, he acts as if it were so.

"My reply, sent in my personal cipher, is enclosed. I have declared myself ready to receive his suggested alterations for consideration; we can make our counter-proposals and include in these alterations such as seem to him desirable. But I have told the plain truth to the Tsar in order to show

him that to some extent there are *obligations* in our regard also, founded on our attitude during the war, and that these ought not to be blown away out of consideration for the French. But, after all, his connection with them is not in any way affected, provided it does not now—as formerly—imply a direct point against us. He must now stand by the flagstaff and show his colours.

"Our holiday here is being spent happily and pleasantly in most glorious weather in an old historic castle beside the beautiful and romantic fiord. It has been made all the better by the betrothal of my good and excellent Eitel Fritz with the pretty Oldenburg lady, who looks most distinguished, and together they make a splendid pair. May the Lord be with them both with His most abundant blessing!

"Bright little Arthur of Connaught was here again, as well as Teck and Lord Clarendon, Chief Master of Ceremonies to His Majesty. Our intercourse with them was quite free and comradelike. They were all under the unpleasant impression caused by the *Matin* article, and depressed at the idea that anyone should imagine them to be capable of such a treachery in peace time! As honourable gentlemen they have felt it keenly, and energetically denied the possibility of such an eventuality. His Majesty sent me by Arthur a carved walking-stick from Balmoral, with a message that it was very unfortunate that my son had not come there, for he would have had a distinguished 'reception'! I replied that 'I had not a moment's doubt about this, but *first the father, then the son!*' He smiled, but he understood me.

"Ballin has been talking to me; Beit was with him lately. He (Beit) is the great speculator and Stock Exchange jobber of the City. He takes care of all the speculations of His Majesty, who must be almost a partner in his transactions. He must be always providing His Majesty with heaps of gold, of which he is always in need. One may say 'he runs the King.'[1] Ballin asked whence came all the strife, ill-humour and hatred against us in England, and what was the attitude of the City towards it. Beit replied that the City did not want to have anything to do with it, stood fast for good relations with us, and did not trouble about the crazy Jingo Press. . . .

"His reason for saying this was what he and many others

[1] In English in the original.

in His Majesty's circle and among the initiated had often heard His Majesty declare. He (His Majesty) was resolved *coûte que coûte* to bring about the realization of Chamberlain's plans regarding protective duties and the union of the Motherland with the Colonies against the rest of the world.

"He knew quite well that I had openly declared that 'in case of England introducing protective tariffs, that would be a blow to Germany's trade, which was the very apple of my eye; and that immediately that was threatened I would draw the sword and fall upon England!!!' His Majesty, therefore, must arm against such an *attack*, concentrate his ships from all parts of the world in his home seas, so as to be equipped against the avenging blow of his angered nephew!! The two chief instigators who confirm His Majesty in this awful idiocy are said to be his two evil spirits: (1) Sir John Fisher, First Naval Lord of the Admiralty—his *alter ego*, Admiral May, a personage in highest favour at Court, is now at Gibraltar in command of the Channel Fleet; (2) Mr. Chamberlain himself. His Majesty and Chamberlain, also, are *old gentlemen*, anxious before the end to do something quite astounding that will make the world talk of them, bursting with envy of German progress and the success of *the young people*—namely, you and me.

"As Beit has access to the inner circle of His Majesty, Ballin went thoroughly into all this with him, showed him plainly the absurdity of all these ideas, and authorized him, on the ground of his personal knowledge of my view of world policy, to make plain to the King the absolute baselessness of all this, and the awful error in which he is involved. He also urged him henceforth to influence His Majesty in the direction of an understanding with me, and a trustful co-operation with Germany. Beit promised to act in this sense.

"Another well-known man from London, with whom I soon afterwards spoke, confirmed by what he told me these assertions of Beit. Commercial circles and the City are firmly of opinion that they would lose as much as we would by a conflict with us, and are absolutely opposed to it. It is only the Court that is quite terribly anti-German. . . . Unfortunately there could be no hope of improvement in the near future unless there was also a radical change on the German side. To my question, 'How and in what respect?' he gave me after some hesitation the short and terse reply,

'By a change in the representative of Germany—in short, the Ambassador'! When I, very much astonished, remarked that I believed we had precisely the right man there, my friend laughed out loud. He was the most thoroughly unpractical man we could ever have had in London, he declared. I may point out that my informant has no position in the Government service, but is a free man, who has an open mind and a clear judgment, and he simply took the opportunity of bringing to my knowledge the outcome of his actual experience, for he is also very interested in the improvement of the relations between Berlin and London.

"Your communication as to Stamboul does not at all please me. Marschall must just push on and bring about an alliance with the Effendis. Nothing is done by delaying and everlastingly hanging around. He must take the English or the Russians for his model. Thanks to me, he stands in a good position with the Effendis, and this must now be turned to use and advantage in *majorem Germaniæ gloriam*. Count Schweinitz's report on his journey will have shown your Excellency how comfortably the Embassy carries out its business in Asia Minor. Marschall must really be taken to task.

"With best greetings to the ladies; I regret to have made such a lengthy claim upon your time, but I believe my information will interest you. With many good wishes.

"Your faithful and grateful,

"WILLIAM I.R."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"LIEBENBERG (MARK), Oct. 17, 1905.

"When Witte left Rominten he asked me if he might later, from time to time, privately and unofficially, send me accounts of his impressions at Petersburg, which might serve to facilitate my proceedings in relation to His Majesty the Emperor. I suggested to him that he might write to Phili Eulenburg,[1]

[1] Prince Philipp zu Eulenburg, who for some years was the Emperor's most intimate friend and adviser. In 1908, owing to accusations brought against him, he withdrew into private life.

who had received him and had several conversations with him. Enclosed is the first letter of Witte to Phili, forwarded by him to me, which is of interest as a contrast to the Tsar's telegram. It shows a difference of view between him and Lamsdorff, and a dislike on the part of the latter for the agreement, which he seems to wish to have altered. Now we shall receive the proposals from him. When you have read the enclosed please send it back to Phili.

"Monaco has brought favourable news from his acquaintances. Rouvier has clearly recognized the object in view; he has all sensible Frenchmen at his back and has been essentially strengthened in his position by Delcassé's revelations. He asks for friendly considerateness on our side in connection with his task in Parliament. For the rest, we can trust ourselves to him, and we need not be disturbed if now, for the moment, a marked drift of friendliness towards England is noticeable in France. She has some ground for vexation in the success of our banks and as to the construction of the new breakwater at Tangier, which the French public takes to be an extra advantage to our side, and an unfair proceeding. They do not know that the arrangements for this were already completed before we took any part in the negotiation, as the Conference realized, and it was already all settled before my visit to Tangier. But Rouvier knows this, and sees in the affair no covert design on our part. The wish to come to an arrangement for a definite *modus vivendi* with us may be near at hand in France, and would, with time and the advance of peaceful feeling in the nation, become more and more evident.

"It is raining cats and dogs here as if it had never so rained before. Many greetings to your people and to the Baden notabilities.

"Your true friend,

"William I.R."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Nov. 13, 1905.

"In pursuance of Your Imperial and Royal Majesty's most gracious instructions to me, not to let us be excluded

from such steps in the Balkan question as were being taken by Austria-Hungary and Russia, I communicated the assent of Your Majesty's Government to the programme of an international financial control for Macedonia, proposed by the above-named Powers, in the May of this year. The contents of this programme are set forth in outline in an enclosed copy of the Note of the Ambassadors at Constantinople to the Porte on the 8th of this same month. The arrangements provided in this programme appear to be throughout acceptable from the Turkish standpoint, and have already obtained the consent of all the other Powers concerned.

"Nevertheless, from the outset the Porte has opposed the Finance programme, as seeing in it an encroachment on the sovereign rights of the Sultan. After the efforts of the Ambassadors to dissuade the Turkish Government from this opinion had utterly failed, the great Powers decided that their representatives at Constantinople should ask for a collective audience with the Sultan, in order personally to induce His Majesty to accept the programme. To a collective Note addressed by the Ambassadors to the Porte, in pursuance of this decision, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he was not in a position to proceed further with regard to the request for an audience with the Sultan. Meanwhile, by my direction, Your Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople had repeatedly called the attention of the Sultan and the Turkish Government to the seriousness of the situation, but always without any result.

"As so far the means of bringing Turkey in an amicable way to consent to the wishes of the great Powers seemed to be exhausted, Austria-Hungary and Russia approached the other Powers with an invitation to a naval demonstration in Turkish waters. Their programme for the demonstration came briefly to this, that each Power should be represented by one large ship and one smaller one of high speed; that the squadron thus got together should assemble at the Piræus, and after three days' warning go to Mitylene to seize the customs house and telegraph station there. If, after staying there eight days, no submission on the part of the Porte resulted, the same procedure was to be kept in view at Lemnos and Tenedos. In the hope that the Porte would even yet at the last moment, of its own accord, be ready to accept the Finance plan, Your Majesty's Government had meanwhile sent

a noncommittal reply to the Austro-Russian invitation. But as, according to more recent information from Baron von Marschall, we can no longer, for the time being, count upon any submission of the Turkish Government, we must now—according to my most respectful opinion—follow in principle the example of the other Powers, so as not to incur the suspicion of Europe that we are looking after separate interests of our own in Turkey. On the other hand, we may be able to limit ourselves merely to showing our flag with the naval demonstration in case it is actually carried into effect.

"I venture, therefore, to ask Your Imperial and Royal Majesty most respectfully for your gracious authorization that we shall accept the invitation of Austro-Hungary and Russia to the naval demonstration and accordingly Your Majesty's Special Service ship, the *Loreley*, now at Constantinople, shall be sent to take part in the proceedings."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"NEW PALACE, NOV. 26, 1905.

"Dear Bulow,

"I send you the letter which reached me this morning from the Tsar. He has, after all, decided to come out of his kennel [*aus dem Bau herauszukommen*]. The annexed 'Declaration' is a direct annulment of the Agreement, in case of a war with France. There is thus a return to the former *status quo*. This becomes still more interesting if one has previously read his warnings about complications in Morocco. He seems to suggest that the French are still cherishing desires for war—probably further instigated by Chamberlain—and that conflicts are possible. It is, of course, remarkable that he does not say that these can result only from a combination *à deux*—Anglo-French—and all the same he holds by his connection with France. Thereby, without more ado, he would become one of the allies of England. Thus *practically* the *military* coalition *à trois* is established. I do not precisely know whether he realizes this.

"Anyhow, he is not well informed, for Tattenbach has long since taken his departure, and everything there is going on quietly. It looks as if France has compelled him to exert some pressure on us. Hence the somewhat fatherly, but still almost threatening, admonition about Morocco.

"The *English* are making every effort *to prevent* us from coming to a friendly attitude with France and bringing the two countries closer together. *The Russians*—after His Majesty had solemnly undertaken to promote the union of France with us—*are refusing their co-operation* under the plea of its difficulties being too great. We must therefore take matters in hand ourselves, and, relying on our clear conscience and good purpose, try to accomplish the serious task of winning over France.

"There has been sent to me from South Germany a pamphlet dealing with this subject, which was published a few days ago and has been circulated in thousands throughout the country. The pamphlet is forcibly and logically plain-spoken, and will be quite intelligible to the general public. I do not as yet know who the author is.

"The attempt of the Tsar to make it clear to me that he must stand as loyally by his father's signature to the Dual Alliance as to his own signature at Björkö is a good illustration of those words of Scripture, 'No man can serve two masters; he will accept the one and despise the other.' We evidently are to be this 'other.' For the 'Declaration' is a reply to my desire expressed in the cipher message that he should safeguard me against *attacks* and warlike tendencies on the part of his ally in union with England, or some other State. This he coolly puts aside, and, on the other hand, he appeals to 'his treaty relations' with some 'Bushranger' or other who may happen to attack us!

"This is rather poor thanks for our attitude during the last year, and rather reminds one of Butler's words, '*Dank vom Hause Österreich*'![1] ['Thanks from the House of Austria'!]

"When Lamsdorff disappeared, that was no great misfortune! As France will never attack us single-handed, but only in union with England and urged on by her, so in case of a war of ours with England, in which we must deal with France, the Tsar would at once take shelter behind the 'Declaration,'

[1] A familiar quotation from Schiller's "Wallenstein."

and rush to the aid of the two Powers. So there is the Coalition *de facto*! Well, King Edward has handled it cleverly. Now the land forces of France are completely at his disposal.

"The hunting on the Göhrde was splendid, in good weather. I sincerely wish things may take a much better turn.

"WILLIAM I.R."

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THE YEAR 1906

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THE YEAR 1906

NOTE.

The most notable incident touched upon in the following brief section was the meeting between the Kaiser and King Edward, on August 6, at Friedrichshof. The measure in which King Edward influenced European events during this period is a subject on which even English students of history disagree greatly. It may be of interest here to cite the views of Mr. H. Wickham Steed, as given in his well-known book "Through Thirty Years: 1892-1922" (Heinemann). In 1906 Mr. Wickham Steed was *Times* correspondent at Vienna. He used to have frequent talks with King Edward during the latter's annual "cure" at Marienbad. In Chapter VII of his first volume, "The Beginnings of Trouble, 1906-1908," he writes as follows:

Journalists who look upon their work as a public trust cannot allow feelings of deference to dull their critical faculty when they approach eminent men. Towards King Edward I felt dutiful loyalty as an Englishman; but, as a journalist, my mind was open. He was the recognized leader of Europe. Whither was he leading her? To some, the turn he had given to European affairs since his accession seemed statesmanship of the first order. To others, including not a few public men in England, he appeared to be an amateur diplomatist the more dangerous because he wore the British Crown. Which was the truer view? As I reflected upon my first talk with him and analyzed my impressions rather than his actual words, the reasons for his leadership and for the disquietude it had aroused became clearer. He was strongly magnetic—an essential quality in a leader; but his mind moved with a swiftness that could hardly fail to disconcert the slow-thinking among his advisers who would also be likely to find his frankness startling and his directness of purpose uncomfortable. Moreover, he accepted and even appeared to welcome contradiction—a rare trait in a Sovereign. In any case, an uncommon man and a big man, I thought. Later experience convinced me that the chief secret of his power really lay in his goodness of heart and honesty of intention. He wished well to the world. While loving England with the encompassing affection that only those can feel who have looked upon England from without and know what she has meant and may mean to foreign peoples, he held her noble among the nations and desired her never to forget that *noblesse oblige*. There was in him no antecedent enmity towards any foreign country, though he could feel fierce resentment against persons who deliberately misrepresented

or sought perversely to thwart him. His purpose was to keep the peace. From it he never swerved. The notion that he wished to " hem Germany in," to surround her with a ring of hostile States, was either ignorant or malicious; but he knew, from long and intimate experience, how devious were German paths and what pitfalls might await the feet that trod them guilelessly.

V

THE YEAR 1906

To Count von Metternich,
Ambassador in London.

"Berlin, Jan. 9, 1906.

"You will have already seen by my Telegram No. 7 that your remarks regarding Sir Edward Grey in connection with the Morocco question are thoroughly in accord with the standpoint of the Imperial Government.

"Our policy as to Morocco throughout is no attempt to break up the Anglo-French *Entente*. The whole Morocco question generally is not of such exceeding importance that we should make it specially a question of our prestige. We have the sincere desire, while respecting our own dignity as well as that of France, so to come out of the Morocco Conference that there shall be as its result neither victor nor vanquished. There is proof of our conciliatory state of mind not only in the attitude of our official Press but also in our lately published White Book, which we were only induced to publish on account of the issue of the one-sided French Yellow Book. In all this our attitude has been the avoidance of anything aggressive or embittered against the French Government, an effort on our part which has been recognized even by the French Press, so far as its statements are known to me.

"There is an indication of some anxiety in English circles in a step taken by Baron Alfred Rothschild with the banker Paul Schwabach of this city. Rothschild sets out with the opinion that, for the moment, the political horizon, if not darker, is yet overcast, and he thinks the new English Government would like nothing better than improved relations between Germany and France as well as between

Germany and England, and that nothing would more contribute to a *rapprochement* between the two latter countries than a consolidation of the relations between the two former. Rothschild considers this a specially favourable opportunity for a joint effort of Germany and England in this direction with a common purpose, and he appears to be certain that the French would be pleased at an Anglo-German *rapprochement*, provided account were taken of their own feelings and their interests safeguarded. Rothschild asked if the Imperial Government had any message for the British Government or wished for any kind of explanations from the latter.

"I have at once informed Rothschild, through Schwabach, that I am quite ready to communicate to him, in the most trustful way, and with full confidence in his friendly intentions towards us, my views on the present situation. In this, however, the assumption is that a solution is being sought for, in which not only 'the interests of the French are safeguarded,' but also the interests of all the States that are carrying on business in Morocco will be taken into just consideration, and German interests are identical with these.

"I am still expecting Rothschild's views in reply. I want to have your opinion at once in view of your coming departure.

"Very likely you will see who is hidden behind Rothschild, and probably, like me, you will take it to be useful that you yourself, before your departure, should go to see Rothschild and discuss the situation with him according to my view. I shall be quite satisfied with this. Or would it be more advisable to make further use of Schwabach as an intermediary?"

To General-Lieutenant von Moltke,
Chief of the Army General Staff.

"Berlin, Jan. 24, 1906.

"I heartily thank Your Excellency for the very interesting communication of the 23rd of this month concerning the position of France in the event of a war. Last June, at the time of Delcassé's resignation, the French newspapers of the

Nationalist type openly declared that under the Democratic-Socialistic régime of the time, and especially thanks to the Minister of War, André, France had been gradually made defenceless. I therefore consider the subsequent armaments of France as mainly a measure of internal policy. The Rouvier Cabinet want to preclude a repetition of accusations like these.

" For the question of war or peace, France's own armaments in the near future are less of an influence than the prospects of armed support from another great Power in the event of war. If the Morocco Conference comes to an end without any result, then according to international law the *status quo ante*, as it is sanctioned by the Treaty of Madrid, remains in force. And here comes in the possibility that France might seek to secure her claims by herself, and, sword in hand, attempt the conquest of Morocco. The present Government of France will only venture upon such a far-reaching and perilous undertaking if—now that Russia, even with the best of will, is hardly in a condition to come to her help—she feels quite sure of England's support by sea and land.

" That the former English Government aroused her hopes in this direction we already knew even before M. Delcassé's revelations. But the present English Government has learned from the elections that the great majority of the English people do not want to pay any more war expenses, besides having enough of them from the Boer War. It is not to be left out of account that disastrous French defeats—given the case of Morocco not being left isolated in the war—might inspire the English people with a will for war ; but in view of the present unwillingness it will not be easy for France to venture on war with Morocco ; rather will her policy be given a conciliatory direction at the Conference.

" The Prime Minister, Rouvier, has expressly given us the assurance, even if only verbally, that France asks for no general mandate for herself. Meanwhile it is an open secret that the French Government has suggested to various Cabinets that they, on their part, might propose a general mandate for France. Not one of them has so far been found prepared for this. On the contrary, several Powers have already let it be known that they would consider a French general mandate as a danger for all non-French business interests. As I have

already remarked, the most important point will be the position assumed by the English Government. The new Cabinet declares 'that it cannot withdraw from the fulfilment of its treaty obligations.' But these are exclusively of a diplomatic character. Article 9 of the Anglo-French Morocco Treaty sets forth 'that both Governments will guarantee mutual diplomatic support for the execution of the treaty.' But in case the general mandate is not to be obtained by diplomatic means, the French would not undertake anything further without a certainty that England was protecting their rear with her Fleet and Army. An enquiry in London to make this point quite clear would certainly precede any warlike action of France against Morocco.

"I consider it to be unlikely, after the results of the English elections, that a consenting reply would be given on the English side. I feel confirmed in this opinion through hearing within the last few days that King Edward had spoken in a peaceful sense to a political personage who was setting out for Algeciras, and had expressed the wish to hear of the friendly settlement of the matters in hand. As we know, King Edward was not always of this opinion, but he has a keen instinct for English public opinion. A word of peaceful advice from him will also be very effective in Paris. I believe that under these circumstances I can give my opinion for the probability of a satisfactory result of the Conference —that is to say, no French general mandate and the continued maintenance of the 'Open Door.'

"Should any dark points arise later I shall not fail immediately to call Your Excellency's attention to them, and I shall be grateful if you, on your part, will let me know of any important military news. . . ."

MEMORANDUM.

"BERLIN, Jan. 25, 1906

"The English Ambassador told me yesterday evening, after a dinner at his house, that he had received a private telegram from the Hon. Sidney R. Greville, Lord-in-Waiting to King Edward, and a trusted friend of the King, according to which King Edward had made 'overtures that deserved

[*E.N.A.*

M. Isvolsky.

p. 198

attention' on the subject of his exalted relations with his Imperial nephew. The Ambassador added in this connection: 'The King is really now full of the wish to get back to better relations with the German Emperor. He has no intention of disputing as to who was right or who was wrong in any of the various points on which they have differed. Recriminations lead to nowhere. *Rechthaberei* [1] is of evil origin. With a spirit of conciliation, with good will, and, above all, with tact on both sides, as matters now stand a satisfactory situation might be established between the two monarchs. It would be great good fortune if the injurious and mischievous personal friction between the two Princes could be eliminated from the important political relations between the two countries.'

"In connection with this, Sir Frank came to talk about these political relations. He has got through some difficult years here. The misunderstandings on both sides had gradually reached such a height that at last he was almost doubting if there could be any good way out. The attitude of German public opinion during the Boer War had made a deep impression on England. On the other hand, the Englishman was resentful and, once offended, very difficult to smooth down again. Granted that the English people may also on its side have given bitter and exaggerated expression to feeling against Germany prompted by other circumstances, incidents and reasons. But he was convinced that the maximum point of the misunderstanding, ill-feeling and danger had gone by some weeks, or rather a few months, ago. He again saw land ahead, at which he was heartily glad, for he would regard a lasting division and an irreconcilable attitude between Germany and England as a great misfortune, not only because as English Ambassador at Berlin he was in duty bound to foster friendship between the two peoples, but also from the standpoint of his whole ideal of politics, of which I knew for the last thirty years.

"The only obstacle (he thought) which still stood in the way of a gradual but certain *rapprochement* between Germany and England was the Morocco question. Unfortunately much mutual distrust still existed in Berlin, in London, and in Paris. I might rely upon it that Sir Edward Grey desired not

[1] The habit of insisting that one is in the right. A word often used in Germany.

to embitter Germany and France against each other, but to bring about a *détente* between Germany and France. The present English Ministry wished not for war but for peace. But on the Morocco question they could not leave France in the lurch. The whole of the English people, Liberals as well as Conservatives, did not want to let the 'Entente Cordiale' be imperilled. In this connection the political interest that all England had in the Entente was linked with very marked motives of sentiment.

"The English people also would not consider it 'fair' to let France go empty-handed out of Morocco, in which she had secured such important concessions. If the Morocco question could only be settled in some sort of a conciliatory way, and thus the normal peaceful and quiet *modus vivendi* of the past established, there would of itself come about, more quickly than seemed possible to many people, a reconciliation and mutual understanding between the English and the German peoples. The Ambassador spoke with great earnestness, but with sincerity and a conviction of the correctness of his ideas.

"While Sir Frank was speaking to me a telegram from the English representative at Algeciras to Sir Edward Grey was brought to him, which Grey had at once wired to him 'for his personal information.' Although he was not expressly empowered to do so, Sir Frank quite confidentially gave me the telegram to read.

"It dealt with four points. (1) It appears that the German delegates at Algeciras showed no inclination to enter into a direct exchange of ideas with their French colleagues on the more important points of difference. (2) It seems also as if they had no wish to let others act as intermediaries between them and their French colleagues. (3) It seems as if they wanted the French delegates to put the French standpoint with reference to the more important points in dispute before the Conference without any previous private discussion. (4) The German delegates seem to be unwilling to make concessions to France in the region of finance in return for the renunciation of a general mandate. I replied that as to (1), I did not believe that our delegates were deliberately declining friendly discussion with their French colleagues; as to (2), I believed that the mediation of third parties—English, Italians, Americans—would not be rejected by our delegates; as to (3), I did

not believe that our delegates wanted to drive France into a tight place in the way suggested; as to (4), on technical questions of detail I could not very well make a statement, as we had given our delegates a free hand in this direction. But as to this I could thus summarize the instructions that our delegates had been given—a peaceful solution of the questions in dispute in Morocco without prejudice to the rights, interests, and honour of either one or the other party concerned, and for this purpose the utmost possible spirit of conciliation so far as our position would admit, our aim being only the 'Open Door' under permanent and honourable conditions, and equality in matters of trade for the Powers that had interests in Morocco.

"Speaking freely, and even in quite a confidential way, Sir Frank remarked that M. Revoil had been described to him as a man who would try to gain as much as possible, and for this end would at first put forward large claims, but if dealt with in a tactful and friendly way could be won over to a compromise. The French were not thinking of attacking us. They had also no wish whatever to let matters come to a war with us. But for every French Government there was a line of dignity, prestige, and sentiment beyond which they could not let themselves be pushed unless they wished to be driven from power. And just now, in view of the coming general elections in France, to remain at the helm was for the time being a matter of life and death for those who now held it."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"FRIEDRICHSHOF, Aug. 16, 1906.

"My interview with King Edward has come off to my complete satisfaction. The King was evidently in good spirits and felt very well here. As regards politics, the King, of his own accord, at once led the conversation to Russia, about whose internal conditions he seemed very anxious. I was pleased to have his statement that he had himself twice written personally to the Tsar giving him advice in a Liberal

sense, and it was clear he was not very favourably impressed by the fact that he had received no reply to either of these letters. He had certainly expected a better result of his intervention.

"Then the King went on to lament the lack of seriousness in Austro-Hungary and the general conditions there. The Emperor, he thought, was weak and had no longer his former energy with which to face the subversive elements in the country. On this, I turned our conversation, amongst other matters, to Count Albert Apponyi, whose policy I judged to be hardly satisfactory, verging on disloyalty. On this, the King interrupted me and expressed the opinion that he was altogether a visionary, and that I might well say that he intoxicated himself with his own talk, yet in other ways he was a clever and accomplished man. From the tone and manner in which the King spoke, one might gather that the Count is to be regarded as a factor for English policy in Hungary, on whom it might be well to keep a sharp eye. He went on to speak of the possibility that the Archduke Francis, after the Emperor's death, would free himself from his sworn undertaking not to raise his wife to the rank of Empress, and said that in that case it would be most judicious for us to recognize the Countess Hohenberg as Empress. One must regard the matter as an internal affair of Austria. I fully agreed with His Majesty, and found him entirely of the view that we both, and the other great Courts of Europe, should act on a common understanding in such a contingency.

"William I.R."

VI

THE YEAR 1907

VI

THE YEAR 1907

NOTE.

In this section and in the next the subject of Austria is much to the fore and the diamond-cut-diamond intrigues of Isvolsky and Aehrenthal. Here the glimpses into the course of European politics are very fitful and somewhat baffling. To make much of them one needs to have by one some such book as Dr. G. P. Gooch's " History of Modern Europe " or Mr. Wickham Steed's " Through Thirty Years." In the chapter of this work already cited (on p. 193) Mr. Steed describes most interestingly the scheme for a Quadruple Entente, of which Aehrenthal was the principal author. The following passage will throw some light on the situation in Germany, Russia, and Austria in the years 1907-1908 :

The Italian Ambassador [at Vienna, Duke Avarna], who had been working like a ferret, discovered that important negotiations had been going on between Austria-Hungary and Russia before Aehrenthal's visit to Bülow at the beginning of May. " Something must have happened at Berlin," Avarna told me, " to alter Aehrenthal's plan of campaign. His present scheme for a Quadruple Entente, designed to exclude England and Italy from the Balkans, would be an infraction of the Triple Alliance, which consists not of one but of three distinct arrangements—Austro-German, Italo-German, and Austro-Italian. The Austro-Italian arrangement contained a clause to the effect that all Balkan questions shall be dealt with in agreement by the two Allies. If, therefore, Aehrenthal is dealing with these questions, directly or indirectly, without consulting Italy, he will justify Italy in calling him to order and in taking separate action unless he plays straight. As he is going to Italy soon, the matter is of the utmost importance."

From other quarters I received some indication of the general outlines of the proposed Quadruple Entente. They were, roughly, that France should be compensated for her support of Germany at Constantinople by the withdrawal of German opposition to French expansion in Morocco ; and that Austria-Hungary should be compensated for similar support by German help in extracting from the Sultan a concession for an Austro-Hungarian railway from the Bosnian frontier through the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar as far as the main line of the Salonica Railway. Thus the Bosnian Railways would become part of an Austro-Hungarian through-route to Salonica, and a direct strategic connection with Macedonia would be created outside Serbian territory. What advantages were to accrue to Russia was not so clear. Eventual running

rights over a section of the Bagdad Railway; the placing of a large Russian loan in France, Germany and Austria-Hungary, and a revision in favour of Russia of the stipulations of the Berlin Treaty in regard to the Dardanelles, were among the "compensations" suggested. But they were all largely hypothetical. Germany was to gain most. Besides giving her the support of three other Great Powers for her schemes in Turkey, and, in particular, for the Bagdad Railway enterprise, the Quadruple Entente would have destroyed one of her bugbears—the Anglo-French Agreement—and would have killed another—the incipient Anglo-Russian Agreement—before its birth.

VI

THE YEAR 1907

To Baron Speck von Sternburg,
Ambassador in Washington.

"Berlin, Jan. 5, 1907.

"*Secret.*

"*To be deciphered by yourself or by the Councillor of the Embassy.*

"I leave it to your judgment to make good use of the following points in your conversations with the President.

"England's choice of Carnegie as a channel of communication is regarded as particularly treacherously planned in order, under the cloak of friendship, to influence the chivalrous President against the person of our most gracious Master.

"The utterly needless dragging-in of the commercial treaty negotiations is a further indication that with the wire-pullers in London it is a main point for them to hinder the present development of more cordial relations between us and America. Already England has been long regarding this with jealous eyes, especially since the mission of His Royal Highness Prince Henry.

"As we are here informed from London, England is expecting to take advantage of The Hague Conference to improve Anglo-American relations at the expense of those between Germany and America. It is said that Mr. Bryce is to go to The Hague as England's leading representative and do all that is possible for a good understanding with the United States, and be very responsive to America's wishes. You can also say to President Roosevelt that we are ready even beforehand to talk over with the United States questions that may come up for discussion at The Hague. In this way

there would be the best response to the wish of the President—as mentioned by Carnegie—to go hand in hand with us at the Conference; this would also be the best means for dissipating any mistrust on the President's part.

"From Your Excellency's telegram it is plain that President Roosevelt has not yet spoken with you about this business. His Majesty feels a painful impression at the President not having at once spoken of this question to you, and at his apparently giving credit to mere bill-posting reports. This is entirely for your personal information.

"But there is nothing against your giving Messrs. Root and Carnegie, by word of mouth, some knowledge of the above."

To Count von Metternich, Ambassador in London.

"Berlin, Feb. 9, 1907.

"Your Excellency has been quite right in avoiding a discussion with the Foreign Office about the Bagdad Railway question. The observance of this same attitude for the future will commend itself to you, so as to avoid weakening our position in this business.

"The concession for the construction of the Bagdad Railway has been handed over to the Anatolian Railway Company by His Majesty the Sultan, in legal form, and has thereby become German property. Sir Charles Hardinge plainly recognized this fact in the August of last year at Friedrichshof, when he expressly declared the Bagdad Railway to be an entirely German undertaking. He understands very well that Germany has a firm hold on this undertaking, and in all questions referring to it England will always have first to ask for an understanding with Germany.

"Further, in the English House of Commons last summer, the representative of the Government, Mr. Runciman, admitted that the concession for the construction of the Bagdad Railway is the property of a German company. On its part, the German syndicate is in a position to carry forward the railway for years to come, without any foreign financial help,

so soon as the Porte supplies the securities for the construction provided by its agreement. But the Porte can immediately provide these securities, supposing that the view accepted by your guarantor is correct, that England will raise no new difficulty as to the 3 per cent. rise in customs duties, on the ground of the additional 250,000 '£ Turkish.'

"We have under these circumstances no need whatever to appeal to other nations for the financing of the undertaking. Still less can any other nations claim any share in the Bagdad Railway without important equivalent concessions, as if they could put forward some kind of already existing right. In the case of foreign financial circles wishing to have some part in the undertaking, it would accord better with the existing conditions of the affair if they would first, on their own part, make offers to the German syndicate and ask to purchase the subsequent concession by providing some equivalents.

"From what Your Excellency tells me, I take it that, despite the loyal assurances of Sir Charles Hardinge, there are those who do not yet take into account this view, based though it is on actually existing conditions. Above all, there is an indication of this in the attitude of England on the Bagdad Railway question. One can only be astonished when the English Government, in a business which concerns an exclusively German concession, thinks that it must in the first place let itself be guided by considerations regarding Russia. The wish for a loyal regard for our interests seems here hardly to put in any appearance.

"The only way in which this English conception of the matter can be explained is that we are expected to internationalize a purely German railway enterprise, or that eventually we are to hand over to England the most valuable part of the railway, the line from Bagdad to the Persian Gulf, and this obviously without any equivalent worth mention. So far as regards the question of internationalization, this would not be possible for us without much closer consideration, in the interest of the German investors who have secured and successfully made good the concession, not without serious effort and considerable expenditure of money. On the other hand, the transfer of the line from Bagdad to the Persian Gulf to England could never be seriously taken into consideration, because the Sultan would never declare himself satisfied with this idea. The same is true of Mr. Morley's

suggestion to let the line end at Bagdad, and then make the Tigris navigable for shipping from Bagdad to the Gulf. One would never be able to get the Sultan to agree to a plan that would bring all southern Mesopotamia under the control of the English gunboats.

"Further, if Mr. Morley asserts that the Anglo-German negotiations as to the Bagdad Railway in the year 1903 were actually carried on by financial people without any connection with the English Government, in this he is quite wrong. According to the ministerial statements of Mr. Balfour, the German offer was at that time carefully examined by the English Government, and finally declined. (See Reports Nos. 243 and 279 of April 1903.) The blame for the failure of the negotiations at that time therefore falls entirely on the English Government. I may assume that Your Excellency has at once called the attention of the British Secretary of State to his mistake. If this is not the case, it would be desirable that you should bring the subject up again with him at the first opportunity that offers. For your confidential and personal direction, I further note as to this point that, in view of the Anglo-French *Entente*, we can no longer allow a participation of English and French capital under the favourable conditions then offered.

"As regards Your Excellency's suggestion that we should now as soon as possible bring about an understanding with Russia on the Bagdad Railway question, I do not know that this object is in itself worth the trouble of trying for. Meanwhile I doubt if just now we could get it. It is known to Your Excellency that in the October of last year M. Isvolsky gave us a verbal assurance that no difficulties would be raised against us about the Bagdad Railway. We have accordingly given him the expectation of our making no objection to a Russo-Persian Agreement as to trading concessions in North Persia, but at the same time declared that in return we must now be allowed to see a precise statement in writing as to the wishes of Russia that are to be taken into account, and that it would facilitate our agreeing to these if M. Isvolsky, in his memorandum relating to these matters, would repeat his verbal assurance as to the Bagdad Railway. M. Isvolsky has readily consented to this; meanwhile, however, nothing has come of the affair.

"One can hardly be mistaken in assuming that he is less

concerned about an understanding with us on this question than as to an agreement with England about Central Asia and Persia, and that on this account he will want to make use of the Bagdad Railway question in its bearing on England. According to all appearances, the negotiations in view of an understanding with England have for the time come to a dead stop. In case of our raising the Bagdad Railway question at Petersburg at the present moment, the danger might arise of our thus giving Russia a trump card to play that might be of special value against England. An intimation from Isvolsky that we were trying to come to an understanding with him over the Bagdad Railway question would presumably not fail to make an impression in London, and to make the present Government there amenable to very far-reaching concessions with regard to the wishes of Russia.

"I consider it to be indicated, therefore, that for the present we should maintain a complete reserve towards Russia on the Bagdad Railway question."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, May 6, 1907.

"Your Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was successful in preventing the assignment to Macedonian requirements of the so-called 'old revenues' under the Public Debt Control. We had thus been able to take these revenues into account as a basis for a loan for the further construction of the Bagdad Railway. But it is lately rumoured from Constantinople that under the united pressure of England and France the Porte has come to an understanding pledging some part of the revenues in question for the purpose of a financial operation with the Ottoman Bank. In case of this business being definitely concluded, these revenues would remain under this liability until the year 1910, and thus could not be drawn upon for Bagdad Railway loans. The further construction of the Bagdad Railway would thus be seriously imperilled by this financial operation with the Ottoman Bank.

"According to communications from the Deutsche Bank,

there is further ground for the presumption that England has taken in hand the buying-up of any shares of the Anatolian Railway Company that come on the market, in order as far as possible to depreciate German influence in this company and secure for herself a predominant position in it. The Sultan's attention has been called to this danger by Your Majesty's Ambassador. When His Majesty anxiously asked how this danger was to be obviated, Baron von Marschall replied that His Majesty might grant to the Anatolian Railway Company the concession it had asked for, for the irrigation of Konia, and at the same time authorize the doubling of its share capital for the purpose of carrying out this undertaking. If the company secured the doubling of its share capital it would place these shares well and thus obviate any danger of a surprise by England. Before the departure of Your Majesty's Ambassador from Constantinople the Sultan let him know that he had agreed to the doubling of the share capital of the Anatolian Railway Company in connection with the irrigation of Konia.

" It will now be important to follow up this consent of the Sultan by concluding, as soon as possible, definite arrangements with Turkey. According to my most respectful opinion, in view of the serious and difficult position presented to us just now by the joint action of England and France in Turkey, the conduct of these negotiations, as well as the safeguarding of our other important interests in Turkey, should be entrusted, not to the present Chargé d'Affaires, but to an official of the Diplomatic Service specially sent there. A reason for this is that the Sultan, according to my experience, pays very little attention to the Chargé d'Affaires, and hardly ever, or only quite exceptionally, grants him an audience. Your Majesty knows the Sultan's peculiarities and what great importance he attaches to mere externals. It would no doubt flatter His Highness if Your Majesty would send him, as the substitute for Baron von Marschall, another envoy who has already been entrusted with important posts. As the fittest representative of Your Highness's Ambassador at Constantinople, Your Majesty's envoy to Rumania might be considered. Herr von Kiderlen has an exact knowledge of Eastern affairs as a result of his stay for several years at Bucharest, and is also familiar with this post at Constantinople through his earlier activities in that sphere.

"I venture, therefore, to ask for Your Majesty's most gracious authorization, empowering me to send Your Majesty's envoy at Bucharest to Constantinople as the representative of Baron von Marschall."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II
TO PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"KIEL, June 26, 1907.

"Dear Bernhard,

"When this letter comes into your hands you will have had time to digest the contents of my telegram. These lines will tell you the sequel. I went to lunch to-day with Monaco. He told me that Etienne [1] had been most profoundly *impressionné*. Etienne had repeated the entire speech to him this morning in the presence of Mabilleau. After carefully balancing the pro's and con's, M. Etienne, it appears, had come at last to the conviction that the '*Alliance of France* with Germany' would be *the best* [*richtigste*], and to have *agreed to this in principle*. It will be necessary, Etienne says, to work hard and to proceed gently and quietly in order to win people over gradually to the idea. After lunch Mabilleau came up to me; we moved away to one side, and he said: '*Eh bien! Vous l'avez donné joliment à Etienne. Je vous suis profondément reconnaissant, car c'était absolument nécessaire, comme Etienne se faisait des illusions.*' Etienne, he said, had repeated the whole thing to him and he had become convinced that this was the only reasonable way. I had been quite right to make the situation so clear and definite to him; '*à présent il voit clair, et l'homme qu'il est, je le connais pour cela, il en tirera les conclusions.*' He, Mabilleau, would at once go to The Hague to see Bourgeois—for Bourgeois was the only *homme* in France, 'the coming man'—and he would tell him everything and influence him in the right direction. He would also inspire his five million Mutuels with the same idea, and this would be a good weapon for Bourgeois with which to impress the authorities. "*J'en suis convaincu, d'abord l'Alliance, ensuite la prépondérance morale au Maroc.*' From this

[1] A former member of the French Government. He would appear to have been impressed by some *public* speech made by the Kaiser. Cf. next letter on page 214.

it is to be seen how near Morocco lies to their heart—that they should actually be ready to proceed to an Alliance with us on its account! Well, much water will run down the Seine and the Spree before that! But I believe, all the same, that I have sown seeds which, God willing, will spring up presently into fine plants!

"To-day at last the weather has become fine and *Iduna* has won. Many greetings to the Countess from

"Your true friend,

"WILLIAM I.R."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II
TO PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"KIEL, June 26, 1907.

"Yesterday evening the Prince of Monaco introduced M. Etienne to me. They both dined with me. He gives the impression of an extremely energetic man, thick-set, massive, with a broad, heavy head, a thick mop of grey hair, dark bushy eyebrows, eyes full of energy and intelligence, jovial bearing. After some general talk of an introductory sort, I perceived that he had something on his mind, and later in the evening, as we sat drinking beer at Borby, I gave him an opportunity of expressing himself freely. He at once brought the conversation round to Morocco. He put forward the French point of view with French verve and conversational talent. The upshot of our long talk was as follows.

"Germany should recognize France as the predominant Power in Morocco. All France wants is to establish peace and order. A disturbed Morocco would prove in course of time an impossible and harmful neighbour to Algeria.

"I: 'France will take Morocco, then?'

"He: 'No! A hundred and fifty thousand men would be wanted for that.'

"I: 'A protectorate?'

"He: 'Not after the Tunis model; only a moral predominance, so as to be able to give advice.'

"I: 'We all do that on the strength of the Algeciras Treaty.'

"He: 'France after Algeciras fell in with Germany's wishes in the belief that Germany would stand by her in order to make possible the recognition of her preponderance. This had not come about. Hence the strong feeling now against Germany.'

"In Tangier, he went on to say, a declaration had been expected from me—*un mot pour la France*. That had not come about, hence the ill-feeling. There was nothing he was so anxious for as good relations between Germany and France. It was in my power to bring them about; *un mot, un beau geste de l'Empereur*, and everything would be in right order. A *bon accord* could then be created between the two countries, and, by way of compensation, rectifications or modifications of frontier lines in the colonies—in Africa, for instance—would be granted to us.

"I answered as follows:

"France had concluded the Morocco understanding with England in the spring of 1904 behind our back without communicating with us, and therefore against us. Our interests thereby had been seriously imperilled, as had been the interests of all other European Powers in Morocco. I knew this personally from the heads of these other States. I had allowed France a whole year in which to communicate with me on the subject, but no communication had come to me. Therefore it was that the Algeciras Conference had been called into life, so that the regulation of the condition of things in Morocco might be seen to, by the Great Powers acting together. Morocco was a free country under an autonomous hereditary dynasty, over which a single great Power could have no preponderance unless it were established by conquest or a protectorate. The Algeciras Treaty upon which we had taken up our footing would prevent that. This spring we had given an indisputable proof of our goodwill to France when, going beyond the frontier belt, she occupied Udjda, which had been a transgression of the Algeciras Treaty and which had much upset the other nations. It had been as the outcome of my good advice that the Sultan had shown himself so accommodating as to accede to the multiform desires of France (the Mauchamp affair, etc.). These had been direct services which I had rendered France

without having been in any way obliged to do so. All these services, however, had been accepted by France almost without a word of thanks, and then everything remained just as it had been. As for the *beau geste*, why, I had made quite a number in the course of the nine years of my reign!

"He: '*Oui, oui! Ça nous a touché au cœur!*'

"I: '*Vous n'en avez pas tiré les conséquences!*'

"I was very glad, I went on to tell him, that he of his own accord had intervened between our two countries. His having done so was very much to the interest of France, and it was the only thing to do.

"The great questions of the future which were cropping up in the world required a united Europe, and Germany and France ought to go into them hand in hand. He agreed completely and declared that all *ententes* which had been concluded recently were harmless and that there was nothing in them to disquiet us. I replied that Germany was strong enough to look on at all such political pastimes calmly and with a smile. In the end things could not be done without us in spite of all the *ententes*. The great countries of the future, Japan and America, already took account of us and placed themselves beside us. France, on the contrary, had sacrificed her freedom of action and was being taken in tow by England; England was dictating in Paris whatever she liked, and France had become England's will-less slave.

"As proof of what I said I instanced the abandonment at the last moment before the Kiel Week of the contemplated despatch of a French man-o'-war and the absence of the French Ambassador in Berlin in spite of the presence of so many of his countrymen: both of these things were done to gratify English wishes. When M. Etienne sought to question this, the Prince of Monaco, who was sitting beside me, bore out my statements. M. Etienne was extremely disturbed, but returned to the subject of Morocco and the *beau geste*. When he had fired off a number of fine phrases I answered that we had done with *beaux gestes* for the moment, and that it was for France now to give definite tokens of her good will. I could not take into benevolent consideration France's wish for a moral preponderance in Morocco until *la France aura conclu une alliance fixe avec l'Allemagne*. If the French were my allies, their wishes would find a favourable ear with me, things would go as well for them,

and their existence would be as well safeguarded as those of Austria and Italy. I could no longer accept the principle which France had been following down to now: the arm to Russia, the hand to Great Britain, a greeting to Germany. I now required at least the hand; the arm would be still better. My own hand had been stretched out to her for nine years past in loyal fashion. France had offered her hand to all the others but had turned her back on me. In spite of everything, I still held out my hand. I advised her now to clasp hold of it before it was too late, so that France should not come into the situation which the Duc de Décazes recently described to me with accuracy: '*Pourvu que la France ne paye les pots cassés par l'Angleterre.*' Thus, first the Alliance, without hurt to her Alliance with Russia; then *préponderance morale* in Morocco. When Etienne's face took on a dubious expression and he turned towards Monaco as though pleading for his support, the Prince replied: '*L'Empereur a dit la vérité. Je partage absolument son opinion.* '*L'Empereur a raison.*'

"Here the drama came to an end.

"The French are all enthusiastic over their stay and welcome here, and they condemn in the sharpest terms the absence of their Ambassador—in contrast with Tower and Inouye, who are here—as *une bêtise incomparable.*

"Etienne would much like to call on Your Serene Highness. So far as I can make out from French intimations, Cambon has had instructions from Paris not to go to Kiel, these instructions reaching him *viâ* his brother in London, whom he will perhaps have questioned surreptitiously regarding the Kiel Week.

"The weather remains horrible. Yesterday I accompanied the *Meteor* on the *Hohenzollern*, and was a witness of the way in which the yacht was seized by a hurricane-like squall and windspout simultaneously and lost her bowsprit; she will be all right again to-morrow we hope. Temperature 9 Grad. Hearty greetings.

"Send a copy of this to Prince Radolin in Paris.

"WILLIAM I.R."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, June 27, 1907.

"Your Majesty's very interesting telegram of the 26th inst. and supplementary letter received with thanks. I can but congratulate Your Majesty on the masterly way in which you brought home to M. Etienne the essential points of our Morocco policy and their connection with our general policy.

"In the Islamic world in the present configuration of the world's politics and as long as the Franco-English *Entente* makes us the target for hostility, we ought not to abandon without full compensation the ascendency which we possess through the standing Your Majesty has won. Naturally such compensation is not to be looked for in the local colonial modification of frontiers and small concessions of Africa, any more than in any preferential treatment in Asia Minor, with which efforts are being made from the French side to tempt us.

"Your Majesty hit the nail on the head when you pointed out that an alliance with France was the only price for which our position in Morocco could be saleable. We ought to remove entirely the impression that we could sell Morocco for small benefits, as though for a *pourboire* [*Trinkgeld*]. For there is a question here not of Morocco only, but to a much greater degree of the reaction which such a commercial transaction would have on the Sultan in Constantinople and on the whole of Mohammedanism to the detriment of Germany's standing in the world.

"We shall continue, therefore, to take our stand firmly on the basis of the Algeciras Treaty and wait quietly until the French come to us with really acceptable proposals. It is in keeping with the Gallic character that the French should be inclined to regard every previous mark of amiability on our side as a sign of weakness and that they should find in every concession of ours a pretext for putting forward new wishes.

"Time is fleeting for us. It is being steadily realized in Germany and abroad that Your Majesty has acted rightly in German interests in taking up the position in regard to the Morocco Conference which the Algeciras Treaty put upon a basis not easily shattered.

"The ascendency which Your Majesty possesses, as leader of the country and in firm alliance with Austria-Hungary,

is so strong that her paper provisos and declarations cannot affect it. Thinking Frenchmen will not continue to close their eyes to this fact and to the necessity for them, which follows from it, to turn to us. It is to be hoped that Your Majesty's conversation with such men of note as Etienne and Mabilleau will help to spread cognizance of this.

"I shall be happy to receive M. Etienne, and in my conversation with him I shall avail myself of the views expressed by Your Majesty as a valuable guiding line."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, June 30, 1907.

"I beg to inform Your Majesty that M. Etienne called on me yesterday. He struck me as a capable man. He began by giving expression to his warm gratitude for your gracious reception of him in Kiel. Two of Your Majesty's remarks to him impressed him particularly: your assertion that France's conduct towards Germany had been marked by hostile intentions and your reference to the possibility of a German-French alliance. Etienne proceeded to assure me that no one in France thought of making an attack on Germany. The French knew well, he said, that even a victorious war would only result in producing more wars. The alliances and *ententes* which France had contracted had no aggressive purposes in view but were made necessary by the strength of her German neighbour. The whole of France was for peace. It was, therefore, desirable for us to come to an understanding over Morocco, which had given, and continued to give, so many causes of misunderstanding. Feeling in France was not yet ripe for an alliance with us. We had to take into account the racial sensibilities of the French, who were sensitive and proud and who did not allow themselves to be rushed into things.

"In reply to M. Etienne I said it was conceivable that Your Majesty believed in the existence of warlike inclinations and tendencies in France as the *Revanche* idea so often made itself conspicuous in the country. It would not have escaped M. Etienne's attention, moreover, that all the treaties into which France had entered with other countries had been

given a turn against us by French public opinion. As far as Morocco was concerned, we took our stand on the Algeciras Treaty, the ink of which had scarcely had time to dry. While the French had originally regarded this treaty as a victory, they now seemed to regard it as a fetter. The treaty had been neither the one nor the other, but was an international treaty which, so long as it was in force, should not be broken or pulled about. As yet (I proceeded) it was difficult to say what would or could happen in five years when the term of the police mandate conferred on France and Spain for this period would lapse and render desirable new international arrangements regarding Morocco.

"All that was certain was that this would depend principally on the nature of the relations between France and Germany. I was acquainted, I said, with the sensibilities of the French. I knew also that less could be done for the smoothing of Franco-German difficulties and sensibilities by official personages than by the public and the Press—*les hommes de bonne volonté dans les deux pays*. With patience and tact it should be possible to avoid clashes in the immediate future, but in this an important task needed to be fulfilled by the French Press which unfortunately too often adopted a hurtful tone towards us. In Morocco we abstained from all aggressive acts; France, however, must carry out the duties entrusted to her there by the Algeciras Treaty, and must in particular respect the economic equality of rights. The entire German people wanted peace and friendly relations with our French neighbour. The German people, however, must not be harassed and angered. And the idea should not be evoked in its mind that people were going out of their way to threaten it and damage it and hem it in. If a peaceful mood were attained in Europe, and especially as between Germany and France, *ententes* would follow, otherwise not. For such a peaceful mood we must work on both sides, quietly and silently, but steadily.

"M. Etienne declared that all I had said was in keeping with the ideas which Your Majesty expounded to him. He recognized the truth of this conception of the situation and he would do all he could in France to the same ends. He hoped, more particularly, that co-operation between German and French capital—perhaps in Morocco also—would constitute a good preparation for the political understanding."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, July 26, 1907.

"I beg to give Your Majesty the following account of the course down to date of the second Peace Conference at The Hague.

"The Conference in its session of six weeks has only a few tangible results to show, as is not surprising in view of the ticklish nature of the subjects under consideration, the great number of people taking part, and the clash of the interests which have to be safeguarded in spite of all the idealistic hopes for international peace.

"The deliberations are undertaken by four Commissions, the first three of which are divided into two Sub-Commissions.

"In the first Commission, which is presided over by M. Bourgeois, the former French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and which concerns itself with the development of international arbitration, the German proposal for the creation of a Superior International Prize Court is under discussion. This proposal has been greeted by the Conference with great applause and is pointed to as a token that Germany contemplates taking an active part in a practical way and for feasible ends in the work of the Conference. Side by side with the German proposal there is an English suggestion which on somewhat different lines is aimed equally at the introduction of an International Prize Court. A compromise between the two suggestions will probably result.

"The second Commission, which, under the chairmanship of the Belgian Prime Minister, M. Beernaert, is concerning itself with the usages of war on land, has not yet arrived at any definite result, as the Sub-Commissions are still engaged in considering schemes and proposals.

"The third Commission, to which specific questions of war usages on sea have been submitted, and where proceedings are presided over by Count Tornielli, the Italian Ambassador in Paris, has just concluded its deliberations on the application to warfare on sea of the Geneva Convention as revised last year. The proposal before it was one brought forward by the German delegation. It was made the subject of some words of grateful appreciation from Count Tornielli, and after the French member of the Court who had been

appointed *rapporteur* had given in his report on it the work was considerably lightened. Thanks to the German preliminary work, the third Commission was enabled to bring forward the first definite plan entirely in the sense of the German proposal—for ratification.

"In the fourth Commission, which, under the chairmanship of the second Russian delegate, M. von Martens, has to deliberate on the right of prize-taking [*Seebeute*] and contraband, the proposal put forward by the United States of America for the abolition of the right of *Seebeute* was rejected owing to the opposition of England and Russia, which was backed up by France, Spain, Japan, and several smaller States. Your Majesty's first plenipotentiary delegate, Freiherr von Marschall, restricted himself wisely to the declaration that Germany had always shown herself sympathetic to the abolition of the right of prize-taking, but that she must make her eventual attitude towards the American proposal dependent upon the previous regulation of other naval warfare questions bound up with the right of prize-taking in order to ensure that the defence of private property on the sea should be safeguarded equally for all nations.

"Two proposals made by Belgium and Brazil for the protection of private property on the sea were withdrawn, as, in view of the attitude of opposition adopted more especially by England, Russia, Spain, and Japan, they were as unlikely as the American proposal to be accepted unanimously. The English proposal in regard to the abolition of the idea of contraband is not likely to have a successful issue in view of the attitude adopted by Germany, France, and other Powers.

"The disarmament proposal, the announcement of which produced so much talk, has not yet been brought forward by the English delegate, but it is expected to be submitted within the next few days.

"Your Majesty's plenipotentiary delegates when they started for The Hague were provided with exhaustive instructions which had been formulated in the Foreign Office with representatives of the naval and military departments and the other departments of the Empire and Prussia concerned. These instructions have hitherto been adequate, so that the delegates have found it necessary to seek further instructions only in regard to details. In view of the unsettled position of the work of the Conference and the insignificance of the

results as yet effected, the delegates have been able hitherto to confine themselves to handing in the printed protocols of the sessions of the Conference which give information regarding the course of the proceedings without offering any more general political interest until now.

"We can look back with satisfaction upon the course of the proceedings down to now. As I have been told, quite impartial persons who have been at The Hague, and who have been in close touch with members of the Conference, have been saying what an excellent impression has been made on all sides by the German delegation and its thorough-going preparation for the tasks of the Conference. The Press also has taken a favourable line, and has recognized Germany's effort to co-operate eagerly and earnestly in the problems of the Conference."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, July 29, 1907.

"The second Hague Conference has progressed so far with its work that some of the more important proposals under discussion are now beginning to take shape. Among these is the proposal for the settlement of international disputes by arbitration which is before the first Commission.

"The delegation of the U.S.A. has submitted a proposal whereby the States taking part in the Conference shall undertake to submit to the Parliament Court of Arbitration at The Hague all questions of rights and all disputes over the interpretation of treaties, provided that these disputes do not involve the vital interests, the independence, or the honour of the States concerned, and that they do not affect the interests of another State. Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Switzerland have given their adhesion to this proposal, which goes beyond the limitations of the one which was previously put forward by Russia and assented to by Your Majesty's Government. France will probably agree to it also. Other States have hitherto hesitated to commit themselves. Your Majesty's first plenipotentiary delegate, Baron von Marschall, put the German point of view before the first Sub-Commission of the first Commission which has been dealing with the

arbitration question on the 23rd inst. His speeches are reproduced in the report of the proceedings sent herewith on pages 18-22.

"The introduction of a compulsory method of arbitration for international disputes over specified questions of rights and interpretation was discussed already at the first Hague Peace Conference. It failed owing to the resolute opposition of Germany. This opposition was based in the first place upon the considerations that the impartiality of international arbitrators did not seem to be guaranteed, that the indiscriminate summoning before an arbitration court of small and large States alike was not consistent with the status of the large States, and that the possibility of appeal to an international arbitration court at any moment is not calculated to promote peace and conciliatoriness in international affairs.

"The instructions given to our delegate at the second Peace Conference were based upon the general instructions then given by Your Majesty.

"Baron von Marschall began his speech by making certain concessions to the idea of compulsory arbitration, and proceeded to intimate that Germany had herself agreed in the year 1904 to proposals for compulsory arbitration with Great Britain and the U.S.A. in regard to disputes as to rights and interpretation. The conclusion of such treaties with England and the United States was practicable because we were separated from these countries by the sea. It was otherwise with States which were close neighbours and which offered continual occasions for friction as the result of closer intercourse and in some cases of extensive frontier-lines. And we should view as quite unacceptable a world-wide arbitration treaty which would deprive us altogether, even as against smaller unfriendly States, of the opportunity of turning our power to account.

"Your Majesty approving, we shall continue to stand by this position."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Nov. 5, 1907.

". . . . The negotiations in regard to the Norwegian Independence Treaty [*Integritätsvertrag*], the conclusion of which

was to have taken place at the end of September, have since met with a new delay. The signature of the Treaty has only just been effected. The latest postponement was due to the wish suddenly expressed by Sweden, and supported by France, either that Sweden should be allowed to sign the Treaty also, or that the passage in the agreement which speaks of the measures to be taken by the Powers for the protection of Norway in the case of her being threatened or injured should be cancelled. Russia having assented to Sweden's signing, the Swedish Government was informed that Your Majesty's Government also had no objection to her being allowed to do so provided the other parties agreed. As was to be expected, however, Norway refused in the most decided way to allow Sweden to sign, as Sweden thereby would be accorded the status of a protective Great Power and a differentiation in the ranks of the two peoples would come about.

"In view of the decided opposition of Norway, Sweden, whose attitude from all appearances was influenced by England, allowed her claim to lapse. It seems, moreover, that during the final stage of the proceedings His Majesty the King of Norway took energetic action in the matter in England.

"After the Swedish request had been withdrawn the Treaty was signed on the 2nd instant by Your Majesty's Ambassador as well as by the representatives of Norway, England, France, and Russia. The fact of the conclusion of the Treaty has been made known; on the other hand, the text will be published only after ratification, as it has first to be submitted formally to the Störthing.

"Immediately after the signing of the new Independence Treaty, the Treaty of 1855 between Sweden-Norway, England and France, directed against Russia, was cancelled in so far as Norway was concerned by an agreement between England, France, and Norway.

"The conclusion of the Treaty has not met with favour in Sweden, as there a 'point' against Sweden is, without justification, attributed to it. It was pointed out already some time ago to the Swedish Minister here that this interpretation of the matter has no basis; that no reference is made to Sweden in the Treaty, in which there is talk only of the possibility of the independence of Norway being threatened by '*une puissance quelconque*.' The Treaty, according to our interpretation,

contains no unconditional guarantee of independence; rather, the Powers undertake only to use what may appear to be the most suitable method for maintaining the independence. We had given our approval to the wording of the Treaty only after we had effected an understanding with Russia that no obligation was being entered into for the maintenance of the independence of Norway by armed force."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"Dec. 30th, 1907.

"My Dear Bülow,

"I have to-day read with interest and pleasure Rex's long-expected secret report. It is indeed a frank, clear judgment, and presents a plainly defined goal. I fully share his views. They are partly repetitions of what I have long been preaching to the Foreign Office, but I have, unfortunately, never been able to carry it into effect, since with us Germans the 'pale cast of thought' constantly hinders 'enterprises of great pith and moment.'

"In the autumn of last year, after agreement with you, I had a conversation with Yin-Tschang before he left, about the future of China. I described to him how heartily I desired and had tried to smooth the path of the Empress, and that, for this reason, I had given orders for the withdrawal of my troops. He was to tell Her Majesty this on my behalf. You will recollect the success of this step, and in any case it is recorded in your archives. It was a great stroke, and China again began to have confidence in us. On that occasion, with your agreement, I charged Yin-Tschang to communicate to Her Majesty the Empress a proposal for an *entente cordiale* which should *guarantee* the most important parts of China (not the distant outlying provinces and, on our side, Chow) with support in the event of attack. That he promised me to do. But as he has only *now* attained a position of influence, he has only just been able to set the business in train, and that, indeed, at a very suitable moment.

"The Rex proposal therefore agrees with mine, and must be made the basis of *immediate* negotiations. An *entente*

cordiale with China for the *maintenance of the status quo* is absolutely necessary for us. Otherwise the whole of our world policy is to be thrown on the scrap-heap. Therefore I have witnessed with pleasure the departure of the American Fleet. Its cruise around into the Pacific knocks all the calculations of the British and the Japanese on the head. The British must, *nolens volens*, again send a strong squadron to the East, which they imagined to be secure under Japanese protection; that must weaken them in Europe against us.

"The Japanese naturally want China for themselves, but they also want to get rid of all the whites in Asia. But they are not *yet* ready with their Fleet, and therefore not inclined to fight with America at this stage. Therefore the situation is *favourable* for them and for us, since the pressure of nineteen ships of the line, fifteen armoured cruisers, that is to say, the largest fleet under a *single command* in the world, will prevent the others from attempts at partition to the prejudice of ourselves and America, in the best possible way. It is *also* in the American interest to conclude an *entente cordiale* with China for the maintenance of the *status quo*, so that her trade does not suffer.

"In the long run Russia will also be disposed to make an agreement of this kind when once the Russians have properly grasped the situation, because they have a great interest in maintaining China, and not getting as Oriental neighbours other unfriendly Europeans as well as Japan. The Emperor has already given me indications to this effect. I have impressed upon him particularly the importance of good relations with China. All the European nations have concluded agreements here for particular purposes, in order to maintain and safeguard their interests. We must certainly do it now, since our most important future export interests are involved; these demand the continued integrity of China.

"By a division of the spoils such as the three rascals have in mind we are lost, and there is nothing more to be done! The *modus operandi* may be so selected that China concludes an *entente* with each of us separately. We can indeed work upon Roosevelt through Sternburg so that when he receives the proposal he gives it friendly consideration. We must without fail come to terms as soon as possible! I have been working and toiling for years for this occasion. It was not easy! Whenever I raised the question with Tschirschky he

merely wrung his hands and said 'China, oh, China!' That was all! That we, as a side issue, might place the Russians in a dilemma—which is very usual with such sneaks as Lamsdorff and Isvolsky—never dawned on him! But it is now high time to *take firm hold* of a favourable opportunity, and not for ever be looking round at other people to find what this and that man says. The others have never bothered about us; so tit for tat!

"How much life there still is in China is shown in the article of the *Financial Chronicle* which I sent to you yesterday. Moreover, Chinese self-respect is not to be under-rated, and if her Army reorganization was supported and influenced by us it would be a good thing! England's whole policy during recent years is clear! It is to make her position in Europe unassailable as far as we are concerned, and to tie up our maritime forces in Europe while she seizes the Yang-Tse Valley, so that we must bow to the storm and not disturb her in her conquest. That is the reason for all the understandings with the Mediterranean Powers, to have *points d'appui* everywhere, and that is the reason for urging France forward in the Morocco question.

"This policy is intended to bring about a collision between us, so that the Briton will be quit of both of us and will be able to consume her fat morsel undisturbed! That also is the reason for the agreement with Russia over Persia, so that Russia will be pacified and quiet and will not be a nuisance. That also is the reason for the immense annoyance of the British at the cruise of the American Fleet, which indeed they have not concealed from me; the naval balance of power is hopelessly deferred, and in the East will be quite different from what suits them. Therefore efforts must be made to keep the Fleet in the Pacific and if possible for it to visit the Philippines and China! It is the covering force for the Yang-Tse until we are ready with our Fleet! *England will never venture to do anything against America.*

"If it should seem that we are acting together resolutely for the maintenance of China, then pharasaical England will even perhaps join us! And in this way Japan is rendered harmless. Here, then, is a great work to be done. Forward! We have thought about it for long enough! Enough phrases have been exchanged already; now let us see action!

"WILLIAM I.R."

VII

THE YEAR 1908

VII

THE YEAR 1908

NOTE.

In this year perhaps the outstanding topic is the naval rivalry between Germany and England. We are given at great length the arguments used in 1908 to defend the building of the big German Navy. In his book " Imperial Germany " (already cited on p. 129), Prince von Bülow thus describes how the Navy came into being. It seems appropriate to reproduce here the following passages :

The sea has become a factor of more importance in our national life than ever before in our history, even in the great days of the German Hansa. It has become a vital nerve which we must not allow to be severed if we do not wish to be transformed from a rising and youthfully vigorous people into a decaying and ageing one. But we were exposed to this danger as long as our foreign commerce and our mercantile marine lacked national protection at sea against the superior Navies of other Powers. The task that the armed forces of the German Empire had to fulfil had changed considerably, since the protection on the Continent that our Army secured us no longer sufficed to shield our home industries from interference, encroachment and attack. The Army needed the support of a Navy that we might enjoy the fruits of our national labour.

When in the spring of 1864 the English Ambassador in Berlin drew the attention of the Prussian President of the Council at that time to the excitement in England caused by Prussia's advance against Denmark, and let fall the remark that if Prussia did not cease operations the English Government might be forced to take arms against her, Herr von Bismarck-Schönhausen replied : " Well, what harm can you do us ? At worst you can throw a few bombs at Stolpmünde or Pillau, and that is all." Bismarck was right at that time. We were then as good as unassailable to England with her mighty sea power, for we were invulnerable at sea. We possessed neither a great mercantile marine, the destruction of which could sensibly injure us, nor any oversea trade worth mentioning, the crippling of which we need fear.

To-day it is different. We are now vulnerable at sea. We have entrusted millions to the ocean, and with these millions the weal and woe of many of our countrymen. If we had not in good time provided protection for these valuable and indispensable national possessions,

we should have been exposed to the danger of having one day to look on defencelessly while we were deprived of them. But then we could not have returned to the comfortable economic and political existence of a purely inland State. We should have been placed in the position of being unable to employ and support a considerable number of our millions of inhabitants at home. The result would have been an economic crisis which might easily attain the proportions of a national catastrophe.

Ever since the end of the 'eighties in the nineteenth century the building of a Fleet sufficient to defend our oversea interests had been a vital question for the German nation. It is greatly to the credit of the Emperor William II that he recognized this, and devoted all the power of the Throne and all the strength of his own personality to the attainment of this end. It only adds to his merit that he, as head of the Empire, championed the building of the German Fleet at the very moment when the German people had to come to a decision about their future, and when, as far as man can tell, Germany had the last chance of forging the sea weapons that she needed.

The Fleet was to be built while we maintained our position on the Continent, without our coming into conflict with England, whom we could as yet not oppose at sea, but also while we preserved intact our national honour and dignity. Parliamentary opposition, which at that time was considerable, could only be overcome if steady pressure were brought to bear on Parliament by public opinion. In view of the anxious and discouraged state of feeling that obtained in Germany during the ten years following Prince Bismarck's retirement, it was only possible to rouse public opinion by harping on the string of nationalism, and waking the people to consciousness. A great oppression which weighed on the spirit of the nation had been occasioned by the rupture between the wearer of the Imperial Crown and the mighty man who had brought it up from the depths of Kyffhäuser. This oppression could be lifted if the German Emperor could set before his people, who at that time were not united either by common hopes or demands, a new goal towards which to strive, and could indicate to them " a place in the sun," to which they had a right, and which they must try to attain. On the other hand, patriotic feeling must not be roused to such an extent as to damage irreparably our relations with England, against whom our sea power would for years still be insufficient, and at whose mercy we lay in 1897, as a competent judge remarked at the time, like so much butter before the knife. To make it possible to build a sufficient Fleet was the foremost and greatest task of German policy after Bismarck's retirement: a task with which I also was immediately confronted when, on June 28, 1897, at Kiel, on board the *Hohenzollern*, I was entrusted by His Majesty the Emperor with the conduct of foreign affairs, on the same day and the same spot on which twelve years later I handed in my resignation.

VII

THE YEAR 1908

To Count von Rex,
Minister in Peking.

"Berlin, Jan. 3, 1908.

"An alliance between Germany, China, and the United States of America is impossible on account of the United States, since the latter would not be able to secure the necessary agreement of the Senate. The goal of the negotiations for the *rapprochement* so much to be desired for us must for the time being be limited to the exchange of declarations. China would have to ask us and the United States for the support of her policy, which would have to be laid down as follows: that she would not consider territorial concessions in favour of any Power, and that the Open Door for the trade of all nations would be maintained, while Germany and the United States would have to declare to China their agreement with this policy and simultaneously assure her that they would direct their policy towards the complete maintenance of the integrity and independence of China.

"This procedure should presumably be settled in Washington; it would appear inoffensive to third Powers, as France and Japan have recently without the concurrence of China come to a corresponding agreement, and it would satisfy China, as we are guaranteeing, by the exchange of Notes, the common interest of Germany and the United States in the continuance of China *as an integral whole*, as against the other Powers. China would probably prefer declarations of this kind to a treaty of alliance which was limited expressly to the eighteen provinces of the Empire, because by such a treaty the outlying territories of China would be placed at

the mercy of attack by third parties. The secret agreements over concessions by China to us and the United States initiated by you are to be avoided under all circumstances, since they contravene the principle of the 'Open Door' and would not be scrupulously kept secret either on the Chinese side or indeed in Washington.

"Under strict secrecy and exclusively for Your Excellency's personal information, I add that the impression is to be avoided that *we* have any particular interest in the exchange of declarations. Indeed, the initiative must come from China, who must try to win over the United States to the idea, so that third parties should regard not Germany, but the United States, as the initiators. This will easily be arranged if China, in her *démarches* in Washington, pays the proper degree of attention to the characteristics of President Roosevelt, in particular his self-confidence and his active temperament; naturally we shall be as useful as possible to China in these *démarches*.

"Please try unobtrusively, perhaps through Yin-Tschang, to induce the Chinese to enter as soon as possible on these negotiations, which, of course, will have to be kept strictly secret on the Chinese side also until they are concluded.

"The question of a wider understanding between Germany, Russia[1] and the United States of America is not yet ripe for discussion."

To Count von Pourtalès,
Ambassador in St. Petersburg.

"Berlin, Feb. 17, 1908.

"From Your Excellency's welcome Report No. 55 of the 11th instant, I have seen with interest, but not without astonishment, that the agitation of the Russian Press, based on completely erroneous conceptions, over the economic designs of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, have found fertile soil in the mind of even so enlightened a statesman as M. Isvolsky.

"Your Excellency has already been telegraphically

[1] In the despatch "Russia" is clearly an error, as the sense obviously requires "China."

informed that, contrary to the rumours spread in the Press, we did not instigate the Austro-Hungarian Government to accept the project with regard to the Sanjak Railway, but that this project does not in our opinion offer any reason for anxiety. On this question I can only repeat that the right of the Austro-Hungarian Government to build this railway cannot be questioned, having regard to the stipulations of the Berlin Treaty. Since this right was conceded to Austria-Hungary without any limitation by all the signatory Powers of the Berlin Treaty, the choice of this particular moment for the inception of the undertaking must be left to the discretion of the Danubian monarchy. *Qui suo jure utitur, neminem laedit.*

"If the Vienna Cabinet have taken up the project just at the present moment, there are plainly economic reasons for this decision. In declaring that she is pursuing no political aims in the Balkans, Austria-Hungary has not given up her right to ensure her economic interests there. The Sanjak Railway is only concerned with the latter. The notion that the purely economic enterprise of the Sanjak Railway contravenes the Mürzsteg political programme is incomprehensible to us. We are convinced that Baron Aehrenthal was actuated by the most loyal motives in his action, and that his *bona fides* in the whole question is placed beyond all doubt. As far as we are concerned, we are, as has already been communicated to Your Excellency elsewhere, completely sympathetic to the project, because we see in it not only a means for the further development of trade and commerce in the Balkans, but because the enterprise also seems to us likely to render good service in the urgently desired pacification of Macedonia. . . . We have evidence that the campaign of calumny which the Russian Press, supported by the English and French Press, is at present waging against us on account of our supposedly underhand Eastern policy, has not been without influence upon persons in high places in St. Petersburg, and that it threatens to convert the friendly feeling which has existed up till now into the contrary. We are not only accused of the treacherous instigation of the Sanjak Railway enterprise, but also of urging Turkey towards war, of intriguing in the Persian boundary dispute, and generally of tricky and hostile policy towards Russia.

"After Your Excellency has succeeded in disposing satisfactorily of some of these absurd propositions, I beg that

you will also describe to Isvolsky the other points as absurd and frivolous suspicions. We are not meddling in Eastern questions; if we do so it will be in public declarations and in concert with the Powers. No doubt of our complete loyalty is justified. With regard to the Persian boundary dispute, we have three times of our own accord pressed the Porte for a peaceful settlement.

"We know that M. Isvolsky has not much power over the Press, but we think we may expect from his friendly disposition towards us that he will at least make the attempt to controvert the campaign of calumny which becomes day by day more intensive. We are trying to pacify our Press, but we fear that these efforts will be in vain if the Russian Press perseveres in this hitherto unheard-of fashion."

To Count von Pourtalès,
Ambassador in St. Petersburg.

"Berlin, March 3, 1908.

"*Secret.*

"I have read with interest Your Excellency's welcome Reports Nos., 67, 70, 72, and 73, of the 21st and 24th ult. I am grateful to you for this detailed information. The picture given in your reports of circumstances in St. Petersburg is no pleasant one for us. The reports show that a zealous and not entirely unsuccessful campaign is being carried on against us. In this respect the remarks of the War Minister to General von Jacobi, which the latter communicated to His Majesty on the 23rd ult., give food for thought. I should also be very sorry if Your Excellency's news of the same date of a hostile report by Count Osten-Sacken should prove to be true.

"On the other hand, not much stress can be laid upon the assurances of goodwill with which M. Isvolsky is very prodigal, and which he has further elaborated in the private letter of the 14th ult. enclosed in this despatch. I have so far no reason to suspect the honesty of this declaration, but in the interest of our good relations I could wish that it had hitherto been better implemented by deeds.

"In the meantime Your Excellency must continue now, as in the past, to take every opportunity, wherever hostile rumours are being spread, to confute them seriously and emphatically. I draw your attention in general to some instructions sent to you, and add the following observations:

"To statements such as those indicated in your Report No. 73 that we are urging on the Turks against Russia, that we are said to be so omnipotent in Constantinople that we could, if we would, push through the Macedonian Reform question, you should reply, amongst other things, that we have never for a hundred years made any difficulties whatever for Russia in Eastern Europe, in contrast to other Powers, and that we have never carried on intrigues against Russia there, in which connection you can mention the Crimean War and the last Russo-Turkish War. We are not so influential in Constantinople, as is often maintained, either from ignorance or malice.

"This is especially so in questions—as, for example, in the Macedonian question—in which fundamental principles affecting Islam, Turkish vital interests, and the personal position of the Sultan in the Mohammedan world, indeed, his personal security, are concerned. In considering Sir Arthur Nicolson's remarks (repeated in your Report No. 67) on Turkey, and the possibility of Russia's putting an end to the Turkish dominion in Europe, Russian statesmen should bear in mind that there might be a snare laid for Russia, in the same way as Japan was incited by England against Russia.

"Your Excellency might very well remind M. Isvolsky that, according to our information, the Turks have no intention of attacking Russia so long as they are not too much annoyed. The conduct of Baron von Marschall and our conduct in Persia are part of the same policy, and indicate that His Majesty, our Gracious Master, is seeking to avoid conflicts and crises.

"Both His Majesty and I think the sketch you have made of Isvolsky in this connection a very true one. His Majesty draws from it the conclusion that Your Excellency, in your handling of the Russian Minister, should follow the example, so far as possible, of your English colleagues.

"Stronger action on the part of Your Excellency, especially with regard to the Russian Press, seems to be indicated, so that it can no longer be said that the door of the German Embassy is generally closed to the Russian Press.

"With regard to the conversation recorded in Report No. 72, Your Excellency might say to M. Stolypin: 'Look at Europe. There you have on the one side the Western Powers; of these, France is a republic reeking with Radicalism and with Socialists. It is inconceivable that these elements should *bona fide* desire the maintenance of the Tsardom. England is in very much the same position with her outspoken Liberalism.' Herr Stolypin will remember the illuminating phrase of Campbell-Bannerman: '*La Douma est morte; vive la Douma!*' An alliance of Russia with these two Powers can only result in undermining and endangering the Tsardom.

"On the other hand, if Russia turns to Germany and Austria-Hungary for support it will be otherwise. As convinced Monarchists we desire the maintenance of the Tsardom, and must desire it, since otherwise we ourselves should be exposed to the dangers of revolution and Socialism. We must necessarily desire for Russia the maintenance of the monarchy, stability at home, and power to execute the internal and external tasks lying before the Russian State.

"In this connection Your Excellency might also draw M. Stolypin's attention to the fact that the results of Russian wars have always been disturbances at home and revolutionary changes of increasing intensity: the Dekabrist movement, the emancipation of the peasants after the Crimean War, the Nihilist movement after 1878, and finally the recent Russian revolution, are the milestones of this hitherto steadily increasing danger to the Russian State organism.

"You will tell M. Stolypin clearly how much we regret the attacks of the German Press on him. I myself, and the principal Ministers of the Imperial Government, are similarly being constantly attacked and bespattered with mud in the same way by the German Radical and Jewish Press. We have, M. Stolypin and I, the same opponents, namely, the sworn enemies of every monarchy and of every Conservative Government.

"With regard to the attitude of the Russian Press towards us we can do nothing except complain once more, and support our complaint by pointing out the injury which these Press attacks do, not only in Germany, but in Russia itself.

"Finally I draw your especial attention to M. Isvolsky's remarks, given in Report No. 74, which awaken a certain

suspicion that there is some secret knowledge in Russia of our official correspondence, and to impress upon you the necessity of taking the greatest precautions for the maintenance of the secrecy of the Embassy archives and cipher codes."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, March 6, 1908.

"*The Times* publishes to-day a letter from its military correspondent drawing public attention to a matter of the greatest importance. It has, writes the correspondent, come to his knowledge that the German Emperor has addressed to Lord Tweedmouth a letter dealing with English and German naval policy. The Imperial letter, which (the writer says) is undoubtedly genuine and has also been answered, arises out of an attempt to influence, in the German interest, the Minister responsible for the English Naval Estimates. The Imperial letter, and the answer to it, must immediately be laid before Parliament (according to *The Times*), since the matter has become an open secret. I respectfully beg Your Majesty for a copy of the letter to Lord Tweedmouth, so that we may be armed against all eventualities, and so that I can consult Your Majesty after my return on the further course of the affair."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, March 6, 1908.

"Count Metternich telegraphs:

"'If in any way possible, I think the publication of the Imperial letter to Lord Tweedmouth the best way to make good in some degree the damage caused by *The Times* statement. Without publication false insinuations will be willingly believed. Questions in Parliament will undoubtedly be asked. The matter may cause the fall of Lord Tweedmouth and give a severe shock to the Liberal Government, which is favourably

disposed towards us. All the elements friendly to us will be weakened and the Jingoes strengthened. Also the popularity of His Majesty the Emperor here in England will suffer, and mistrust of our policy will again increase.'

"I cannot give any final judgment on the opportuneness of publication without knowledge of the wording of Your Majesty's letter, but I respectfully beg your agreement in principle to a publication on our side, in any case with the omission of personal passages, as, for instance, those concerning Lord Esher.''

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, March 8, 1908.

"I tender Your Majesty my respectful thanks for the correspondence sent to me.

"The wording of Your Majesty's letter is such that in my most humble opinion publication would in itself have a favourable effect, but such publication would not be possible without simultaneous communication of Lord Tweedmouth's answer. This contains a premature communication in regard to the English naval programme. That might evoke disagreeable attacks in England against the present Government, whose unweakened continuance in office is desirable for us. But, apart from this, the exchange of ideas and relations generally between our own and the English Navy would be made more difficult, and Your Majesty's relations with the English Navy would be disturbed.

"Therefore we shall publish nothing without preliminary agreement with the English Government. We must for the moment await the statements to be made to-morrow in the English Parliament.

"The English Press is almost unanimous in its judgment of the action of *The Times*. Count Metternich telegraphs to-day:

"'To-day's papers, although most of them demand publication of the correspondence, do not follow *The Times* lead, but write in a moderate tone. The attempt of *The*

Times to make the incident an important international question is a complete failure.'

"Our own Press, with few exceptions, is dignified and calm."

To Count von Metternich,
Ambassador in London.

"Berlin, March 17, 1908.

"Many thanks for your interesting letter of the 8th instant. Now that the incident of the correspondence with Lord Tweedmouth has been brought to such a satisfactory conclusion in the English Parliament, and public opinion and the Press have been more or less calmed on the matter, I think that the raising of the question in the Reichstag, which must doubtless be expected, should not lead to unpleasant consequences. In any case, I hope that the correspondence affair, whatever Sir Ernest Cassel thinks, will not prejudice German-English relations.

"What you tell me of the fantastic English notions of our naval construction I think very much to the point. But if everybody on that side is convinced that our Fleet constitutes a danger for England, we must all the more exert ourselves to point out to the English, on every opportunity that offers, how unfounded and, indeed, senseless their anxiety is, not only for the present but also for the future. That this corresponds also to His Majesty's intentions has already been communicated to you elsewhere. The contents of the Imperial letter to Lord Tweedmouth seem to me well calculated to allay English anxiety with regard to our Fleet. Further material for this purpose is provided in the annexed article by Corvette-Captain (ret.) Capelle, '16 *Jahre Linienschiffsbau*' ('Sixteen Years of Battleship Building'). The supplement to the *Figaro* of the 8th instant by the publicist Gaston Calmette, known both as Germanophile and Anglophobe, is also worthy of note. It begins, '*En vérité voilà bien du bruit pour une omelette*,' and goes on to declare that the

English Press presents to the world a spectacle that would be described as ridiculous on that side of the Channel if it had been a question of any other country.

"I have given instructions that in future as much material as possible should be sent to you to combat the present ridiculous English anxiety about our Fleet. Meanwhile I entrust with complete confidence the necessary further handling of this delicate question in respect of our relations with England to your experience and skill, and I remain. . . ."

To the Emperor William II.

"Vienna, March 30, 1908.

"Most respectful thanks for your gracious telegram which I received here yesterday evening. What a pity that Jupiter Pluvius is making angry grimaces over Venice, while the said god is smiling in the pleasantest manner over more northerly Vienna.

"I have just come from His Majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph, whom I found better than I had expected. His Majesty, who has been keeping his room for some weeks and may not go out, has to spare himself. Mentally the Emperor was in good form. He summarized with astounding exactitude the different phases of the Macedonian problem. In warm words the Emperor expressed his thanks for the loyal and admirable support which Austria has found in Your Majesty in this and other questions. The Emperor hopes that the agitation evoked in Russia by the Sanjak Railway project will soon cease, and apparently ardently desires the continuation or the resumption of the *entente* with Russia on Balkan questions. The Emperor is looking forward with pleasure to Your Majesty's arrival in Vienna, and is pleased that Her Majesty the Empress will accompany you.

"What Your Majesty says about the new turn in the Balkan question is to the point. I tried as far as I could to strengthen Baron Aehrenthal in this attitude. He hopes that Isvolsky, after his vanity has been satisfied for the time being by the fuss and the various speeches in the Duma over the Sanjak Railway incident, will again draw nearer to Austria,

Hungary, and Germany, since Russia, in her present situation, has no interest in causing a catastrophe in Eastern Europe, and therewith, presumably, a general conflagration.

" I found Baron Aehrenthal distrustful of English schemes in the East, yet ardently desirous that our relations with England should gradually, but steadily, improve, since this is of supreme importance for Austria also, and for her especially. I threw out the suggestion whether Austria-Hungary should not try to win over France for a reasonable and conservative Balkan policy. France, which has milliards invested in Turkish securities, and still more milliards in Russian loans, had, I said, a very great interest in the continuance of Turkish rule.

" Baron Aehrenthal agreed, but he thought that at present the French were swimming in English channels, that every word said to a Frenchman would instantly be reported to London and, if possible, misrepresented, and would then arouse fresh mistrust and annoyance there. Baron Aehrenthal has no illusions about Italy, but desires the retention of office by Giolitti and Tittoni, who were both relatively intelligent persons and especially were not out for adventures in the East. Aehrenthal desires that the Porte should make economic concessions in Tripoli to the Italians, since it would be much better if the Italians turned their hopes for the future to Tripoli rather than that they should take a bite at Albania or turn to Irredentism.

" I replied to Baron Aehrenthal that this last point of view was certainly right, but that it would be difficult, in the Sultan's highly suspicious state of mind, to ask for satisfaction for Italy in Tripoli.

" All that Your Majesty was gracious enough to tell Tittoni about the Balkan question I find excellent.

" The Archduke Francis Ferdinand, on whom I waited yesterday, was very friendly. He expressed his lively and sincere thanks to Your Majesty for your kindness and friendship. His Imperial Highness knows very well that the Habsburg Monarchy has an interest in supporting Turkey, since, on the disruption of the Turkish Monarchy, National States would be formed which would not only by their democratic constitution set a bad example to the people of the Habsburg Monarchy, but would also exercise a dangerous attraction for the nationalities united under the Habsburg

sceptre. The Archduke's ideal is and remains the Triple Alliance. He complained of the Italian Irredenta, and almost more of the Serb intrigues in Bosnia, in Herzegovina, and even in Croatia. The Archduke presented me to Princess Hohenberg, whom I find charming, still pretty, ladylike, and tactful in manner and speech.

"At dinner at Aehrenthal's I met last evening the Austrian Prime Minister, Beck, and the Hungarian Prime Minister Wekerle. The latter confirmed what the Archduke Francis Ferdinand had told me about Serb intrigues in Bosnia and South Hungary. Wekerle gives the impression of being very intelligent: a Swabian Schläule [cunning old man] decked out with the sauce of the clever dialectic of a Hungarian parliamentarian. He said that all the Hungarian parties desired common action with Germany in the Hungarian interest. Baron Beck, too, seems to be a clever politician. When I remarked that ninety Socialists in the Austrian Imperial Diet elected at one blow immediately after the introduction of universal suffrage seemed to me rather serious, he pleaded their relative harmlessness in the Cis-Leithan provinces.

"Austrian Socialists would be less intransigeant than their German, and especially their North German, comrades; in particular they would, like all Austrians, be Monarchists; they appeared at the opening of Parliament in the Hofburg, and attended the Minister's parties like all the others. Beck, indeed, admitted that no lasting alliance could be made with the Socialists even in the Cis-Leithan provinces.

"I will give my wife Your Majesty's kind and gracious compliments to-morrow evening in Berlin, where I return to-morrow. I earnestly wish good weather and all good wishes for the journey."

To Count von Metternich,
Ambassador in London.

"Berlin, June 12, 1908.

"Accept my best thanks for your Report 559 of the 5th inst., which was very welcome to me, and which I have read with special interest. I have laid it before His Majesty

the Emperor, and His Majesty deigned to make the following marginal comments :

" (1) To ' they are building a great Fleet, and we fear that they will proceed with the same decision as in earlier decades of their history and that we are the object of their efforts ' : ' Wrong ! '

" (2) To the concluding words of the same paragraph : ' A fight with England which might be forced upon us, we should regard as a crime ' : ' Correct ! '

" (3) At the close of the whole report : ' Very Good.'

" We have felt it deeply that at the moment when the King of England was preparing to start on his journey to Reval some German papers should write tactless and vulgar articles (Society correspondence) on the King's person. We succeeded in preventing the publication of these disgraceful statements as far as possible. The more important papers have, without exception, declined them. But should they become known in England and commented upon, I beg you to point our that with us *freedom of the Press* has turned into *impudence of the Press*, and that the tone and attitude of our Press, especially of the papers depending on Society chatter, and the so-called comic papers, have become ruder to our own Emperor and our own Government than is the case in almost any other country. This phenomenon is a sad one, and is supremely disliked in all decent circles.

" On your explanations *re* the Bagdad Railway and Persia, I may observe that we have no intention of economic penetration in Persia, which might be disagreeable to the Russians and the English. Still less have we any intention of playing a political rôle in the Shah's realm. In this matter we are trying to have regard for the justifiable, and often for the unjustifiable, susceptibilities of both Powers and to avoid every appearance of meddling in the internal political situation of Persia. That cannot be unknown to the English Government ; if they maintain the contrary, they are acting against their better knowledge.

" Fears about the Bagdad Railway are unfounded and exaggerated. We do not at all exclude the idea of an understanding with Russia and England ; we only wish to keep the

lead in the work initiated by German enterprise. To conferences *à quatre*, such as England proposed last year, we shall not agree at the present political conjuncture."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, June 17, 1908.

"*Secret.*

"I most respectfully submit to Your Imperial and Royal Majesty in the annex to this letter an extremely confidential private letter from the Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, of the 12th instant, and a telegram from Ambassador Count Metternich of the 15th instant.

"There is no mistaking the fact that once more intrigue and agitation against us is going on in every hole and corner. I still think that England would be very unwilling, for economic and financial reasons, to go to war. I believe that Russia needs and desires peace. Finally, I think that France herself, though she is not yet consoled for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and of her *prépondérance légitime* of 250 years' standing on the Continent, and has not yet abandoned the idea of a *revanche*, would think very seriously before facing the incalculable chances of a war. But, at the same time, I also think that it is to the interest of those Powers to make us appear excitable and restless. Those are the tactics of our enemies, because every real or apparent threat from our side gives the French an excuse for further fortification of their Eastern frontier, the English an excuse for building more Dreadnoughts, and the Russians for placing more troops towards their western border. For this reason it is to be regretted that Your Majesty's speech at Döberitz, intended for officers only, has been, by an indiscretion, made known to wider circles. We must work at making the Army ready and capable for war as quietly as possible, but avoid anything which may attract unnecessary attention from outside to our task and expose us to new suspicions and intrigues."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"TRAVEMÜNDE, July 6, 1908.

"Ballin, to-day back from London, has been to see me. At my request he will seek out Your Highness in Norderney. Impressions in London favourable. City and commercial circles still absolutely against war, as before. Annoyance and displeasure over the King's journey and *Entente* business increasing. Tension between Ministry and King for the same reason. Sir Ernest Cassel did not know of the countermanding of the King's visit to me in the winter. . . . Cassel will do all he can to persuade the English Royal pair to visit Berlin. I let him know through Ballin that I shall not be back from the Baltic if His Majesty is passing through Germany to Marienbad.

"Ballin will tell you much that is interesting. He has managed the affair splendidly. I am starting to-day, weather permitting, and wish you a good summer. Best regards to the Princess.

"WILLIAM I.R."

TO COUNT VON POURTALÈS, AMBASSADOR IN ST. PETERSBURG.

"NORDERNEY, July 15, 1908.

"From an absolutely trustworthy person in close contact with the King of England we have learned that King Edward, in order to detach the Tsar from His Majesty the Emperor and to set him against our Imperial Master, told the former at Reval that the Sanjak Railway project had been hatched out by His Majesty the Emperor and suggested by us to the Austrians. His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas appears to have given credence to this calumny.

"Your Excellency knows from despatches from us that there is not a word of truth in this insinuation. His Majesty the Kaiser knew nothing at all about the Sanjak Railway project,

and first heard of the matter through the newspapers after Aehrenthal's well-known speech in the Delegations. The assertion that our Gracious Master engineered the matter in Vienna is a ridiculous fabrication, purely designed to render His Majesty the Emperor's policy suspect to the Tsar, in order thus to draw the Russian monarch completely into the English pale and to incite him against us. I, too, knew nothing beforehand of the Austrian action, and was therefore not able to exercise any influence. It is just as wide of the mark to maintain that Baron Marschall is the real originator of the Austrian plan and that he suggested it to the Vienna Government.

"Your Excellency will, through M. Isvolsky, ask for an audience with His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas and explain to the Russian monarch the real inwardness of the situation, making use of the interview of the correspondent of the *Novoe Vremya*, Jussanov, with me, so far as you may think it desirable to do so. I leave it to Your Excellency's proved tact whether to avoid mentioning King Edward in your interview, speaking instead of the 'English side,' or whether you should speak more plainly, if His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas in his reply gives you the required opportunity.

"Please tell the Russian Foreign Minister the reason and aim of your audience."

To the Emperor William II.

"Norderney, July 15, 1908.

"*Very Secret.*

"Your Imperial and Royal Majesty has my most respectful thanks for the gracious telegram from Odde. I am glad that Your Majesty had such a pleasant excursion, and hope sincerely that the weather will continue favourable.

"I am grateful to Your Majesty for having been so good as to ask Ballin to seek me out here. The conversation with him was extremely interesting, particularly as Ballin has given me detailed information of the relation between Your Majesty and His Majesty King Edward. Evidently the King is

laying himself out to annoy Your Majesty with all sorts of pin-pricks. Nothing amuses the King more, Ballin thinks, than when we show ill-temper. That the King regards as a sign of success.

"At the same time the King would like it to appear as if Your Majesty had been brusque with him. These tactics the King pushes deliberately and cleverly. Our tactics must be designed not to expose ourselves and to offer the King no possibility of accusing us with justice in any matter of fact or form. That applies indeed to the question of the visit. The King will be pleased if any annoyance is apparent on our side over the failure thus far to return Your Majesty's last year's visit to England. He would then conclude, with satisfaction, that he had succeeded in making us angry. We must, on serious political grounds, hope that the English visit to Berlin will take place. With this end in view Ballin also thinks an early meeting between Your Majesty and His Majesty the King very desirable as a prelude to the Berlin visit and for discussion of its details.

"In Ballin's opinion, it would be best if this meeting could take place while the King is on the way to Marienbad. If that is not at all possible the meeting would have to be arranged for his return journey from Marienbad. To Strassburg or Metz the King will not come. It would be a mistake to propose to him a meeting there, since the refusal which might be certainly expected would make him more popular than ever in France. Could a rendezvous perhaps be arranged in Homburg, Kronberg, or Baden-Baden, if it cannot be managed on the way out?

'Ballin is convinced that it is in the German interest to avoid a collision with England for the next few years, subject, of course, to maintaining our dignity: not only because time is on our side on account of the increase of our population, the strengthening of our defences, and the hoped-for strengthening of our finances, but also because, in all human probability, an element of unrest will be removed from the English clockwork in due course with the King, who is beginning to age. Ballin thinks that after the decease of His Majesty the King the earlier correct attitude of England will be renewed by Ministers in agreement with Parliament, when once the prepossessions and rancours of the Sovereign are excluded from their calculations. Hence the great importance of

getting over the next few years. '*Heute, heute lass Dich nicht fangen, so bist Du tausendmal entgangen.*'

"In Ballin's view the German-English tension and the danger of war rests primarily on the German naval construction and especially on the rate with which we are building battleships. To try to justify the building of these ships would only make public opinion in England still more mistrustful. But we should avoid all pomp and speechifying at the launching of ships which might draw attention to them. The Englishman is not like the German, who takes his ideas (if not from the depths of his own consciousness) from books and statistics; John Bull is impressed by what he actually sees before him. In any case the measure of our financial resources prevents our naval construction from assuming a magnitude which could mean aggression on a really vitally dangerous scale, and not merely an imaginary peril. We cannot simultaneously have the greatest Army and the greatest Fleet. We cannot venture on a rivalry in Dreadnoughts with England, who is so much richer than we are. The battleship disparity between ourselves and England will remain about the same for a long time.

"Ballin repeated the suggestion whether it would not be possible to reach an understanding with England on the scope and degree of naval armaments. In his opinion that would be easier with the Liberals than with the Conservatives, and it is therefore urgently desirable to come to terms with the former. . . .

"Ballin does not think the Russians will get much money in England; on the other hand, he thinks that King Edward will try to arrange for a new Russian loan in France and will succeed.

"What Ballin told me of the general economic depression is very interesting. Money now is as scarce in England and America as in Germany; for the moment it was only obtainable in France, because France was not over-developed industrially and because of the saving habits of the population. The English had come to grief with their Japanese investments.

"Ballin made some sensible remarks on our reforms in Imperial finance. He does not ignore the fact that it will be difficult to prosecute it in our present business position and under the influence of German party spirit. He indicates

it as one of the hardest tasks ever formulated. Even the new taxes would only stop up the gigantic hole, if simultaneously there were greater economy in all directions and in all offices. Everywhere in Germany there was too prodigal a spirit. We had gradually entered everywhere on ostentatious ways of life and business which could not continue. We must return to simpler and more frugal ways. . . ."

To the Emperor William II.

"Norderney, July 28, 1908.

"The foreign Press, hostile to Germany, is seeking to represent the present revulsion of feeling in Turkey as an English victory and a German reverse. English papers insinuate that we advised the Sultan in the sense of an early withdrawal of the Constitution.

"The day before yesterday, Councillor of Legation Helfferich, formerly of the Colonial Division, where he attracted Your Majesty's notice by excellent pamphlets on colonial political questions (cotton cultivation, etc.) and was decorated at Your Majesty's desire, visited me. He is now Director of the Deutsche Bank, and comes direct from Constantinople, where he worked for two years in the interest of the Bagdad Railway.

"Helfferich tells me that the whole of Islam, all respectable Turks, especially the loyal officers, saw in the Sultan's complete change of attitude the last possible means of saving Turkey, which in its present economic condition has been going to pieces. The first result of the change of policy would be a revival of Turkish national feeling, which would improve the position of Turkey in face of the attacks of Balkan nationalities and of certain Great Powers. In my most humble opinion, it is interesting that the official Paris *Temps* is already beginning to talk of the necessity for deferring indefinitely the Reform programme of the Powers, in view of the recent happenings in Constantinople.

"It also throws doubt on the eventual continuance of

Russian and English co-operation on the Golden Horn in face of these events. Russia has hitherto favoured the reactionary elements and combated reform in all the countries which she seeks either to weaken or to attach to herself (Poland, Sweden, the Balkan States, Persia). She has always taken the Old Turks under her wing in Turkey, and worked against economic and political reforms. I hardly think that Russia will be pleased at the change of front in Constantinople. But it should be doubtful whether an English Liberal Government can oppose Liberal and Constitutional ideas in Turkey.

"Leaving aside other suspicions, I beg humbly to inform Your Majesty that Herr von Kiderlen is instructed to express to His Majesty the Sultan at the next Selamlik (that is on Friday) Your Majesty's good wishes and the hope that the wise and statesmanlike action he has taken will promote the well-being and the strengthening of the Turkish Empire."

To Count von Metternich,
Ambassador in London.

"Norderney, Aug. 5, 1908.

"*Secret.*

"His Majesty the Emperor and King remarked on your Report No. 691 of the 16th ult., 'Bravo, Metternich!'

"The views put forward in your conversation with the Ministers, Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Lloyd George, were unquestionably the best. Moreover, your explanations had a favourable effect on Mr. Lloyd George, as his subsequent speeches have shown. Nevertheless, we should—this is emphasized by His Majesty in connection with your letter—be under no illusion as to the very delicate character of the question discussed with the two Ministers.

"The German people, like the English, are susceptible on questions affecting security, independence, and dignity. This susceptibility has been increased in our case by the unmistakable tendency of English policy to be on better terms with all other Powers than with Germany, and by the past disloyal and tendencious polemic directed against us

by a great part of the English Press, and also by the French Press, applauded and incited by England. If a foreign country were to demand from us one-sided limitation of our armaments by sea or land, no German Government would be able to reply with anything but an absolute refusal.

"The whole German nation would be united in shouldering any sacrifice, even a war on several fronts, rather than endure such an insult to its honour and its prestige. In this connection, I draw your attention to my speech in the Reichstag of April 30 of this year, in which I announced, with the concurrence of all parties, that we would not allow the level of our armaments to be prescribed by any other Power.

"What would the French say, or the English, if we were to try to force upon France an agreement on the ratio between Army strength and population, or a settlement on technical weapons or on the construction of frontier works? What would the Russians say if they were to have to arrange the distribution of the troops on their western frontier in accordance with our wishes? What would the whole world say if we tried to set up a Two-Power or even a Three-Power standard for our Army on which our fate rests, not less than England's on her Fleet, and at the same time forbade other Powers even to approach this standard?

"I am in complete agreement with your report that it is to German as well as English advantage to avoid a conflict which would have the most melancholy consequences from the political, economic, and social point of view for both nations, for Europe, and for the course of human civilization. With these considerations in mind, you have represented to the English Ministers that the indispensable preliminary to the desired understanding is the initiation of friendlier relations between England and Germany, and it will be your task to use your influence further in this direction. I leave it to you to decide whether it would be tactically right if you took any opportunity of remarking to influential persons in England that we built our ships purely for defensive purposes—that is to say, to meet the chance that England, in a war between Germany and France, might stand on the French side. For French aggression Germany must, unfortunately, always be prepared. But if England would promise neutrality in such a case it would

be naturally easier for us to adopt a still slower rate of naval construction.

"But, above all, your remarks will have served to indicate how completely unfounded in fact English alarm is. In our naval construction we are actually far behind England, and shall remain behind her for as long as one can see. In this connection, I draw attention to the last edition of *Nauticus*. We have, as His Majesty the Emperor again declared in Swinemünde, no intention at all of equalling England in battleship building or of even substanially approaching her level. The disparity between us and England in this respect will in any case remain as it is during the next few years, and probably for a very long time, perhaps permanently. We do not want to enter into a competition, into a rivalry of shipbuilding, with England. Admiral von Tirpitz has never had this idea. The idea of competitive shipbuilding against England was advocated by General Keim and some other enthusiasts in speeches and newspaper articles. This it was that induced His Majesty to take up the position he did in the Navy League crisis, and was the reason for General Keim's permission to retire.

"I hope that you will, as aforesaid, succeed in doing away with the really quite unfounded, and in Germany almost incomprehensible, English anxiety, enlighten the English on the real state of affairs, and prevent proposals which, if they were made in any comminatory form, would not be acceptable to the German people and the German Government. The question whether in the future mutual agreements between us and England on naval construction are possible cannot be answered with certainty to-day. The preliminary for such an agreement would be, in any case, a more friendly general policy on England's side towards Germany, regularly pursued over a considerable period. The further essential condition for entry into pourparlers of that kind is a definition of the line at which the English anxieties begin to take shape.

"If the execution of our present naval programme, which is conditioned and based on the defensive needs of our coasts and the dimensions of our trade, seems to the English to constitute a threat, alteration of this policy would be hardly possible, because the nation would not understand the abandonment of a moderate agreed programme

based, after mature deliberation, on these governing factors. But if the English reckon on the accomplishment of this programme as a *fait accompli*, and are only afraid of fresh German plans for naval construction, the further development of the idea of an understanding, initiated from the English side, is perhaps not to be excluded. Your reports will give me further information with regard to your observations there, without making the point the subject of official discussion. The discussion of the manifold difficulties of a political and technical nature which stand in the way of the English project of agreement can be deferred until then."

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To the Foreign Office.

"Norderney, Aug. 20, 1908.

"His Majesty telegraphed to me:

"'The suggestion for a milliard loan in England contained in the clipping from the *Daily Telegraph* of the 17th inst., submitted to me by the Foreign Office, interested me very much. On the English side it is certainly intended as a menace or a warning for us. But it need not be taken by us as such in any way. The idea which inspires this loan proposal—to offer an unattainable standard for any intended naval building rivalry on our side, that is to outbid us in the race on the financial side—is mistaken. We have a firm, limited programme, which has been public for many years. This is falsely decked out on the English side as competitive building, and an actual English competitive programme is being put forward, based on a competition they have themselves invented. The large sums of money necessary for this purpose are not to be a burden on the current Budget, and will escape as far as possible discussion in Parliament, with attendant recriminations against Germany. Hence the loan.

"'I think this idea from the English standpoint fully justified and very practical. It is a method purely English in character, and if it is thrown to us as a challenge we should not take it up, since the matter does not directly concern us. I wish, therefore, that our Press should take as little

notice as possible of the whole affair. If it is discussed at all, it should be discussed briefly and calmly, and in a business-like way, solely from the financial and not from the political point of view. As we maintain our right to regulate without restriction from outside our means of defence according to our estimated requirements, in this case the English may claim the same right.'

"I ask you to influence our Press as far as possible in the sense of the Imperial instructions."

To the Foreign Office.

"Norderney, Aug. 22, 1908.

"Please tell August Stein confidentially that he should on his own initiative, and without allowing the hand of the Foreign Office to appear, dissuade Lloyd George from visiting me. Reasons: his visit would naturally be known, and would be connected on both sides of the Channel with the naval programme. But the question of slowing down the rate of naval building is not yet ripe. Public opinion in Germany not yet prepared. By his visit, hopes would be raised in England that cannot for the moment be fulfilled, leading to harmful repercussions on public opinion. Also it would presumably injure his reputation in England, especially with the Opposition, if it was said that his efforts with the German Government had failed. Ask Stein to tell the Foreign Office, immediately after his conversation with Lloyd George, whether he succeeded in dissuading the English Minister from the idea of a visit, and telegraph the result to me."

To the Emperor William II.

"Norderney, Aug. 26, 1908.

"I thank Your Imperial and Royal Majesty most humbly for sending me the letters of Montague and Kerr, which I

have looked at with interest. From Your Majesty's marginal notes to my letter of the 13th inst., I see that Your Majesty is not in agreement with my view of the situation on many points. I beg Your Majesty not to doubt my support of Your Majesty's naval efforts not only with my head, but with my heart. I know that the creation of the German Fleet is the historical task laid on Your Majesty. I venture to draw attention to the fact that since 1897 I have emphatically supported all provision for the Navy publicly and behind the scenes, in full session of Parliament and in Committee, by word of mouth and in writing.

"Only a few days ago I read in an English review that the hostility of many Englishmen towards me was very justifiable, because I was one of the driving forces for the development of the German Navy, that I had persuaded the Reichstag to accept the Navy Supplementary Vote of 1899, and had also the last Navy Supplementary Vote on my conscience, since that would hardly have got through without the dissolution of the Reichstag of December 13, 1906, and without the inner group that emerged from it. I need not repeat that we must not yield under any circumstances to English pressure or an English menace. Weeks ago I indicated to our Press that they should take a firm line in this direction. The articles, which were commended by Your Majesty in this connection, were written at my request. Just because I have the execution and completion of our naval programme so much at heart, I desire to shelter the growing tree from the gathering storm which may uproot it.

"So far as I can see, there seems to exist a difference between Your Majesty's view and my respectful judgment of the situation on two points. Your Majesty believes that the English will not let it come to war with us. In this connection it is naturally difficult to prophesy. No one can hold out the certainty that the English will not attack. In contrast to many other people, I did not believe in an immediate danger of war in the autumn of 1904, when the English concentrated their Fleet in the Channel. I now think war indeed conceivable, if the English regard the continuation of naval armaments on this scale *ad infinitum* as certain. It is not only the agitators in England who have ideas of war. The discontent goes deeper than that. The visit of the English King and Queen, now announced

does not in itself constitute an unconditional guarantee for the immediate future. If the situation becomes more acute, indeed, the visit may never take place.

The situation with which we should be faced in the event of war is a serious one. If we have to deal with England only, she can do more harm to us than we to her. If France is drawn into the war, it means for us probably war on three fronts, for Russia will hardly remain neutral in that case. Even if the Tsar wished it, the Slav tendency in Russia would press for entry on the side of France. Kolmar von der Goltz thinks the value of the Turkish Army less than it was. He seems to think that the Bulgars alone would defeat it. The Turks, turned Liberal, who organize ovations in front of the English Embassy, will with difficulty be persuaded to undertake anything against England. Neither Marschall nor Metternich believe it to be possible. Revolt in India seems unlikely, since the only warlike element there, the Mohammedans, are loyal. The Fellahs in Egypt are a cowardly lot, from whom no uprising is to be expected.

"Metternich has declared to me in the most definite fashion that no threat has ever reached him from the English side. In his opinion the English will never threaten us. They only put out feelers to see if by any arrangement with us they might on their side be relieved of the necessity of a fresh powerful addition to their Navy. Failing such an arrangement, they would proceed with a new huge naval programme.

"Also it would, in Metternich's opinion, be quite wrong to tell the English we were now ready to enter on our official conversations on the matter. But we need not on that account cut off all hopes for the future. We could always repeat that our naval programme was moderate and fixed by law. If we categorically and for ever refuse *ab ovo* any understanding on naval construction, even in the numerous non-binding private conversations which every ambassador must conduct, then ill-humour in England will advance by geometrical progression; in that way a real danger of war will naturally arise, and, above all, England will build more than ever. Her resources in this field are greater than ours.

"The prospects of a peaceable development of affairs are bound up more or less with the Liberal Cabinet. A

fundamental and permanent change in public opinion and of policy in England must be represented to English Liberals as an essential to any future understanding; so long as the feeling in England is what it is to-day, there can be no talk of agreements, for we built precisely in defence against an attack by England, which, to judge by the language of the English Press, the state of feeling in England, and the tendencies of English policy, seems to be quite within the realm of possibility.

"In conclusion, I should like to say one thing. Your Majesty may be assured that if the storm that threatens on the other side of the Channel should break, my heart will not sink into my boots. I shall then do my best in Your Majesty's service to see that we, however the luck goes, *unseren Feinden viele Leichen vor die Füsse werfen*.[1] Your Majesty may know how I have done all that is possible to mould events that Your Majesty's lifework may be carried through with God's help. It is a question of getting over the next few years."

To Count Metternich,
Ambassador in London.

"Berlin, Sept. 22, 1908.

"His Majesty the Emperor related to me his conversation with Sir Charles Hardinge, but much more calmly than in his telegrams. The Emperor seems to have been agitated at Hardinge's making representations to him direct about our naval construction, and not without sharpness. I must say myself that it would have been more consonant with constitutional and diplomatic usage if Hardinge, instead of addressing himself to the Monarch, who could not be held responsible, had approached the Imperial Government direct or through Sir Frank Lascelles. Much asperity would have been thereby avoided. Confronted with this delicate question personally, the Emperor replied more bluntly than would otherwise have been the case. His

[1] It seems better to leave this strange and ugly phrase in the original. Literally, "throw many corpses before the feet of our enemies."

Majesty stated emphatically to me, as you already know from the Imperial marginal annotation, that we do not wish to exceed our present naval building programme, and could not for financial and military reasons, and that this programme in fact presents no danger to England.

"Tirpitz would not be indisposed to discuss the naval question with the English experts. But he does not know how he could visit England without arousing attention. He said to me confidentially, seriously and definitely, and indicating his responsibility before his country and before history, that he thought it quite incomprehensible how the English, whose superiority at sea is unattainable, not to say unshakable, by us, could fear a German attack. Tirpitz seemed to me absolutely disinclined to come to an understanding with the English on naval construction. He merely said that the existing programme, laid down by law, could hardly be modified, since all the bourgeois parties in the Reichstag and public opinion would not understand it. Also English policy must show a more friendly tone towards us in the diplomatic field and in the Press, for the German people would never consent to anything which could be ascribed to outside pressure. If there were first of all a *détente* between Germany and England, the question could then be worth considering, and perhaps not insoluble, whether both countries could not come to an understanding on naval building and thereby do away with their mutual fears."

THE EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH OF AUSTRIA
TO THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

"BUDAPEST, Sept. 29, 1908.

"My Dear Friend,

"Recent events in Turkey, which led to the restoration of constitutional conditions, have not been without repercussion on the provinces administered by my Government, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

"If these provinces, which have developed culturally and materially in a gratifying way, have expressed for some

considerable time a desire for constitutional institutions, these aspiration have, in view of the altered situation in the Osmanli Empire, now taken such an emphatic form that my Government does not think it can continue to resist them if the peaceful development of affairs on the southern frontier of the monarchy is to remain secure against disturbance.

"Since the sovereign power alone can proceed to the granting of a constitution, I shall see myself compelled to declare the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

"We are acquainting the Imperial Ottoman Government with the position of affairs, and simultaneously are informing them that, in proof of our eminently peaceful policy, which rejects any idea of territorial acquisition in the Balkans, we are withdrawing our garrison troops in the Sanjak, and that in future we renounce the exercise of the privilege provided for us in the Berlin Treaty in respect of the Sanjak of Novi Bazar.

"I regard it as due to the close personal friendship and the political friendship as Allies, which unites us, to inform you of this event without delay. You will, I am sure, judge it with friendly benevolence and will not fail to appreciate that we have acted under the pressure of inexorable necessity.

"Your faithful friend,

"Francis Joseph."

To the Acting Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, Stemrich.

"Norderney, Sept. 30, 1908.

"Herewith an important letter from Aehrenthal, which I should not like to submit to His Majesty without comment. In my covering note to this letter, of which I desire a draft, we should have to draw attention to the principal points in it. In raising the following points, I would expressly urge that if any objection might be taken in that quarter to this or that comment of mine, I beg you to bring it to my notice.

"The proposed annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria might, of course, furnish the signal for the union

of Crete with Greece, and for a declaration of independence by Bulgaria. But after Aehrenthal had assured himself of Russian concurrence and in the present state of Europe, we cannot oppose Austria's desires. Our position would then become really serious, if Austria lost confidence in us and swerved from our side. So long as we both stand together, we form, like the old German Federation, a block which no one will lightly venture to assail. It is just in important Eastern questions that we cannot well put ourselves into opposition with Austria, which has closer and greater interests in the Balkan Peninsula than ours. A refusal or even a hesitating and quibbling attitude in the question of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina would never be forgiven by Austria. In the possession of these two provinces, the old Emperor Francis Joseph, and official Austria with him, sees compensation for the loss of Italy and Germany.

"We must, then, accept Aehrenthal's communication without pretended *empressement*, but with calm and clear assent, and let it be seen that our assent arises from our absolute trustworthiness where Austria is concerned. In the Emperor's reply to the Emperor Francis Joseph we can perhaps insinuate the idea that Baron Aehrenthal's prudence and skill certainly succeeded in carrying out the annexation in a manner not too hurtful to Turkish self-respect, and so that it should not be taken by the Balkan States as an encouragement to hostile proceedings against the Turkish Empire. But that must in any case be cautiously expressed and only on the ground of a conservative peace policy.

"Aehrenthal asks an audience for Szögyényi for October 5th or 6th. Will His Majesty have returned by then from Rominten, or does His Majesty give audiences to ambassadors at Rominten? Szögyényi is very inquisitive. It is advisable that His Majesty should not make any statement in the audience to Szögyényi about the annexation question or the world situation, but should say he will read the Emperor Francis Joseph's letter with the sentiments of close friendship and respect which he feels for the venerable gentleman, and reserve his answer.

"The Straits question. Here I might reply to Aehrenthal that I also am convinced of the identity of our own and Austria's interests in Constantinople, and would therefore

willingly be prepared to act in concert with Austria in the further negotiations on this important and delicate point.

"From Aehrenthal's letter it further appears that relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia have again very much improved. The Sanjak Railway incident seems to have been overcome. Certainly latent and profound differences exist between the two Empires. But both sides are obviously willing, by following an unimpassioned policy, not to allow the differences to be accentuated.

"The Young Turk movement, which the Russians regard with antipathy and the Viennese with scepticism, draws the two Imperial Powers for the moment nearer together. Moreover, relations with Italy are handled by Aehrenthal much more cautiously than by his predecessor. Aehrenthal's idea of attracting Spain nearer to the Triple Alliance is right and deserves support. In spite of the dependence of the Spaniards on the French money market and on the English Court, they should, for monarchical reasons, not quite lose their sympathy with the Triple Alliance.

"Aehrenthal's letter also breathes his hatred of Serbia. His Majesty knows from the (very secret!) communication from Aehrenthal to Schoen that Aehrenthal is playing with the idea of throwing Serbia into the jaws of Bulgaria on a suitable occasion.

"Aehrenthal seems to think that the bell will toll for Turkish dominion in Europe at no distant date. Since he does not wish to see the Russians on the Balkan Peninsula, and cannot permit the emergence of a great Serb realm, stretching its tentacles as far as Laibach, Cilli and Trieste, an expansion of Bulgaria seems to him the most desirable eventuality. He indeed goes on the assumption that a Great Bulgaria would, in the nature of things, fall into opposition to Russia. From the Austrian standpoint, much is to be said for this view. But Austria should simultaneously take care that the Rumanians do not come off badly, since they form a useful make-weight against the Slav peoples in the Balkans. Even the Greeks deserve some consideration from this point of view.

"What Aehrenthal says of our relations with England sounds very serious. His Majesty's attention must be drawn to that. Clemenceau was obviously speaking under the

influence of what he had heard in Karlsbad from King Edward, and King Edward was under the influence of his visit to Friedrichshof and the conversation which took place there between His Majesty and Hardinge. I would also like to suggest to His Majesty how injuriously German-English relations must be affected once more by the violent renewed agitation of the Navy League. *Cui bono?* Nothing disturbs and annoys the English more than the idea that we mean to build ships *ad infinitum*. At home exaggerations of this kind do not help financial reform, but tend rather to make it more difficult, because they make people think that even the great sacrifices which are now being demanded from the taxpayer are but drops in the bucket against naval plans of that kind, when we also have to provide for the Army, social services, education, etc. The situation tends more and more towards a smoothing-out of the relations between all the Powers; only between us and England does the divergence become more acute on account of the naval question, but by the side of England stands France, and by France, Russia.

"*Ad vocem* Goltz, I should like to say, further, that he must in any case express his opinion of the chances of the Turks in a collision between Turks and Bulgars. We should not send a Prussian general to a foreign country for him to be beaten there. It would be a good thing for the Turks to engage a prominent Frenchman for their finances and, if possible, an Englishman for their Fleet, before they let Goltz come.

"I have noted with satisfaction that our Press is handling the Casablanca incident remarkably calmly. The speed with which French and English, English and Russians, Russians and Austrians, have agreed shows that, in spite of their former most acute differences, really dangerous differences are only aroused when the Press or too tricky diplomacy poisons their relations. It would be useful if our Press took this opportunity to point out how wrong it is that more Germans should be joining the French Foreign Legion. Would any foreigner join our colonial force? That should be stigmatized and further warnings given. I beg you also to consider with Loebell whether our penalty for recruiting should not be increased.

"I beg you to despatch the draft for my covering note

to His Majesty as soon as possible. When this covering note comes back from His Majesty, a copy must be taken of my letter and of Aehrenthal's communication to me, which His Majesty will certainly return for the archives; this, together with this letter of mine, must be laid before the Secretary of State. The originals of Aehrenthal's letter, and of mine to His Majesty, I beg him to return. I leave it to your judgment when and how I should answer the Aehrenthal letter. If the moment for it appears to you to have come, please submit a draft to me.

"P.S.—Exaggerations by the *Flottenverein* [Navy League] would only be harmless if we intended to come to an understanding with England on naval construction. In this case, such excesses of the Navy League could be used to tell the English: your and our Navy cranks ask the impossible, but we are ready to come to an understanding with you over a reasonable limitation of construction on both sides. But if we have no such intention, Navy League demonstrations of that kind are directly dangerous, and doubly so now, when not a landlubber, like Salm, but a Grand Admiral, presides over the Navy League."

OBSERVATIONS FROM THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

"Oct. 12, 1908.

"Aehrenthal's action takes on more and more the aspect of an ensign's escapade. He said nothing to us; he gave such veiled intimations to Isvolsky and Tittoni that they regard themselves as completely duped; he left the Sultan, whom it most concerns, entirely out of account; laid his Master open to the charge of concerting the affair with the treaty-and-peace-breaker Ferdinand; brought the Serbs to fever-heat; annoyed Montenegro extremely; incited the Cretans to revolt; threw our Turkish policy, carefully built up over a period of twenty years, on to the dust-heap; angered the English and helped them to occupy the position we had won in Stamboul; bitterly annoyed the Greeks by his Bulgarophile tendency; tore the Berlin Treaty to pieces and confused the Concert of the Powers in the most

dangerous way; upset the Hungarians, because Bosnia ought to have been annexed to them; enraged the Croats, because they intend annexation to themselves. For total achievement it constitutes a European record which no diplomat has ever yet reached.

"He is certainly *not* a far-seeing *statesman*. We must endeavour in this muddle to get back to a better footing with England. That can be done by the Straits question—if it should arise—if we support their standpoint benevolently, and demand the opening of the Straits for all Powers, not for Russia only. Rumania, as a border State (on the Black Sea) will also desire that. But this question must first be privately discussed with Turkey, and Marschall must take soundings. England and Germany are the two Great Powers who were apparently not informed beforehand in the whole uproar, and they therefore have a free hand and should come to an understanding. All the more so as both desire the welfare of Turkey.

"WILLIAM I.R."

TO COUNT VON METTERNICH,
AMBASSADOR IN LONDON.

"BERLIN, Oct. 13, 1908.

"Best thanks for your interesting telegrams. Austria-Hungary declares that it is not consonant with her dignity for the Bosnian question to be discussed at a conference. We must support our Ally in this view. Moreover, according to the latest news, it appears to be not impossible that Austria-Hungary may come to an understanding with Turkey over the Bosnian question, by which Austria-Hungary, on the assumption that it is merely a question of a formal act of ratification, will perhaps agree to a conference. In our view a preliminary condition for a conference is that its aim should be unity among the Powers, not only upon the agenda, but also in the solution of all questions.

"*For your purely personal information.* I wonder whether a conference would really correspond with our interest. We and Austria-Hungary would, presumably, be constantly outvoted by Russia, England, France, and Italy. I don't



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Count von Metternich.

p. 266

believe in danger of war in the East. Russia is not in a position to stand up to the excellent Austro-Hungarian Army, the war-shouting of Serbia and Montenegro is not to be taken seriously. Perhaps it is better for the world to be intensively occupied for a time with Eastern questions than if Morocco or, indeed, the German-English difference were to occupy the foreground. Further, I note expressly our honest desire to mitigate the last-named, on which I am in agreement not only with His Majesty the Kaiser, but with Admiral Tirpitz.

"In England they continue to have completely mistaken ideas alike on our Navy plans and our supposed Machiavellian policy. We join with England in the wish to maintain the existence of the Turkish Empire. Our loyal support of Austria-Hungary, our ally of thirty years' standing, cannot be taken amiss by England, as she herself has given her full support to France in the much more dubious Morocco question.

"Do you think the moment is favourable to ask England to meet our views on the Bagdad Railway as a kind of compensation for our agreement to the idea of a conference?

"Tell Isvolsky that I anticipate his visit to us with pleasure and lively interest."

To Herr von Tschirschky,
Ambassador in Vienna.

"Berlin, Oct. 13, 1908.

"On my return from Norderney yesterday I hastened to confer on the present situation with M. von Szögyényi, who intends leaving for home in a few days. I spoke to the Imperial and Royal Ambassador to the following effect:

"The slight displeasure which he sensed in our most Gracious Master when he had the honour of delivering, while at Rominten, the Emperor Francis Joseph's letter, announcing the decision for the absorption of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the evacuation of the Sanjak, was at an end. Moreover, it had been owing to the circumstance that, by an extraordinary coincidence, a similar communication had reached the President of the Republic in Paris a few days

earlier. I had yesterday the opportunity of a prolonged talk with His Majesty the Emperor and King, and was now in a position to say that His Majesty fully appreciated the standpoint, and shared the view that I had taken from the first day, that we had neither occasion nor had we any inclination to submit the action of our Ally to criticism, but had the firm intention of supporting and continuing to support her in fulfilment of our obligations as an ally. And, even in the event of emergence of difficulties and complications, our ally could rely upon us. I found difficulty in believing that serious complications could arise.

"A hostile or even warlike attitude was not to be feared from Russia, since she required calm and peaceful development after the serious shocks she had experienced. England was probably little inclined to fire a single shot over the Eastern question. I felt certain that France did not desire war at all, least of all over Eastern events. The ill manners of the Serbs and Montenegrins would not, as I see it, indeed, be taken tragically in Vienna. But however events might develop, our ally might be assured that we should not allow ourselves to be influenced in our behaviour as allies, either by Clemenceau's anxieties mentioned to me in Baron Aehrenthal's last letter, nor by certain measures taken by the Russians on our Eastern frontier. His Majesty the Emperor and King, whose friendship for the revered Emperor Francis Joseph is well known, remains unshakable in his loyalty to his Imperial ally.

"As for the congress idea, we found Baron von Aehrenthal's standpoint not only comprehensible, but also correct. It would not beseem the dignity of the Habsburg monarchy if she admitted that her decisions taken to meet the situation should be submitted to the criticism and the decision of a congress. Participation by Austria-Hungary in a congress could, we were also convinced, only follow on the assumption that His Majesty had reached a previous agreement with Turkey on the sovereignty of His Apostolic Majesty in Bosnia and Herzegovina. How far this was possible at present could not yet be decided; in any case we were ready to support the wishes and the efforts of Austria-Hungary. Also I had already taken steps to convince the Turks that it was only a question of finding a pretext for the eventual absorption of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that

it did not seem to us comprehensible that it should conjure up complications on a matter of pure form and so disturb not only their good relations with Austria-Hungary, but also with us.

"In the closest confidence I added to my interlocutor: against a congress or a conference there was also the circumstance that a meeting of this kind might on other questions take a course unwelcome to Austria-Hungary and to us. It lay quite within the realm of probability that a grouping of the Powers might take place in which Russia, England, France, and perhaps also Italy, might range themselves on one side, and Austria-Hungary and Germany on the other. Thus we would be easily outvoted by the others.

"In my view it was certainly not advisable publicly to adopt a standpoint of refusing in principle. Still less was it indicated to show any eagerness. Rather it seemed to me wise, when we were asked to express an opinion, to say that the meeting of a conference would only seem to be useful if previously complete unity had been reached between the Powers on all the questions to be discussed, so that it would have to deal merely with formal ratification. But it was a long way to the attainment of this object.

"It seemed to me desirable that the recognition of the situation created in Bulgaria should not take place until compensation was forthcoming to make good to Turkey the loss she had suffered. A natural preliminary would be a settlement of the railway question on lines satisfactory both to Turkey and to the company concerned. Th e demands were justified not only by reasons of political morals, but also—and that had the greatest weight with us—by the circumstance that Turkey's creditors would suffer substantial injury by an unsatisfactory solution of the railway question and inadequate attention to the tributary relation between Turkey and Eastern Rumelia. The strength of our friendly policy towards Austria-Hungary would be considerably increased in the Parliament, and in the public opinion of our own country, if the policy of the monarchy remained carefully thought-out so that German economic interests were not injured.

"I beg Your Excellency to be kind enough to express yourself without delay to Baron Aehrenthal in the sense of the foregoing. If circumstances should demand it,

Your Excellency would go to Budapesth for this purpose. I beg you also to express to Baron Aehrenthal my most sincere thanks for his kind and valuable letter, and to tell him that I reserve for myself the pleasure of referring to it in detail as soon as the excessive demands on my time by pressing foreign and domestic business permit."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH.

"BERLIN, Oct. 14, 1908.

"My Dear Friend,

"I thank you heartily for the kind letter in which you were kind enough to inform me of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I am well able to appreciate the reasons which induced you to take this important step; in this question also you can rely on my unalterable friendship and respect as on the close friendly alliance which unites our Empires. The annexation will certainly prove a benefit to the two provinces, which have developed so excellently under your administration.

"Your decision simultaneously to withdraw the garrisoning in the Sanjak of Novi Bazar and for the future to renounce the exercise of the privileges obtained by you in the Berlin Treaty with regard to this Sanjak I regard as a wise measure with which I am in complete agreement. This step will certainly have a good effect, as it gives proof of the peaceful nature of your intentions and will make it easier for Turkey, support and consideration for whom is equally in the interest of our two allied Empires, to acquiesce in the new order of affairs.

"Your faithful friend,

"WILLIAM I.R."

TO THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

"BERLIN, Oct. 22, 1908.

"*Secret.*

"M. Isvolsky is evidently coming to Berlin with the idea of eliciting from us statements of which he could make use

in London, Vienna, Constantinople, and also with the distrustful Tsar. Therefore I have considered in detail with Herr von Schoen what we should say to him. The subject is dealt with in two memoranda which I submit to Your Imperial and Royal Majesty in the annex to this letter with the request that Your Most Gracious Majesty will let me know whether you agree.

"M. Isvolsky naturally harbours the hope to hear much that is sensational about the Eastern situation and our relations to other Powers, in order to turn it and make use of the material as seems good to him. Since there is no occasion for us to lift Isvolsky out of the morass into which he has walked, I humbly venture to suggest that Your Majesty should consider whether it would not be advisable for Your Majesty to say nothing of importance to him about politics, but simply to refer him to the Secretary of State and to me with the remark that Your Majesty is not particularly interested in the special questions under consideration.

"Moreover, it would in my most humble opinion be advisable that Your Majesty should handle M. Isvolsky personally with calm friendliness, so that he cannot play the part of a martyr. It would naturally be very flattering for the vain man if Your Majesty were to say that Your Majesty hoped that Isvolsky would long remain in office, but that if at any time he had to resign, he must come to Berlin as Ambassador.

"ANNEX I

"General Considerations

"(1) We have no fundamental disinclination for or objection in principle to the idea of a conference. Nevertheless, an essential condition for the conference would be previous *complete* unity between the Powers on *all* the questions to be discussed.

"(2) We have neither inclination nor occasion for retrospective criticism of the Austro-Hungarian action. Austro-Hungary is an independent Great Power, pursuing an independent Balkan policy. It is a mistake to criticize every Austro-Hungarian step.

"(3) Firm and honest support for Austria-Hungary, our constant ally, is demanded of us for reasons of loyalty and of

good sense. Austria-Hungary has acted after consulting the necessities of her situation.

"(4) We have less reason now than before to range ourselves on the side of Turkey, since England has taken Turkey under her special protection and is more Turkish than the Turks. In default of *direct* political interest in Turkey, any policy is possible for us there, naturally with reservations on our important economic interest.

"(5) Satisfaction in Russia's decision not to claim any compensation for herself.

"(6) In the Straits question we have no primary interest. Our attitude to this question depends upon the general situation and the grouping of the Powers and their attitude towards us. Russia knows that we shall not combat her Straits policy; but it is too much to ask that, in the present grouping of the Powers, we should give her active support and so embarrass our friends and allies. Russia's ally, France, does not desire any infringement of full Turkish sovereignty either in the Sanjak or in the Straits.

"(7) The guaranteeing of the European dominion of Turkey seems to us an idea whose execution is in the general interest as it is in the interest of peace.

"(8) Fundamentally we are glad to have been informed so late by Isvolsky. In this way we have no responsibility and a free hand.

"(9) The Turks have already put themselves in communication with Austria-Hungary and Turkey, and that, so far as Bulgaria is concerned, on French advice."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Oct. 30, 1908.

"I am sending Your Imperial and Royal Majesty with this a number of newspaper articles on the interview which Colonel Stuart Wortley has published on the basis of the conversation which he had with Your Majesty.

"The English Press for the most part comments on the interview in sceptical, critical, and unfavourable terms. Englishmen of authority like Lord Roberts and Sir Edward Grey have refused to express themselves at all regarding this interview. The French and Russian papers avail themselves

of the occasion to indulge in heated attacks upon Your Majesty and upon the policy of Germany. What is more, the German Press, with a few very slight exceptions, is of the opinion that through the interview our policy and our country will be grievously injured.

"The attacks of the German newspapers are unjust, for Your Majesty had the grace to send me, through the Minister Baron von Jenisch, the remarks of the English author for me to examine. I was at Norderney at the time, with a great mass of important questions to attend to (the Eastern Crisis, Imperial Finance Reform, and other home matters), and therefore I did not myself read Colonel Wortley's long composition, which was very illegibly written on poor paper, but sent it on to the Foreign Office for examination. In doing so I gave strict instructions that the article should be most carefully examined in regard to its possible effects and that I should be informed where alterations, additions, and omissions seemed necessary. The Foreign Office returned the English manuscript with a report in which it suggested some small alterations, while making no kind of serious objection to its publication. The Councillor of the Foreign Office engaged in such duties who was staying with me wrote to the Minister Baron von Jenisch in the sense of this report.

"If I myself had taken cognizance of the manuscript I would have requested Your Majesty not to give permission for its publication at the present moment. If Your Majesty disapproves of my conduct in not having examined the English manuscript myself in the pressure of other matters on my mind, and if you make the lack of caution shown by the Foreign Office a subject of complaint against me, I beg you respectfully to release me from my post. If, however, I have not lost Your Majesty's confidence, I can remain on only if I am enabled to meet the unjust attacks upon my Imperial Master openly and emphatically. I must therefore ask Your Imperial and Royal Majesty's gracious permission to say officially in the *Norddeutschen Allgemeine Zeitung* that the attacks brought against Your Majesty in a great portion of the Press are entirely unjust, that Your Majesty sent me the manuscript of the English author, that I had it sent on to the Foreign Office, and that the latter had suggested only slight alterations."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"ECKARTSAU, Nov. 5, 1908.

"*Quite Private.*

"In previous conversations, in which I acted the part only of listener, Franz Ferdinand dealt in a very spirited way with the Annexation question. He has taken a hand in the whole thing, and a very active hand. He is full of recognition for Baron von Aehrenthal, whom, it seems, he sought out himself. Extraordinarily warm in his opinion of the attitude we have taken and of our fidelity as an ally—almost enthusiastic; very severe on King Edward VII and England; crushing in his judgment of Count Mensdorff, whom he will get rid of —he may become 'His Majesty King Edward's Ambassador in Vienna!' for he represents only the latter's interests.

"Isvolsky, he said, was regarded with hatred and contempt. Recently a *secret* Mission was sent to him (the Archduke Franz Ferdinand), through which the promise was made him that good friendship would always be maintained with Austria, and that *no man* would be set against Austria by Russia as a result of the present somewhat warlike development (Serbia). Baron von Beck, he said, is a dead man and will soon make way for Herr von Bienerth. *Weidmannsheil!* [1] . . .

"WILLIAM I.R."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"VIENNA, Nov. 6, 1908.

"*Very Secret.*

"The Archduke said he had received despatches during the night telling about the Austrian Ambassador's reception by the Tsar. The Ambassador had had to wait four weeks before he could deliver the Emperor Francis Joseph's letter. In the Russian Foreign Office the excuse was given that a search had had to be made in the archives for the Articles of the

[1] A huntsman's greeting or farewell.

Treaty, which could not be found at first. When he received the Ambassador the Tsar confined himself to drawing-room talk and spoke about the weather. Not a single word about politics. The Archduke characterized this behaviour as most improper [*ungehörig*].

"Direct negotiations with Turkey have been striven for, in order to avoid a conference. The Archduke claims to be a friend of Turkey and holds it to be important that Turkey be strengthened and supported. Bosnia and Herzegovina are to be administered as an Imperial Province in the way we administer the *Reichsland* [Alsace-Lorraine]. He declared he was very glad that everything had gone so well, thanks to our loyal attitude, to which he could not do justice enough. Only one thing annoyed him, namely, that the Bulgar had made his *coup* simultaneously; it was improper that he should now be always mentioned and quoted along with His Majesty the Emperor; that should have been avoided.

"The two days here passed very harmoniously and brightly, thanks to his pleasant ease of manner and cordial friendliness. He sent you his special greetings. The hunt went off brilliantly, he arranging everything himself and taking the lead personally. I brought down 65 stags.

"I have the impression that there are no warlike developments imminent, unless Serbia and Montenegro be completely mad.

"Best thanks for your friendly telegram, just received. I remember you always in my morning and evening prayer. '*Er half uns durch allen Menschenhass und Neid doch durch!*' 'There is a silver lining to every cloud.' God be with you, in old and faithful friendship.

"WILLIAM I.R."

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE IMPERIAL NAVY, VON TIRPITZ.

"BERLIN, Nov. 30, 1908.

"*Secret.*

"I thank Your Excellency most warmly for your communication of the 25th inst., and return you herewith the article from the *Saturday Review* of September 11, 1897,

which was enclosed. I have brought the contents of this article to the attention of the Imperial Ambassador in London. In the Reichstag on the 19th of this month I had used these precise words:

"'And is it, then, so unnatural that our economic expansion, due to the growth of our population and to our productive powers, should have changed the once friendly feeling of the English people—at least in the case of a section of the English people—into mistrust or have imbued it with a certain misgiving?'

"In these words I gave expression to an opinion on the cause of the German-English antagonism which corresponds with Your Excellency's views. My remarks on the subject, however, have called forth hot rejoinders, not only from the anti-German *Times*, but even from the Liberal *Westminster Gazette*, which is not unfriendly to Germany. I enclose the articles in question.

"In the meantime Lord Roberts' motion, of which there has been talk, has been under debate in the House of Lords. Even if Lord Roberts may have exaggerated his disquietude in regard to a German invasion, the voting has shown that a large section of the English peers followed him in a field—universal military service—which is very unpopular in England. The 'free' English regard universal military service as a degrading institution of the Continent. It will by its expense call for new taxes. It will also affect English habits and customs in the most unpleasant fashion in this, that it will restrict the freedom of movement of the men of military age, who in England very often desire to go to the Colonies while still quite young. If the Peers have supported so unpopular a Bill by a great majority, one cannot resist the thought that a great number of them must stand in fear of serious danger of their country.

"Everyone who has been in England latterly agrees that in point of fact, however unjustified it may be, there prevails a great alarm in regard to a possible attack by the German Fleet. In 1897 such an article as that in the *Saturday Review* was an exception—such an abnormality that it is still remembered now, twelve years later. On the other hand, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that malicious articles against Germany are now the order of the day in all the English newspapers, Conservative, Liberal, and Radical. If Ministers

who have been schooled in diplomacy express themselves more cautiously, cries of alarm in respect to the German danger are being given out loudly and publicly not just once in a way, but repeatedly by Ministers, Members of Parliament, and officers. . . .

"An eloquent piece of evidence in the same direction is to be found in the persistent questions and debates in Parliament regarding the Navy, the Two-Power standard, etc. I append copies of two despatches on the subject from Count Metternich, dated the 24th and 25th inst. I am also sending for Your Excellency's consideration a highly-thought-of article from the *Standard*, a thoroughly serious organ, wherein the idea of a preventive war is energetically put forward. Fear of our Fleet and of our plans for developing it persists in England. It is unjustified, but it is a fact with which we have to reckon. Moreover, the idea of a preventive war clearly expressed in the *Standard*—the idea, that is, of an English attack on Germany, before it be too late—is not new; it has been put forward repeatedly in the English Press. It is to be expected that in all probability this idea will gradually take possession of the English people, just as their feeling of mistrust in regard to our intentions in building up our Fleet has taken root with them. Bearing in mind the tenacity with which the English fasten on to such an idea once it has become generally accepted, I must as a responsible statesman take into serious consideration the question how we are to act if confronted with such a contingency. I am, therefore, taking it on myself to submit to Your Excellency, to whom it now falls as authoritative expert in the matter to furnish a reply, the question whether, if it came to a sudden clash of arms, Germany and the German people could meet an English attack with calm and confidence."

To Count von Metternich,
Ambassador in London.

"Berlin, Dec. 11, 1908.

". . . In the Reichstag I have avoided as long as possible speaking on the Disarmament question, although it has been

dealt with exhaustively or been touched upon by all the speakers. I had to answer a direct question from the side of the Liberals. In doing so I was at pains in the first instance to avoid even mentioning England, and I went on to point out that our geographical position pointed to the need of a strong Army *on land*, and that for this reason, and owing to our expansive social policy which is already so far advanced, our armaments on the sea were restricted and could have for aim only the defence of our coast.

"I beg you, in order to ensure a proper understanding of my speech, to make use of what I have here told you about its occasion, and to make known also what I said yesterday to Goschen, who dined with me. I explained to Goschen that our Fleet-building plan, as you are aware, has been fixed legally; that it has pased the Reichstag and the Bundesrat [the Federal Council]; that the Government is committed to it, and could, therefore, with difficulty do anything against it—at all events, directly; but that latterly many different kinds of technical and financial considerations had been brought forward—some of them in the Reichstag—which made it necessary to deliberate whether it were well to build so many big ships at once as were provided for by the law.

"Should the Reichstag be influenced by these considerations, at least the speed at which the building will proceed would be lessened, I said. I would gladly lend a hand in this direction.

"I enclose a verbatim report of my speech.

"Make all this known wherever you think proper. I hope it will have a reassuring effect and in any case serve to prove the loyalty of our policy."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"NEW PALACE, Dec. 13, 1908.
11.30 a.m.

"Your Serene Highness,

"Herewith I send you a transcript—made by my aide-de-camp—of a report received by me this morning written by

the Naval Captain von Hintze on the situation in Russia and the chances of an outbreak of war.

"The report is written with the acuteness, logic, and clearness which characterize all his communications regarding Russia and the people and conditions of the country. I believe he is right in what he tells about the trains of thought he describes and the conclusions they lead to in the different Russian circles in question.

"The report presents also an interesting foil to the telegram which you sent me yesterday evening. Now we know the grounds on which the demands for the freedom of the Straits has been built up, and why the Austrian bid in respect to Batoum has not come off.

"Of importance is the statement that in London they so snubbed Benckendorff over the Straits that he even began to think of withdrawal. Naturally it had to come to this, for England has now undertaken energetically the support of the Young Turks—and thereby the strengthening of Turkey. For this is the exact opposite to Russian wishes and interests: these for centuries past have aimed at the gradual weakening of the Ottoman Empire, and an opening of the Dardanelles is in full accordance therewith.

"It is clear that the *Tsar now* identifies himself with the wishes of Isvolsky and of a majority of his subjects in regard to the opening of the Straits, and that the conference is merely a veil.

"And thus the stone of the Straits question has been set rolling and will now with difficulty be stopped. All that remains for us to do now is to make a way clear for it and take care that it shall not knock up against anyone and do damage. How is this to be done?

"We knew already from their own utterances that Aehrenthal had already discussed the Straits question with Isvolsky. Also that, generally speaking, there is in Austria no objection to handling this question in a way favourable to Russia's wishes. England has snubbed Russia and suggested direct negotiations with Turkey. Turkey—whether of her own accord or by the advice of England does not matter—has not wanted to hear anything about it. France sits in a dilemma between London and St. Petersburg and seeks to mediate. Italy wobbles this way and that, hoping to get 'compensation' one way or the other. The highest bidder will have her

support. That is the situation. Originally a conference was to be called 'to investigate the changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the independence of Bulgaria, as well as to handle other questions affecting the Balkan countries': *i.e.*, it was to effect a revision of several Articles in the Treaty of Berlin, it being hoped that all the parties concerned would agree thereto.

"The Tsar, however, desires to modify the *Treaty of Paris* by means of the demand for a conference for dealing with the question of the opening of the Straits and thus amalgamates the two questions or else sets aside the first. Thereby a quite altered combination of the Powers might be brought about. It might revive a grouping similar to that in the old Crimean War, but in a weakened form. In any case it would not be out of the question to bring the three Imperial Powers nearer together by exercising some cleverness and to strengthen the monarchical principle. If Austria and Germany—which, it is true, did not exist at the time of the Crimean War—were to show their readiness to meet the Tsar in regard to the Straits question, and if they exerted themselves to remove the obstacles in the way, as we now know that he attaches so much importance to the point that he does not even shy at an appeal to arms, we should help him to a new success, which would bring him into opposition to England, satisfy Russian public opinion, and render a great service to Isvolsky. France has to decide whether she will go in with her Russian ally—that is, with the Imperial Powers—or whether she will hold with England. She will assuredly do the first by reason of the twelve milliards. England will be damaged in her position, whether she sides as she has done hitherto, with Turkey—in which case she must go against the opening of the Straits—or else demand the opening for all, and, therefore, for *herself* also, which Russia *won't have*. She must bring down on herself the hate either of the Turks or of the Russians, which means that she must do for herself [*sich überwerfen*] either with the Slav world or the Mohammedan world. In the latter case the consequences would very soon make themselves felt in ugly fashion in Egypt and in India. For it is, in fact, the unrest in these countries that is the reason for England's sudden friendliness for the Turks.

"The Russians are already counting on, and arming for, a war in which we also would be involved; we are not afraid

of it; I believe, however, that it could be prevented by the opening of the Straits, which, proposed by two Emperors to the third, would bring about a tolerable relationship between the three Imperial Powers; to which France, *nolens volens*, would, for good or for evil, have to agree, and Italy also; and England would, at the least, become very civil. In any case the situation is very serious.

"The comical thing is that just in this position of affairs the Demon of *Saving* has broken loose in the Reichstag and indulging in veritable orgies, whereby the Army and the Navy are being prevented from preparing for coming events and making themselves *proof against attack* as they might have done.

"In Austria three Army Corps are practically ready for mobilization. An interesting historical fact is to be noted in respect to Austria in the Napoleonic Wars. *On every occasion* when she, with pains, had got her Army in order, and balanced her finances, and regulated her currency, and set herself to *economize drastically*, Napoleon fell upon her suddenly and she lost everything again.

"We must now get armed and ready for the fight! We have, however, made a bad beginning, with 50 millions deducted from the Navy; this makes it impossible for us to construct sea-mines, many hundreds of which are still lacking for the defence of our harbours and river-mouths! In the present position of things it is almost treason to the country! How many milliards might we not lose thereby in our commerce! The very effort to make great economies on our armaments in such a troublous time takes on the appearance of weakness and tempts the enemy to make an attack.

"The concluding sentence in yesterday's St. Petersburg telegram, that 'the Tsar is my friend, now as ever, and that I can rely upon him,' coming after the rough declaration that 'he wants to have the Straits'—*er wolle die Meerungen haben*—shows us the way in which his friendship can be won and kept and also turned to account. Berlin, then, must get to work quickly, together with Vienna, and the Straits question must be negotiated with St. Petersburg. Thus can the Tsar be won over to the Imperial Powers and Isvolsky's vanity satisfied at the same time.

"WILLIAM I.R."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Dec. 14, 1908.

"I beg to thank Your Imperial and Royal Majesty for sending me the interesting report of your aide-de-camp, Naval Captain von Hintze, and the accompanying instructions issued by Your Majesty. The aim of an understanding between the three Imperial Powers now to be striven for again, to which Your Majesty graciously points, would unquestionably be furthered by an understanding between us and Austria in regard to the Straits question.

"In my opinion, the first thing to do to this end would be, as Your Majesty urges, to give Russia to understand that we and Austria will raise no difficulties against Russia in this question. But, at the same time, Russia must, on the other hand, have it made clear to her eyes whence the difficulties in the matter come. This can best be achieved, as I believe, by Russia being put into direct negotiations with England under the auspices of the French, the Russians' allies. I therefore venture to ask for Your Majesty's gracious approval of the following instructions to Your Majesty's Ambassador in St. Petersburg :

"'In acknowledgment of Telegram No. 347 of the 12th inst., I beg you to say to His Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, through Captain von Hintze, that our standing in regard to the Russian wishes respecting the Straits is too well known to need further exposition. Our standing found expression officially in the protocol added to the secret treaty of 1887, and our benevolent attitude towards Russia has not changed on this point since the lapse of the treaty. Moreover, we know also that our Austrian ally on the occasion of the discussions between Aehrenthal and Isvolsky loyally held out the prospect of right of passage through the Straits for Russia. On that occasion both Ministers went forth on the assumption that no difficulties were to be expected from England in this connection, as for twenty years past, since the miscarriage [?] of the Drummond Wolff Treaty in regard to Egypt, England had always openly declared, notably through the authorized voice of her Ambassador, in the preceding year by O'Conor, and by the late Duke of Edinburgh in his time, that England was no longer interested in the Straits and that she left their

defence to Turkey. An unlooked-for change, however, had come about in the English standpoint. Public opinion in England had gone out unanimously with such force to the Young Turks' revolutionary movement—as it has done to every so-called '*freiheitlich*'[1] movement, even when resulting in an upheaval in other countries—that the English Government was not in a position to agree to any arrangement which looked like an act of unfriendliness to Turkey. This change of standpoint has rendered worthless the assuredly sincere Austrian offer in the Straits question, and thereby alone the position of Isvolsky in respect to his own countrymen has become a difficult one.

"'We should not hesitate to give expression, public expression, to our readiness to fall in with Russia in regard to the Straits question, and we have no doubts as to our Ally being equally willing. We submit to the Russian Emperor, however, the question whether it would be to the advantage of Russia for us to come forward in the matter from the start. The animosity which to our keen regret prevails against us in England, and to some extent in France, is so great that for us to come forward would imperil rather than advance Russia's wishes. We have, in point of fact, had the frequent experience of late that for us to adopt an attitude in a matter was enough to cause England and France to adopt a contrary attitude.

"'Therefore we should think it better in Russia's interests that she should in the first place avail herself of France as an intermediary with England; France, who herself has no direct interest in the Straits, will scarcely refuse this service to her ally, and her voice counts for much in England. It is to be assumed that England is to be won over easily to the Russian wishes in this way, as her *Entente* and good relations with France are certainly held of greater account than a momentary fit of ill-humour on the part of Turkey. If France takes up the wishes of Russia in London with some vigour, Russia can count on a success, for the assent of Germany and Austria is assured to her beforehand.'

"In connection with these instructions I have the honour to add that I have thought it desirable not to bring bluntly before Russia the *true* reason of English friendliness towards Turkey on which Your Majesty has laid stress—the thought

[1] *i.e.*, Every movement associated with the cause of freedom.

of her own Mohammedan subjects in India and Egypt—but only to emphasize the sentimental enthusiasm [*Schwärmerai*] which the English are unquestionably showing just now for the revolutionary freedom-loving [*freiheitlich*] element in Turkey.

"In conclusion, may I point out to Your Majesty with reference to the remark about Batoum made by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, as recorded in Captain von Hintze's telegram herewith returned, that His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas has evidently been misinformed on this point. Baron Aehrenthal did not in the Note offer the freeing of Batoum from the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin; all he did was, at an earlier stage in the discussion, to point out, apropos of Isvolsky's insistence, that *all* alterations in the Berlin Treaty must be discussed at a conference, that in this case the question of Batoum also must be discussed, in respect to which Russia has long since disregarded the provisions of the Berlin Treaty.

"With reference to the cancelling of the order for sea-mines, I at once obtained information from the Imperial Naval Office. Neither Rear-Admiral Capelle, Director of the Administrative Department, nor Captain Dähnhardt, head of the Accountancy Division, are able to tell me where the news had its source. In the Estimates for 1909, one-and-a-half million marks were granted for sea-mines. The grant, it appears, met with no difficulties in the Imperial Treasury; moreover, no order for sea-mines given by the Imperial Naval Office has ever been refused by the Reichstag. The Naval Estimate has not yet been under discussion. Moreover, in the general debates there has been no talk of sea-mines."

To Count von Metternich,
Ambassador in London.

"Berlin, Dec. 25, 1908.

"Your despatch of the 26th (*sic*) inst. regarding the conversation you had with Mr. McKenna has been brought by me confidentially before the attention of Admiral von Tirpitz. The First Lord of the Admiralty on that occasion said, among other things, that the increase in the crews of our Fleet would give a sure indication as to whether we contemplated an extension of our present naval programme. Admiral

von Tirpitz declares that this notion is completely mistaken. I think, however, I do not need to give you the arguments and facts on the strength of which the Admiral has requested me to correct Mr. McKenna's statement, as I see from the despatch of the Naval Attaché, which since then has been sent, that Admiral von Tirpitz has clearly taken occasion to communicate the necessary explanations to the First Lord of the Admiralty through Captain Widenmann. On the other hand, I must not fail to send you an article from the *Kreuzzeitung* of the 14th inst., on which the Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy also has called attention and which is concerned with the question of the Two-Power standard. Perhaps you may have an opportunity to draw the attention of Mr. McKenna and of other persons of note to optimistic opinions expressed by so high an authority as Sir William Whyte in respect to the superiority of the English Navy over all conceivable combinations of the other Sea-Powers. The line of criticism which is taken by English naval experts in regard to the naval policy followed by the English Government demonstrates that in England also there are men of weight who possess insight enough to admit, to a great extent through its own fault, the British Government is now forced into considerable extra expense on naval armaments if it does not abandon the carrying out of the principle of the Two-Power standard.

"You are aware, for the rest, that I am far from wanting to close my eyes to the fact on which you lay stress whenever occasion offers, that the planned-out development of our Navy, and in particular the rate at which it is being proceeded with, have produced a state of disquiet in England which has in it an element of danger, and which calls for attention on our side. On December 10, in the Reichstag, I demonstrated very distinctly that an excess in our naval construction beyond the limits prescribed by needs of defence and provided for accordingly by law was ruled out, and, what was more, ruled out for certain elementary and unalterable reasons. My explanation, however, does not seem to have had the effect in England which we looked for. So far as I have been able to make out from here, it has received very little attention in the Press, and the latest conversation between Mr. McKenna and our Naval Attaché discloses clear indications of a continued mistrust.

"In these circumstances I ask myself whether even so substantial a concession to English nervousness as a slowing-down in the progress of our present naval programme as provided for by law would suffice to dissipate the anxieties which, whether in good faith or bad, are being professed in England in respect to our intentions and to bring about a decided change in English public opinion and in the attitude towards us in official quarters.

"Perhaps, indeed, our Navy Bill, which provides for the construction of four large ships during each of the three years 1909, 1910 and 1911, while the rate is lowered to two ships each year for 1912 and 1913, might allow of the possibility, without decreasing the total strength of the Navy, of our meeting the English wishes by building only three ships a year, instead of four, in 1909, 1910 and 1911, and carrying forward the difference to the years 1912, 1913 and 1914.

"I am ready to ask Admiral von Tirpitz for his opinion as to the feasibility of this idea from the practical standpoint of the naval construction. It is important, however, that I should have at the same time your opinion as to what effects in England would result from a measure, the carrying of which is only to be achieved after overcoming the considerable difficulties I shall encounter on the part of the Kaiser [*an Allerhöchste Stelle*] as well as on the part of the Navy, and which doubtless will excite the displeasure also of a not inconsiderable section of our representatives of the people [*Volksvertratung*].

"It is, of course, indubitable that the slowing-down of our rate of construction here suggested would be very welcome to the present Liberal Government in view of their financial difficulties. The question, however, which in my opinion we have chiefly to consider, is this: whether such a departure from the strict prosecution of our naval programme as legally provided for would produce a lasting effect also outside the circles of the extreme Liberal Pacifists in England. I am thinking of the Imperialistic Liberal Wing, and still more of the Unionist party with its Chauvinistic elements.

"On the basis of the news to hand, among others of the utterances of Sir Edgar Speyer on the occasion of his latest visit to Berlin, I gather that we must reckon on the possibility, if not on the probability, of the Conservatives coming into power in England in the New Year. I would therefore take the measures in question into serious consideration only

if you felt sure of their being accorded on the Unionist side also such a reception as would serve as a guarantee that our concession would not be regarded on the English side as a merely transitory profession of platonic friendship.

"Moreover, in view of the continuity of foreign policy which is so sedulously laid stress on of late in England, the Liberal party, even if they should remain for some time at the helm, would be able to assume political liabilities in regard to us only in combination with the leaders of the Opposition.

"I believe, however, that you will agree with me that we ought only to abandon our naval policy, based as it has been down to now exclusively on our needs of defence and on the political situation now existing, if simultaneously there were a definite prospect of our being given the assurance that in the event of warlike complications we should not find England on the side of our opponents. A one-sided response on our side to English wishes, without corresponding concessions on the English side, would be precluded on the ground that we must avoid the appearance of having acted under pressure from England. . . ."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Dec. 29, 1908.

"I beg to enclose herewith a very confidential despatch just received from Radolin on the present feeling in France. I would point out that this despatch seems to point to a certain agitation. When Radolin was last in Berlin scarcely a fortnight ago I asked him what attitude he thought France would adopt if Austria were attacked by Russia and Germany were brought into the conflict as Austria's ally.

"Radolin then answered without hesitation that in his opinion even in this case the French would scarcely venture to do anything against us, as their disinclination for war, and in particular the fear of the Republican authorities in respect to the internal consequences of war, were too great. On the other hand, Count Mirbach-Harff, until recently Second Secretary at the Paris Embassy, now Councillor of Embassy at St.

Petersburg, who is clever and notable for his calm judgment, told me a few days ago that in his opinion, in the case above-mentioned of a German-Austrian war against Russia, it would be impossible for France to remain neutral.

"From this to the state of feeling described by Radolin, however, is a far step. In any case we must envisage the position to which he draws our attention with the seriousness it calls for. The reproaches which are being made against us by the French are completely without grounds. We have handled the question of the Casablanca deserters with so much calm and patience that we have been subjected to violent reproaches in our own Press for having been altogether too pliable with France. I heard at the time from many directions that, especially in our military circles, people were loud in condemnation of me because our attitude towards the French in the question of the deserters was held to be too tolerant and yielding. Nevertheless, we did not hesitate to submit the question to the Hague Arbitration Court.

"It is absolutely untrue and a hateful perversion of the facts to state that we took up the deserters' question more sharply than was warranted in order to avoid troubles at home. It was at the very time that our internal troubles were accentuated that we decided to submit the incident to the Arbitration Court at The Hague, thereby giving a strong proof of conciliatoriness. If Radolin goes on to say that we should leave France alone for the present I consider he is quite right. We must bother France now as little as possible. When a certain feeling of tranquillity has come about we shall try to come to an understanding with the French Government over Morocco.

"I believe, besides, that the irritability of the French to which Radolin points is to be attributed primarily to the constant work of the English in Paris. According to a despatch from Quadt, a Russian Secretary recently transferred from Tangier to Teheran confided to him that Lowther, the English Minister at Tangier, now Ambassador at Constantinople, had definite instructions in Morocco to inflame Germans and French against each other whenever he could. These English underground machinations are not likely to cease so long as the English nervousness continues in regard to our ship-building, which is the beginning and the end of the English mistrust and anger against us."

VIII

THE YEAR 1909

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NOTE.

The most exciting thing in this final section is its close. Which are we to believe—or to come nearest to believing—the Kaiser's contemporary account of the *Daily Telegraph* incident, or Bülow's? Dr. G. P. Gooch kindly allows me to cite from his obituary estimate of the Chancell r in the *Contemporary Review* for December 1929 the following comment upon the matter. Dr. Gooch shows himself a severe judge of Bülow in the whole of his article, but he ends it on this characteristically fair note: "The curtain will rise again on the publication of his Memoirs, which may aid us to correct any injustice in the reflections inspired by his death."

"Though the Kaiser's share in the direction of foreign affairs was less than we used to believe, his improvizations and aberrations drove his counsellors almost to despair. There is no more revealing document in the *Grosse Politik* than the long and poignant letter of September 28, 1909 (*Die Grosse Politik*, XXIV, pp. 203-7), in which the fallen Chancellor pours out his heart to his successor and recalls the compromising speeches, telegrams, and letters, which flowed from the impulsive ruler without consulting his responsible adviser. The two men worked together in tolerable harmony till the *Daily Telegraph* affair brought the end within sight, though they were never on the affectionate terms which existed between the monarch and Eulenburg. The Chancellor declared that he had never read the text which had been sent to him at Norderney; but his statement is difficult to believe, and some of his critics denounce it as a cowardly lie. Be this as it may, his handling of the crisis in the Reichstag infuriated the Kaiser, who, for a few days, completely lost his balance and cried aloud that he had been "betrayed." The quarrel was patched up for a time; but on the rejection of the inheritance tax in the summer of 1909 the Chancellor resigned. According to Bülow the resignation was voluntary; according to the Kaiser he was dismissed."

It may be noted that Baron von Schoen, one of the most generally respected of German diplomatists, who was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1908, refuses to believe in Bülow's alleged duplicity in this matter. Baron von Schoen in his Memoirs speaks with sympathy and appreciation of the Chancellor, with whom he was closely associated for many years.

VIII

THE YEAR 1909

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Jan. 29, 1909.

"I beg to return to Your Majesty the very interesting letter from His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

"As Your Majesty will have seen from the tone and contents of the letter, it is fairly easy to distinguish between those passages in which the Russian Emperor speaks from his own knowledge and standpoint and those in which his words owe their information and inspiration to M. Isvolsky. This applies in particular to the complaint not merely over the 'Austrian' policy, but over the 'Aehrenthalian' policy, and to the account of the violation of the Mürzsteg *Entente* [1] through the announcement of Austria's intention to build the Sanjak Railway. Your Majesty has pointed out the inaccuracy of this account in your marginal note, in which you quite justly lay the responsibility on Isvolsky's attitude after Reval. In point of fact the circumstances were so, as Your Majesty is aware that Russia benefited very well by the *Entente* with Austria during the Japanese War and the internal difficulties resulting therefrom, but that the vain M. Isvolsky, who thought he would make himself less popular in Russia by a co-operation with Austria than by a step in the East taken either without or actually against Austria, availed himself of the pretext of the Sanjak Railway to destroy the *Entente* and to induce his Imperial Master to attempt in Reval the inauguration of a new Russian Eastern policy. The Sanjak Railway was obviously only a pretext for this; for all that was in question in respect to it was that Austria wanted at last to avail herself

[1] Isvolsky and Aehrenthal had come to an understanding at Mürzsteg in Styria.

of a right which had been formally guaranteed to her by the Powers for thirty years past and from the exercise of which Russia sustained no harm either politically or economically.

"I venture, none the less, respectfully to express my opinion that for the present Your Majesty would do well not to spin out any further the thread of the discussion of these things so as not to lead on to useless discussions over things which cannot now be changed, but that Your Majesty should postpone any lengthy reply to the Emperor's letter until a more favourable psychological moment.

"I avail myself of this occasion to lay before Your Majesty four more despatches from Count Pourtalès. According to the one marked A.S.163, M. Isvolsky has again tried to find out from Your Majesty's Ambassador what attitude we should adopt in the event of an attack by Austria on Serbia. Count Pourtalès answered evasively, declaring that the eventuality referred to by M. Isvolsky was absolutely improbable. With Your Majesty's gracious permission I shall instruct Count Pourtalès, in future, whenever M. Isvolsky touches upon this subject again, to confine himself to saying that we regard the possibility of an Austrian attack on Serbia as out of the question. Any more detailed pronouncement would not only be quite unnecessary for us, but might also entail some danger that Isvolsky, either direct or through some English or French friends, might contrive to sow seeds of distrust of us in Vienna.

"According to the despatch marked A.1658, it would seem also that in the English Diplomatic Corps, which is considerably more inclined for active mischief-making than is its own Government, the conviction has been taking shape that Russia is not at present good material for kindling warlike movements on the Continent. However, the difficulties against which the Anglo-Russian friendship is coming up, according to A. 1655, in the Persian question, make intelligible England's desire to create a diversion for Russia in some other direction. The longer and the more undisturbed the *tête-à-tête* between the two Powers in Persia, the more difficult it will be—especially with regard to public opinion in both countries—to maintain their good understanding. We have only to play the rôle of the benevolent looker-on, who keeps his inner feelings of joy to himself. I propose, however, with Your Majesty's approval, to send a transcript

of the despatch to Your Majesty's Ambassador in London, in strict confidence, for his own enlightenment in the matter.

"In despatch A.1659 Count Pourtalès writes of a coolness also in the Franco-Russian relations. Such a coolness can only become intensified if no third party intervenes and more especially if both friends do not notice that we know anything about their little domestic differences. I shall not, therefore, give our Embassy any intimation even of the purport of this despatch.

"There are other indications to hand that the French are no longer quite at ease in regard to the policy and the fanfaronades of M. Isvolsky. The French Ambassador has twice asked the question whether we should intervene between Russia and Austria either alone or with France. The Italian Ambassador has developed the same idea. So far I have only replied evasively that the moment for any kind of intervention did not seem to me to have come.

"I am, however, of the opinion that we ought certainly not to enter into any kind of mediation in co-operation with the French. An attempt at mediation between Russia and Austria-Hungary, whether successful or not, would in any case evoke mistrust of us in Vienna and would make us look, not merely in the eyes of the Austrians but in the eyes of the whole world, like lukewarm friends. It is certain that this would be represented and turned to account as a political defeat of Germany. Moreover, France would take to herself all the credit for the benefit which would accrue to Russia.

"France's notion about mediation comes only from her fear of a warlike conflict over the East. This fear has been implanted in the French by their distrust of Isvolsky's policy. The French have no use at all for a general conflagration; they have no desire to fight us just because the Russians want to prevent Austria from wiping out the Serbs. Moreover, they are well aware that their ally is by no means equipped for a war, and they are naturally nervous, also, 'last, but not least,' about their money invested in Russia.

"If, then, we refuse our co-operation in a mediation the French must endeavour *by themselves* to prevent warlike developments—that means they must exert themselves actively in St. Petersburg and advise calm and conciliatoriness. That, of course, is naturally very burdensome for the French,

as they know they will thereby alienate the Russians greatly. That is why they want to drag us into action.

"We have no inducement, naturally, to take a hand in this game and to pull the chestnuts out of the Russian fire for the French to our own harm. All the benefits of any such move would be for the French, all the harm for us. If we play a waiting game, France must act on her own, and then the encirclement ring which at last has grown breakable will gradually burst asunder. I beg Your Majesty's permission, therefore, to continue to set my face against all suggestions of intervention from whatever side they may come."

MEMORANDUM.

"BERLIN, Feb. 10, 1909.

"Sir Charles Hardinge, who called on me yesterday, began our conversation by saying that he was commissioned by Sir Edward Grey and the British Government to tell me how glad the English Government was that Germany and England had of late in many respects taken up the same attitude in the Balkan question. It would be natural that we, as Austria's ally, should avoid all appearance of seeming to exert pressure upon Austria. Baron Aehrenthal would, of course, be particularly sensitive as to this. The English Government, however, were aware that we in discreet and tactful fashion had helped considerably towards inducing Austria-Hungary to adopt a more conciliatory bearing towards Turkey.

"I replied that we wanted to see a strong, independent, prosperous Turkey. To this end we wished, also, to see the new régime in Turkey consolidated, and that we should do what we could in this direction.

"In regard to the latest Russian proposal, Sir Charles Hardinge said that he had advised the Turks to agree to it in principle. In respect to details, Russia and Turkey would be able to come to an understanding.

"It was clear that the English Government will take a friendly line towards the Russians in this matter. As to our own standpoint, I expressed myself to Sir Charles Hardinge somewhat as follows:

"We welcomed everything that could lead to an understanding between Turkey and Bulgaria, and therefore we welcomed the Russian proposal also if it should prove acceptable to both parties. We hoped that England, having such good relations with Russia as well as with Turkey, would do all she could in a financial way to further Turkey's wishes. We, however, wished to make it perfectly clear that the rights and interests of the Eastern Railway, in which German capital was interested, as well as of creditors of the Turkish Debt, should remain safeguarded.

"Sir Charles Hardinge hopes that the danger of war between Turkey and Bulgaria has been warded off. The English Military Attaché at Sofia remains still of the opinion that Bulgaria, in a military sense, is stronger than Turkey and would perhaps get to Constantinople if there were a clash; but he thinks that Prince Ferdinand is too disinclined for war to let things come to an outbreak of hostilities. The situation would appear to be more threatening in Serbia and Montenegro. Both of these small States would end by breaking loose, as they believed that, if beaten, they would not be left in the lurch by Russia. On my remarking to Sir Charles Hardinge that Serbia and Montenegro would certainly not venture to break loose if Russia were to declare to them that they would fight *à leur propre risque et péril*, he expressed the opinion that such a declaration would be impossible for the Tsar as protector of all the Slavs. The Powers, however, must continue to warn the Serbians and Montenegrins against a *coup de tête*.

"It was also to be desired that Austria, if she should be forced to take steps against Serbia, should declare in advance that she would not annex that country and that she would respect its integrity. Sir Charles asked me whether I believed that Austria was disposed to fulfil the Montenegrin wishes in respect to Spizza. I replied that this seemed to me completely out of the question. A Great Power could not make any territorial concessions without a war. Neither His Majesty, the Emperor Francis Joseph, nor the Heir to the Throne would do that. Mr. (*sic*) Hardinge seemed to have expected this reply and expressed his opinion that efforts must be made to indemnify Serbia and Montenegro by economic equivalent.

"Sir Charles turned the conversation also towards Crete. Here he takes his stand entirely by the side of Turkey. In Paris, he implied, there was a great disposition to sympathize

with the wishes of Greece. The Greeks threatened a Ministerial crisis and an insurrection in Crete if the island were not soon handed over to them.

"The English Government believed that this question could not be settled before the middle of the summer after it had become possible to restore peace in the Balkans. Sir Charles Hardinge complains that the difference between Russia and Austria has taken the shape of a personal duel between Isvolsky and Aehrenthal. He had many objections to make as to Aehrenthal's *modus operandi*, but seemed to have no special respect for Isvolsky's character and to view Aehrenthal as the more serious-minded politician. He seemed to think it very probable that Isvolsky had given Aehrenthal *carte blanche* in regard to Buchlau, if he did not encourage him to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. Naturally he would have had it in mind to treat this as an equivalent in the matter of the Dardanelles question. But of this now there could be no talk. It seems that Isvolsky has been told openly in London that the moment is as inopportune as it could possibly be for the regulation of the Dardanelles question. In Paris, Hardinge said, the same attitude had been taken.

"Apart from the wish to see Turkey consolidating herself, all Hardinge's remarks pointed to the keen hope that peace in the Balkan Peninsula and in Europe might not be disturbed. Sir Charles is no pessimist in this connection. Russia, he feels, is far from being in a position to make war; the French have not the slightest desire for war; Germany and England want peace.

"Sir Charles Hardinge seems to have quite abandoned the idea of the conference. He said that the conference should in no case be held without a previous exact understanding upon all contentious points. If, however, such an understanding were achieved, the conference would really be unnecessary.

"Hardinge congratulated us in very cordial words on the conclusion of the Morocco Treaty. This would be received in England with a general feeling of relief. This arrangement would help also to produce better relations between England and Germany. English statesmen, he said, had been freed from a great anxiety by the conclusion of the Treaty, as they had always been afraid that a Franco-German conflict might have resulted from the Morocco question.

"Hardinge at the close of our conversation said he was very glad indeed to have had this exchange of views, and that he hoped that England and Germany would go together not merely in the Balkan question, but in as many others as possible. He spoke in terms of warm praise of our Ambassador, Count Metternich, who, he said, had won general esteem in England by his loyalty and who understands English affairs and opinions thoroughly.

"Sir Charles Hardinge did not utter a single word on the question of the Navy."

MEMORANDUM.

"BERLIN, Feb. 11, 1909.

"Lord Crewe, who called on me to-day, gave warm expression, just as Sir Charles Hardinge did yesterday, to the wish for good relations between us and England. He hopes that the visit of His Majesty the King of England has removed many misunderstandings and that it may prove of favourable influence on the intercourse between the two countries.

"In the course of our conversation, Lord Crewe came *proprio motu* to refer also to the Navy question. He intimated in this connection that England naturally did not contemplate making any rules [1] for us in regard to our ship-building, but that as the existence and future of the British Empire depend upon her strength on the sea, England also, on her side, must do what is necessary for her security.

"I replied that we should never have thought of taking it ill of England. England, however, need not look for anything dark or perfidious behind our ship-building. Anything of the kind lay far from our thoughts. I said it was inconceivable to us that a reasonable people like the English could believe in the idea of a German invasion.

"Lord Crewe replied that a large section of the English people, but not the present English Government, were disturbed by our building battleships in preference to others.

[1] *Vorschriften* in the German. The word may mean rules, orders, commands, instructions, etc., according to the context.

We justified our naval armaments, he said, by pointing to the need of protecting our trade; cruisers were better adapted for this. I answered that no one in Germany thought of building a Navy that should be stronger than England's. Our geographical position laid on us the necessity of keeping up a large Army, so that the extent of our financial and economic forces made it appear completely out of the question for us to go beyond England in ship-building or even to come near her.

"Our main strength would always lie in our Army. The German people wished to be, and were bound to be, so strong on the sea that no other Power should be able simply to run over it [*es . . . einfach überrennen*]. It was a mistake on the part of the English to believe that we were building our Fleet against England. There were other countries against which we had to defend ourselves on the sea.

"Lord Crewe, who conducted the whole conversation in the very friendliest tones, quite recognized the reasonableness of this. Incidentally, he expressed the opinion that England sooner or later would have to adopt universal military service.

"I observed that, if this should happen, I should regard it as a fortunate development, and for us as well as for England, as universal military service made people disposed to peace."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Feb. 19, 1909.

"The first Secretary of the Russian Embassy has just intimated on behalf of the Ambassador that Prince Ferdinand has enquired in St. Petersburg whether he might come to the funeral of the Grand Duke Vladimir, his '*proche parent et ami intime.*' His Majesty the Tsar has answered in the affirmative.

"In the prevailing circumstances, Prince Ferdinand will be treated in accordance with his 'new' rank. M. Isvolsky has discussed frankly with the Turkish Ambassador in St. Petersburg the situation thus brought about, and he

begs the Imperial Government also to take note of the embarrassing position wherein the Russian Government is placed in this case."

To the Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy, Admiral von Tirpitz.

"Berlin, Feb. 19, 1909.

"*Strictly Private.*

"I beg to inform you that the conversation between His Majesty the Kaiser and King Edward has strengthened me in the conviction that it is best for the present not to go into the question of the Navy with England. I derived the same impression from my talk with Lord Crewe.

"I have latterly, in the course of many conferences with members of the Reichstag, been using my influence to ensure that our Naval Estimates should be passed without reduction, without opposition, and, if possible, without discussion. On the other hand, it is naturally very desirable that no further increase of the Navy should be agitated for by the Navy League. I hold it as absolutely necessary, further, that our Press should talk as little as possible about the new English naval programme soon to be expected, and that it should merely record the facts. In so far as influence can be exercised over the Press from here, I have done what has been necessary, and I hope that Your Excellency also will support my efforts in this direction."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Feb. 19, 1909.

"I have the honour to bring before Your Majesty two telegrams from Your Majesty's Ambassadors in London and Paris. According to them, the English and French Governments are taking steps in common with Vienna to

bring about a settlement of the conflict between Austria and Serbia.

"If M. Pichon has emphasized to Prince Radolin the fact that such a *démarche* in Vienna is characterized by friendliness towards Austria, this *démarche* none the less could not be reconciled with the attitude which we, with Your Majesty's approval, have taken up towards our ally during the entire Eastern crisis; rather would Austria get the impression that we also were advising her to be conciliatory towards Serbia, who has subjected the patience of the Habsburg Monarchy to a severe ordeal.

"I therefore beg Your Majesty's assent to the following answer to be communicated to the Governments of England and France:

"'From the proposals which have been made to us, we note with satisfaction that the English and French Governments agree with us in the wish to eliminate as far as possible all danger of a warlike outbreak in the East, and to prevent therefore a clash between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. While we are in complete agreement with both Powers in respect to these aims, we have doubts as to the *modus procedendi* proposed.

"'According to our view, any action aiming at the avoidance of a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia ought to be taken *in Belgrade*. The provocations which came from Serbia, officially and non-officially, have put forth threats of war, and in connection with a question which does not affect the Serbian Kingdom, for the passing of the two Turkish provinces into the possession of Austria-Hungary has produced no change for Serbia, either practically or legally; and therefore it is impossible to know for what "compensation" ought to be made to Serbia.

"'Therefore we cannot encourage Austria through the mouths of other Powers, and at least with the *appearance* of an exertion of pressure from these Powers, to accord kind words and make promises to a Serbia who threatens war.

"'Austria-Hungary has declared repeatedly that she does not want to attack Serbia; the Monarchy has shown this attitude by great patience in ignoring all provocations from Serbia. Disturbance of the peace is threatened *only from the Serbian side*; the persistent machinations and

threats of Serbia can only create one situation, which for the neighbouring Monarchy is becoming unbearable, and which compels her to employ the right of every Power to create peace on her frontier.

"'If in reality Serbia, as she has just declared in contradiction to the previous attitude of her Government, her Parliament, and the Heir to the Throne, is not thinking of war and will keep quiet, there is no cause for anxiety, in view of the assurance given by Austria and demonstrated by the facts that she does not want to attack Serbia.

"'As, however, Austria-Hungary has repeatedly declared that she wants to grant Serbia certain economic advantages, we should consider it useful in Serbia's own interest to make a *démarche* to the end that Serbia should give guarantees against a continuation of her provocative attitude, that the Serbian Government should bring its actions and official communications within its own borders into harmony with the peaceful assurances it has given to the Powers, and should then turn direct to Austria-Hungary in order to treat with her regarding the economic advantages to be conceded to her.

"'Only when Serbia shall have given the required guarantees would it be possible, according to our view, for the Austro-Hungarian Government to consider the question whether it would be disposed to treat direct with Serbia.

"'A *démarche* in Belgrade would gain greatly by *all* the Powers, including Russia especially, taking part in it. Russia might well be convinced in friendly fashion by her French ally of the usefulness of such a step. We are, however, ready to co-operate in Belgrade with England and France alone.'

"This answer would combine with loyalty to our ally a certain responsiveness towards England and France by acknowledgment of their peaceful aims. With Your Majesty's gracious approval, the answer communicated to London and Paris shall be brought also to the knowledge of the Vienna Cabinet.

"In conclusion, I have the honour once again to bring before Your Majesty's attention the telegram from Count Metternich of the 18th inst., which has already been shown you. According to the opening sentences of this telegram, the Franco-English proposal, apart from the efforts towards

the maintenance of peace and order, would seem to have been dictated by the wish to ease the position of M. Isvolsky. We have no inducement to help towards this."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Feb. 20, 1909.

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has just informed me that the French Ambassador in Vienna addressed an enquiry to Baron von Aehrenthal. Baron von Aehrenthal replied that the news regarding an ultimatum to Serbia was entirely unfounded. Austria had at present no reason to depart from her eminently peaceful policy, which was marked by a long-continued patience in the face of Serbian provocations. If they were uneasy in Paris, it was open to the French Government to convince the Serbs of the madness of their policy. For any intervention in the matter, Belgrade was the place, not Vienna.

"Pichon has informed the Austrian Ambassador in Paris of the Anglo-French *démarche*, justifying it on the ground of disquieting news from St. Petersburg."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Feb. 22, 1909.

"I have the honour to bring before Your Majesty's attention the private letter from Baron von Aehrenthal enclosed herewith.

"The letter deals for the most part with the position in the East, as is natural in the present state of political affairs.

"If Baron Aehrenthal begins by expressing the hope of reaching a definite understanding with Turkey very soon, this expectation has been justified by the news just received here. The Turkish Ambassador in London, who has been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, is, I have learnt,

journeying to Constantinople without making a halt anywhere in order to sign the treaty with Austria-Hungary as soon as possible.

"Baron Aehrenthal proceeds to deal very exhaustively with the question of the Austro-Hungarian relations with Serbia.

"In view of the refusal which, with Your Majesty's approval, was given to the Anglo-French proposal for a *démarche* in Vienna, it is in accordance with our policy to continue to stand quietly and firmly by the side of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the further development of the Serbian question as presented by Baron Aehrenthal in his letter.

"Should Austria eventually be forced into extreme measures and into taking up arms against Serbia, a Russian attack, in spite of all the Slav incitements, is scarcely probable according to all human calculations. The state of Russia's Army and of her finances, her internal situation, and, above all, the interests of the dynasty, stand in the way of any warlike steps on her part.

"Nevertheless, the Russian Government would be landed in an awkward position by a crushing of Serbia at the hands of Austria if they had to look on at it quietly. M. Isvolsky, however, has not yet been able to decide to declare distinctly and unmistakably in Belgrade that Serbia can count on no kind of Russian help in a conflict with Austria. He has hoped, instead, that we should allow ourselves to be moved by the Anglo-French proposal to extract concessions from Austria which he would then have turned to account with his Serbo-Slav brethren as his own achievement.

"As we have checked this plan, M. Isvolsky will either have to resort of his own accord to energetic peace efforts in Belgrade or he will be peremptorily counselled by France to do so. It would naturally have been more to the taste of France to persuade us into exercising pressure in common with herself on our ally than to be forced to admonish her own ally to be calm and reasonable. As, however, we have placed ourselves firmly and openly by the side of Austria, France will be obliged, with or without England, to address peaceful advice to St. Petersburg. For France does not want war for several reasons; in any case, she will do everything to prevent herself from being

forced on account of Serbia into a war against us and Austria-Hungary, in which she would have to fight on the side of Russia for Utopian ideas of Slav brotherhood.

"A serious and downright renunciation of Serbia by Russia, whether spontaneous or made under pressure from France, would create undoubted calm there. This will not come about as long as M. Isvolsky continues to persist in the demands he made some time ago for the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina and for a territorial 'indemnification' of Serbia.

"I beg Your Majesty, before I answer Baron Aehrenthal's letter, to favour me with an audience in connection with the questions dealt with therein and with the answer to be sent to it."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, Feb. 25, 1909.

"I beg to inform Your Majesty that I have telegraphed to Count Metternich in the sense commanded with reference to the Austro-Serbian differences.

"As it had come to my knowledge that the French Ambassador here had already been commissioned by his Government to feel the way towards combined action, and as M. Cambon will have the honour to-morrow to see Your Majesty, I have thought that I should be falling in with your intentions by placing him in direct acquaintance with the proposal of Baron von Aehrenthal. While doing so, I got the impression that the French Government had already made suggestions in St. Petersburg in the sense of a change of attitude and is willing to go further in this direction. This is indicated by the attitude of the official French Press for some days past and by the tone of the Russian papers received to-day. It will be as well for us, therefore, to leave further action in St. Petersburg to the French, and to act as though we knew nothing about the French pressure on St. Petersburg, in order to make it easier for the Russians, ostensibly *proprio motu* and not under pressure from her allies, to fall in with the German-French-English action now to be taken in Belgrade."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, March 2, 1909.

"I beg to bring before Your Majesty's attention a draft which, after consultation with the French Ambassador here, it was proposed to use as the basis of the contemplated *démarche* in Belgrade, and for which the French Government was to make special efforts to secure also the agreement of Russia.

"Yesterday the French Ambassador said that France had doubts as to the concluding clause, in which there is question of direct negotiations between Austria and Serbia. It was pointed out to M. Cambon in reply that this was precisely the main thing. We had to stipulate unconditionally that this should be established from the start; otherwise there would be confusion, and after the Belgrade *démarche* we should have got no further. We could not urge Austria, as M. Isvolsky seemed to suggest, to treat with Russia as though Russia were Mandatory Power of Serbia; Austria would be as little disposed to admit that the other Powers should intrude in her dealings with Serbia. Austria and Serbia were independent States and must therefore treat with each other independently, all the more that what was in question was the granting of concessions by Austria of her own accord.

"With regard to M. Isvolsky's present *démarche* in Belgrade, M. Cambon expressed the opinion that the Powers could perhaps support it as it aimed at what the Powers wanted. The reply was made to M. Cambon that we could not imagine that in matters in which the Powers had wished to move *pari passu*, they could now wish to appear at the beck and call of M. Isvolsky *à la rémorque de la Russie*. Moreover, we did not know how much pressure M. Isvolsky intended to exercise in his *démarche* and what he intended to promise Serbia in case she, as he expressed it, entrusted her fate into the hands of the Powers.

"M. Cambon came round finally to the opinion that his Government ought to proceed with their efforts in the direction of a combined *démarche*. Otherwise it would imperil the bringing about of a general conflagration in which France would certainly be incurring the most risk.

"M. Cambon concluded by speaking of the possibility that, in case M. Isvolsky should in fact return from Belgrade with quite binding assurances, the other Powers might individually, each on its own account, give the same assurances. On this side that would be declared a practicable way, and it would be declared possible that the Powers might communicate to Vienna the assurances received in this way. The reply was made to M. Cambon that in this case also an indispensable condition would be an understanding of all the Powers, including Russia, that the Serbs should be put into direct negotiations with Austria.

"M. Cambon proceeded to talk about the Conference idea. He pointed out that, even if the Powers most closely concerned came to terms, there would remain a danger in the background so long as the changes in the Berlin Treaty had not been formally sanctioned. The reply was made to M. Cambon that neither we nor Austria had ever contested this, but that it seemed to us that it might be left to the last when all questions in dispute had been settled. Then it would surely be a mere matter of routine whether seven men should sit round a green table or whether a piece of paper should be sent round to the Powers for signature."

To the Emperor William II.

"March 27, 1909.

"Your Majesty's attention has been drawn already to the telegrams from London and Paris regarding the reception given there to our proposal for the recognition of the annexation of Bosnia.

"I beg to place before Your Majesty a transcript of the instructions which have been sent to Your Majesty's Ambassadors in London and Paris in reply.

"Side by side with our action there are negotiations in progress between the English and Austrian Cabinets in regard to a *démarche* to be undertaken by the Powers in Belgrade under the leadership of England, which aims at rendering an Austrian invasion of Serbia unnecessary.

"From different indications we shall be asked by England,

France, Russia, and probably Italy also, to take part in this step in Belgrade, if England and Austria come to an agreement regarding it.

"I would like, with Your Majesty's permission, to refuse to take part in this action of the other Powers. In the first place, I do not anticipate any decisive results from the step in Belgrade; secondly, we have no inducement to take part in a step which has been arranged without our co-operation. We are the better able to leave the responsibility to the other Powers in that the step in which we were previously ready to participate was prevented by M. Isvolsky's one-sided action, and in that our latest proposal, namely, to secure a firm basis for the step in Belgrade by recognition of the annexation, has been refused by England.

"Now that Isvolsky's bluff has been exploded by Germany's firm attitude, England is obviously trying to begin the game all over again. Her refusal of the proposal accepted by Isvolsky, however, indicates her intention to have a voice in the matter again as soon as Austria-Hungary finds herself forced to invade Serbia. We must therefore show that we continue to regard the situation as serious, and that we shall not allow ourselves to be bullied, and that we are, moreover, resolved, as on the occasion of the recent crisis, to stand to the uttermost by the side of Austria-Hungary."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, March 27, 1909.

"I beg to send Your Majesty, together with the despatch from Count Metternich herewith enclosed, a memorandum, written at the wish of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by Acting Councillor of Legation Kriege, who was in London last week for the signing of the Naval War Usages Treaty—a memorandum, namely: regarding his conversations with Your Majesty's Ambassador and with Consul-General Johannes.

"I beg Your Majesty to decide whether Count Metternich—

to whom instructions went, in accordance with Your Majesty's previous command, to tell Sir Edward Grey that we could not see the advantage of the inspection by the German and English Naval Attachés of the ship-building of both countries—should proceed to intimate our refusal of the English proposal. Perhaps it might be in the interest of our own Navy to agree to Sir Edward Grey's proposal, which he anticipates would have a calming effect upon English public opinion, now deeply troubled on the subject.

"I have had a copy of Metternich's report, as well as of this memorandum by Kriege, sent to Admiral von Tirpitz, so that he has full knowledge of the matter in case Your Majesty should be pleased to command a personal report from him. If Your Majesty should be pleased to command an acceptance of the Grey-Asquith proposal, I would venture to ask you to let me know your decision as soon as possible so that Grey may know of it through Metternich before making his speech in the House of Commons on Monday afternoon.

"[Enclosure]

"*The Acting Foreign Office Councillor Kriege to the Secretary of State Baron von Schoen.*

"Berlin, March 26, 1909.

"On the 22nd inst. I gave an oral account to Your Excellency of the communications made to me in regard to the question of the Navy by the Imperial Ambassador, Count Wolff-Metternich on the 19th, during my latest visit to London, as well as of the conversation which I had on the following day on the same subject with the Imperial Consul-General Johannes. In accordance with instructions, I have the honour now to put this account before you in writing.

"The Ambassador expounded to me in detail the same idea which some days later he set forth in his despatch of the 23rd inst., and, in doing so, gave expression to the wish that I should take the matter up in Berlin. He summed up his impressions of the present situation by saying that we now stand at a new turning-point in our relations with

England, that hitherto it was to be assumed only that England would avail herself of any opportunity offered her by a European war *even without her having any responsibility for it*[1] to strike at us; but that if the new understanding recently suggested by England did not take place, England would probably take steps to bring about such an opportunity *herself*.

"The Imperial Consul-General gave his entire support to the opinion of the Ambassador, and while so doing drew attention to the following point: The financial position of England is by no means favourable, by reason especially of the Old Age Pensions recently introduced, which entail very heavy expenses. The British Government, unless it should be able to receive continually reliable news regarding the position of our fleet-building, would probably be forced by public opinion to make its own armaments proportionate to the current highly exaggerated news as to our armaments. The large outlay thereby necessitated would have to be covered by loans which, in view of the extent of the already existing National Debt, could not be raised on the basis possible hitherto of two-and-a-half or two-and-three-quarters interest.

"The issue, however, of a loan at higher interest would entail a strong retrograde movement of the existing debt, which was taken up throughout England and especially in the wide strata of the well-to-do inhabitants. As a result of the indirect and direct losses which would come about, the commercial and professional classes, who are at present peace-loving, would be badly hit and would be made accessible to the idea of getting rid of the causes of their disquietude once and for all by a war. In this way the war-party already in existence might suddenly secure a decisive predominance in the country."

[1] It may be well to give here the German words: "bis jetzt sei nur anzunehmen dass England eine sich ihm *ohne sein Zutun* bietende Gelegenheit eines Europäischen Krieges zum Losschlagen gegen uns benützenwerde.'

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"April 3, 1909.

"Dear Bülow,

"Before Tirpitz went on to you to-day I discussed the whole rotten business of the English Fleet and the Dreadnoughts ['*die ganze englische Flotten-und-Dreadnought-schweinerei*'] with him once again in the presence of Müller and Plessen, and I authorized him to express himself to you in the same sense on the subject. We came unanimously to the conclusion, with the recorded facts before us, that Metternich incurs part of the blame by the way in which he has dealt with the situation; inasmuch as he gave away in advance the *colossal personal concession* which I had placed at his disposal for possible use at a later stage—*i.e.*, that no supplementary law should come in 1912: that he gave this away in advance, without any reason, without receiving from England *the slightest return* except innumerable lies, deceptions, insinuations, and insults. Thereby the whole affair has been badly and wrongly 'gemanaged,'[1] and he, and consequently we, have been forced into a corner. Because:

"(1) The English, although they are the Constitutional State *par excellence*, were guilty of the gross political mistake of jumping over all the Constitutional authorities and usages—yourself, Schoen, Tirpitz, etc.—to address themselves direct to the Monarch and Supreme War Lord and with threats and in tones of command, 'You must stop building.'

"This ought not to have happened, as there had been no 'invitation to negotiation'—as was now being declared in Parliament—but only a quite *one-sided* request from England, which could be answered only in the way it was. Last autumn, when Metternich was being approached on the part of England with all kinds of enquiries and conversations—*tentative*—the Ambassadors ought to have brought it home to the Government with all possible sharpness and emphasis, and rubbed it into them in the roughest manner, and obliged them in the first instance to ask our pardon

[1] The Kaiser's own word.

for their indescribable behaviour. Only after this had been done could one have considered *binding proposals* from London and have negotiated in regard to them.

"(2) Because the Ambassador unfortunately neglected to act as above indicated, Cronberg had to continue to put up with the *tone* and the bearing of England, who addressed Metternich and, through him, us, always in peremptory fashion, with a veiled demand *what we should do*! Hence—even if the negotiations were *tentative*—the situation was never that of a discussion between two Powers of *equal rights*, but always had the effect of a somewhat haughty *advance* on the part of a *stronger* Power to a *weaker Power not regarded as of the same standing*. Hence also the refusal, as always one's personal honour [*die eigene Ehre*] was almost at stake.

"(3) Because the English overtures, as said—if also in *tentative* form—always only in the form of requests and demands, which were to be fulfilled at once, if possible, by us, were always addressed to us; there was never to be gathered from them the intention of a negotiation between equals which would be as binding for one party as for the other. Thus neither at Cronberg—where it was a matter of 'you must stop building'—nor later in the conversations in the autumn and winter, was there to be discovered the slightest sign that *the English themselves had any real intention of reduction also*; but it was always made clear to us only that it would be *in the English interest* that *we should stop* arming. So that they might be able to maintain their advantage with as little money and trouble as possible. That was a standpoint to which, from a military standpoint, or from the standpoint of our national honour, we could not assent.

"(4) Because all the machinations of England have their origin in this, that she wants to force from us an absolute recognition of the Two-Power standard, and that we simply cannot and will not and do not intend[1] to do this without capitulation before the world or without injury to our national honour. She can claim a superiority on the sea as much as she likes and build accordingly; she can, moreover, construct this in accordance with any ratio; there is nothing to be said against this; but *to acknowledge* the

[1] "*einfach nicht können noch wollen, noch werden.*"

Two-Power standard, employed as it is *against us alone*—that I am quite unable to do, still less to confirm it for ever by agreements of any sort! A certain advantage they are free to have, the Two-Power standard never!—such are the words of Admiral von Tirpitz, uttered before witnesses.

"(5) From the above the following results: that hitherto England has made no honourable overtures for negotiations as from equal to equal, but has only sought *without committing herself* to force us into a corner and in a one-sided manner to prevent us from building. Hence it was not possible to arrange anything. I am, however, after agreeing as to this with Admiral von Tirpitz, *perfectly ready and agreeable*[1] *to negotiate with England* if England will loyally invite us *to enter into negotiations* on the technical basis, sketched out by him on the ratio of three to four in ships of the line; while allowing the proposal of last autumn to lapse—that of not adding a ship in 1912. This can be adjusted differently in accordance with Tirpitz's proposal.

"Your Serene Highness will be good enough, therefore, to allow Tirpitz to work out a scheme in which numbers and types are provisionally set out side by side, and which will indicate roughly the proposals that we wish to make in case the English Government gives us another opportunity—*of an official and binding nature*—to express ourselves.

"Naturally she must on her side *propose and promise* us loyally the discontinuance of the excess building. Thus what we want are negotiations in courteous form from *equal to equal*, and not one-sided peremptory wishes. This is the purport of Tirpitz's proposal to me, with which I am agreed.

"WILLIAM I.R."

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
BARON VON SCHOEN.

"VENICE, April 9, 1909.

"I approve the draft of a communication to Admiral von Tirpitz. I would like, however, to have your opinion

[1] "*vollkommen bereit und einverstanden.*"

whether an addition might not be made to it somewhat to the following effect:

"'I feel, however, that I must point out already at this stage that the introduction of negotiations on our side, on the basis proposed by Your Excellency to His Majesty as set forth in His Majesty's letter to me, meets with a serious objection. If we reply to the English invitation to an arrangement[1] with the proposal:

"'(1) The ratio of four to three in ships of the line;

"'(2) Other decrease of armaments on the side of England; and

"'(3) The withdrawal of our promise not to add another ship in 1912,

it is to be feared, in my opinion, that the English will not only at once regard this communication as a refusal of the negotiations, but, especially by reason of point three, acquire an impression of German plans and intentions which, in direct opposition to the effect expected by Your Excellency, will increase considerably the danger of war. In this case I should have to leave to Your Excellency, alone, the responsibility to His Majesty, to the country, and to history, if the results were unwelcome and serious.'

"With reference to the end of the despatch, I would like to remark that it seems to me desirable also, in view of the excitement which has been noticeable in England, not to initiate the negotiations immediately. We might do well to give the impression that we had responded to the pressure of the English agitation in a way which did not seem to us too precipitate. On the other hand, it seems to me extremely desirable to utilize the disquietude which manifestly still prevails in England and the high estimate held there of German power, in what has the appearance of being its zenith, to demand English concessions. In view of the sober and prudent character of the English nation, it is not inconceivable that the present feeling will give place to a calmer but also more decided courageous attitude which may make the English Cabinet less yielding.

"Provided no new troubles or excitements arise on either side, I would think a delay of two or three weeks sufficient before entering into the negotiations. It is important,

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[1] *Verständigung.*

also, not to be too late, as on the other side of the Channel decisions might be come to which might impart the character of an inglorious retreat to the inauguration of the negotiations and which naturally might thus make the step impossible.

"I entirely agree with the idea that we might establish a more far-reaching political understanding with England by means of the negotiations, and I look forward to going into the matter with Your Excellency on my return."

MEMORANDUM.

"VENICE, April 17, 1909.

"His Majesty the Emperor is of the opinion that an understanding with England in regard to ship-building is possible only if framed in a general understanding with this country, whether this should take the form of a general guarantee of neutrality in case of war or of a far-reaching Colonial agreement, or an agreement not to injure each other or any such understanding. Within this framework the understanding with regard to ship-building would have to be included. This would have to be based upon reciprocity and, in my opinion, should take place only in agreement with the naval authorities.

"His Majesty insisted repeatedly that he had no thought of building a Fleet which would be as strong as, or stronger than, the English. He declared with the same emphasis that the ratio between us and England would always remain the same as at present. What he wanted was only that we should be able, by means of a systematically and rationally constructed Fleet (battleships, cruisers, torpedo-boats, submarines, mines, sea-fortresses) to defend our coasts, seaports, shipping and commerce. Moreover, it would not be directed against England as our sole rival, or even our principal rival, on the sea. He was more than ever convinced that a clash with England would be a misfortune. He did not want to have any competition in armaments with England.

"On the other hand, the Government and the people in Germany had a right to demand that the naval programme

taken in hand by the Federal Council and the Reichstag should be carried through. Moreover, from the moment the attitude of the English people and the English Press became threatening, no German Government could show pliability without losing respect."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"ACHILLEION, April 21, 1909.

"In the telegram of yesterday with reference to the despatch of the cruiser the wish was expressed that *S.H.S. Hamburg* be sent to Mersina, as alarming news continued to come thence to Berlin. In a telegram which reached the Foreign Office simultaneously, Herr von Marschall intimates that Ferid Pacha has got Smyrna and Syria in order by his wise and energetic measures, and that the troubles in Mersina had only a local significance and involved no anxieties for foreigners. The *Lorelei* is already there and has up to now reported *nothing*. I do not know, therefore, why the *Hamburg* should be sent to Mersina—what can anyone want with the pair of small cruisers in the Mediterranean?

"They offer no protection to the Germans in the interior, nor can they take action in Turkish towns—to which they have not hitherto had access—as the position in the interior of Turkey is a private matter, and alongside with the Fleets of the Mediterranean Powers, which may appear on the scene, they naturally would not impress the Turks. It seems to me that 'alarming news' must be taken with greater reserve. Here on the spot one believes only three-fourths of what one is told, and this is true also of the well-informed King. The line of argument taken by Admiral von Tirpitz, of which you tell me against the requisitioning of the *Gelder* to replace the cruisers detached from the Fleet, 'that people abroad might get excited over it or make mistaken comments on it,' is to me incomprehensible and, moreover, not tenable.

"An order given by the Supreme War Lord for the maintenance of the mobilization strength of the war Fleet, which

has been weakened by ships being detached from it, is rejected in view of its effect abroad! That is no reason to my mind! And it is scarcely in keeping with the dignity of the German Empire and of its armed might! Two small cruisers must be replaced, because the Fleet would be *forced* to detach them from lack of foreign cruisers; this necessary measure, perfectly intelligible in all countries, is represented as 'disturbing for people abroad!' ['*das Ausland aufregend!*']

"In the first place, this is not so, and secondly it would be all the same to me if it were! If people abroad are disturbed just now, it is over the Balkans and the Turks, not over the replacing of two small cruisers in the German Fleet. Admiral von Tirpitz has, therefore, to telegraph to me a more serious justification to explain why he will not carry out my order to bring the Fleet to full strength by replacing the ships taken from it. The handling of this matter entails the danger that in the Reichstag they may get so used to the tapping of the Fleet in special cases that no one will discover or pay any attention to the lack of foreign cruisers and that what is allowed in respect to cruisers to-day will be allowed in respect to ships of the line to-morrow. This I could never allow. Let us beware, then, of creating such serious situations. The rule must be unconditionally kept that ships detached from the Fleet for foreign service owing to lack of foreign cruisers must at once be replaced.

"I would add to this with reference to the replacing of the two cruisers shortly by training-ships that there is in existence an Order by me that training-ships are not to be employed in political service in general.

"This telegram is to be communicated to the Imperial Navy Office.

"WILLIAM I.R."

TO THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

"BERLIN, April 22, 1909.

"When I was drafting my telegram in which I asked Your Majesty graciously to consent to the despatch of the *Hamburg*, the reassuring message from Baron von Marschall had not yet arrived here. Numerous and urgent appeals

for help had come to us, not only from Consulates, but from Germans connected with them who were in danger and from circles within our sphere of interest. Among those in danger I may mention in particular engineers employed on the Bagdad Railway as well as German cotton-spinners in Adana with their many employés.

"Our attention was called to the threatening situation in Mersina and other places on the coast by others also, notably from the side of the Greeks and of the French. The Greek Government had ordered the despatch of men-of-war with all possible speed to Mersina.

"In the meantime Your Majesty will have taken note from the message from the *Lorelei* that the danger continues, and that the presence of ships is very much desired. This is made clear also by other messages. I am not blind to the fact that our ships can, and should, do nothing more than make a moral impression in the threatened seaports, and take on board any fugitive Germans in cases of need, which I hope will not occur.

"If imperilled Germans remained without protection I feel that it would have the effect of impairing the sympathy and interest and encouraging regard for the Fleet which have contributed so much to Your Majesty's achievements in furthering the Fleet's work. The measures which are now being taken, especially the despatch of the *Hamburg*, have been gratefully received. I hope confidently that the situation will soon have been so calmed down that our cruisers can return.

"Although Your Majesty's desire to prevent the weakening of the Fleet is fully justified, it seems to me that it is not opportune to requisition supplementary ships for the Fleet so long as the duration of the absence of the two cruisers in question is uncertain. Not long ago the Naval Votes were taken unanimously and without discussion, a fact which made an impression everywhere. To call forth discussion of the Navy now—and this would be the result of a requisition of supplementary ships—would in my respectful opinion have an injurious effect.

"I am asking Admiral von Tirpitz to reply fully to Your Majesty on the administrative aspect of the matter."

To the Emperor William.

"Berlin, April 27, 1909.

"I beg to inform Your Majesty that, adequate security having been given for the safeguarding of our interests in the Eastern Railway, I am authorizing Your Majesty's representative in Sofia, in co-operation with the representatives of Austria and Italy, to recognize the independence of Bulgaria and, to this end, to seek an audience with the King. According to news from Vienna, the Emperor Francis Joseph has sent the King his congratulations on his recognition by telegraph. As a personal expression of congratulation to the King would, I feel, be in accordance with Your Majesty's gracious intention, I do not fail to submit the following draft of a telegram:

"'To His Majesty King Ferdinand, Sofia.

"'In the certainty that the Government will provide in loyal fashion for the safeguarding of German material interests in the new control of the Orient railway question, I have authorized my representative to express to you my Government's recognition of the independence of thy country. It rejoices me at the same time to express my personal congratulation to thee and to be able to greet thee as King of Bulgaria. I kiss the hand of the Queen.'"

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, May 30, 1909.

"In view of the circumstance that Your Majesty will be graciously receiving the Turkish Ambassador, Osman Nisami Pacha, I venture to submit the following remarks on both the political questions in the settlement of which the Ambassador is interested.

"The Turkish Government has now approached us officially with the request that Your Majesty should graciously grant permission to General Baron von der Goltz to enter the service of the Turkish Army. In accordance with Your

[E.N.A.

Prince and Princess von Bülow with a friend.

A photograph taken in 1909 in front of the Prince's country house near Baden-Baden.

p. 320

Majesty's command, given me some time ago, I had already entered into communication with General von der Goltz and had asked him to inform me as to his position in regard to this matter. Baron von der Goltz has replied that he regards the task proposed to him in Turkey as a very difficult one. The principal difficulty lies in this, that the different military leaders do not agree.

"He does not think that he would have the necessary authority if he now definitively entered the Turkish service. It would place him in great dependence on the Turks. He would, however, have complete authority if he came to Turkey as Royal Prussian General and gave advice to the Turks, as he did last year. Baron von der Goltz in connection with this matter has expressed the wish to have about four weeks' leave in July and afterwards from three to four months' leave in the autumn.

"Within this period Baron von der Goltz hopes to be able to acquire full information on the subject and to plan accordingly. The arrangement might be effected next year should it seem to be workable, as the General anticipates. In any case he expresses the opinion that the question of his definitively entering the service of the Turkish Army should be left over.

"The arrangement above suggested would, in Baron von der Goltz's opinion, satisfy all the Turkish needs, and in proposing it to the Turks we could take our stand upon the fact that the General so acted last year at the request of His Majesty the Sultan. The General sees in this arrangement the advantage for himself and for us that in the event of circumstances making any incident impossible for him he could at any time return. The matter, moreover, will look harmless to foreign eyes. In addition, the possibility of withdrawal would be provided in the event of certain conceivable developments if he were free to shorten his visits, or to give up the position entirely.

"I can but express my complete agreement with the well-weighed reflections of Baron von der Goltz. In particular it would be well, in my opinion, in view of the present position in Turkey, if a period not exceeding the duration of a few weeks were chosen for the General's leave, and if Your Majesty, when receiving the Turkish Ambassador, would, in consenting to the General's request for leave, limit it to a short period."

THE AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, COUNT VON METTERNICH, TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR, PRINCE VON BÜLOW.

"BERLIN, June 2, 1909.

"*Private.*

"Included in the private correspondence regarding the question of the Navy, which your Serene Highness kindly brought before my notice yesterday, was a communication addressed to you by His Majesty the Kaiser.[1]

"This contains the charges against me:

"(1) That I did not turn sufficiently to account as a means for securing concessions from England the assurance I gave the English Minister that neither His Majesty the Emperor nor the Imperial Government contemplated going beyond the limits of our naval programme laid down and ratified by law.

"The same idea is developed in the communication addressed to you by the Secretary of State for the Imperial Naval Office, and the latter has put the matter in the same sense in a special report to His Majesty.

"In respect to this, I beg to state that I have learnt for the first time of a possible Supplement to the Navy Bill for the year 1912 only now in the course of my present stay in Berlin, end of May—beginning of June, while my conversation with the English Minister took place as far back as last winter.

"That conversation was based on the commission given impersonally in the previous summer by His Majesty, and also by Your Serene Highness, to intimate to the English Minister, when opportunity offered, that neither His Majesty nor His Majesty's Government contemplated going beyond the limits of the naval programme ratified by law. Our needs were met thereby and our finances did not allow of more. His Majesty the Emperor commissioned me to give this assurance in his name. It was not proposed to ask for any kind of concession in return. The assurance was merely to have a calming effect. We have repeatedly made similar declarations—Your Serene Highness did so in the Reichstag

[1] "*ein an Hochdieselben gerichtetes Allerhöchstes Schreiben.*"

last winter. His Majesty gave one himself, if I am correctly informed, in his letter to Lord Tweedmouth.

"(2) That I had not wrung from the English Government the expression of an apology for the unconstitutional behaviour of Sir Charles Hardinge in his conversation with His Majesty the Emperor at Friedrichshof.

"His Majesty gave me an account of this conversation at the end of the previous summer, and went on to tell me that it was followed some hours later by a friendly conversation on the sofa and by the conferring of the Order of the Red Eagle, First Class, on the English Under-Secretary. His Majesty did not intimate to me in any way that I was to demand satisfaction from the English Government for what had happened at Friedrichshof. Nor did the instructions sent to me officially contain anything of the kind. Your Serene Highness, on the other hand, did instruct me to give the English Government to understand that surprise had been felt here that Sir Charles Hardinge should have addressed himself to His Majesty the Emperor direct, ignoring the official personages concerned in the matter.

"So far and no further went my commission, which I only fulfilled, with the English Government.

"I leave it entirely to Your Serene Highness's discretion whether you will bring this memorandum to the knowledge of His Majesty. I am, of course, quite aware that my attitude on the Navy question—in connection with which I have felt it my duty repeatedly to point out that our relations with England have been chiefly poisoned thereby—does not meet with the approval of His Majesty, and that, in particular, also the Secretary of State for the Imperial Naval Office complains to His Majesty of my attitude.

"It is naturally not pleasant for the controllers of the Navy to hear that our rate of construction and our relations with England are interconnected. I should, however, be false to history if I gave different information from what I do, and I cannot sell my conviction even for the favour of my Sovereign. It is doubtful to my mind, moreover, whether His Majesty would be served by a smooth and gratifying method of report until we suddenly see ourselves confronted with a war against England."

To the Emperor William II.

"Berlin, June 10, 1909.

". . . I am convinced that at your meeting with His Majesty the Emperor of Russia things will go as well as they are now going in Vienna. I am glad that Schoen is accompanying Your Majesty, as he is very sympathetic to the Russians and to His Russian Majesty. I enclose a copy of the Ten Commandments which I have given Schoen. I think they meet the requirements of Pourtalès and Hintze.

"I am inclined to think that the exchange of 'toasts' will be useful in themselves *car ils relèvent l'importance de l'entrevue*. I would, however, venture to suggest that you lay stress on personal friendship which unites the two powerful Sovereigns and which is a guarantee of peaceful tranquillity. May I ask for a draft of the 'toast' to be delivered in St. Petersburg?

"The Ten Commandments

"(1) Handle the Russians, especially Isvolsky, in a friendly way. We must discuss questions of policy with Isvolsky, as he will be brought into them by his Sovereign. Naturally, one must be cautious with him. Let him talk.

"(2) Say to the Russians nothing which, if reported to Vienna (either directly, or indirectly *via* London or Paris), might call forth mistrust there.

"(3) Don't broach the question of the Dardanelles. If the Russians should do so, reply to them in friendly fashion that this is a European question, but that the Russian wishes will certainly not be foiled by opposition from us, provided the further development of German-Russian relations permit of our maintaining a favourable attitude towards Russia.

"(4) Don't broach the question of Crete. If the Russians raise it, say that we are not the protecting Powers and have no interest in it.

"(5) In the event of any complaints in regard to Austria, we sigh, or smile, or shrug our shoulders in proportion to the amount of feeling evinced, but do not make any assent.

"(6) We continue to emphasize more and more the traditional friendliness of German-Russian relations: the basis of monarchical order in the world and of peace. The three Emperors' Alliance remains our ideal; but Russia ought to come into it. We cannot enter into any separate alliance with Russia, only together with Austria.

"(7) If the Russians regard the situation in Turkey as unsafe and incalculable, do not contradict them; but treat the Turkish proceedings yourself with serene confidence. We are not much concerned in the matter.

"(8) Say no word against England. Anything said against her would be at once reported there, and, moreover, would only strengthen the Russians in their present friendly feeling for England.

"(9) We do not contemplate opposing Russia in Persia or elsewhere in the East. The Persian proceedings have no interest for us whatever. *Nescio quid nobis magis farcimentum sit.*

"(10) It is not desirable to dwell too much on the proceedings of last winter. If the Russians get on the subject say to them: We were loyal towards Austria; loyal and friendly towards Russia; we have throughout desired peace. Do not talk at all about Björkö."

To Baron von Schoen,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

"Villa Edda, Norderney, Sept. 25, 1909.

"Since the publication the day before yesterday in the *Märkische Volkszeitung* of the article which has doubtless come to your attention dealing with the interview in the *Daily Telegraph*, several newspapers have asked me whether I would like to use their columns for a communication in reply. I have answered that I have no wish to enter into a polemic. To-day I have received from the chief editor of the *B. Z. am Mittag*[1] the telegram of which I enclose a copy,

[1] *Berliner Zeitung am Mittag*: the afternoon edition of the *Berliner Zeitung*.

according to which the *Kreuzzeitung* has reproduced the lies of the *Märkische Volkszeitung*.

"The article in the *Märkische Volkszeitung* was in essentials a rehash of the Martin slander. All the assertions made in the *Märkische Volkszeitung* are untrue. In the *Daily Telegraph* interview there were general observations on the desirability of improving German-English relations with which everyone was able to agree. It contained remarks on the Anglophobe feelings of certain sections of the German people which it would have been better not to put into the mouth of His Majesty but which were comparatively harmless. On the other hand, the interview contained three points to which the excitement called forth by the *Daily Telegraph* article is to be ascribed: the statement that the effort of France and Russia to humiliate England in the dust was prevented by His Majesty; the statement that His Majesty had worked out a serious plan of campaign against the Boers for England; and the statement that our Fleet in the Pacific Ocean could be used also against Japan and has been built with this idea in the background.

"I do not need to tell you that I never advised His Majesty to express himself in the sense of these three points. I had no idea when His Majesty started on his journey to England in 1907 that he would express himself to this effect; until the *Daily Telegraph* article appeared I had no idea that His Majesty had so spoken.

"I cannot remember that His Majesty ever wrote or telegraphed to me at all from England on the subject of any utterances made by him to this effect during his stay there. All I know is that nothing of any utterances of the kind came to the knowledge of you yourself, who accompanied His Majesty to London on that occasion, or to the knowledge of Metternich, who was in His Majesty's suite at Highcliffe. At least, neither of you ever said anything to me about it. I do not think I ever wrote to His Majesty during that stay of his in England, either about his conversations or about anything. In any case, I have never at any time declared myself to be in agreement with His Majesty on the points in question. As long as I was in office I always counselled His Majesty to be prudent in his utterances both in letter and orally. In particular, I always begged His Majesty to say nothing to the English that the Russians, French, Japanese, and Americans might not hear, and the other way about. I also begged His

Majesty not to annoy the Japanese or to make them mistrustful; more than once I said to His Majesty that in politics it does not do to remind people too often of the services one has rendered them. The idea that I had approved or inspired the utterances of His Majesty in question is so senseless that I shall waste not another word on the subject. And the same assuredly holds good in regard to you and Metternich and the other advisers of His Majesty.

"Consequently all the assertions made in this connection in the *Märkische Volkszeitung* articles are absolutely untrue. It is also, so far as my knowledge goes, incorrect to state that in the September articles of the *Deutschen Revue* everything has been said that stood later in the *Daily Telegraph*. It is not correct that the MS. of the *Daily Telegraph* article had been submitted to me in typescript; the typescript copy only reached the Foreign Office later. His Majesty, moreover, had not made any marginal notes on the MS., which I did not read at all.

"Equally untrue are the further statements in the article. The conversations which His Majesty the Emperor had with me in November and March were conducted by His Majesty in the most gracious and friendly fashion. It never entered His Majesty's head to refuse an offer of resignation made by me in March with the words: '*Jetzt nicht!*' [Not now!]. His Majesty assured me of his confidence on that occasion and continued to do so. His Majesty telegraphed to me again to this effect on my birthday and spoke to the same effect when I asked to be relieved of office in Kiel. His Majesty did not wish to relieve me of office, and it was only after a long conversation that I succeeded in convincing His Majesty that my continuance had been made impossible through the situation brought about by the rejection of the Inheritance Tax.

"I have asked the editor of the *B. Z.* in reply not to send a member of his staff to see me as I must keep to my decision not to enter into any polemic. I have asked him, however, to consider whether an official defence against the action of the *Kreuzzeitung* be not called for. It is naturally not to the convenience of the Party to bear the responsibility for my retirement. It ought not, however, to be allowed to shift the odium from itself to the Crown and to open the door, at the same time, to untruthful babblings, misrepresentations, and fresh talk about Camarillas and personal rule. A *démenti*, I

feel, ought to be issued by the *Reichsanzeiger*, and it should be perfectly clear, very definite, and weighty in expression."

To the Imperial Chancellor,
von Bethmann Hollweg.

"Villa Edda, Norderney, Sept. 28, 1909.

"Schoen will have told you that I consider necessary the issuing of an official unequivocal and emphatic *démenti* of the unworthy calumnies to which I have for some time past been subjected. The charges against me which have been spread about are impudent and senseless lies. It is not true that I knew anything of the contents of the *Daily Telegraph* article before it was published. In the stress of official business, and feeling confidence in my subordinates, I did not myself read at the time the lengthy MS., and I was astonished and annoyed when, some weeks later, I made acquaintance with it through the Wolff telegram brought to my notice. The publication by Wolff of the interview came about naturally [*spontan*] and without application to me."

[Prince von Bülow proceeds, in almost precisely the same words as those used in his letter to Baron von Schoen, to show that he had no responsibility whatever for the interview and in particular for the three statements which had occasioned all the excitement. Coming to the point where he had advised the Kaiser not to say anything to the English that the Russians and French, Japanese and Americans might not hear, he continues]:

"Naturally, I should not have been for one moment in doubt that so drastic a blackening of the Russians and French to the English would only be taken by the latter as an attempt to obstruct the *rapprochement* which was in progress between them and these two countries, and that the result would be to produce the exact opposite effect to what was aimed at.

"His Majesty's remark regarding the plan of campaign against the Boers I cannot have advised or approved simply from the fact that I read the letter in question addressed to Her Majesty Queen Victoria, and knew that it contained aphoristic and academic notes on the conduct of war which were of no

practical significance for the progress of the South African campaign. And in respect to Japan I warned His Majesty over and over again not to make this sensitive and mistrustful race still more suspicious than it had become already as the result of many of his deliverances. ('Races of Europe, guard your most precious possession!' His speeches on the Yellow Peril, etc., etc.) I remember that two or three years ago I called back by telegraph a letter from His Majesty to Roosevelt which had gone off already several days before, because, from what I was told of its contents, it seemed to me to contain impudent reflections upon Japan.

"I cannot remember having written at all to His Majesty during the autumn of 1907 with reference to the conversations held by him. This, however, I can state with the utmost certainty, that neither by letter nor by telegraph did I declare myself, nor could I have declared myself, in agreement with His Majesty over these three points. The *Deutsche Tageszeitung* states that His Majesty the Emperor took occasion to show to 'a politician' letters from me in which I gave expression to my agreement. Let those letters be produced! [*Man zeige mir diese Briefe*]. They are as non-existent as the politician in question. I had as little previous knowledge of the utterances of His Majesty under discussion as I had of the letter to Lord Tweedmouth, or of the protest against the candidature of the American Ambassador Hill, or of the Swinemund telegram to the Prince Regent of Bavaria, or of the telegram to Prince von Lippe, or of very many speeches, from the 'Huns' speech of the summer of 1900 to the Schwarzseher [Pessimist] speech in the manœuvres of 1906.

"The attacks directed against me contain yet other and numerous untruths. It is untrue, for instance, that I went in June to Kiel in the hope that His Majesty would not accept my resignation. On the contrary, in view of the political situation internally, I had firmly made up my mind to retire. Without going into minor details, I will only draw attention to one point, namely, the assertion in the *Kreuzzeitung* that I only had His Majesty's confidence 'officially,' and that, moreover, I had never won it back. His Majesty twice refused to accept my resignation, while insisting on his confidence in me.

"After the exhaustive conversation I had with him in March he had in the most cordial and gracious fashion

assured me of his indestructible confidence. Repeatedly he asked me to dinner, called on me, invited me to Potsdam, gave me his company in Berlin, Potsdam, and Wiesbaden in the most gracious and friendly way. When he said goodbye to me and my wife he invited us to Potsdam for the birthday of Her Majesty the Empress. Repeatedly (on my birthday, the 3rd of May, before his journey to meet the Emperor of Russia, and again on the rejection of the Inheritance Tax) he has telegraphed to me in the most cordial tones and in a fashion that left no doubt as to his wish for me to remain in office. When I went to Kiel to ask him to relieve me of my post he discussed with me in friendly and confidential fashion the entire situation at home and abroad as well as the choice of my successor.

"It was only after a long conversation with His Majesty that I succeeded in convincing him that in view of the rejection of the Inheritance Tax and the line taken by me in internal politics since the last elections I could not remain on as Imperial Chancellor. In what a light His Majesty would look if this were all play-acting! I am convinced, however, that it was not play-acting, that His Majesty did not wish to part with me. Just as I, for my part, would not have retired if the issue of the Imperial finances reforms had not obliged me to do so.

"Since my retirement my one wish has been to avoid all publicity and to lead an independent life. I am, however, entitled to ask that action be taken against contemptible calumnies of this description directed against a man who in difficult circumstances and not without success has been for twelve years a Minister and for nine years Imperial Chancellor. What will it lead to if this campaign of slander should continue and if I can no longer keep silence—if it comes to proceedings in the Courts and if my declaration which I make on oath were to be set against alleged utterances of His Majesty? It would be one of the saddest episodes in German history—one which I would fain spare the Throne and the country.

"It is to be anticipated, finally, that in the event of a further propagation of these scurrilities the foreign policy of last winter will come under discussion. The organs of the Centre Party declared so far back as January that I took action on the side of Austria in the Bosnian question hesitatingly and only because I was forced. Similar insinuations are now to be found in the Conservative Press. Now, the exact opposite

was the case. From the very beginning I advocated with the utmost decision an unhesitating intervention on behalf of Austria. In this matter I had to cope with hot argument and serious opposition from His Majesty.

"His Majesty, when the Bosnian question became acute, wanted to go in on the side of England and Turkey, which, had we done so, would have brought into existence against us the coalition which our enemies had until then vainly sought to form, and would have placed us in the most serious position in which we had been since the Seven Years' War. And if in spite of the *Daily Telegraph* affair I remained on in office, it was chiefly because I was convinced that a weakening in that policy of a firm alliance with Austria which I had advocated, initiated and pursued, would not only prevent the exorcising (in the meantime achieved) of the spectre of encirclement, but also imperil peace and the future of the Empire.

"If the *Reichsanzeiger* publishes a clear and decided *démenti*, and if His Majesty sees me in the second half of October during my contemplated short stay in Berlin, and if I then proceed to Rome, the whole wretched business will stop. But the *démenti*, if it is to have effect, must make it quite clear that all the information of the *Märkischen Volkszeitung* taken and worked up from a number of papers, both in regard to the *Daily Telegraph* interview and in regard to His Majesty's relations with me, is untrue on all points. I entertain no doubt that you, my honoured friend, who have been through all the toils and fights of this winter with me, will prevent further harm and trouble, in the interests of the Dynasty and the Fatherland."

THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR, VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG, TO THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

"LINDERHOF, Sept. 28, 1909.

"*Private.*

"I regret to have to inform Your Majesty that not only the Centre papers, but recently the *Kreuzzeitung* also, have entered upon a polemic over the transactions connected with the matter published by the *Daily Telegraph* and the retirement of Prince von Bülow and have thereby called forth considerable

excitement. The assertions are to the effect that Prince von Bülow had previous knowledge of Your Majesty's conversations at Highcliffe and that he gave them his approval orally and in writing. It is declared, also, that the publication of these conversations later in the *Daily Telegraph* was brought about by Prince von Bülow, that the MS. (of which there were several copies) sent to him was read by the Under-Secretary of State Stemrich and Privy Councillor Klehmet, and that thereupon the Imperial Chancellor, who was at Norderney, authorized the publication.

"The retirement of Prince von Bülow is being attributed to these proceedings and not to the voting in the Inheritance Tax question. Prince von Bülow in a letter addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has contested the accuracy of these assertions and asked for a *démenti* in the *Reichanzeiger*, on the ground that it is not right that the odium of his retirement should be removed from the Parties that voted against the Inheritance Tax.

"The most important newspapers, also, ask for an official declaration from the Government, urging that the declaration given by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*[1] in November last year did not correspond with the facts. I cannot regard it as opportune to issue an official declaration. The facts themselves are not known to me at first hand; I could only turn to the archives of the Foreign Office, which are not exhaustive, in respect to the particular proceedings referred to by the *Kreuzzeitung*. To draw the All-Highest Person[2] of Your Majesty into the dispute, however, by making public the confidential communications made to me by Your Majesty, is manifestly out of the question. Moreover, it seems undesirable to reassert the accuracy of a solemn declaration of the Imperial Government such as that of November last year and thereby to call forth a renewed discussion or interpretation. Finally, in my opinion, new matter would be introduced into the dispute.

"I think, therefore, I ought respectfully to ask for your authorization to refuse for the present such a declaration as Prince von Bülow has asked for and to wait and see whether the Press discussion continues and attains serious dimensions.

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[1] This was Bülow's official account of the whole incident.

[2] In this case it seems well to translate the official German phraseology *verbatim*.

In this case I would allow myself to submit to Your Majesty an appropriate proposal.

"I shall return to Berlin after receipt here of Your Majesty's decision.

"BETHMANN HOLLWEG."

THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR, VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG.

"ROMINTEN, Sept. 29, 1909.

"What the *Kreuzzeitung* brings to the front is nothing new but something long known. Moreover, it is nothing but an epitome made from Stein's book in which private proceedings —in spite of my repeated orders to him—are reproduced with amazing accuracy. This book brought about the astonishing reaction in my favour on the part of the German people and was vigorously attacked by the entire Press—even the Government Press—as it saw itself made to look very ridiculous in its agitation against me. The material in Stein's book comprised so many secret things which only Bülow and I knew—for instance, the origin of the Krüger telegram—that, much excited, I sent a man I could trust to ask Stein whence he had it. He replied that it had come to him on Bülow's behalf for publication. Bülow *denied* to me that he had ever communicated this material to anyone. Bülow has spoken with me repeatedly about Stein's book, *at first condemning it, later praising it*, and remarking that he knew Stein well and thought much of him, as he was a very gentlemanly and trustworthy man. At last, when the astonishing fact of the publication and its enormous effect in my favour made me anxious about Bülow's position, which now seemed to me imperilled, and when I communicated to him my anxiety, he gave me to understand by means of hints the *material was* supplied by him and published *with his sanction*.

"The material, therefore, is perfectly authentic and the whole attitude of the Government during November has been exposed and condemned thereby. As was the case also with the people, a reassertion of the November declaration is

completely out of the question and would be a renewed grievous injury to the Throne and to my Person, which I am not for a moment willing to tolerate.

"Government and people and Press were all alike enmeshed last November in a serious and fateful mistake which the Prince unfortunately omitted to clear up and correct—for he alone was in the position to do so. Stein's book gave the people the material which enabled them to form a clear view of things. And the swing round followed this clear view immediately. I have always feared that it would lead to such discussions, but I thought they would come sooner. It is a low trick of the Conservatives to make out that they are doing this to please me—in fact, that they are acting on my command! That is disgraceful!

"After Bülow had said *PATER PECCAVI IN EVERY FORM for his behaviour and the Government's in November*, I had forgiven him in the name of the Crown![1]

"P.S.—One of the chief actors in the matter of the November declaration was—according to my information—Dr. Bassermann, the Leader of the National Liberals. When the enormity of the step—the absolute abandonment of the wearer of the Crown in face of the Reichstag—was pointed out to the Prince, and he was taken to task for allowing anything of the kind, he replied that unfortunately he could not

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[1] It is interesting to compare the Kaiser's contemporary account of what happened at the end of 1908, as given in his letter of September 29, 1909, to Bethmann Hollweg with this later account of it in his Memoirs, the English edition of which has been published by Cassell and Co.:

Towards the end of the winter the Chancellor requested an audience with me. I walked up and down with him in the picture gallery of the palace, between the portraits of my ancestors and the paintings of the battles of the Seven Years' War and of the proclamation of the Empire at Versailles, and was amazed when the Chancellor harked back to the events of the autumn and undertook to explain his attitude. Thereupon I took occasion to talk with him about the entire past. This frank conversation and the explanations of the Prince, which satisfied me, released the tension between us. The result was that he remained in office. The Chancellor requested that I should dine with him that evening, as I had so often done before, in order to show the outer world that all was again well. I did so. A pleasant evening, enlivened by the visibly delighted Princess with charming amiability, and by the Prince with his usual lively, witty talk, closed that memorable day. Alluding to the Prince's audience with me, a wag wrote later in a newspaper, parodying a famous line: "The tear flows, Germania has me again."

By this reconciliation I also wished to show that I was in the habit of sacrificing my own sensitiveness to the good of the cause. Despite Prince Bülow's attitude towards me in the Reichstag, which was calculated to give me pain, I naturally never forgot his eminent gifts as a statesman and his distinguished services to the Fatherland. He succeeded, by his skill, in avoiding a world war at several moments of crisis, during the period, indeed, when I, together with Tirpitz, was building our protecting Fleet. That was a great achievement.

now hold back as he had already come to an understanding with Dr. Bassermann over the interpellation and the reply to it.

"WILLIAM I.R."

THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR, VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG, TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

"LINDERHOF, Sept. 29, 1909.

"Please inform Prince von Bülow by telegram that a letter in reply to his will be despatched from Berlin this evening, and write to him to the following effect:

"'Your Serene Highness wishes, according to your letter, that an official declaration be made in answer to the recent Press discussions over the *Daily Telegraph*. As His Majesty has been heavily involved in this matter, such a declaration would be out of the question without his sanction. His Majesty, however, has quite spontaneously given the definite order in respect to this Press campaign that we are to abstain from the issuing of any official declaration. The Imperial Chancellor regrets extremely in these circumstances that he cannot authorize an official pronouncement. He has full understanding and sympathy for the difficult and painful position of Your Serene Highness. He believes, however, that a service will be rendered to the public interest by the exercise of the utmost reserve.'"

THE END

INDEX

INDEX

A

Abdel Malek, 108, 109, 124.
Aehrenthal, Baron von, Austrian Minister, 205, 235, 242, 243, 244, 248, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 268, 269, 270, 274, 279, 282, 284, 293, 296, 298, 304, 305, 306.
Albert, Prince of Monaco, 134, 136, 138, 139, 185, 213, 214, 216, 217.
Alexander II, Emperor of Russia (1855-1881), 31, 63, 171.
Alexander III, Emperor of Russia (1881-1894), 58, 60, 62, 155, 176, 180.
Alexander Michaelovitch, Grand Duke of Russia, 60, 61, 117, 151.
Alexandra, Queen of England, 257.
Alexandra Feodorovna, Empress of Russia, 61, 62, 116.
Alexeiev, Admiral (Russian), 16, 17, 39, 59, 60, 62.
Alphonso XIII, King of Spain, 105.
Alvensleben, Count von, Ambassador in St. Petersburg, 24, 31, 38, 100, 143, 165, 178.
André, M., French Minister of War, 197.
Aoki, Viscount, Japanese Minister, 17, 86, 87, 88, 101, 104.
Apponyi, Count Albert, 202.
Arco-Valley, Count von, Ambassador in Tokyo, letter to, 17, 86, 88, 101.
Arthur, Duke of Connaught, 182.
Auguste Victoria, Empress of Germany, 22, 330.
Avarna, Duke, Italian Ambassador at Vienna, 205.

B

Bacheracht, von, Russian Ambassador, 113.
Balfour, Arthur James, 210.
Ballin, Albert, General Director of Hamburg-America Line, 81, 82, 83, 100, 101, 182, 183, 247, 248, 249, 250.
Barrère, Camille, French Ambassador in Rome, 42.
Bassermann, Dr. Ernest, 334, 335.
Beck, Baron von, Austrian Minister, 244, 274.
Beernaert, Auguste, Belgian Prime Minister, 221.
Beit, Werner, 182, 183.
Below-Rutzau, von, German Consul in Sofia, 41*; letter to, 43-47.
Benckendorff, Count von, Russian Ambassador in London, 64, 65, 176, 179, 279.
Bernstorff, Count von, 55, 64.
Bertie, Sir Francis Leveson, British Ambassador in Paris, 148, 149.
Besobrasov, M., Russian Secretary of State, 59, 60, 62.
Bethmann Hollweg, Theobald von, Imperial Chancellor, letter to, 328; his letter to William II, 331; the reply, 333; letter to Foreign Office, 335.
Bienerth, Baron von, Austrian Minister, 274.
Birilew, Russian Admiral, 156.
Bismarck, Prince viii, 171, 231, 232.
Bourgeois, Léon, French Minister, 213, 221.
Bryce, James, 207.
Bu Amama, 110.
Bülow, Prince von, *passim*.

C

Calmette, Gaston, Director of the *Figaro*, 241.
Cambon, Jules, French Ambassador in Berlin, 77, 78, 107, 217, 306, 307, 308.
Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, 238.
Capelle, Rear-Admiral, 241, 284.
Carnegie, Andrew, 207, 208.
Cassel, Sir Ernest, 241, 247.
Cassini, Count, Russian Ambassador in Washington, 15, 86.
Chamberlain, Joseph, 183, 187.
Charivari, 39.
Chirol, Sir Valentine, 150.
Christian IX, King of Denmark, 18-2 156, 162.

Clarendon, Earl of, 182.
Clemenceau, Georges, 76, 144, 263, 268.
Coerper, Herr, German Naval Attaché in London, 79, 160.
Cologan, Señor, Spanish Ambassador, 112.
Combes, Justin Louis Emile, French Prime Minister, 96, 97, 138.
Contemporary Review, 291.
Crewe, Earl of, 299, 300, 301.
Crispi, Francesco, Prime Minister of Italy, 103.
Curzon, Lord, Viceroy of India, 162.

D

Dähnhardt, Captain, 284.
Daily Chronicle, 107, 110.
Daily Graphic, 104.
Daily Telegraph, ix, 255, 291; famous interview with the Kaiser in, 325, 326; 327, 328, 331, 332, 335.
Decazes, Duc, 217.
Delcassé, French Foreign Minister, 38, 44, 77, 78, 90, 93, 96, 97, 100, 105, 106, 111, 113, 122, 125, 129, 130, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 144, 145, 148, 155, 174, 185, 196, 197.
Deutsche Revue, 327.
Deutsche Tageszeitung, 329.
Devonshire, Duke of, 51.
Doumer, Paul, Governor-General of Indo-China, 96, 97.

E

Eckardstein, Baron von, 64, 150.
Edinburgh, Duke of, 282.
Edward VII, xi, 22, 24; visit to Kiel, 29; 53, 58, 65; conversation with Prince von Bülow, 67-69; 70, 88, 89, 93, 104, 143, 147, 149, 152, 153, 154, 179, 182, 183, 189, 193, 198, 201, 202, 245, 247, 248, 249, 250, 257, 264, 274, 299, 301.
Elizabeth, Princess of Hesse, 67.
Esher, Lord, 240.
Etienne, M., French Minister, 213-220.
Eulenburg, Prince Philipp, 184, 185, 291.
Eulenburg, Count August, 119.

F

Ferdinand, Prince of Bulgaria, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 51, 52, 90, 265, 297, 300, 320.
Ferid Pacha, 317.
Figaro, 78, 101, 241.
Financial Chronicle, 227.
Fisher, Sir John, Admiral, 183.
Fortis, Signor, Italian Prime Minister, 123.
Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, 202, 243, 244, 274, 275.
Francis Joseph I, Emperor of Austria-Hungary, 81, 242; letter from, 260; 262, 267, 268; letter from William II, 270; 274, 297, 320.
Frederick Leopold, Prince of Prussia, 70, 71.
Fredericks, Baron, 153.

G

George Crown Prince of Greece, 148.
George, Lloyd, 252, 256.
Giers, Nicholas von, Russian Minister, 59.
Giolitti, Giovanni, 243.
Goltz, Baron von der, Prussian General, 258, 264, 320, 321.
Gooch, Dr. G. P., his "History of Modern Europe," 205, 291.
Goschen, Sir William Edward, British Ambassador in Berlin, 278.
Greindl, Baron, Belgian Minister, 55.
Gretton, R. H., his "Modern History of the English People," 93.
Greville, Hon. Sidney Robert, 198.
Grey, Sir Edward, 51, 195, 199, 200, 252, 272, 296, 310.
Griscom, Mr., American Ambassador in Tokyo, 86.
Gummeré, Mr., American Ambassador in Tangier, 113.

H

Hanotaux, Gabriel, French Minister, 44.
Hans, Prince von Schleswig-Holstein-Glücksburg, 18.
Hardinge, Sir Charles, 208, 209, 259, 264, 296, 297, 298, 299, 323.
Harris, Mr., Correspondent of *The Times* in Tangier, 114, 115, 119.
Hay, John, American Minister, 38, 86, 96, 147.
Hayashi, Count, Japanese Ambassador in London, 33, 86.
Henry, Prince of Prussia, 70, 71; letter to, 116.
Helfferich, Karl, 251.
Heyden, Count, 153.
Hill, David, American Ambassador in Berlin, 329.

Hintze, Captain von, 279, 282, 324.
Hinzpeter, Herr, 22.
Hirsch, Dr., Physician to Nicholas II of Russia, 153.
Hohenau, Count von, 78.
Holstein, Baron von, Head of German Foreign Office, viii, 34, 143, 144, 150, 164.

I

Ignatiev, Count, Russian Minister, 59.
Isvolsky, Alexander, Russian Minister, 60, 69, 205, 210, 228, 234, 236, 237, 238, 242, 248, 265, 267, 270, 271, 272, 274, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 293, 294, 295, 298, 300, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 324.

J

Jacobi, General von, 236.
Jenisch, Baron von, 273.
Johannes, Consul-General in London, 309, 310.
Journal de St. Pétersbourg, 96, 97.
Jussanov, Russian journalist, 248.

K

Keim, Herr, Prussian General, 254.
Kerr, Captain Mark, 256.
Kiderlen-Waechter, von, German Ambassador in Constantinople, 212, 252.
Kitchener, Lord, 162.
Klehmet, Herr, 332.
Kodama, Japanese General, 104.
Kreige, Dr. Johannes, 310.
Kühlmann, Richard von, letters to, 95, 98, 107; 113; letters to, 114, 119, 120, 123.
Kuropatkin, General, 57, 72, 117.

L

Lamsdorff, Count, Russian Minister, 17, 38, 39, 59, 60, 62, 63, 69, 76, 78, 81, 100, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 151, 164, 165, 170, 175, 176, 181, 188, 228.
Lansdowne, Lord, 50, 56, 57, 65, 67, 69, 178.
Lanza, Count di, Italian Ambassador in Berlin, 41, 42, 43, 102.
Lascelles, Sir Frank, British Ambassador in Berlin, 22, 50, 51, 88, 89, 131, 132, 133, 199, 200, 201, 259.
Le Matin, 182.
Le Temps, 96, 97, 251.
Leuthold, Dr., Physician to William II of Germany, 39.
Loebell, F. W. von, 264.
Loubet, M., President of French Republic (1899-1906), 41, 42, 93, 136, 176.
Louise Margaret, Duchess of Connaught, 149.
Lowther, Sir Gerard Augustus, British Ambassador in Tangier, 288.

M

Mabilleau, Leopold, 213.
Maclean, Kaid, 124.
Marschall von Bieberstein, Baron, German Ambassador in Constantinople, 41, 130, 184, 187, 212, 213, 222, 223, 224, 237, 248, 266, 317, 318.
Martens, von, Professor, 20, 222.
May, Sir William Henry, Admiral, 161, 183.
McKenna, Reginald, First Lord of the Admiralty, 284, 285.
Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein, Count, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London, 64, 274.
Mentzinger, Baron von, 47, 48, 49.
Metternich, Count von Wolff-, Ambassador in London, letters to, 20, 55; 66, 88; letters to, 131, 147; 159, 160, 195, 208, 239, 240; letters to, 241, 244; 246; letters to, 252; 258; letters to, 259, 266; 277; letter to, 277; letter concerning Naval question, 284; 299, 303, 306, 309, 310, 312; letter from, 322; 327.
Mirbach-Harff, Count von, 287.
Moltke, Count Cuno von, 78.
Moltke, Count Hellmuth von, 161, 165, 166, 168, 169, 170, 196.
Moltke, Julius von, 161.
Monaco, Prince of, *see* Albert.
Montague, Admiral, 256.
Montenegro, Prince of, 180, 265.
Monts, Count, Ambassador in Rome, 40, 41; letter to, 42.
Morley, John, 209, 210.
Morocco, Sultan of, Abdul Asis, 48, 49, 95, 98, 99, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 122, 124, 125, 129, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 139, 140, 141 142, 215, 243.
Müller, George Alexander von, 312.

Murat, Prince, 148.
Mutsuhito, Emperor of Japan, 104.

N

Nelidoff, Russian Ambassador in Paris, 176, 179.
Nicholas I, Emperor of Russia, 58, 63, 156.
Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia (1894-1917), xi, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 58, 59, 60, 62, 67, 69, 70, 71, 74; draft letter to, 74-76; 78, 79, 80; draft of telegram to, 80-81; 82, 86, 90, 93, 99, 100, 104, 105, 116-119, 143-147, 149, 151-158, 162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 170, 171, 173-176, 178, 180, 181, 187, 188, 201, 247, 248, 258, 271, 274, 275, 279-284, 293, 300, 324.
Nisami, Pacha, Turkish Ambassador in Berlin, 320.
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 105, 107, 108, 109, 273, 332

O

O'Conor, Sir Nicholas, 282.
Oscar II, King of Sweden, 152, 225.
Osten-Sacken, Count von der, Russian Ambassador in Berlin, 32, 33, 116, 236.

P

Petrow, General, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, 46, 51.
Pichon, M., French Minister, 302, 304.
Plessen, Herr von, 312.
Poklevsky, Herr, Russian Secretary of Embassy in London, 32.
Pourtalès, Count von, Ambassador in St. Petersburg, letters to, 234, 236; 246; letter to, 247; 294, 295, 324.

Q

Quadt, Count von, 288.

R

Radolin, Prince von, Ambassador in Paris, 82, 133; letter to, 136; 139, 140; letter to, 141; 148, 179, 217, 287, 288, 302.
Radovitz, Joseph von, 40.
Revoil, M., Governor-General of Algiers, 138, 201.
Rex, Count von, Minister at Peking, 226; letter to, 233.
Roberts of Kandahar, Earl, 272, 276.
Romberg, Baron von, 82.
Roosevelt, Theodore, President of the United States, 72, 73, 74, 84, 88, 97, 113, 120, 121, 123, 138, 139, 146, 147, 152, 178, 180, 207, 208, 227, 234, 329.
Root, Elihu, American Minister, 208.
Roschestwensky, Vice-Admiral, 154.
Rosebery, Lord, 51.
Rosen, Dr. Frederick, 125, 179.
Rothschild, Alfred de, 104, 195, 196.
Rouvier, Maurice, French Finance Minister, 75, 133-141, 176, 185, 197.
Runciman, Walter, 208.
Russo-Japanese War, ix, 39, 40, 47, 52, 57, 67, 68, 70, 75, 76, 77, 86, 117, 146, 149.

S

Saturday Review, 275, 276.
Schlieffen, Count von, 161.
Schoen, Wilhelm von, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, letter to, 18; 143, 157, 163, 165, 178, 271, 291, 310, 312; letter to, 314; 324; letter to, 325; 328.
Scholl, von, Adjutant-General, 79, 99.
Schwabach, Paul von, 195, 196.
Schweinitz, Count von, x, 184.
Seckendorff, Count von, 64, 116, 147-150.
Selborne, 70.
Senden, Baron von, 160.
Skrydlow, Vice-Admiral, 101.
Smyth, Dame Ethel, x.
Sophie, Princess of Hohenberg, 202, 244.
Soveral, Luiz, Spanish Ambassador in London, 64.
Speck von Sternburg, Baron, Ambassador in Washington, 73, 84, 86, 137, 138, 147; letter to, 207; 227.
Spencer, Lord, 51.
Speyer, Sir Edgar, 286.
Standard, 277.
Steed, H. Wickham, his "Through Thirty Years" quoted, 193, 205.
Stein, August, German journalist, 256, 333, 334.
Steinrich, Herr, 332.
Stolypin, M., Russian Prime Minister, 238.
Szögyényi Marich, Herr, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin, 39, 262, 267.

T

Tattenbach, Count von, 115, 119, 120, 124, 125, 188.
Times, The, 78, 132, 150, 239, 240, 241, 276.
Tirpitz, Admiral, 254, 260, 267; letter to, 275; 284, 285, 286, 301, 310, 312, 314, 317, 318, 319, 334.
Tittoni, Signor, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 41, 43, 243, 265.
Tornielli, Count, Italian Ambassador at Paris, 221.
Tschirschky, Herr von, German Minister, 99, 100, 101, 154, 156, 168, 169, 227; letter to, 267.
Turkey, Sultan of, Abdul Hamid II, 46, 47, 51, 52, 69, 186, 208, 209, 210, 212, 237, 251, 252, 265, 321.
Tweedmouth, Lord, 239, 240, 241, 329.

V

Vassel, Dr., German Minister in Morocco, 98, 99, 108, 124, 125.
Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy, viii, 42, 43, 103.
Victoria, Princess of Battenberg, 149.
Victoria, Queen of England, 328.

W

Waldersee, Alfred, Count von, 104.
Wedel, Count von, Ambassador at Vienna, 40.
Wekerle, Alexander, Hungarian Minister, 244.
William I, German Emperor (1861-1888), 36, 156.
William II, German Emperor, ix, x, xi, 16, 18, 19; letter to, 21; 22, 23; letter from, 23; letters to, 31, 32; marginal notes by, 33, 34; 35, 36, 37; letters to, 38, 39, 41, 43, 47, 51, 53; letter from, 54; letter to, 54; letter to, concerning the attitude of Russia, 57-65; letters to, 65-67, 69, 70; letter from, 70; letters to, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77; letter from, 78; letter to, 79; telegram to Nicholas II, 80-81; letters to, 81, 84, 86; letter from, 90; 93; letters to, 95, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104; letter from, 104; letter to, 105; letter from, 106; letters to, concerning Tangier, 108, 109, 113; letter from, 115; 119, 120; letters to, 121, 124; 129, 130, 131; letters to, 133, 135; telegram from, 136; letters to, 137, 139; 143-149; letters from, 150-158; 158-169; letters from, 171; 174; letters to, 175, 176; letters from, 176, 178, 181, 184; letter to, 185; letter from, 187; 193, 199; letter from, 201; 207; letter to, 211; letters from, 213, 214; letters to, 218, 219, 221, 223, 224; letter from, 226; 232, 236; letters to, 239, 240, 242; 245; letters to, 246; letter from, 247; letters to, 248, 251; 254, 255; letter to, 256; 259, letter from the Emperor Francis Joseph, 260; 261-264; observations, 265; 267, 268; letter to the Emperor Francis Joseph, 270; letters to, 270, 272; letters from, 274, 278; letter to 282; 286; letter to, 287; 291, letters to, 293, 300, 301, 304, 306, 307, 308; letter from, 312; 315, 316; letter from, 317; letters to, 318, 320; 322, 323; letter to, 324; 326-331; letter from Bethmann Hollweg, 331; letter to Bethmann Hollweg, 333, 335.
White, Sir William, 285.
Witte, Count, Russian Minister, 57-65, 78, 116, 117, 144, 145, 176-179, 181, 184, 185.
Wolff, Theodor, German journalist, 104, 106, 328.
Wortley, General Stuart, 272, 273.

Z.

Zedlitz, Count Robert, ix, x.

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